* feat(gallery): publish signed OCI fallbacks
Publish both official gallery indexes with their local base configs so
an outage of the HTTP and GitHub sources can fall back to Quay.
Keep artifact signing policies separate from backend image policies,
and expose each moving gallery tag only after its digest is signed.
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6
* fix(gallery): confine packaged files to selected roots
Use directory-scoped file access to reject symlink escapes during gallery packaging. Create private bundle files for the publishing runner.
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-6
---------
Co-authored-by: localai-org-maint-bot <306269227+localai-org-maint-bot@users.noreply.github.com>
The unpacked oci:// gallery cache and the last known good copy of the
index were keyed on the gallery URL only. After an operator tightened a
gallery's verification policy (added source_repository, moved not_before
forward), content verified under the older policy, or under none, was
still served for up to an hour from the unpacked cache, and indefinitely
from the last known good copy while fetches failed. A fetch refused by
signature verification also fell back to that last known good copy, so
a refusal became a silent downgrade. Turning strict integrity on did not
stop an unverified cached copy from being served either.
Name both caches by the URL plus a stable hash of the policy. A gallery
without a policy keeps its old URL-only name, so existing caches stay
usable. A fetch refused by the policy, or by strict integrity, is now
reported and never answered with a cached copy; a network failure still
falls back, but only to a copy verified under the current policy. The
strict integrity check runs before the cache is read.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5 [Claude Code]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
* feat(oci): pull ORAS artifacts into a directory
Galleries published to an OCI registry arrive as an ORAS artifact whose
layers carry their tree path in org.opencontainers.image.title. Nothing in
pkg/oci could read a non-image manifest, so add PullArtifact: it lays the
layers out under a destination directory and returns the manifest digest so
callers can pin and verify signatures on it.
A registry is remote input and this writes files, so the manifest is
validated before any byte is fetched. A title that is absolute, escapes the
destination or is missing is refused, an artifact of an unexpected
artifactType is refused, and both the layer count and the total size are
capped with caller-settable limits.
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 [Claude Code]
* feat(gallery): fetch and verify galleries published as OCI artifacts
A gallery whose URL is oci://host/repo:tag is now pulled as an ORAS
artifact and its index.yaml read from the unpacked tree, alongside the
existing HTTP and file sources. Mirrors, the per-candidate timeout, the
failure cooldown and the last known good copy work the same for both
schemes, so a gallery can mirror an OCI primary with an HTTP fallback.
When the gallery declares a verification policy the artifact reference is
resolved to its manifest digest, the publisher signature is checked
against that digest, and only then is the same digest pulled. Nothing
unverified is written to disk or parsed. With strict integrity mode on,
an OCI gallery without a verification policy is refused instead of
warned about, which is what the flag already does for backend installs.
The pull lands in a staging directory that is renamed into the cache only
once the whole tree is on disk and the index reads back as an index, so a
failed or interrupted pull leaves nothing a later fetch would serve. A
fetch that finds a fresh cache entry does not contact the registry.
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 [Claude Code]
* feat(gallery): resolve entry urls relative to the gallery root
A gallery published as a self-contained tree, which is what an OCI
gallery is, names its base configs by their place in that tree. Such a
url reached the HTTP client verbatim and no entry of the gallery could
be installed.
A scheme-less entry url now resolves against the root the index came
from: the unpacked artifact for an oci:// gallery, and the directory of
the index URL otherwise. The relative path may not climb out of that
root, reusing the guard the artifact puller already applies to layer
titles, and an entry that does is dropped from the listing rather than
failing the whole gallery. An entry that names its own scheme is
untouched, so .ref indirection and local github: resolution behave as
before.
Reading an entry of an OCI gallery also needs the unpacked artifact
directory as its trusted root, since the cache is deliberately a sibling
of the models directory the downloader otherwise confines a file read
to.
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 [Claude Code]
* fix(oci): restrict artifact file permissions
Create artifact files with owner-only permissions to satisfy G302.
Document the existing path validation for the G304 scanner finding.
Check the permissions of downloaded layers in the artifact test.
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 gosec
* fix(oci): confine artifact writes to their root
Use root-relative filesystem operations to reject escapes through existing
directory symlinks. Retain owner-only permissions and add a symlink escape
regression test, without suppressing the path traversal finding.
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6
---------
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: localai-org-maint-bot <306269227+localai-org-maint-bot@users.noreply.github.com>
