9 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
LocalAI [bot]	f15b9178ec	feat(usage): track and visualise usage per API key (#9920) ... * feat(usage): add Source, APIKeyID, APIKeyName columns to UsageRecord Adds three additive columns plus UsageSource* constants. The columns are auto-migrated by InitDB. APIKeyID is a nullable foreign reference to UserAPIKey.ID; APIKeyName is snapshotted on each row so revoked keys keep showing their name in history. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(usage): backfill Source on pre-feature usage rows InitDB now classifies any pre-existing usage_record with an empty source: 'legacy-api-key' user -> legacy, everything else -> web. The backfill is idempotent (only touches NULL/empty rows). Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(usage): add GetUserUsageBySource aggregator Groups by (bucket, source, api_key_id, api_key_name). Filters out legacy by default. Returns both per-bucket detail and roll-ups (by_source, by_key sorted desc and capped at 200, grand_total). The MAX(created_at) projection is iterated via Rows().Scan into a string column and parsed manually because the SQLite driver surfaces the aggregated timestamp as a string, which database/sql refuses to scan directly into time.Time. Postgres returns a real timestamp; the same string path handles its RFC3339 form too. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(usage): log Rows() errors and assert LastUsed in tests Adds rows.Err() and Rows() open-failure logging in computeSourceTotals so silent data drops surface in logs. Logs on parseLastUsedString format misses for the same reason. Strengthens the snapshot-survival test to assert LastUsed is a recent timestamp, locking the SQLite time-string parser behaviour. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(usage): add admin GetAllUsageBySource with filters and truncation Optional user_id and api_key_id filters (composed with AND). Legacy bucket is included for admin callers. truncated=true when more than 200 distinct keys would be in the by_key roll-up. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(auth): plumb auth_source and auth_apikey through Echo context tryAuthenticate now sets auth_source on every successful branch (web for session/Bearer-session, apikey for Bearer-key/x-api-key/ token-cookie, legacy for legacy env key match). For named-key branches it also stores the resolved *UserAPIKey under auth_apikey so downstream middlewares can snapshot id+name without re-validating. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(auth): expand tryAuthenticate godoc and cover Bearer-session branch Documents all three context-keys side effects (auth_source, auth_apikey, _auth_session) plus the split of responsibilities with the parent Middleware. Adds a test for the Bearer-as-session-token classification so future regressions there fail loudly. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(usage): UsageMiddleware records source + snapshots key name Reads auth_source and auth_apikey from the Echo context (set by auth.Middleware in the previous task). Snapshots UserAPIKey.ID and Name onto each row so revoked keys remain readable in history. Falls back to source=web when no auth_source is set (auth disabled or unrecognised path). Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(usage): add /api/auth/usage/sources and admin variant Self endpoint filters legacy server-side; admin endpoint includes legacy and accepts user_id + api_key_id filters. Response includes buckets, totals.{by_source, by_key, grand_total}, and a truncated flag set when the per-key roll-up was capped at 200. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs(routes): mark test mirror handlers as keep-in-sync with production The newTestAuthApp helper duplicates production route handlers inline because it cannot use RegisterAuthRoutes (which requires a *application.Application). Naming the source path on each mirror makes the drift contract explicit for future maintainers. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(ui): add usageApi.getMySources/getAdminSources + i18n strings Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(ui): add Sources tab skeleton with data fetch Adds Usage page tab that fetches /api/auth/usage/sources (or the admin variant). Renders raw totals plus a placeholder key list; real visualisations land in subsequent commits. Restructures the existing tab button block so Models and Sources are visible to non-admins (Users remains admin-only). Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(ui): source mix ribbon + searchable/sortable sources table Replaces the SourcesTab placeholder rendering with two reusable components: SourceMixRibbon (one segmented bar per source class) and SourcesTable (search + sort + revoked-key dim). Pulls the current API key list to detect revoked keys. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(ui): skip revoked-key detection until the key list is known existingKeyIds defaulted to an empty Set, which made every live api_key row render as (revoked) during the brief window before apiKeysApi.list() resolved, and permanently after a fetch failure. Use null as the unknown state and suppress the revoked badge until the parent provides a real Set. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(ui): top-N stacked time chart and drill-in chip for Sources tab Top 7 sources by total tokens get distinct colours; the rest roll up into 'Other'. Clicking a row in the SourcesTable dims everything except that series in the chart; the chip is the canonical clear. