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3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Richard Palethorpe
|
3a932a9803 |
feat(distributed): Add NATS JWT authentication and TLS/mTLS options (#10159)
* feat(distributed): NATS JWT auth, TLS/mTLS options, and e2e coverage Mint per-node NATS user JWTs at registration when LOCALAI_NATS_ACCOUNT_SEED is set, and connect workers with scoped credentials from the register response. Add optional LOCALAI_NATS_TLS_CA/CERT/KEY for private CA and mTLS alongside tls:// URLs, plus test-e2e-distributed and NatsJWT container e2e specs. Document JWT setup (nats-auth-setup.sh) and TLS env vars in distributed-mode. Assisted-by: Grok:grok grok-build Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(distributed): correct NATS JWT scoping and harden client auth The JWT-auth path added in 46467cc7 had several gaps that fail silently under LOCALAI_NATS_REQUIRE_AUTH: - Agent-worker minted JWTs did not allow the subjects the agent worker actually subscribes to (jobs.mcp-ci.new and nodes.<id>.backend.stop), so MCP-CI jobs and backend-stop session cleanup were silently dropped. Scope the agent permission set to those subjects. - NATS subscription permission violations were swallowed (Subscribe returned a live-but-dead subscription). Confirm subscriptions with a server round-trip so a denial surfaces synchronously, and log async permission errors. - The backend worker connected anonymously when given a JWT without its paired seed; reject the unpaired credential instead. - The documented service-user permissions in nats-auth-setup.sh omitted prefixcache.>, which the frontend publishes and subscribes; add it. Also: add a credential-provider hook to the messaging client (consumed by the follow-up credential-lifecycle change), drop the always-nil error from NatsMessagingOptions, run go mod tidy (jwt/v2 and nkeys are now direct), and gofmt the feature's files. Tests: an agent-JWT e2e spec that connects to the enforcing NATS server and exercises every subscription the agent worker makes, plus permission allow-list coverage unit tests. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(distributed): acquire and auto-refresh worker NATS credentials Workers fetched NATS credentials once at startup, which broke two cases under JWT auth: a worker that registered while still pending admin approval never received a minted JWT (it connected unauthenticated and gave up), and a long-running worker's 24h JWT expired with no way to renew it. Introduce workerregistry.NATSCredentialManager, built on idempotent re-registration (the frontend preserves the node row and mints a fresh JWT each call): - Acquire re-registers through admin approval until the node is approved and credentials are minted (or returns the first success when auth is not required, preserving anonymous-NATS behavior). - RefreshLoop re-registers before the JWT expires (~75% of its lifetime), updating the credentials served to the connection. - Both are bounded (default 100 attempts / consecutive failures) and return an error on exhaustion, so an unapprovable or unrenewable worker exits non-zero and surfaces the problem instead of hanging or drifting toward an expired credential. The messaging client gains WithUserJWTProvider, fetching credentials on each (re)connect so the connection transparently adopts a refreshed JWT when the server expires the old one. RegisterFull exposes the approval status and full response; Register delegates to it. Both the backend worker and the agent worker are wired to this: explicit env credentials are used as-is, minted credentials are acquired-with-wait and refreshed, and a permanent refresh failure shuts the worker down so it restarts and re-acquires. Tests cover Acquire (wait-through-pending, bounded give-up, context cancel), RefreshLoop (refresh-before-expiry, bounded failure, no-expiry exit) and jwtExpiry decoding. Docs updated in distributed-mode.md. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |
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Richard Palethorpe
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12d1f3a697 |
security(http): refuse redirects on outbound clients via hardened pkg/httpclient (#10087)
LocalAI's outbound HTTP clients used Go's default redirect policy, which
follows up to 10 redirects. On a cross-host redirect Go forwards custom
request headers — including credential headers such as Anthropic's
x-api-key — to the redirect target (Go strips Authorization, Cookie and
WWW-Authenticate cross-host, but NOT arbitrary custom headers). An
attacker able to elicit a redirect from an upstream (a hijacked or
spoofed upstream, DNS trickery, or a malicious upstream_url) then
harvests the operator's provider API key.
This was first reported against the cloud-proxy / MITM PII path
(GHSA-3mj3-57v2-4636); the same class affects every other outbound
client. Rather than patch each call site, add pkg/httpclient as the one
sanctioned constructor for outbound HTTP and route everything through it.
pkg/httpclient:
- New(...) refuses redirects, TLS 1.2 floor, no body
deadline (streaming/SSE safe)
- NewWithTimeout(d) simple request/response calls
- WithFollowRedirects opt-in following that still strips credential
headers on any cross-host hop; different
scheme/host/port == different origin, guarding
the curl CVE-2022-27774 port-confusion class
- WithTransport(rt) keep a custom transport (IP-pin, HTTP/2, a
credential-injecting RoundTripper)
- HardenedTransport() base transport with the TLS floor + bounded setup
- Harden(c) apply the policy to a library-supplied *http.Client
- NoRedirect the CheckRedirect policy; wraps ErrRedirectBlocked
Lint: a forbidigo rule flags http.DefaultClient and http.Get/Post/
PostForm/Head, pointing at pkg/httpclient (.golangci.yml,
.agents/coding-style.md). forbidigo cannot match the &http.Client{}
composite literal without also flagging legitimate *http.Client type
references, so that form is enforced by review.
Migrates every non-test outbound call site across core/, pkg/, cmd/, and
the Go backend (backend/go/cloud-proxy). Credential-bearing and
internal-RPC clients refuse redirects; download / CDN / registry clients
use WithFollowRedirects so they keep working while stripping secrets
cross-host. The only credential-bearing client that follows redirects is
the gated-download path (pkg/downloader/uri.go), which strips the token
on the cross-host hop to the CDN. Hardening this closes, in passing:
- MCP remote-server bearer token leaking via a redirect (the
RoundTripper re-injected Authorization on every hop)
- agent multimedia/webhook clients leaking user-supplied auth headers
- cors_proxy following redirects, bypassing its SSRF IP-pin
- downloader's authorized read path leaking the token cross-host
Fixes: GHSA-3mj3-57v2-4636 (cloud-proxy leaks operator provider API key
(x-api-key) to attacker host on cross-host redirect)
Reported-by: tonghuaroot
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code]
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com>
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Ettore Di Giacinto
|
59108fbe32 |
feat: add distributed mode (#9124)
* feat: add distributed mode (experimental) Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix data races, mutexes, transactions Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fixups Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix events and tool stream in agent chat Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * use ginkgo Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(cron): compute correctly time boundaries avoiding re-triggering Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * enhancements, refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * do not flood of healthy checks Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * do not list obvious backends as text backends Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * tests fixups Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * Drop redundant healthcheck Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * enhancements, refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |