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765
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 localai-org-maint-bot
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4e4597dfc2 |
fix(worker): resolve staging directory symlinks
Resolve allowed directories before comparing them with resolved files. Otherwise staging rejects valid files under macOS temporary paths. Cover aliased roots, sibling paths, and symlinks escaping the root. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 |
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localai-org-maint-bot
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2756eaeab0 |
Merge master into the distributed test branch
Include current gallery and virtual-model path fixes before continuing the requested test repairs. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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561d623976 |
feat(gallery): add EXL3 vllm.cpp models (#11912)
* docs: design EXL3 gallery entries Define the pinned Qwen3.8 and DeepSeek V4 Flash entries before changing the gallery. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 [web] * feat(gallery): add EXL3 vllm.cpp models Add pinned Qwen3.8 and DeepSeek V4 Flash configurations. Bind the staged DFlash companion path so vllm.cpp opens LocalAI's managed snapshot. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 --------- Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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aff9db9758 |
fix(distributed): resolve paths for virtual models (#11911)
Virtual model names have no primary file to anchor the worker path. Companion assets still stage successfully, but relative options retain an incorrect model directory and fail to load. Derive the worker root from successfully staged option assets when the primary path is absent. Cover Buffalo packs, files, directories, overrides, and failed transfers. Document the frontend upgrade. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 golangci-lint Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-bot
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0291189e82 |
test(nodes): adapt fixtures to worker transport
Merge current master and adapt incoming tests to the distributed APIs. The sound mock now implements NewClientForNode and uses WorkerLocalAddress. The upload finalization test supplies the existing direct test dialer. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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e494033607 |
fix(distributed): finalize stalled model uploads (#11910)
A worker can retain all model bytes with an unfinished-upload marker. Retries then start at zero and repeatedly fail with HTTP 416. Verify the existing bytes and finalize same-file retries at full size. Reuse the normal integrity checks so corrupt content cannot be accepted. Add regression coverage and document worker recovery. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 golangci-lint Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-bot
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d397393022 |
Merge master into the distributed test branch
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-6 |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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88d19567b8 |
feat(faces): replay saved face enrollments (#11908)
Accept original embeddings and timestamps so clients can restore faces when the in-memory store restarts. Derive stable IDs from exact vectors to make registration retries preserve identity without duplicate entries. Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-6 golangci-lint Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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fb8b7a359a |
fix(distributed): stage sound detection audio (#11907)
* fix(distributed): stage sound detection audio Sound detection passes frontend temporary paths directly to remote workers, unlike transcription. Stage the WAV before classification so CED can read it without a shared temporary directory. Preserve the original request for retries and propagate staging errors without calling the backend. Cover staging, request preservation, and error handling with regression tests. Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-6 golangci-lint * test(distributed): verify routed sound staging Call sound detection through the client returned by SmartRouter.Route. This checks interface dispatch through both routing wrappers, rather than constructing FileStagingClient directly. The test fails without the sound-staging override and passes with it. Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-6 golangci-lint --------- Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Plamen K. Kosseff
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77b8241c51 |
docs(integrations): add Distribution Packages section (#11904)
Community-maintained packagings that currently track releases — Homebrew, ALT Sisyphus and the Gentoo local-ai overlay — with a note that versions may lag. Placement and scope as discussed in the issue. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5 Signed-off-by: Plamen K. Kosseff <p.kosseff@gmail.com> |
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57f802aa7a |
chore: ⬆️ Update leejet/stable-diffusion.cpp to d8fb10c02977c8ca999f3fb4e02df9ecf10f7ba6 (#11898)
* ⬆️ Update leejet/stable-diffusion.cpp Signed-off-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(stablediffusion): adapt streaming options Upstream now selects segmented weight streaming automatically and removes the stream_layers field. Keep the old LocalAI option as a no-op for existing model configurations. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 --------- Signed-off-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: mudler <2420543+mudler@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-bot
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8403d9da05 |
Merge master into test/distributed-e2e-ci
Preserve heartbeat checkpoints and backend readiness across the tunnel transport changes. Update incoming tests for the renamed worker address fields and health monitor arguments. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 |
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Alex Mazzariolandlocalai-org-maint-bot
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4d854f96a8 |
Update containers.md to fix podman image qualification (#11749)
* Update containers.md to fix podman image qualification Signed-off-by: Alex Mazzariol <alex@alex-maz.info> * docs(containers): clarify Podman image names Podman can reject short image names when no registry is configured. Explain why the examples use fully qualified Docker Hub names. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6 --------- Signed-off-by: Alex Mazzariol <alex@alex-maz.info> Co-authored-by: localai-org-maint-bot <306269227+localai-org-maint-bot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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3462e57a3b |
fix(distributed): back a failed claim off instead of respinning it
The claim queue's attempts counter grew without bound and nothing read it. At the default two-second poll a permanently undispatchable row cost about 43000 UPDATEs a day, and it cost more than writes: rows are claimed oldest first, so the oldest stuck row was re-claimed ahead of every newer one on every tick and held a dispatch slot while it failed. One poison row starved the queue behind it. No dead letter, and that is the decision rather than the omission. Read settleClaim: the only outcome that releases a claim is one where NOTHING was learned about the work. No agent worker was connected, the tunnel broke, a peer could not be reached, the stream was refused before the request body left this replica. Not one of those is a worker saying it ran the job and it failed, and an attempt ceiling would turn "the fleet was away long enough" into a job failure nobody reported, which is the collapse this whole design exists to prevent pointed at work instead of at nodes. The one verdict available here, that no build of any worker serves this kind, is already settled as an answer. So the retry stays unbounded and the RATE does not. Each release stamps the row with the earliest it may be claimed again, doubling from two seconds to a cap of sixty, computed in the release statement from the row's own attempts count and stamped on the DATABASE clock, because that is the clock competing replicas order the queue on. Queued work becomes claimable again within one cap of the fleet returning, and a stuck row no longer holds the head of the queue. A claim released by the reap carries no delay at all: that work was never handed to anyone, so there is nothing to back off from. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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4b9cd31dd3 |
fix(worker): check a gRPC port is free before handing it out
The backend port allocator allocated from its own bookkeeping alone. That bookkeeping records what this worker did with a port, and the collision it cannot see is with something this worker never did: the default base port is 50051, inside Linux's default ephemeral range of 32768 to 60999, so the kernel hands ports in this range to outbound connections and to anything that binds port 0. A backend handed one of those dies on bind, and the frontend sees a backend that will not start. Every candidate is now probed by binding the exact address the backend will listen on, in all four allocation branches: the key's own port, the free pool, a grown port and a stolen one. Probing the free pool matters as much as probing a grown port, because a port this worker released is exactly as available to the kernel as one it never used. A candidate that fails the probe is quarantined rather than blacklisted, since whatever holds it is usually an ephemeral connection that gives it back, and its affinity claim is dropped so an unbindable port does not stay reserved for the key that last held it. Exhaustion now says how many candidates were skipped, which is what tells an operator "something else is in my range" from "my range is too narrow". This does not remove the race and cannot: between the probe and the child's bind the kernel can still give the port away. It removes the far larger window in which the allocator hands out a port the kernel gave away minutes ago, which was the whole of the observed one-in-three harness flake. The e2e harness comment that recorded the missing check is corrected, and the docs say how to move the range out of the ephemeral one entirely. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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f207976281 |
fix(distributed): say that skills and collections are replica-local
Skills and RAG collections had no cross-replica invalidation, and the two builders that would have published one were deleted earlier in this branch because nothing called them. Wiring one now would be wrong, not merely late. Both features are derived entirely from the frontend's own state directory. A skills.Service indexes <state dir>/skills, a collections backend enumerates <state dir>/collections and holds one handle per collection it found there, and no replica reads or writes another replica's copy of either. In distributed mode PostgreSQL carries a skill's NAME and description in skills_metadata, and nothing else: Get, Search, Export and the resource verbs all read local files. So a peer told to drop a cache entry would rebuild it from a directory that does not hold the change. For a postgres-engine collection it would be worse than a no-op, since re-deriving one on a replica with no local index file yields a collection that answers with an empty file list against a populated vector store. What is missing is shared storage, not a broadcast. Recorded rather than left silent: the two cache fields say why nothing invalidates them, a distributed frontend logs the limitation once at startup, and the docs name the two deployments that avoid it. The new spec pins the premise, so a change that moved either directory onto storage every replica mounts reddens and the decision gets taken again. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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a1b5c177bc |
feat(cluster): make a peer prove which replica it is
GET /api/cluster/peer authenticated with the deployment's shared registration token and took the dialling replica's id from ?id= on trust. Every worker holds that token, so anything holding it could open a peer link as any replica: relay through it to every worker tunnel that replica owns, displace a real replica's inbound link by declaring its id, and point the roughly 31 GiB per-session receive window at one replica. Validating the id against the instances table does not fix this, because the attack declares a real replica's id. So the route now checks two credentials and needs both. The shared token still says the dialler belongs to this deployment; a new per-replica credential says which replica it is. The credential follows the per-node worker credential rather than inventing a second mechanism: crypto/rand.Text, stored only as a hex SHA-256, compared in constant time, with no fallback to the shared token. It differs in the stronger direction. A worker's credential is minted by the frontend and handed over once; a replica writes its own instances row, so it mints its own secret, publishes only the hash in the same statement that publishes its address, and never sends the plaintext anywhere but the peer dial. A peer that presents no credential is refused, not waved through. An old replica and an attacker holding the shared token send the same request, so accepting the first accepts the second; there is no safe downgrade here, only a quiet one. The refusal is made loud instead, on both sides, naming the upgrade rather than the network. On the documented frontend-first order a new replica still dials an old one; an old replica cannot dial a new one, which costs relayed requests that land on a not-yet-restarted replica and surfaces as no route, never as absence. A rejected peer gets its own sentinel, ErrPeerRejected, whose unwrap chain carries ErrPeerUnreachable as well and no absence sentinel at all. Keeping the older sentinel means no existing consumer changes behaviour; the cause stays out of the chain, so absence cannot escape through it and nothing can read an authorization failure as a worker that went away. One consequence beyond the fix: a replica with no advertised address has no instances row, so it now cannot dial out either. It was already unreachable inward. The startup error and the docs say so. Registry.Register, NewMembership, NewPeerPool, PeerHandler and RegisterClusterRoutes all gained required arguments, so the identity cannot be dropped without a compile failure. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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pengmin
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718357219b |
fix(ui): send collection intervals as numbers
Squashed merge of #11819. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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8744de44d4 |
fix(whisperx): reject unconfigured diarization
WhisperX silently returned a plain transcript when diarization lacked the Hugging Face token required to load pyannote. Reject that request clearly so callers do not mistake missing speaker labels for a successful diarization. Convert WhisperX seconds to the nanosecond duration unit used by the transcription API. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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陈志谦
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dd1776a91f |
docs: correct documented env var and CLI flag names (#11886)
- api-errors.md documented LOCALAI_SUBTLEKEY_COMPARISON (missing the KEY underscore); the code defines LOCALAI_SUBTLE_KEY_COMPARISON, so the documented variable silently did nothing - cli-reference.md documented a --csrf flag / $LOCALAI_CSRF env that do not exist, with inverted semantics; the actual flag is --disable-csrf (LOCALAI_DISABLE_CSRF), 'Disable CSRF middleware (enabled by default)' |
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陈志谦
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24f897cd09 |
docs: fix dead anchors and a dead section link (#11885)
- middleware.md: the 'default detector' link used #instance-wide-defaults; the heading is 'Instance-wide default detector' - the advanced/reference landing pages linked an ../installation/ directory that does not exist in docs/content; dropped the dead bullets (deployment content lives under getting-started) |
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Abdullah Mansour | عبد الله منصور
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a98501d6ce |
docs(llama-cpp): clarify multimodal speculative decoding (#11700)
* docs(llama-cpp): clarify multimodal speculative decoding Update the speculative decoding guidance now that modern llama.cpp backends can combine mmproj-based vision with speculative decoding, including MTP. Document compatibility checks, draft acceptance statistics, VRAM tradeoffs, and a combined configuration example. Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.6-Sol [gh] [OpenStack] [Docker] Signed-off-by: Abdullah Mansour <abdullahmansour.marketing@gmail.com> * docs(llama-cpp): clarify multimodal MTP references Distinguish the upstream change that removed the general multimodal speculative restriction from the later change that added MTP with explicit vision compatibility. Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.6-Sol [gh] [Docker] Signed-off-by: Abdullah Mansour <abdullahmansour.marketing@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Abdullah Mansour <abdullahmansour.marketing@gmail.com> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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730d259976 |
chore(distributed): take the nats-io modules out of the build
Distributed mode has not dialled a message broker since the control plane moved onto the workers' own outward tunnels and every fan-out family moved onto PostgreSQL LISTEN/NOTIFY. What was left was the dependency itself, and the code that existed only to feed it. Dropped from go.mod: nats-io/jwt/v2, nats-io/nats.go, nats-io/nkeys, nats-io/nuid and testcontainers-go/modules/nats, along with the fourteen indirect requires that only the NATS testcontainer pulled in. go.sum carries no nats line either, so the removal is not the partial kind where the require goes and the checksum stays. Deleted with them: pkg/natsauth in full, the broker client's remaining options and TLS files, the per-node JWT minting on both the register and the approve path, and the natsauth.Config parameter threaded through the node routes. The credential manager is renamed and stripped rather than deleted, because it still holds the tunnel token that every re-registration rotates. The bus flags stay accepted and ignored, and are now hidden, on every command that had them, so an existing unit file, compose file or Helm values file still starts on the day of the upgrade. What is not kept is the validation that REQUIRED one: a distributed frontend started with no bus URL is no longer fatal. The TLS paths lose type:"existingfile" deliberately, so a certificate deleted along with the broker cannot fail a startup. One operator-visible behaviour change: --nats-require-auth no longer makes an agent worker wait through admin approval. Ask for that wait with --distributed-require-auth, which already implied it. It is documented in the migration section and pinned from both sides. A deployment now needs PostgreSQL and the frontends' own HTTP listener, and nothing else. coverage-baseline.txt moves from 54.2 to 62.0. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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d3dfad90b9 |
chore(distributed): stop telling an operator to run a NATS cluster
Every carrier had already moved and no process opened a bus connection, but the surface an operator reads still described a deployment with a broker in it: a compose service, a 220-line credential-generation script, two CI steps pulling a container nothing started, two flag tables offering --nats-url, an architecture diagram with a NATS box wired to the workers, a join-command generator in the Nodes page that emitted --nats-url for agent workers, and a test suite that stood a NATS server up for specs that no longer used it. That is the one way this programme could still fail invisibly. Every test passes, every binary works, and every production deployment goes on running and paying for infrastructure that carries nothing. Nothing in this repository starts a NATS server any more. The compose file is four services, the docs say to shut the broker down and what to keep, and the e2e suite runs on one PostgreSQL container. The three LOCALAI_NATS_*_TIMEOUT env vars are KEPT, and are now documented twice as being kept. They were never broker settings: each names a control-RPC budget the frontend applies to a worker, still read and still enforced. They carry the prefix only because they arrived with the bus, and renaming them would break every existing deployment for cosmetics. The agent worker's join command was the last surface still emitting the flag, two tasks after the agent worker stopped dialling. The Playwright spec that covered it asserted the opposite of what is now true, so it is inverted rather than deleted, and it reads the rendered command string rather than the component's variables: the variables are what the fix removes, so a spec reading them would have stopped compiling instead of failing, and a compile error is not evidence about what an operator is shown. nats_jwt_test.go and its helpers are deleted. They pinned a real server ENFORCING the minted permissions. The CONTENT of those allow lists is still pinned, untouched, by pkg/natsauth's own suites, including the spec that refuses to let the agent lists go empty, since an empty allow list in NATS means unrestricted. The enforcement half is retired rather than moved: enforcement is a property of a connection, and nothing opens one. The suite's own NATS container goes with them, which the brief left for the next task. Removing the pre-pull while BeforeSuite still ran the image would have defeated the step rather than cleaned it up, and this change removes the last reader of TestInfra.NC. agent_native_executor_test.go and mcp_ci_job_test.go are moved onto infra.Bus() instead of deleted: they were the last two specs building a bridge and a dispatcher on a client nobody uses, which is exactly the drift TestInfra.Bus's own comment warns about. cluster.Options.NatsURL is now fed a deliberately dead address rather than a live container's. Frontends and agent workers still receive LOCALAI_NATS_URL, because that is the coverage for the promise that an existing command line still starts; sourcing it from a running server would have let a regression that actually dialled it pass. The control in cluster_control_test.go keeps its assertion and loses its explanation, which claimed the deployment had a bus and no longer could. One latent spec race surfaced and is fixed: the background-run spec waited for a COUNT of events and then read a snapshot for the terminal status, which is the last event of a run and therefore always arrives after the count is met. Its immediate twin had already been fixed this way. Nothing in production changed. pkg/natsauth keeps its files. It is reachable from production only through the natsauth.Config parameter thread, and that thread is the next task's. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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a6b2d7c0ec |
fix(distributed): read a departed agent tunnel as the routing fact it is
Task 4 gave agent workers tunnels and deliberately left the NodeType skip in HealthMonitor.tunnelDeparted, with a spec asserting that an agent node whose presence reader answers PresenceGone is NOT marked unhealthy. That spec was scaffolding. It was true while an agent worker took its jobs and its verbs over the message bus: a departure row for one said nothing about whether it could work, and an early bug in the new tunnel client could otherwise have demoted a fleet of healthy agent workers. There is no bus. An agent worker is reachable through its tunnel and through nothing else, so a departed agent tunnel means exactly what a departed backend tunnel means: no live replica holds it, the departure has outlived the reconnect grace, and that is a routing fact the scheduler and a reaper may act on. The skip would now hide the only symptom an unreachable agent worker has. This is the deliberate removal Task 4's M6 predicted, and task-4-report.md is where that mutation already stands recorded red against the spec this commit deletes. The skip existed at ONE site. router_liveness.go has none: its candidates come from queries that already filter node_type = 'backend'. The two skips in managers_distributed.go stay, because an agent worker still runs no backend processes, so it has no backend to list and no backend op to apply. Two node types can depart now, which is why the second half exists. Before this, one type could depart and every per-node cache a departure left stale was dropped from wherever its owner happened to notice, so a reader could not tell which caches a demotion invalidated by reading the demotion path. Departure gets ONE notification point. DepartureNotifier is edge triggered, because the monitor runs on a ticker and a departed node stays departed; its subscribers are NAMED, because what has to be caught is a forgotten cache and a count can say only that one of four is missing; and NewHealthMonitor takes it as a required positional argument, so a caller that does not pass one fails to compile. Four caches subscribe: prefix-cache affinity in every model, probe freshness at every address, in-flight staging operations, and the per-node breakdown of every open gallery operation. The prefix-cache one is registered only when prefix-cache routing is enabled, so --distributed-prefix-cache=false stays a true no-op. The notification carries the node's name as well as its id, because the staging tracker keys on the name and the other two key on the id, and a subscriber should not have to read the registry from inside an eviction hook. A departure notification is an act on absence, so it fires only on the routing fact. A tunnel lost inside the grace, a worker that never dialled, a presence query that failed and a stale heartbeat all announce nothing, asserted per node type. The stale-heartbeat branch is excluded on purpose: it already marks the node offline, which deletes its rows and runs the registry's replica-removed hooks, so firing there too would double-evict and make the notification mean two different things at its subscribers. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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3b4858851a |
feat(distributed): carry an agent cancel on the worker's own tunnel
agent.<name>.cancel was the last family on a message bus, and the only reason an agent worker dialled one. Its subscriber is the worker running the execution, and a worker has no database, so the family could not move to the PostgreSQL fan-out carrier: a cancel published there would reach no worker while reporting that it had been sent. It is a control verb now. An agent worker mounts workerctl.PathAgentCancel on the loopback control plane behind its tunnel and applies the cancel to the same registry the executor registers a run on. The frontend issues it through nodes.AgentControlClient.CancelAgentRun. That call is a FAN-OUT and not a pick, because nothing records which worker holds a given execution: the claim row names the claiming replica, and it is deleted when the run ends. Every agent worker a live replica can reach is asked over its own tunnel, relayed by the peer mesh when a peer holds it, and each worker answers only for itself. The answers stay apart, which is why this family was held back. A cancel a worker made is nil. A cancel some worker could not be asked is ErrAgentCancelUndelivered, which is neither a refusal nor a missing run. A cancel every reachable worker declined to own is ErrAgentRunNotOnAnyWorker. A deployment with no agent worker is ErrNoAgentWorker. Neither new sentinel wraps ErrWorkerUnroutable and neither is a worker answer, so nothing is reaped, demoted or evicted because of a cancel. A worker in the ABSENT CONNECTION condition, one whose tunnel was lost inside the reconnect grace, counts as undelivered. It is not retried in the call and not queued: a retry would spend a budget the caller did not choose, and a queue would need durable state whose only consumer is a run whose control stream went with the tunnel. A worker whose departure has outlived the grace is the one routing fact a caller may act on and is excluded, or a single retired agent node would make every cancel undelivered for ever. The fan-out reads a different node set from the pick. A draining worker takes no new work but is still finishing what it holds, so it is offered the cancel; a pending one is refused by the tunnel route on every dial and is not. With that, nothing in LocalAI connects to NATS. The agent worker's dial, its credential ladder and its refresh loop are gone, and so is the frontend's cancel carrier. LOCALAI_NATS_URL is accepted and ignored everywhere, and distributed mode no longer requires it. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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b45076c5f7 |
refactor(distributed): delete MessagingClient and shrink the NATS client to fan-out
Nothing in the tree publishes, subscribes, queue-subscribes or requests through
the MessagingClient interface any more, so it is deleted rather than shrunk to
Broadcaster: two exported names for one method set in one package is an
invitation for the next author to pick whichever the surrounding file already
imported.
$ grep -rn 'messaging\.MessagingClient' --include='*.go' .
core/services/syncstate/syncstate.go:54: // It is messaging.Broadcaster rather than messaging.MessagingClient because
(one hit, a comment; no live referent. The naive grep in the plan also matches
prose and the local test type names fakeMessagingClient and
countingMessagingClient, so it can never be empty.)
*messaging.Client is shrunk to exactly Broadcaster plus its own lifecycle.
QueueSubscribe, QueueSubscribeReply, SubscribeReply, Request, Conn and the
package helpers QueueSubscribeJSON and RequestJSON go with it; none had a
production caller. Deleting the methods rather than only the call sites is what
makes putting a family back on this carrier a build error instead of a line that
compiles, publishes successfully, and is delivered onto a carrier the deployment
is being taken off. Conn is in that list because while it existed every other
name was one c.Conn().X() away; the flush-and-verdict that its real consumers
needed is now ConfirmRoundTrip, which keeps the NATS JWT permission specs armed.
The client, its options and its TLS plumbing are NOT deleted, and both processes
stay on the bus. agent.<name>.cancel is the one fan-out family that could not
move: its only subscriber is the agent worker, which has no database and cannot
join the PostgreSQL carrier at all, so a cancel published there would reach no
worker and be reported as sent. The frontend passes the client to
newFanoutBridges as its cancelCarrier and the worker subscribes on it, so
--nats-url stays required on agent-worker. Both go with the tunnel cancel verb.
The struct field is renamed Nats -> CancelCarrier to say what it is for, and
agentpool loses the messaging.Publisher it held only to be non-nil: it never
published on it, and it was gating whether a frontend runs agents distributed or
in an in-process pool. Retiring the bus would have flipped every replica back to
the in-process pool silently. The gate now reads the agent store, which is the
dependency the mode actually requires.
Also deletes four subject builders with no production publisher
(SubjectFineTuneProgress, SubjectFineTuneCancel, SubjectCacheInvalidateSkills,
SubjectCacheInvalidateCollection), the queue and request/reply halves of the
shared test double, and the e2e specs that were their only callers. Every
surviving subject is now pinned to its exact literal, because a subject is a
cross-version wire format and a rename that looks internal stops half a fleet
hearing the other half.
Docs: distributed-mode.md and cli-reference.md no longer claim NATS carries the
agent-worker job subjects, the frontend's cross-replica events, or an agent
worker's real work.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
|
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|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
44cb495169 |
feat(distributed): move the last nine fan-out families onto PostgreSQL
Gallery progress and cancel, the operation cache's start and end, the model
and backend cache invalidations, staging progress, and the prefix cache's
observations and invalidations now travel on the LISTEN/NOTIFY carrier. No
subject is published or subscribed on messaging.Client anywhere in the tree,
which is what makes retiring that package a deletion rather than a migration:
$ grep -rn 'natsClient\.Publish\|nats\.Publish\|\.Nats\.Publish\|QueueSubscribe\|SubscribeReply\|\.Request(' \
--include='*.go' core/ pkg/ | grep -v _test \
| grep -v 'c\.Request()\|ctx\.Request()\|Request()\.Context' \
| grep -v 'core/services/testutil/fakebus.go'
core/services/messaging/client.go:168,170,172,227,234,236,250,252,254,268,269,287
core/services/messaging/interfaces.go:21,22,23
Every remaining hit is inside core/services/messaging itself. The production
reads of the NATS client are now three, all of them the documented agent-worker
exception: Close on shutdown, the agent pool's publisher, and the agent-cancel
carrier passed to newFanoutBridges.
Prefix-cache observations publish like every other family rather than through a
method that refuses a message too large for a notification. The plan proposed
such a refusal on the reasoning that a long prompt makes a chain of thousands of
entries; ExtractChain caps a chain at Config.MaxDepth blocks, MaxDepth is a
constant with no operator knob, and the chain reaching Sync.Observe has one
source, the router's own extraction hook. A worst-case observation is a few
kilobytes against an 8000-byte cap, so the hot-path spill the refusal was
designed to avoid cannot occur, and shipping it would have added the programme's
only deliberate message drop to guard a condition that cannot arise. pgbus gains
FitsInline instead, a predicate that shares one size decision with Publish and
decides nothing, and core/application refuses at startup to wire a prefix cache
whose configured depth would put every observation over the cap.
The carrier choice is no longer stated at four sites. StagingTracker.SetPublisher
and SubscribeBroadcasts become one SetBroadcaster, so a tracker that publishes
where its peers are not listening cannot be spelled; prefixcache.Sync gains
SubscribeBroadcasts, which reads the carrier it publishes on; and the gallery
service and the operation cache are wired by methods on DistributedServices that
name no carrier at all, so the NATS client beside it cannot be handed over.
OpCache.SetMessagingClient and GalleryService.SetNATSClient are renamed to
SetBroadcaster so a missed call site fails to compile.
Two pre-existing defects that the two-real-carrier specs surfaced are fixed. A
progress tick published before a cancel and delivered after it cleared Cancelled
and left the operation reading as still running on that replica; mergeStatus now
drops a stale tick rather than merging it. GetStatus and GetAllStatus handed out
the stored OpStatus pointer while the broadcast subscribers mutated it in place,
so an /api/operations response could be marshalled mid-write; both now copy.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
|
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|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
5a95bb3c0a |
refactor(distributed): move job and agent fan-out onto the PostgreSQL carrier
Five of the six families whose subscriber is an open HTTP response rather than a process-lifetime cache now travel on pgbus: jobs.<id>.progress, jobs.<id>.result, jobs.<id>.cancel, agent.<name>.events.<user> and responses.<id>.cancel. Both ends of each move together, so there is no state where a publisher is on one carrier and its subscriber on the other. agent.<name>.cancel does NOT move, and the plan was wrong about why. Its only subscriber in the tree is the agent worker, which has no database and so cannot join the PostgreSQL carrier at all. Publishing that cancel on pgbus would have lost every cancel of a worker-run agent while returning nil, which reports a cancel that reached nobody as a cancel that was sent. EventBridge now names its cancel carrier separately, a frontend replica sets it to the carrier the worker reads, and it stays there until a cancel rides the worker's tunnel like every other verb addressed to a worker. The carrier drops at 256 rather than blocking, which is not safe on its own for a result: a lost result has no successor message. It is not the only path. The claiming replica persists the terminal line before it releases the claim, and an open progress stream re-reads the job row once after subscribing and then periodically, so a dropped terminal broadcast costs promptness and never the answer. Both per-request subscriptions close in a defer instead of on one return path, and pgbus grows Subscribers() so the leak they would otherwise cause can be asserted. It has no other symptom: only the first subscriber of a channel issues a LISTEN, so a leaked filter just adds one closure per notification for every stream the replica has ever served. Subscribe now issues its LISTEN before it registers, which makes that count a readiness signal rather than a figure to compare against itself. Two rules that were stated at several sites and pinned at none are now one each. The re-broadcaster is built beside the dispatcher and the bridge and handed to the dispatch loop, so no line is left that can point it at a carrier nobody subscribes to while every spec stays green. The set of statuses a job never leaves is one exported set that the SSE bridge and the store both read. The last hand-written subject filter in production code became messaging.SubjectAgentEventsWildcard. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
||
|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
245010f2f6 |
feat(distributed): carry the state.*.delta families on PostgreSQL
syncstate.Config held one carrier field typed as the NATS client, so a pgbus.Bus could not be handed to a SyncedMap at all: it satisfies messaging.Broadcaster and not MessagingClient. The durable re-hydration path built for the responses map therefore had a NATS-only consumer and nothing in the build said so. The field becomes Bus messaging.Broadcaster, SubscribeJSON moves to its own file and relaxes its parameter to Broadcaster, and the four adopters fan out over PostgreSQL LISTEN/NOTIFY: fine-tune jobs, quantization jobs, agent tasks with their per-tenant children, and Open Responses metadata. A new spec proves it on a real database, over two Bus instances on two pinned listener connections: a Set and a Delete carry, a payload past the 8000-byte notification cap comes back byte identical through the spill row, two families sharing one LISTEN channel stay separate, and a terminated listener re-hydrates a row written while it was gone. The five sites that each chose a carrier for an adopter are collapsed into one DistributedServices.Broadcast() accessor. Five field reads were five chances to leave one family on NATS with nothing failing, because messaging.Client satisfies Broadcaster too. The accessor also refuses to hand out a nil pgbus.Bus wrapped in a non-nil interface, which every adopter would read as "broadcast" and dereference on the first Set. SetTaskSyncNATS and SetJobSyncNATS are renamed to SetTaskSyncBus and SetJobSyncBus so a missed wiring site fails to compile. The response metadata table gains a retention of its own, defaulting to 24 hours. It inherited the Open Responses store TTL, which defaults to 0 meaning no expiration. Zero is defensible for a map that dies with the process and is not for a table: the table grew for the life of the deployment and a restarting replica re-hydrated every response the cluster had ever created. A row that names its own expiry is still judged on that column alone, and "this row is dead" now has one SQL spelling that PurgeExpired deletes by and ListUnexpired is the negation of, so a hydrate cannot resurrect what a sweep has already retired. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
09acb3823a |
fix(distributed): give one tenant's agent tasks a subject of their own
Every AgentJobService built its tasks SyncedMap with the name "agent.tasks", and there is one service per user. So every tenant published on and subscribed to the same subject, state.agent-tasks.delta, and SyncedMap.apply scopes nothing: a task tenant A created was written into tenant B's in-memory map on every replica, and ListTasks reads that map. Nothing repaired it short of a process restart. The subject now carries the tenant in a token of its own, state.<name>.<tenant>.delta. Four tokens where the unscoped builder makes three, deliberately: SubjectMatches compares token count before anything else, so a tenant's subject and the cluster-wide one cannot cross-match, and neither can two tenants. Putting the tenant inside the name token would not do that, because the sanitizer folds '.' to '-' and the only filter that could then span tenants is state.*.delta, which spans every other family too. The rule is stated once. subscribeFilters calls publishSubject rather than restating the subject, so a map cannot end up publishing scoped and subscribing unscoped, which would leak exactly as before while every publish assertion passed. The one case that decides on its own is the cluster-wide administrative view: it hydrates from every tenant's rows, so it also takes the per-tenant wildcard, or it would be stale the moment any tenant wrote. A tenant hydrates from its own rows and applies only its own deltas. PerTenant defaults to false, so finetune, quantization and the responses store keep the subject they have. The second half of the same defect was the delete. taskStoreAdapter.Delete called DeleteTask(id) and JobStore deleted by primary key with no user predicate, reachable from DELETE /api/agent/tasks/:id, which takes the id off the URL. A tenant who learned another tenant's task id destroyed that tenant's row. The user id now travels with the id and lands as a user_id predicate. Empty stays the administrative any-owner scope, the same thing an empty id already means for ListTasks and ListJobs. A foreign delete removes nothing and returns no error: not yours and not there are the same answer to the caller, and neither is a store failure. SetUserID rebuilds the tasks map for the same reason SetTaskSyncNATS does. GetJobs happens to set the user id first, nothing enforced it, and with the order reversed the map would be built with an empty tenant and put that user's tasks back on the cluster-wide subject. Both halves predate this programme; they are surfaced here rather than caused. Neither is fully closed for a deployment with the agent pool off, where the task routes are still served by one cluster-wide service that every authenticated caller shares; that is a separate gap and it is documented. testutil.FakeBus grew a real defect this was the first change to trip: Unsubscribe matched on the filter string, so with two subscribers on one filter, closing one deafened the other. Subscriptions now carry an id. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
||
|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
43f7a5d108 |
feat(distributed): give responses.metadata something to re-hydrate from
The responses.metadata SyncedMap had no durable Store, so its reconnect re-hydrate replaced nothing. That was survivable while responses converged through deltas on a broker that mostly stayed up. It is not survivable on a carrier whose listener is one pinned PostgreSQL session: every response created while the subscription was down stays invisible on that replica forever, and the symptom is a 404 from one replica and a 200 from another for the same response_id. State that must survive a gap now lives in a response_metadata table, and the notification only says it changed. The map writes through on a Set and reads the table on hydrate, on reconnect and on reconcile, so the gap closes instead of becoming permanent. The row carries the whole projection as JSON rather than one column per field. A column-per-field schema would be a second definition of what a peer may act on, and the two would drift the first time syncedResponse gained a field: the map would broadcast the new field and hydrate without it, so a replica that had reconnected would serve a different response body from one that had not, with nothing failing anywhere. Only PayloadJSON is ever decoded; owner_replica and owner are indexed copies for an operator reading the table by hand. A missing row and an unreachable database are different facts. Every store and adapter method returns a driver failure as an error and never as an empty result, and syncstate replaces nothing when its source errors, so an outage leaves the map holding what it had rather than blanking it into a cluster-wide 404. Liveness is the database's clock, spelled expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > now(), because every replica hydrating from this table must agree on which rows are live and a Go-side cutoff makes that a property of whichever process asked. The test container shares the host clock, so no behavioural spec can tell the two apart; the statement shape is pinned instead. The constructor refuses a non-PostgreSQL handle, because an unguarded now() on the single-binary path reads as a missing migration. A ticker sweeps expired rows every five minutes on each replica, and Close waits for it rather than racing it. Note that the sweep removes nothing while LOCALAI_OPEN_RESPONSES_STORE_TTL is 0, which is the default: with no TTL nothing ever expires and the table grows for the life of the deployment. The docs say so plainly. EnableDistributed takes the store positionally and last, so a call site that forgets it fails to compile rather than silently restoring the deltas-only map this change exists to replace. A nil store there is refused by name: it is reached only from the distributed branch of route registration, so it is a wiring bug and not a deployment shape. What still never leaves the owning replica is unchanged: the resume buffer and the CancelFunc. The write-through is one row per response state change, not one per generated token. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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|
localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
|
44de82e7c7 |
docs(dco): let maintainer-operated automation sign off (#11850)
The AI-assistant policy says an AI agent must never add a Signed-off-by trailer, because only a human can certify the DCO. That is right for the case it was written for: an assistant helping a contributor who then signs off themselves. It does not fit automation a maintainer runs. Those pull requests have no human submitter, so nothing ever signs and the DCO check blocks them permanently. Sixty-one open pull requests from the maintenance bot are in exactly that state, every one of them correctly following the documented rule. Carve out the case: automation a maintainer operates signs off with that maintainer's identity. The maintainer certifies the DCO, as they do for a commit they typed by hand, because they configured the automation, own its output, and take responsibility on merge. The Assisted-by trailer still records that a model wrote the code, so provenance is unchanged. Keep the exception narrow. An assistant helping an outside contributor still must not sign off, and a bot must not sign for anyone but its operator, including on a contributor's branch it pushes to. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
||
|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
78f4ff7934 |
feat(distributed): dispatch queued work as a claim queue
The three NATS queue groups jobs.new, jobs.mcp-ci.new and agent.execute are gone. Dispatching work is now a row in a work_claims table, taken by one frontend replica with SELECT ... FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED and driven on an agent worker as a streaming control RPC over that worker's tunnel. Exactly-one delivery among competing consumers is a database problem, not a broker feature. An agent worker has no database, so it never claims; it executes what the claiming replica hands it. A claim must not outlive the replica that took it. The reap releases a claim whose owner is no longer a live replica in the instances table, on the database clock, and never asks how long the claim has been held. A job that legitimately runs for an hour on a heartbeating replica is left alone, while a claim whose owner stopped heartbeating becomes claimable again within one liveness window. A replica with no advertised address has no instances row at all, so it refuses to claim rather than have its work reaped out from under it mid-run. The settle rule is stated once, in settleClaim, and every exit path calls it. A transport failure releases the claim and never completes or discards it; only a decoded reply line completes it. That line is deliberately not cluster.IsWorkerAnswer, which accepts the stream refusals a worker's tunnel writes before any request body reaches its control server: completing on those would discard work that never ran. The terminal line is persisted before the claim is completed, so a store that refuses leaves the claim standing rather than leaving the job running for ever. That is the dropped-result defect fixed structurally rather than by retry. This also surfaces a pre-existing gap rather than causing one: no worker has ever served plain task jobs, and publishing them into an empty queue group left them running with no trace. Such a claim is now failed with a reason. Removes QueueWorkers, --agent-subject and --agent-queue, and narrows an agent worker's minted JWT by agent.execute and jobs.mcp-ci.new. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
9d7a2457d9 |
feat(distributed): stop a backend on one route, whatever the worker is
nodes.<id>.backend.stop was the last worker-facing NATS subject, and it existed only because ONE publisher had not moved. An agent worker already mounted workerctl.PathBackendStop on the tunnel it holds, and a backend worker already took its stop there, so RemoteUnloaderAdapter branched on NodeType to pick a carrier for a verb both kinds of worker served the same way. The branch is gone, and with it nodeTypeOf and its NodeTypeBackend default, which removes one of the ten NodeType branches left to sweep. The adapter loses its messaging.MessagingClient outright rather than keeping an unused field: it now holds no publisher, so re-routing any verb back onto the bus is a change to the struct and to every caller of the constructor, and does not compile until all of them agree. messaging.SubjectNodeBackendStop and subjectNodePrefix are deleted, the agent worker's subscription with them. pkg/natsauth drops the per-node backend.stop grant from the agent SUB list. That is a narrowing of eleven entries to ten, never to nothing: NATS reads an EMPTY allow list as unrestricted, so the coverage spec asserts both that the retired subject is no longer covered and that the queue subjects an agent worker lives on still are. The e2e half proves it against a real enforcing server: one spec subscribes successfully on an agent-minted JWT, the next is refused the retired subject on a JWT minted the same way. Both halves of the old split were pinned, so both pins are re-aimed rather than deleted, and the two node types are asserted separately rather than as one parameterised case, because only two cases can show that the two used to differ. Three assertions that the adapter published nothing are deleted instead: with no publisher to hold, no change could ever redden them. The CLI's handler set moves into agentWorkerControlHandlers so a spec can stand it up and post to it. That wiring was a bare literal no spec pinned, and deleting the subscription made it the ONLY carrier for backend.stop: a dropped field would have been a 404 the frontend reads as a worker too old to serve the verb, and nothing in the repo would have noticed. Mutations: the agent branch restored off the control route reddens two specs; the backend branch restored, separately, reddens five; PathBackendDelete in place of PathBackendStop reddens nine across both node types; dropping the CLI wiring line reddens the new wiring table; re-adding the allow-list entry reddens the unit spec and the JWT e2e spec; and restoring the publisher for real does not compile. Four comments this change falsified are fixed, in core/cli, pkg/model and the distributed-mode docs, which now say both kinds of worker serve POST /v1/control/backend/stop and what each does with it. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
5effa47527 |
feat(distributed): make MCP execution and discovery a selection
mcp.tools.execute and mcp.discovery were the only NATS subjects that combined a queue group with a reply, and no carrier in this design provides both. They never needed one: a queue group is a way of choosing a subscriber, and choosing is a query. The frontend now lists the approved, non-draining agent nodes, asks the node_connections table in one joined statement which of those tunnels a live replica holds, prefers one this replica holds so the call skips the relay hop, and issues an ordinary control RPC on the path task 4 already mounted. A peer-held tunnel is reached through the relay. That is a choice a broker's hidden balancing could not make. The selection reads presence and nothing else. It is filtered only on node type and on the two statuses an operator controls, never on a health verdict written on another clock, because refusing a worker that is connected and answering is the same defect as picking one that is gone. An empty fleet answers ErrNoAgentWorker, which is deliberately neither ErrWorkerUnroutable nor anything cluster.IsWorkerAnswer accepts: nothing was asked of any worker, so no reap guard may act on it. A reply carrying an Error is the worker's own answer and is returned unchanged; it is never offered to a second worker, which would turn "this MCP server rejected your arguments" into "the fleet is broken" and could run a tool twice. A call that never reached a worker is retried against a different pick, at most three times, and whatever error is finally returned is returned unwrapped so its identity survives the loop. MCP prompts and resources now answer 501 in distributed mode instead of an empty 200. They are served only from sessions the frontend holds, and in distributed mode it holds none. That gap predates the removal of the bus and is not closed by it; this only stops it being silent. Agent workers keep every other subject, including nodes.<id>.backend.stop. Their minted JWT loses the two MCP subjects and keeps a non-empty allow list, because NATS reads an empty one as no restriction at all. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
64059cd7d7 |
feat(distributed): give agent workers a tunnel of their own
Phase 2 gated agent nodes out of tunnel credentials at the mint site. That was right while nothing dialled into an agent worker: a credential would have replaced nothing, and the gate was structural rather than a second check that could drift. It is wrong now that the frontend needs to reach an agent worker by RPC. attachTunnelToken mints for backend and agent nodes and CLEARS for anything else, through one tunnelEligible predicate rather than two conditions that can be widened separately. ConnectHandler still never reads NodeType, so an empty hash is still what refuses an ineligible node. An agent worker now starts a loopback control server behind the same bearer check a backend worker uses, and holds one tunnel whose only stream tag is http: it runs no backend processes, so the grpc tag has nothing to route to and is not offered. Its MCP tool, MCP discovery and backend.stop verbs are served from ONE implementation reached by both the bus and the tunnel, so a frontend cannot get different bytes depending on which carrier delivered. The tunnel is an ADDITION. --nats-url is still required, and agent jobs, MCP execution, MCP CI jobs and nodes.<id>.backend.stop all still travel on the bus. Absence semantics are unchanged. An agent node now has a real node_connections row whose departure ages past the grace, so the node type check in HealthMonitor.tunnelDeparted stopped being an optimisation and became the rule; its comment says so, and the spec that pins it is shown red under a mutation that deletes the check. The scheduler needed no change: every placement query already filters node_type = backend, so an agent node never reaches nodeMayTakeWork. Shared rules moved to one site each. The request bounds, the POST-only check and the unknown-path 404 live in workerctl and are called by both worker packages; the bearer check that guards every extra route is one function in core/services/nodes used by both server constructors. workerctl.AllPaths splits into BackendPaths and AgentPaths, with AllPaths as their deduped union, because a backend worker does not mount the agent verbs and asserting otherwise would fail a correct worker. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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|
Claudio Maradonna
|
335acce21f |
fix(ds4): cancel abandoned inference (#11822)
Propagate gRPC cancellation into DS4 prompt synchronization and poll it at decode boundaries. Stop on failed stream writes and skip parser finalization and KV persistence for abandoned partial requests. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Signed-off-by: Claudio Maradonna <git@codeshifter.xyz> |
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|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
49128cf486 |
feat(distributed): keep the listener draining and let it come back
PostgreSQL holds undelivered notifications in a queue it shares with every session on the server, and it kills a listener that stops draining. Two failure modes follow, and both are silent: a carrier that blocked on a slow resolver would lose its connection and with it every later broadcast, and a carrier that reconnected without re-registering would be connected and deaf. The receive and dispatch halves were already separate. What was missing is everything around them. The listener path moves into listener.go and gains a carrier-level Dropped() so a replica that is behind can be seen; the queue depth and the spill retention become Config fields with exported defaults; the LISTEN session gets an application_name so an operator can count listeners in pg_stat_activity and a spec can drop exactly one of them; and OnReconnect fires after the re-LISTEN, on a goroutine of its own, because a callback re-hydrates from a database and must never run on the path whose only job is to drain. That callback is reached through an optional interface assertion, so deleting its invocation compiles and every adopter silently stops converging. The spec is the only guard, and it is named in a comment at the site. The slow consumer is proved through the transport rather than a seam: an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock on bus_messages stalls the resolver's spill SELECT for exactly as long as the spec holds it, and the listener is shown still draining and dropping while it does. The dropped connection is a pg_terminate_backend matched on the carrier's own application name. Neither Dropped nor IsConnected is on messaging.Broadcaster, and a spec asserts that over the interface type. Both are facts about a frontend; the conditions a scheduler acts on are facts about a worker, and no consumer holding the interface can read one as the other. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
cf619fc91b |
feat(distributed): carry fan-out on PostgreSQL LISTEN/NOTIFY
Distributed mode needs an operator to run a NATS cluster. This adds the carrier that replaces its fan-out half, so a deployment eventually needs PostgreSQL and its own HTTP listener and nothing else. pgbus holds one PostgreSQL session per replica, pinned for the life of the process because LISTEN registrations belong to one backend session and a pooled handle would lose them on the next checkout. Publishes go out on the pool with pg_notify. Subjects map onto a channel by their first token, from a closed set of roots. A subject outside the set is refused at publish AND at subscribe rather than mapped to a channel of its own: a channel name is capped at 63 bytes, and one LISTEN per job id would be unbounded. Refused rather than dropped, because a subject that goes nowhere and reports nothing is the class of defect this work exists to remove. PostgreSQL refuses a notify payload of 8000 bytes or more, and several subjects on this bus exceed that in normal operation: a job result carries a whole LLM output, a gallery progress event carries one entry per node. Those are written to a row and the notification carries the id. What is measured against the cap is the ENCODED notification, not the caller's payload, because the subject and the envelope travel too. The filter grammar is not respelled here. Subscribe asks messaging.ValidFilter and delivery asks messaging.SubjectMatches, which makes this the first production caller of a matcher that had only test doubles. New refuses a DSN that names a different database from the pool: that pairing publishes successfully, delivers nothing, on every replica, and reports no error anywhere. Nothing publishes on it and nothing subscribes yet. The construction is wired anyway, because the DSN has exactly one legitimate source and a setting that decides whether any broadcast is delivered should not be invented by whichever call site is migrated first. Delivery is at-most-once, like NATS core. Nothing downstream may read a message it did not receive as evidence about a node: a carrier that cannot deliver is not a worker that is gone. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
dd9aff58ff |
feat(distributed): take the backend worker off NATS entirely
A local-ai worker no longer opens a bus connection. connectNATS and its
spec are gone; Run registers once, starts its tunnel, arms /readyz on that
tunnel, and heartbeats. The worker's bus credential flags (--nats-jwt,
--nats-user-seed, --nats-require-auth, the three TLS flags) and
Config.NatsAuthRequired go with it. --nats-url stays, accepted and
ignored, so an existing worker command line still parses.
/readyz was the thing most likely to wedge a tunnel-only worker: it
required a live NATS link, so a worker with no bus would have reported
itself unready forever. nodes.NATSReadiness becomes nodes.TunnelReadiness
over a local interface{ Connected() bool }, and worker.Tunnel gains
Connected(), backed by a mutex-guarded session field the loop publishes
and clears. A closed-but-not-yet-cleared session reads as disconnected:
the loop waits for every in-flight stream before it clears the field, and
the probe must answer not-ready through that wait.
The heartbeat gate is DELETED rather than re-pointed at the tunnel. The
heartbeat is the worker's own answer that its process is alive; whether
the frontend can reach it is a separate fact the frontend already holds
and ages against LOCALAI_WORKER_RECONNECT_GRACE. Withholding the
heartbeat would report an unreachable worker as an absent one on the one
path with no grace, where the health monitor marks it offline and its
pending backend ops are deleted behind it. heartbeatLoop is given no view
of the tunnel, so a gate cannot be added back without changing its
signature.
Removing the NATS credential manager from this path also removes a defect
it carried: its refresh loop re-registered on a timer to renew a JWT, and
Register CLEARS a node's NodeModel rows. Any backend worker running on
frontend-minted credentials had its replica rows deleted roughly every
18 hours.
Of core/cli/workerregistry, everything survives. The manager is still
used in full by core/cli/agent_worker.go, which still needs NATS: Acquire,
Provider, RefreshLoop, HasCredentials and TunnelToken are all untouched.
The backend worker simply calls RegisterFullWithRetry directly now.
WorkerPermissions is documented as serving agent nodes, and its non-agent
branch narrowed to _INBOX.> on both sides. It is NOT deleted: NATS reads
an empty allow list as no restriction, so returning nil would upgrade
every JWT the frontend still mints for a backend node from its own inbox
to the whole account.
Agent workers keep the bus everywhere: their CLI flags, their
subscriptions, the agent branch of WorkerPermissions, and the compose
service with its LOCALAI_NATS_URL and depends_on: nats.
Also corrected two flags the Nodes page advertised that do not exist
(--distributed-nats, --distributed-db), and a log line plus several
comments that still named a bus the code no longer touches.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
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|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
749cc7ad81 |
fix(distributed): let absence be decided by something, at all three call sites
Removing "Presence: clusterRegistry" from the options literal in initDistributed left all seven suites and tests/e2e/distributed green. The predicate was right and its input was silently nil, which returns the deployment to absence being decided by nothing, with no log line and no failing request. That is the fourth finding of this exact shape in this phase. The two assignments move out of a twenty-field literal into distributedSchedulerOptions, a named function a unit spec can reach. Deleting either is now red. The health monitor takes its presence reader and grace as a required positional pair instead, so deleting those does not compile at all. requireAbsenceWiring then refuses to start a distributed frontend whose scheduler or health monitor has no source of absence, because refusing to boot is the only symptom either failure has. With a fresh heartbeat and a permanently gone tunnel there was no reaper at all. A heartbeat says the worker's supervisor is alive; it says nothing about whether anything here can reach that worker's backends, because those are reached over the tunnel. A proxy that stops upgrading WebSockets, a rotated registration credential or a reconnect loop longer than the grace left a node listed healthy forever while every request for a model already loaded on it failed "no route to that worker", and every reaper keyed on the heartbeat. The health monitor now reads presence from the same place and against the same window as the scheduler and demotes such a node. That also ends the 15s re-promotion: the demotion arm returns before the recovery arm, so the scheduler's demotion is no longer undone on the next tick, and recovery needs the tunnel back rather than just the heartbeat. The demotion is status-only. MarkOffline would DELETE the node's rows, and deleting rows on a presence read would give any future defect in that read the widest blast radius in the system for nothing the demotion does not already deliver. LRU eviction is the third path that commits work to a node, and it read only the stored status. A node full enough to be an eviction target is exactly the node the VRAM and idle selectors never offer, so pickReachableNode structurally cannot cover it. It now runs its chosen node through the same nodeMayTakeWork predicate, demotes it and evicts again rather than handing back an install that cannot land. Presence is read after the transaction and not inside it: reading it inside would hold a FOR UPDATE lock across a query needing a second pooled connection, which is how concurrent evictions deadlock a pool. Also: a router built with a presence reader and no grace now has its documented default pinned by a spec rather than only claimed by a comment; ageDeparture asserts RowsAffected, since an UPDATE matching nothing succeeds and the inside-the-grace spec returned the same verdict either way; the scheduler comment that still described the bus is corrected; the docs stop conflating heartbeat recovery with tunnel recovery and name the third reader; and an overlong rewrapped line in membership.go is folded. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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93af91419b |
feat(distributed): read worker absence from the database, not from a bus timeout
The scheduler decided whether a worker had gone away from nats.ErrNoResponders: one frontend's observation that nobody answered IT within a request budget. Two replicas asking in the same moment could disagree and demote each other's workers, and a worker re-homing its tunnel between replicas looked identical to one that had died. SmartRouter now reads cluster.Presence instead. Only PresenceGone -- no live replica holds the tunnel AND the departure has outlived the reconnect grace -- excludes a node from placement, and it is a fact every replica reads identically from the database. PresenceReconnecting, PresenceUnknown and a failed presence query are all non-verdicts and place work as normal: excluding on a database hiccup would cost the fleet its capacity for a reason that has nothing to do with any worker. nodeAnswersOnBus is deleted. It excluded on a sentinel no control RPC can produce, so it decided nothing while PingNode cost a relayed round trip per scheduling decision to feed it. PingNode goes with it, from the adapter and from NodeCommandSender. isRequestTimeout drops nats.ErrTimeout: every verb this adapter sends now travels over the worker's tunnel. The predicate is named nodeMayTakeWork rather than nodeHasRoute. "Route" is ErrWorkerUnroutable in this package, the condition nobody may act on; PresenceGone is the one a scheduler may. Spelling them the same way is the collapse this work exists to prevent. Also folds in ReapStale's return rename: it counts connection rows CLEARED, never rows deleted, and reading it as a delete count would make a worker that is re-dialling right now look forgotten. The spec pinning that a message merely quoting "nats: timeout" is not a timeout was scripting a SUCCESSFUL reply carrying the phrase, which comes back with a nil error and never reaches the classifier. Restoring the string match left it green. It now scripts a 5xx whose body carries the phrase, and asserts that the phrase reaches the classifier as a precondition. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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4c3e0deb19 |
test(distributed): pin the unreadable-request rule at all three file verbs
The rule "a body this worker could not parse is a non-2xx, never the worker's answer" is written at three exits in control_files.go and only ensure was pinned. Turning stage's or listdir's decode exit into a 200-with-error left worker and nodes entirely green, and what that converts is a frontend's malformed request into the worker's own verdict about a file, which passes cluster.IsWorkerAnswer and reaches a reap guard. The production code was already right; nothing held it there. The e2e NATS JWT spec was asserting the opposite of the code and passing. It published nodes.<id>.files.in and called it an allowed subject after that grant was deleted, and it could not tell: a permission violation does not close the connection, so FlushTimeout and IsConnected both stay happy. It now reads LastError, the way its sibling always has, and asserts the denial plus the one publish right a backend worker has left. Also pinned, each mutation-verified alone: the CreateTemp branch (an existing staging-tmp at 0500 reaches it without a seam), the walk's context check (a caller that gave up must fail the listing, never be answered with a short one), and the cache and data directory layout. The data directory was derived twice, once in worker.go and once for the listdir verb; worker.go now reads the same helper, so a move cannot leave a verb listing files the file server does not serve. The per-verb RPC ceiling moves from an argument at five call sites into fileRPCBudget, so no site can name the wrong one, and the two values are asserted. The body-cap table now holds both directions locally and with two different claims: a body exactly at the cap proves the bound is a ceiling and not an off-by-one, and an absolute megabyte proves the cap stays above real gallery traffic. Only the second notices a cap shrunk to 64 KiB. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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7fc617c8ed |
feat(distributed): serve file staging over the worker tunnel
The four nodes.<id>.files.* subjects were the last commands a serve-backend worker took off the bus. They are now HTTP routes under workerctl.Prefix, on the same loopback server and behind the same bearer check as the ten lifecycle verbs, so the frontend reaches them through the worker's tunnel. files.listdir is the verb this matters most for. Its reply had to fit a payload the bus would carry, which put a wide model directory close to the limit; a response body has no such ceiling, so nothing truncates the listing at either end. A short listing reads to the frontend as files the worker does not have. S3NATSFileStager becomes S3FileStager and calls ControlClient, which means every failure now lands in the bucket phase 3 exists to keep straight: a route this frontend could not use is unroutable and nothing may act on it, while the worker's own answer, including "that file is not there", is evidence a caller may act on. Each RPC's deadline is DERIVED FROM the caller's context rather than started fresh, at every one of the five call sites, so a caller that gave up stops the RPC too. A worker started without an object store mounts no file verb at all and answers 404, which is the same answer a build too old to know them gives. The subjects and the backend worker's files.> publish grant go with them; a backend worker now publishes nowhere but its own inbox. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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44f12b2adb |
feat(distributed): call the worker's control routes instead of the bus
The ten backend and model lifecycle verbs stop being NATS requests and become HTTP calls on the worker's own control routes, reached through that worker's tunnel on the `http` stream tag that already carries file staging. Nine subject builders and the per-op install-progress subject are deleted with their entries in the worker's NATS permissions; the request and reply DTOs are untouched, so a body on the wire is byte for byte what the subject carried. This closes the merge gate Task 3 left open, which was worse than lost commands. Once the worker stopped subscribing, PingNode was still asking nodes.<id>.backend.list and nodes.<id>.models.running, so EVERY healthy worker answered no-responders, nodeAnswersOnBus read it as absence and pickReachableNode demoted it on the scheduling path. PingNode is a control RPC now, and no control RPC can produce ErrNoResponders, which is the only error that exclusion acts on. Two specs drive pickReachableNode against a real adapter and a worker answering over its control plane, which is the only arrangement that can see the difference: the router's own double never touches a transport and stayed green for the whole window the defect was live. How a control RPC FAILS is the whole of this change, so it is decided in ONE function reading ONE table. A worker's answer passes through unwrapped, so cluster.IsWorkerAnswer still sees it and a reap guard may act on it; everything else is wrapped in ErrWorkerUnroutable so nothing can. There is no third branch, because a third branch is how the eight collapses on this branch happened: each was a site that decided for itself which errors were evidence. A 404 under the prefix is its own sentinel, because it is the worker stating a deployment fact about ITSELF rather than a verdict about a backend, and only the legacy upgrade fallback may act on it. The caller's budget is checked FIRST. A timeout is not a verdict: a refusal arriving in the instant a deadline expires would otherwise be reported as the worker's non-transient answer, which reaps a row, and nothing orders the two timers. A 5xx and an undecodable body are transport failures, not answers. An empty ModelsRunningReply means "this worker is running nothing", which the reconciler acts on, so it must never be manufactured from a body that would not parse. A stream that ends before its reply line is the same rule one layer up: a tunnel dying mid-install is not the worker saying the install failed. backend.stop is split by node type rather than moved. Agent workers hold no tunnel, so they have no control plane to serve, and they still subscribe to nodes.<id>.backend.stop to drop cached MCP sessions; that subject and its agent permission both survive. It is the honest intermediate state until agent workers hold tunnels too. A failed control RPC no longer demotes a node anywhere. ErrNoResponders meant "not on the bus"; a control failure means "this frontend could not route to it", which is equally what a healthy worker re-homing its tunnel between replicas produces. Absence is a fact read from the database, and the scheduler starts reading it in a later task. The rolling-update fallback re-fires a DESTRUCTIVE force-reinstall, so it runs only on the worker's own 404. Its negative direction was pinned at the admin call site and unpinned at the reconciler's, where widening the condition to any error left all 676 specs green: a background drain nobody is watching would then force-reinstall every queued backend the moment a replica lost its tunnels. Three specs cover it, arranged so the force install IS reachable in the negative case and a fallback that fired would show as a call and a drained row. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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f9d0d4c5c6 |