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs(usage): document per-API-key Sources tab and endpoints Extends features/authentication.md Usage Tracking section with: - A 'Sources' tab description and source-class taxonomy - Endpoint documentation for /api/auth/usage/sources and the admin variant - Response shape example with by_source / by_key / grand_total - Migration note about pre-feature row backfill Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(usage): silence errcheck on deferred rows.Close CI errcheck flagged the bare 'defer rows.Close()' in computeSourceTotals. Wrap in a closure that discards the close error explicitly; an error here is non-actionable since we have already drained the rows and logged any iteration failure. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(usage): bound batcher intake and add Shutdown/FlushNow hooks The pre-existing usage batcher had no cap on its add() path; the usageMaxPending=5000 constant only guarded the re-queue path after a failed write, leaving memory growth unbounded if the DB fell behind. This commit: - Adds the cap to add() so saturation drops new records (rate-limited warn at 1/1024) instead of growing unbounded. - Raises usageMaxPending to 50000 to absorb realistic inference bursts. - Replaces the package-level batcher global with a mutex-guarded pair plus a currentBatcher() accessor so Init / Shutdown cycles are race-free. - Adds ShutdownUsageRecorder() for graceful drain on process exit (not yet wired into app shutdown, just published). - Adds FlushNow() for deterministic tests; the middleware suite no longer needs 6s sleeps per spec and now runs in ~50ms instead of 18s. - Re-queue on failed flush is now cap-aware: prepends as much of the failed batch as fits alongside concurrent arrivals, instead of dropping the whole batch when full. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(usage): drain usage batcher on graceful shutdown Registers ShutdownUsageRecorder with the existing signals.RegisterGracefulTerminationHandler so SIGINT/SIGTERM synchronously flushes any in-memory usage records before the process exits. Without this, up to one flush interval (5s) of recorded usage was lost when LocalAI restarted. Refs: #9862 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>	2026-05-21 16:34:02 +02:00
Richard Palethorpe	670259ce43	chore: Security hardening (#9719) ... * fix(http): close 0.0.0.0/[::] SSRF bypass in /api/cors-proxy The CORS proxy carried its own private-network blocklist (RFC 1918 + a handful of IPv6 ranges) instead of using the same classification as pkg/utils/urlfetch.go. The hand-rolled list missed 0.0.0.0/8 and ::/128, both of which Linux routes to localhost — so any user with FeatureMCP (default-on for new users) could reach LocalAI's own listener and any other service bound to 0.0.0.0:port via: GET /api/cors-proxy?url=http://0.0.0.0:8080/... GET /api/cors-proxy?url=http://[::]:8080/... Replace the custom check with utils.IsPublicIP (Go stdlib IsLoopback / IsLinkLocalUnicast / IsPrivate / IsUnspecified, plus IPv4-mapped IPv6 unmasking) and add an upfront hostname rejection for localhost, *.local, and the cloud metadata aliases so split-horizon DNS can't paper over the IP check. The IP-pinning DialContext is unchanged: the validated IP from the single resolution is reused for the connection, so DNS rebinding still cannot swap a public answer for a private one between validate and dial. Regression tests cover 0.0.0.0, 0.0.0.0:PORT, [::], ::ffff:127.0.0.1, ::ffff:10.0.0.1, file://, gopher://, ftp://, localhost, 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(downloader): verify SHA before promoting temp file to final path DownloadFileWithContext renamed the .partial file to its final name *before* checking the streamed SHA, so a hash mismatch returned an error but left the tampered file at filePath. Subsequent code that operated on filePath (a backend launcher, a YAML loader, a re-download that finds the file already present and skips) would consume the attacker-supplied bytes. Reorder: verify the streamed hash first, remove the .partial on mismatch, then rename. The streamed hash is computed during io.Copy so no second read is needed. While here, raise the empty-SHA case from a Debug log to a Warn so "this download had no integrity check" is visible at the default log level. Backend installs currently pass through with no digest; the warning makes that footprint observable without changing behaviour. Regression test asserts os.IsNotExist on the destination after a deliberate SHA mismatch. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(auth): require email_verified for OIDC admin promotion extractOIDCUserInfo read the ID token's "email" claim but never inspected "email_verified". With LOCALAI_ADMIN_EMAIL set, an attacker who could register on the configured OIDC IdP under that email (some IdPs accept self-supplied unverified emails) inherited admin role: - first login: AssignRole(tx, email, adminEmail) → RoleAdmin - re-login: MaybePromote(db, user, adminEmail) → flip to RoleAdmin Add EmailVerified to oauthUserInfo, parse email_verified from the OIDC claims (default false on absence so an IdP that omits the claim cannot short-circuit the gate), and substitute "" for the role-decision email when verified=false via emailForRoleDecision. The user record still stores the unverified email for display. GitHub's path defaults EmailVerified=true: GitHub only returns a public profile email after verification, and fetchGitHubPrimaryEmail explicitly filters to Verified=true. Regression tests cover both the helper contract and integration with AssignRole, including the bootstrap "first user" branch that would otherwise mask the gate. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(cli): refuse public bind when no auth backend is configured When neither an auth DB nor a static API key is set, the auth middleware passes every request through. That is fine for a developer laptop, a home LAN, or a Tailnet — the network itself is the trust boundary. It is not fine on a public IP, where every model install, settings change, and admin endpoint becomes reachable from the internet. Refuse to start in that exact configuration. Loopback, RFC 1918, RFC 4193 ULA, link-local, and RFC 6598 CGNAT (Tailscale's default range) all count as trusted; wildcard binds (`:port`, `0.0.0.0`, `[::]`) are accepted only when every host interface is in one of those ranges. Hostnames are resolved and treated as trusted only when every answer is. A new --allow-insecure-public-bind / LOCALAI_ALLOW_INSECURE_PUBLIC_BIND flag opts out for deployments that gate access externally (a reverse proxy enforcing auth, a mesh ACL, etc.). The error message lists this plus the three constructive alternatives (bind a private interface, enable --auth, set --api-keys). The interface enumeration goes through a package-level interfaceAddrsFn var so tests can simulate cloud-VM, home-LAN, Tailscale-only, and enumeration-failure topologies without poking at the real network stack. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): regression-test the localai_assistant admin gate ChatEndpoint already rejects metadata.localai_assistant=true from a non-admin caller, but the gate was open-coded inline with no direct test coverage. The chat route is FeatureChat-gated (default-on), and the assistant's in-process MCP server can install/delete models and edit configs — the wrong handler change would silently turn the LLM into a confused deputy. Extract the gate into requireAssistantAccess(c, authEnabled) and pin its behaviour: auth disabled is a no-op, unauthenticated is 403, RoleUser is 403, RoleAdmin and the synthetic legacy-key admin are admitted. No behaviour change in the production path. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): assert every API route is auth-classified The auth middleware classifies path prefixes (/api/, /v1/, /models/, etc.) as protected and treats anything else as a static-asset passthrough. A new endpoint shipped under a brand-new prefix — or a new path that simply isn't on the prefix allowlist — would be reachable anonymously. Walk every route registered by API() with auth enabled and a fresh in-memory database (no users, no keys), and assert each API-prefixed route returns 401 / 404 / 405 to an anonymous request. Public surfaces (/api/auth/*, /api/branding, /api/node/* token-authenticated routes, /healthz, branding asset server, generated-content server, static assets) are explicit allowlist entries with comments justifying them. Build-tagged 'auth' so it runs against the SQLite-backed auth DB (matches the existing auth suite). Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): pin agent endpoint per-user isolation contract agents.go's getUserID / effectiveUserID / canImpersonateUser / wantsAllUsers helpers are the single trust boundary for cross-user access on agent, agent-jobs, collections, and skills routes. A regression there is the difference between "regular user reads their own data" and "regular user reads anyone's data via ?user_id=victim". Lock in the contract: - effectiveUserID ignores ?user_id= for unauthenticated and RoleUser - effectiveUserID honours it for RoleAdmin and ProviderAgentWorker - wantsAllUsers requires admin AND the literal "true" string - canImpersonateUser is admin OR agent-worker, never plain RoleUser No production change — this commit only adds tests. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(downloader): drop redundant stat in removePartialFile The stat-then-remove pattern is a TOCTOU window and a wasted syscall — os.Remove already returns ErrNotExist for the missing-file case, so trust that and treat it as a no-op. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(http): redact secrets from trace buffer and distribution-token logs The /api/traces buffer captured Authorization, Cookie, Set-Cookie, and API-key headers verbatim from every request when tracing was enabled. The endpoint is admin-only but the buffer is reachable via any heap-style introspection and the captured tokens otherwise outlive the request. Strip those header values at capture time. Body redaction is left to a follow-up — the prompts are usually the operator's own and JSON-walking is invasive. Distribution tokens were also logged in plaintext from core/explorer/discovery.go; logs forward to syslog/journald and outlive the token. Redact those to a short prefix/suffix instead. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(auth): rate-limit OAuth callbacks separately from password endpoints The shared 5/min/IP limit on auth endpoints is right for password-style flows but too tight for OAuth callbacks: corporate SSO funnels many real users through one outbound IP and would trip the limit. Add a separate 60/min/IP limiter for /api/auth/{github,oidc}/callback so callbacks are bounded against floods without breaking shared-IP deployments. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(gallery): verify backend tarball sha256 when set in gallery entry GalleryBackend gained an optional sha256 field; the install path now threads it through to the existing downloader hash-verify (which already streams, verifies, and rolls back on mismatch). Galleries without sha256 keep working; the empty-SHA path still emits the existing "downloading without integrity check" warning. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): pin CSRF coverage on multipart endpoints The CSRF middleware in app.go is global (e.Use) so it covers every multipart upload route — branding assets, fine-tune datasets, audio transforms, agent collections. Pin that contract: cross-site multipart POSTs are rejected; same-origin / same-site / API-key clients are not. Also pins the SameSite=Lax fallback path the skipper relies on when Sec-Fetch-Site is absent. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(http): XSS hardening — CSP headers, safe href, base-href escape, SVG sandbox Several closely related XSS-prevention changes spanning the SPA shell, the React UI, and the branding asset server: - New SecurityHeaders middleware sets CSP, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, and Referrer-Policy on every response. The CSP keeps script-src permissive because the Vite bundle relies on inline + eval'd scripts; tightening that requires moving to a nonce-based policy. - The <base href> injection in the SPA shell escaped attacker-controllable Host / X-Forwarded-Host headers — a single quote in the host header broke out of the attribute. Pass through SecureBaseHref (html.EscapeString). - Three React sinks rendering untrusted content via dangerouslySetInnerHTML switch to text-node rendering with whiteSpace: pre-wrap: user message bodies in Chat.jsx and AgentChat.jsx, and the agent activity log in AgentChat.jsx. The hand-rolled escape on the agent user-message variant is replaced by the same plain-text path. - New safeHref util collapses non-allowlisted URI schemes (most importantly javascript:) to '#'. Applied to gallery `<a href={url}>` links in Models / Backends / Manage and to canvas artifact links — these come from gallery JSON or assistant tool calls and must be treated as untrusted. - The branding asset server attaches a sandbox CSP plus same-origin CORP to .svg responses. The React UI loads logos via <img>, but the same URL is also reachable via direct navigation; this prevents script execution if a hostile SVG slipped past upload validation. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(http): bound HTTP server with read-header and idle timeouts A net/http server with no timeouts is trivially Slowloris-able and leaks idle keep-alive connections. Set ReadHeaderTimeout (30s) to plug the slow-headers attack and IdleTimeout (120s) to cap keep-alive sockets. ReadTimeout and WriteTimeout stay at 0 because request bodies can be multi-GB model uploads and SSE / chat completions stream for many minutes; operators who need tighter per-request bounds should terminate slow clients at a reverse proxy. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(auth): pin PUT /api/auth/profile field-tampering contract The handler uses an explicit local body struct (only name and avatar_url) plus a gorm Updates(map) with a column allowlist, so an attacker posting {"role":"admin","email":"...","password_hash":"..."} can't mass-assign those fields. Lock that down with a regression test so a future "let's just c.Bind(&user)" refactor breaks loudly. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(services): strip directory components from multipart upload filenames UploadDataset and UploadToCollectionForUser took the raw multipart file.Filename and joined it into a destination path. The fine-tune upload was incidentally safe because of a UUID prefix that fused any leading '..' to a literal segment, but the protection is fragile. UploadToCollectionForUser handed the filename to a vendored backend without sanitising at all. Strip to filepath.Base at both boundaries and reject the trivial unsafe values ("", ".", "..", "/"). Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): validate persisted MCP server entries on load localStorage is shared across same-origin pages; an XSS that lands once can poison persisted MCP server config to attempt header injection or to feed a non-http URL into the fetch path on subsequent loads. Validate every entry: types must match, URL must parse with http(s) scheme, header keys/values must be control-char-free. Drop anything that doesn't fit. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(http): close X-Forwarded-Prefix open redirect The reverse-proxy support concatenated X-Forwarded-Prefix into the redirect target without validation, so a forged header value of "//evil.com" turned the SPA-shell redirect helper at /, /browse, and /browse/* into a 301 to //evil.com/app. The path-strip middleware had the same shape on its prefix-trailing-slash redirect. Add SafeForwardedPrefix at the middleware boundary: must start with a single '/', no protocol-relative '//' opener, no scheme, no backslash, no control characters. Apply at both consumers; misconfig trips the validator and the header is dropped. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(http): refuse wildcard CORS when LOCALAI_CORS=true with empty allowlist When LOCALAI_CORS=true but LOCALAI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS was empty, Echo's CORSWithConfig saw an empty allow-list and fell back to its default AllowOrigins=["*"]. An operator who flipped the strict-CORS feature flag without populating the list got the opposite of what they asked for. Echo never sets Allow-Credentials: true so this isn't directly exploitable (cookies aren't sent under wildcard CORS), but the misconfiguration trap is worth closing. Skip the registration and warn. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(auth): zxcvbn password strength check with user-acknowledged override The previous policy was len < 8, which let through "Password1" and the rest of the credential-stuffing corpus. LocalAI has no second factor yet, so the bar needs to sit higher. Add ValidatePasswordStrength using github.com/timbutler/zxcvbn (an actively-maintained fork of the trustelem port; v1.0.4, April 2024): - min 12 chars, max 72 (bcrypt's truncation point) - reject NUL bytes (some bcrypt callers truncate at the first NUL) - require zxcvbn score >= 3 ("safely unguessable, ~10^8 guesses to break"); the hint list ["localai", "local-ai", "admin"] penalises passwords built from the app's own branding zxcvbn produces false positives sometimes (a strong-looking password that happens to match a dictionary word) and operators occasionally need to set a known-weak password (kiosk demos, CI rigs). Add an acknowledgement path: PasswordPolicy{AllowWeak: true} skips the entropy check while still enforcing the hard rules. The structured PasswordErrorResponse marks weak-password rejections as Overridable so the UI can surface a "use this anyway" checkbox. Wired through register, self-service password change, and admin password reset on both the server and the React UI. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): drop HTML5 minLength on new-password inputs minLength={12} on the new-password input let the browser block the form submit silently before any JS or network call ran. The browser focused the field, showed a brief native tooltip, and that was that — no toast, no fetch, no clue. Reproducible by typing fewer than 12 chars on the second password change of a session. The JS-level length check in handleSubmit already shows a toast and the server rejects with a structured error, so the HTML5 attribute was redundant defence anyway. Drop it. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): bundle Geist fonts locally instead of fetching from Google The new CSP correctly refused to apply styles from fonts.googleapis.com because style-src is locked to 'self' and 'unsafe-inline'. Loosening the CSP would defeat its purpose; the right fix is to stop reaching out to a third-party CDN for fonts on every page load. Add @fontsource-variable/geist and @fontsource-variable/geist-mono as npm deps and import them once at boot. Drop the <link rel="preconnect"> and external stylesheet from index.html. Side benefit: no third-party tracking via Referer / IP on every UI load, no failure mode when offline / behind a captive portal. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): refresh i18n strings to reflect 12-char password minimum The translations still said "at least 8 characters" everywhere — the client-side toast on a too-short password change told the user the wrong floor. Update tooShort and newPasswordPlaceholder / newPasswordDescription across all five locales (en, es, it, de, zh-CN) to match the real ValidatePasswordStrength rule. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(auth): make password length-floor overridable like the entropy check The 12-char minimum was a policy choice, not a technical invariant — only "non-empty", "<= 72 bytes", and "no NUL bytes" are real bcrypt constraints. Treating length-12 as a hard rule was inconsistent with the entropy check (already overridable) and friction for use cases where the account is just a name on a session, not a security boundary (single-user kiosk, CI rig, lab demo). Restructure ValidatePasswordStrength: - Hard rules (always enforced): non-empty, <= MaxPasswordLength, no NUL byte - Policy rules (skipped when AllowWeak=true): length >= 12, zxcvbn score >= 3 PasswordError now marks password_too_short as Overridable too. The React forms generalised from `error_code === 'password_too_weak'` to `overridable === true`, and the JS-side preflight length checks were removed (server is source of truth, returns the same checkbox flow). Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com>	2026-05-08 16:25:45 +02:00
LocalAI [bot]	392fc9ce3d	fix(auth): cascade user deletion across all owned data on PostgreSQL (#9702) ... * fix(auth): cascade user deletion across all owned data on PostgreSQL Deleting a user from the admin UI in distributed mode (PostgreSQL auth DB) returned "user not found" even when the user clearly existed. The old handler ignored result.Error and only checked RowsAffected, so a foreign-key constraint violation surfaced as a misleading 404. Two issues drove this: 1. invite_codes.created_by / used_by reference users(id) but the InviteCode model declared the FKs without ON DELETE CASCADE. On PostgreSQL the engine therefore rejected the user delete with NO ACTION whenever the user had ever issued or consumed an invite. On SQLite (default in single-node mode) FKs are not enforced, so the bug never appeared there. 2. Several owned tables were never cleaned up regardless of dialect: user_permissions and quota_rules relied on CASCADE that does not fire under SQLite, and usage_records have no FK at all and were left orphaned in every dialect. Introduce auth.DeleteUserCascade which runs the full cleanup in a single transaction: drop invites authored by the user, NULL used_by on invites they consumed (preserves the audit trail), and explicitly wipe sessions, API keys, permissions, quota rules, and usage metrics before deleting the user. The in-memory quota cache is invalidated after commit so a recreated user with the same id never sees stale entries. The HTTP handler now maps the helper's errors to proper status codes — real failures surface as 500 with the cause instead of being swallowed as "not found". Add Ginkgo regression coverage in core/http/auth/users_test.go and core/http/routes/auth_test.go covering invite cleanup, used_by null-out, full data wipe, and the FK-enforced original failure mode (via PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON to mirror PostgreSQL behavior on SQLite). Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] * chore(deps): bump LocalAGI/LocalRecall — pull in go-fitz PDF extraction Pulls LocalAGI@main (facd888) and LocalRecall@v0.6.0. The latter swaps PDF text extraction from dslipak/pdf to gen2brain/go-fitz (libmupdf bindings) and wraps it in a 60s goroutine timeout — previously certain PDFs (broken xref tables, encrypted, image-only without OCR) would hang indefinitely inside r.GetPlainText() and poison the upload queue. Pure dep bump, no LocalAI source changes. Indirect graph picks up go-fitz + purego + ffi; drops dslipak/pdf. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-07 08:28:58 +02:00
Ettore Di Giacinto	92f99b1ec3	fix(token): login via legacy api keys (#9249) ... We were not checking against the api keys when db == nil. This commit also cleanups now unused middleware Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>	2026-04-06 21:45:09 +02:00
Ettore Di Giacinto	84e51b68ef	fix(ui): pass by staticApiKeyRequired to show login when only api key is configured (#9220) ... This fixes #9213 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>	2026-04-04 12:11:22 +02:00
Ettore Di Giacinto	59108fbe32	feat: add distributed mode (#9124) ... * feat: add distributed mode (experimental) Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix data races, mutexes, transactions Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fixups Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix events and tool stream in agent chat Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * use ginkgo Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(cron): compute correctly time boundaries avoiding re-triggering Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * enhancements, refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * do not flood of healthy checks Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * do not list obvious backends as text backends Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * tests fixups Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * Drop redundant healthcheck Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * enhancements, refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>	2026-03-30 00:47:27 +02:00
Ettore Di Giacinto	4b183b7bb6	feat: add quota system (#9090) ... * feat: add quota system Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * Fix tests Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>	2026-03-21 10:09:49 +01:00
Ettore Di Giacinto	d9c1db2b87	feat: add (experimental) fine-tuning support with TRL (#9088) ... * feat: add fine-tuning endpoint Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(experimental): add fine-tuning endpoint and TRL support This changeset defines new GRPC signatues for Fine tuning backends, and add TRL backend as initial fine-tuning engine. This implementation also supports exporting to GGUF and automatically importing it to LocalAI after fine-tuning. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * commit TRL backend, stop by killing process Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * move fine-tune to generic features Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * add evals, reorder menu Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * Fix tests Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>	2026-03-21 02:08:02 +01:00
Ettore Di Giacinto	aea21951a2	feat: add users and authentication support (#9061) ... * feat(ui): add users and authentication support Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat: allow the admin user to impersonificate users Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore: ui improvements, disable 'Users' button in navbar when no auth is configured Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat: add OIDC support Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix: gate models Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore: cache requests to optimize speed Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * small UI enhancements Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore(ui): style improvements Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix: cover other paths by auth Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore: separate local auth, refactor Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * security hardening, approval mode Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix: fix tests and expectations Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore: update localagi/localrecall Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>	2026-03-19 21:40:51 +01:00