fix(worker): pin the rune cut, answer unload honestly, drop the dead publisher
Review fix round 1. Seven non-blocking findings; the blocking one is a merge gate for Task 4 rather than anything in this diff, and the report's concern about it is corrected: until Task 4 lands, PingNode probes two subjects no serve-backend worker subscribes to any more, so every healthy worker reads as absent and is marked unhealthy on the scheduling path. The rune-boundary cut in truncate was true behaviour with nothing holding it: a byte-wise mutation survived all 201 specs. isRuneStart is replaced by utf8.RuneStart, the same predicate the cluster package uses for this rule, and two specs pin it, one with a rune straddling the bound and one with a rune ending exactly on it so the fix cannot be "always walk back". unloadModel answered Success:true whatever Free did. That is the worker saying "done" about work it did not do, and the frontend's only caller is EvictLRU, so a false yes told the scheduler VRAM had been released and let it place the next model on a node still holding the old one. It now reports the failure, following stopModelExact, which is the honest pattern already in this package. Still a 200: the worker answered, only its verdict is negative. An address with nothing loaded still answers success, which is a true answer rather than a claim about work done. NewDebouncedInstallProgressPublisher had no production caller after the last commit, only its own spec. Deleted rather than wired: wiring it would publish every event on two carriers, which is what the carrier decision exists to avoid. Its specs now run against the sink, plus one that pins the identity stamped on each event, since the subject used to carry the op and node id and now nothing but the body does. The install progress wiring was exercised by no spec, because with no gallery nothing ever invokes the download callback. The guard moves into startProgress, shared by install and upgrade, which also emits one resolving event before any gallery work. That is worth having on its own: a cold install spends minutes on a manifest and a progress stream with nothing on it is indistinguishable from a broken one. It also makes the wiring observable end to end, and four specs now drive the real installBackend and upgradeBackend over HTTP with no override. model/stop and backend/stop keep taking Background rather than the caller's context, and the sites now say why. model/stop is the acknowledged stop path: it reserves the process, frees it, kills it, waits for exit and releases the port, and abandoning that because the caller hung up would leave a process marked stopping, a port not returned to the allocator and a row nothing reconciles. In stopBackendExact the Free is a courtesy before a kill that happens anyway. model/unload differs because Free IS the operation there. A route set with no prefix or no registrar is now a startup error rather than a silent no-op: a server that comes up healthy while every route the caller registered answers 404 is, through a tunnel, indistinguishable from a version skew. And the AllPaths spec no longer claims to catch a constant that was never added to the set, which it cannot; it asserts the whole set instead, which catches a verb dropped from it. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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49b3d22974 |
feat(worker): serve the control plane over the tunnel, not over NATS
Ten NATS subscriptions on the worker become ten HTTP routes under
/v1/control/, served on the loopback HTTP server the worker already runs
and reached only through the tunnel's existing `http` stream tag.
The carrier is the tag that already exists rather than a new one. A new
tag would have had to invent correlation, per-request deadlines,
unbounded payloads and a progress stream, and each of those is a place
this branch has already put a defect. It would also have added a fifth
entry to the worker's stream-refusal vocabulary, which decides what a
frontend reaps on and took eight fixes to settle. Riding `http` means a
control RPC to a worker another replica holds takes the same relay the
inference path takes, which is the path that has been measured.
The request and reply DTOs are untouched, so a body on a control route
is byte-for-byte what the corresponding subject carried. No subject was
deleted: agent workers still subscribe to nodes.<id>.backend.stop.
Install and upgrade stream. They answer application/x-ndjson: zero or
more {"progress":...} lines carrying the same event the per-op NATS
subject carried, then exactly one {"reply":...} line, always last. That
deletes the 8000-byte notification cap structurally instead of
reproducing it on a new carrier: a progress line is written into the
response the caller is already reading, so there is nothing to size and
no subscribe-before-request window. The debouncer is shared with the
NATS publisher rather than forked, so the ~4/s tick bound is one fact.
A verb's own failure is a 200 with Error set, never a 5xx. The frontend
maps a transport failure onto "no route to that worker", which nothing
may act on, and the worker's answer onto evidence a reap guard may act
on; answering 500 for a failed install would put the worker's verdict
in the bucket reserved for a broken link. Only a request that could not
be read or routed is non-2xx.
Control RPCs carry the caller's budget. r.Context() replaces four
context.Background() calls at the gallery-install sites, and the one
pre-existing fixed timeout on model.unload is now derived from the
caller's context so a shorter budget is honoured. No timeout is invented.
The inner `go func()` in the install and upgrade handlers is deleted
rather than nested: it existed because one subscription served every
install, and over HTTP each request already has its own goroutine.
Per-backend serialization stays lockBackend, which is what actually
prevented two requests racing the gallery directory.
Bounds against a boundary the worker now serves: every body is capped at
8 MiB before any decode; the 404 echoes at most 128 bytes of the request
path, cut on a rune boundary so a half rune cannot travel downstream as
a replacement character; non-POST is refused before the body is read so
a probe cannot fire a command; the streaming responses set nosniff.
The routes mount through nodes.AuthenticatedRoutes, which hands the
registrar a private mux and puts the whole prefix behind the same
constant-time bearer check as the file routes. The worker's HTTP server
now takes the supervisor as a required parameter, so there is no way to
start it without the control plane mounted.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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6e50f060a3 |
fix(cluster): pin the derived retention to the sweep that applies it
The retention a worker's departure is kept for is now derived from the reconnect grace, so a purge can never outrun the window Presence measures against. Nothing pinned that. The sweep could be reverted to pass the constant, or the setter emptied out, and the suite stayed green either way: the specs covered the arithmetic helper, and the fix is the wiring. The loop now has a spec of its own. It departs two workers either side of the difference between the floor and the derived retention, and the row that must go is what witnesses the sweep running at all, so the row that must stay cannot survive by nothing happening. The default grace goes from 60s to 90s. Two of the worker's ceiling backoffs is 60s, but the failed dial between them costs its handshake timeout too, which puts the worst case at 70s, and the backoff resets only after a session long enough that a replica accepting a dial and then dying denies it. So the ceiling is reachable exactly during the rolling restart this window exists for, and 60s sat on the edge of it. Too short reports a live worker as gone and costs a model reload; too long reaps a dead one later. The cheaper mistake is the long one. A held row whose owner is dead and whose stamp is stale is the state a rolling upgrade actually produces, and it was the one state no spec built. It has an answer now, and the two ways to get this wrong land either side of it: reading the stamp first says gone, reading held-ness without the liveness join says connected. Two comments claimed more than the code did. There IS a grace at which a live worker is reported as gone, which is the point of it being a duration; and the switch that reads held-ness first is only a partial second gate, since with the SQL gate gone and a dead owner it answers gone rather than reconnecting. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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6b4ce58207 |
feat(cluster): answer presence with four values on the database clock
A worker whose tunnel is gone is not, by that fact, a worker that has left. Absence is what makes the scheduler stop placing work, reap the worker's rows and evict its models, and one of those paths runs during inference, so the deployment needs to tell a worker re-homing between frontend replicas from one that is really gone before anything acts. Registry.Presence answers that in one joined statement, with four values and not a boolean: unknown when there is no row at all (this package cannot tell a worker that has never dialled from one whose departure aged out, and must not guess), connected while a live replica holds the tunnel, reconnecting while the departure is inside the grace, and gone once it is older. Only the last is a verdict a caller may act on. Held-ness is asked FIRST and the departure only refines it, in the SQL and again in the switch that reads it. Every writer here clears disconnected_at in the statement that writes the owner, but that is a property of these writers rather than of the table: a replica running a binary from before the column existed re-claims without clearing the stamp, so during a rolling upgrade a held row carries an old departure, and a read that consults the stamp first reports a connected worker as gone for the whole upgrade. Both windows are computed by the database, for the reason every other window in this package is: they are compared across replicas, and replicas disagreeing about whether a worker is gone is the flapping this branch exists to remove. No behavioural spec can see the difference, since the test container shares the host clock, so the statement shape is pinned instead. The grace is an operator's knob, defaulting to twice the worker tunnel's maximum reconnect backoff. That made the fixed departure retention wrong: an operator raising the grace past it gets a purge that deletes departures before the grace elapses, so a worker that is gone reads as unknown forever and nothing ever reaps it. The retention is now derived from the grace, with the old constant as its floor. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |