mirror of
https://github.com/mudler/LocalAI.git
synced 2026-10-05 12:34:43 -04:00
845e9f4a41d3fbd4e5b4c75acc4e0cf7957f6041
12
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 mudler-agentandEttore Di Giacinto
|
e4fa051ee3 |
refactor(distributed): put the NATS-only paths behind interfaces (#12395)
* feat(messaging): add shared subject rules Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * test(messaging): cover BroadcastRoots, ControlRoots and SubjectRoot Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(messaging): add Broadcaster and enforce subject rules in every carrier Broadcaster is the fan-out half of MessagingClient. The NATS client and the in-memory FakeBus now refuse a subject outside the served roots and any wildcard other than a whole single token, and FakeBus shares MatchSubject instead of its own copy. FakeBus Unsubscribe now removes its own subscription instead of the first one with the same subject. A shared conformance suite in messagingtest runs against both carriers. The distributed e2e specs that used invented test.* subjects, and the one that subscribed with a > filter, now use subjects from subjects.go. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor: depend on Broadcaster where only publish and subscribe are used Narrowed to messaging.Broadcaster: nodes/staging_progress.go, nodes/install_progress_publisher.go, galleryop/operation.go, galleryop/service.go, agentpool/user_services.go, agentpool/agent_jobs.go, openresponses/store.go, openresponses/sync.go, syncstate/syncstate.go, finetune/service.go, quantization/service.go and failover/distsync/distsync.go. SubscribeJSON now takes a Broadcaster because it only calls Subscribe, which lets the narrowed consumers use it. Stayed wide: worker/supervisor.go, because its client field also serves the SubscribeReply handlers in worker/lifecycle.go. The request/reply, queue and wiring files (nodes/unloader.go, nodes/file_stager_s3.go, jobs/dispatcher.go, agents/dispatcher.go, agents/events.go, worker/file_staging.go, cli/agent_worker.go, http/app.go) are unchanged by design. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(nodes): name the no-route condition and confine the carrier error Consumers matched nats.ErrNoResponders, which names an absence, to demote a node. They now match ErrNoRoute, the control path maps the carrier's failure onto it, and timeouts and worker refusals are pinned as not being no-route. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs(nodes): state which FileStager implementations return ErrNoRoute Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(nodes): build backend clients through one node-aware seam Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: describe the distributed transport seams Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: correct comments that overclaim after the seams refactor Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(agent-worker): refuse an unserved LOCALAI_AGENT_SUBJECT at startup The messaging client now refuses a subject whose root no carrier serves. An agent worker started with a custom LOCALAI_AGENT_SUBJECT such as tenant-a.agent.execute used to start and then wait on a subject the frontend never publishes to. After the subject rules landed it exited at subscribe time with an error that did not name the setting. Behaviour change: the worker now checks LOCALAI_AGENT_SUBJECT before it registers or connects, and exits with an error that names the variable and says to use a served subject under the agent root, for example agent.execute. The served roots are not widened: a custom root was never delivered by the frontend, and a wider set would reopen the drift the subject rules exist to close. The flag help and the agent worker docs state the constraint. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * test(nodes): pin the reactions to ErrNoRoute Three callers react to ErrNoRoute and had no spec: the reconciler's upgrade drain falls back to the legacy forced install, the reconciler marks the node unhealthy when a pending op has no route, and the backend-op fan-out marks the node unhealthy. Each spec drives the real caller with a scripted no-responders reply and reads the result from the registry or the recorded requests. A fourth spec pins the other side: a pending op that times out leaves the node healthy and only counts the attempt, so mapping timeouts onto ErrNoRoute would fail here. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * test(messaging): pin client subject checks and fail the carrier suite in CI Add specs that call Publish, Request, Subscribe, QueueSubscribe, SubscribeReply and QueueSubscribeReply on a client with no connection. Each call must return ErrUnservedSubject for bogus.thing and ErrUnsupportedWildcard for jobs.>. This proves that the subject check runs before the connection is used, and needs no server. The NATS conformance suite is the only check that runs the subject rules against a real carrier. Before this change it skipped without output when Docker was missing. Now it fails when CI is set, so a Linux runner without Docker cannot hide it. It still skips on local runs and on macOS CI, which has no Docker. Add SubjectNodeBackendInstallProgress to the list of constructors that must build served subjects, and ask contributors to extend the list. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: state what ErrNoRoute may change, and group the distributed guides The seams note said MarkUnhealthy was the only state change allowed on ErrNoRoute. A pending backend op still records the failed attempt, counts toward the reconciler's retry limit and is dead-lettered after the maximum attempts. The note now says that MarkUnhealthy is the only change to the node's own state, and that the per-op accounting is not a verdict about the node. The note also documents that the NATS conformance run fails under CI when Docker is missing. The distributed-seams row moves next to the distributed-state row in the topics table. The liveness ping spec header now says no route is a reason to skip the worker, not proof that the worker is gone. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(nodes): give the backend client factory the node id Mechanical: the method gains a nodeID parameter and the eight test fakes are updated. No behaviour change. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(nodes): drop the optional node-aware factory The node id is now in the main method, so the optional interface and its helper had no behaviour of their own. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(nodes): dial backend probes through the client factory Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(nodes): dial workers' file servers through a per-node dialer Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(http): proxy backend logs through the per-node worker dialer The admin backend-logs proxy (list, lines and the WebSocket stream) now reaches a worker through the same per-node dialer as the HTTP file stager, so every frontend-to-worker dial goes through one seam. The shared direct dialer keeps alive for 15s where the proxy used 30s. Harmless for requests bounded at 15s. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(http): keep the backend-logs proxy independent of the admin connection The proxy request had no context before the dialer change and is bounded only by its 15s timeout. Keep it that way. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor: move the worker control payloads to workerctl Mechanical move of the request and reply structs, the install progress event and the file payloads out of messaging. The verbs no longer belong to one carrier. No alias is left behind. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(worker): serve the lifecycle verbs through a controlServer The worker registers one handler per verb and a NATS server maps each verb to its subject. Registration errors now name the verb. node.stop is served with SubscribeReply, which is identical on the wire because the handler never replies. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(worker): report install progress through the control sink Install and upgrade now emit download progress through the sink the control server hands them. The debounce and the terminal flush stay in the handler path, built over that sink by the new nodes.NewDebouncedInstallProgressSink, which replaces NewDebouncedInstallProgressPublisher. The subject and payload on the wire are unchanged. The supervisor no longer holds the bus, and installFn and upgradeFn let specs drive both verbs without a gallery. The malformed-request log lines are restored for install, upgrade, backend.delete, model.unload, model.stop and model.delete, with the reply bytes unchanged. The signal adapter is renamed noReply, which also lets worker.go import os/signal without an alias again. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(worker): serve the file-staging verbs through a controlServer An empty list-dir answer is now {} rather than {"files":null}, because the typed reply omits an empty Files slice. The frontend decodes both to a nil slice in nodes/file_stager_s3.go. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(messaging): add WorkQueue and the NATS producer This is the producer side of the competing-consumer seam. The work kinds map one to one to today's subjects and queue groups: task to jobs.new and mcp-ci to jobs.mcp-ci.new (both in group workers), agent-run to agent.execute (group agent-workers). Enqueue publishes the payload as Publish does today, with one JSON marshal. FakeBus now records queue groups and keeps reply handlers so later specs can pin and drive them. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(messaging): add the NATS WorkConsumer An in-flight limit of one runs the handler inline on the delivery goroutine, as the MCP CI consumer does today. Any other limit spawns per delivery, as the agent consumer does. Queue groups are unchanged. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor: publish queued work through WorkQueue The job dispatcher, the agent pool and the agent scheduler enqueue through messaging.WorkQueue; the NATS implementation publishes to the same subjects as before. DistributedServices builds the queue next to the NATS client and hands it to the dispatcher and the agent pool, whose distributed mode switch now reads a non-nil WorkQueue. The unused AgentPoolService.SetNATSClient is removed. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor: consume queued work through WorkConsumer The agent dispatcher and the MCP CI consumer register through messaging.WorkConsumer. The NATS implementation keeps the inline one-at-a-time model for MCP CI and the per-delivery model for agent runs. handleMCPCIJob reports on the events publisher the carrier hands it instead of a captured client. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor: delete the consumers nothing in production reached jobs.new has a producer and no production consumer, and the agent dispatcher's Dispatch was only called from tests. Publishing jobs.new is unchanged. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(mcp): send MCP requests to agent workers through AgentControl Timeouts still honour only the deadline, not cancellation, exactly as today. The NATS no-responders error maps to ErrNoRoute and a timeout does not. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(agent-worker): serve MCP requests and backend.stop through agentRPCServer The agent worker's MCP tool and discovery reply subscriptions and its backend stop listener move behind an unexported agentRPCServer interface, served on NATS by nodes.NATSAgentRPCServer. The handlers become typed mcp.ToolHandler and mcp.DiscoveryHandler values that answer every failure with a reply carrying Error. Queue group (agent-workers), inline execution on the delivery goroutine, the background handler context, the unmarshal error reply texts and the reply-less backend stop subscription are unchanged. The backend stop handler takes the decoded backend name, so it can still close that backend's MCP sessions. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor(messaging): remove helpers that only tests used BroadcastRoots, ControlRoots and SubjectRoot had no production caller. The roots spec now asserts every served root through ValidateSubject instead. MatchSubject moves back into the test support package, the only place that used it, with its table. NATSAgentRPCServer drops the subscription list it stored and never read, and NewNATSAgentRPCServer gets a doc comment. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * test(mcp): round trip the agent RPC server over a real NATS server One spec sends a tool request and a discovery request through NATSAgentControl to NATSAgentRPCServer and checks that the handlers see the decoded requests and the replies come back. It also puts an undecodable body on the tool subject and checks the server answers with an unmarshal error instead of leaving the requester to time out. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: describe the distributed transport seams The developer note now lists the final seams: fan-out, queues, both halves of the control verbs and of agent RPC, and the dial. It records the open items a second carrier has to handle. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * test: pin the in-flight limit each queue consumer asks for The work queue specs pin what Consume does for a given limit, but nothing pinned which limit each production consumer passes. Changing the agent worker's MCP CI limit from 1 to 0 would have let MCP CI jobs run concurrently on each worker with every test green. Move the MCP CI Consume call into startMCPCIConsumer with the same wiring and pin that it asks for (WorkMCPCI, 1). Pin that NATSDispatcher.Start asks for (WorkAgentRun, maxConcurrent) for several limits. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactor: remove helpers the branch left without a caller SubjectJobCancelWildcard lost its last subscriber when the frontend stopped listening on jobs.*.cancel; the NATS permissions and conformance suite spell the subject out, so nothing reads the constant. decodeBackendStopRequest returned a stopAll flag that production dropped and only a test read. decodeBackendStop is now the single decoder with the same semantics: an empty body is stop-all, an empty Backend is stop-all, malformed JSON is an error. stopBackends still derives stop-all from Backend, so no reply changes. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(messaging): keep an explicitly empty agent queue a plain subscription Before the work queue seam the agent worker passed LOCALAI_AGENT_QUEUE straight to QueueSubscribe, so an explicitly empty value made a plain subscription and every agent worker ran every agent run. WithAgentRunRoute replaced an empty queue with agent-workers, which silently changed that. Keep the queue as given once the option is applied. An empty subject still falls back to agent.execute, since it never had a meaning of its own. The flag default stays agent-workers, so only an explicitly empty value reaches this. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: correct comments and record the PR B notes Fix the recordingFactory comment (it also records the parallel flag), document that a negative maxInFlight is unbounded and that Unsubscribe from a handler deadlocks, and say a permanently undecodable payload returns nil. Record controlHandler's undecodable return as a kept exception, and add the second carrier notes to the developer note: the reconciler has no ClientFactory option, the logs proxy honours HTTP_PROXY, verbs one carrier serves need an opt-out, terminal replies come from the result event, and agent runs publish through the NATS-bound EventBridge, which is not an additive change. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
||
|
mudler-agent
|
1d7023be1a |
test(agentpool): pin the standalone agent contract (#12378)
Adds a Ginkgo contract suite for the standalone (LocalAGI-backed) agent service in core/services/agentpool, with a fake OpenAI-compatible LLM and a harness that boots a real AgentPoolService. It pins CRUD, per-user isolation, export and import, pause and resume, the chat and SSE event contract, status and observables, persistence and the raw-key agent lookup. No production code changes. Specs that pin a known gap are named known gap or known defect, so later phases flip them on purpose. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5 [Claude Code] |
||
|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
8321234275 |
fix(agents): pass pool limits to the LocalAGI agent pool
The LocalAGI bump in #11985 changed state.NewAgentPool to take a SkillsProvider and a PoolLimits value. The call site here was not updated, so master stopped compiling and every Go job went red. Pass the limits explicitly, mirroring LocalAGI's own defaults, so the pool prunes conversation dumps and scheduler run history instead of growing without end. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Bash] [Edit] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
||
|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
2383726d6d |
Revert "chore(tests): Avoid network, sleep and more during tests" (#11601)
Revert "chore(tests): Avoid network, sleep and more during tests (#11050)"
This reverts commit
|
||
|
Richard Palethorpeandlocalai-org-maint-bot
|
cb3bf7af3f |
chore(tests): Avoid network, sleep and more during tests (#11050)
* test: make coverage failures observable Keep per-root logs, reject concurrent coverage runs, and avoid relying on /bin/sleep in the worker timeout test. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test: parallelize coverage without remote fixtures Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 [apply_patch] [exec_command] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test: add offline resource infrastructure Introduce versioned resource manifests, a checksum-verified CAS preparer, offline test wrappers, and a guarded network transport. Replace live Hugging Face, GitHub, and OCI cases with deterministic fixtures and inject fixture metadata into importer discovery. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test: enforce offline resource replay Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test: harden offline resource refresh Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test: expose slow coverage waits Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test: eliminate avoidable wall-clock waits Inject a clock into Hugging Face retry handling, reuse a process-scoped PostgreSQL container with per-spec schemas in the nodes suite, and poll local import jobs promptly. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test: remove repeated fixture startup waits Share PostgreSQL fixtures across parallel endpoint and agent suite workers, and make the worker Free deadline injectable so the wedged-backend test does not spend five seconds on wall-clock time. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test: fix offline resource CI portability Normalize Docker archive metadata before content addressing, derive archive checksums during explicit refreshes, make network lint portable to macOS, and prepare distributed images before running their offline suite. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * ci: cache Go modules before offline tests Warm the complete module graph before the Linux and macOS test jobs enter offline replay mode, so tool dependencies such as Ginkgo are not fetched through the guarded proxy. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test: drop the static network lint in favour of real isolation The offline test suite already prevents tests from reaching the network twice over: run-test-linux-offline.sh puts the test process in a cgroup and REJECTs egress outside the private ranges, and HardenedTransport installs testnetwork.LocalGuard to refuse dials that resolve to a public address. Both fail the test with a precise error at the moment of the dial. test-network-lint.sh added neither. Its diff stage defaulted to a HEAD base, so on a clean checkout it compared the tree against itself and inspected nothing; the branch's own commits were never examined. It only produced output when an earlier job step dirtied the tree, and then it matched a bare https?:// against whatever changed. make react-ui runs npm install rather than npm ci, so CI rewrote core/http/react-ui/package-lock.json and the lint reported an npm registry URL as forbidden test network access: + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/hono/-/hono-4.12.25.tgz", Its fingerprint stage was self-defeating in a quieter way: hashing the whole tree's network-mechanism inventory meant every rebase onto a master that touched any _test.go needed a manual baseline bump, so the check mostly caught its own staleness. Remove the script, its make target and the two prerequisite edges, along with the test-network: fixture markers that existed only to suppress it. The isolation itself is untouched. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 [go vet] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * ci: keep hidden files in the offline test bundle artifact Cherry-picked from 15a37b0ac on the remote branch. The offline bundle lives under .cache/, which actions/upload-artifact skips by default, so the Linux job packed an artifact missing the very file the next step restores. The other half of 15a37b0ac moved test-network-lint out of the `test` and `test-coverage` prerequisite lists into a recipe line, so parallel make could not fingerprint the tree while generated fixtures were still changing. That is dropped: the preceding commit removes the lint entirely, and the race it worked around is one more reason a whole-tree fingerprint was the wrong mechanism. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * refactor: share bounded exponential backoff Use overflow-safe saturating arithmetic for retry delays across model import polling, downloads, registration, node operations, and model loading. Keep model import status checks responsive initially while capping their interval at 500ms. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * ci: mirror Jetson Python wheels Keep the CUDA aarch64 wheel subset in GHCR and serve it as a local PEP 503 index during L4T backend builds, preserving last-known-good packages through upstream outages. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * docs(agents): index the Jetson wheels mirror Mention the GHCR-hosted L4T wheel mirror in the CI caching guide summary so maintainers can find its outage and cache documentation. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * ci: add defensive build network proxy Record build destinations and byte counts, retry observable idempotent HTTP downloads, and isolate explorer database tests that race under coverage. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(kokoros): implement updated backend trait Return unimplemented for image upscaling, matching the backend's other unsupported modalities after the protobuf API update. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(ci): clear recovered proxy errors Do not mark a request failed when a later safe retry succeeds. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * ci: require HTTPS build interception Inject a short-lived proxy CA into BuildKit and Dockerfile RUN steps, reject plain HTTP and opaque tunnels, and retain method/status/byte telemetry for verified HTTPS traffic. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(ci): preserve system trust in unproxied builds Mount the generated interception CA at a dedicated secret path and add it to the trust bundle only in proxy-aware dependency stages. This prevents optional secret mounts from masking the system CA bundle in ordinary backend test builds. Install the requested Go toolchain before starting the proxy and satisfy cleanup error checks found by CI lint. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(ci): persist build proxy trust Install the generated proxy CA through the system-managed local certificate directory so ca-certificates upgrades retain it. Avoid turning canceled matrix jobs into proxy cleanup failures. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(ci): trust proxy in nested build scripts Install the build proxy CA before nested source fetches, route the DS4 package setup through the HTTPS mirror helper, and avoid repeated OCI setup in gallery behavior tests. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(ci): use HTTPS apt sources for Bonsai Rewrite ARM64 package sources before installing GCC and check gallery fixture cleanup errors so the optimized tests satisfy errcheck. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(privacy-filter): trust build proxy CA Install the mounted build proxy certificate before privacy-filter's make target fetches its HTTPS sources, for both source and prebuilt builder paths.\n\nAssisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test: fail on hidden offline egress Count cgroup-scoped firewall rejects and fail the offline test harness with bounded aggregate diagnostics. Inject the gen-audio GGUF probe so fixture-backed importer tests do not attempt real network access. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(ci): preserve system CA trust Build a combined runner certificate bundle instead of replacing public roots with the generated proxy CA. Centralize additive container installation in the shared proxy CA helper. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> Co-authored-by: localai-org-maint-bot <306269227+localai-org-maint-bot@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
walcz-de
|
2ccc67bc7f |
feat(agents): native Prometheus metrics for agent chat runs (#10689)
Operators need a scrape-friendly signal for agent-turn health (completing,
erroring, cancelled, duration) — log-derived counters proved brittle (ANSI/
timezone parsing, restart gaps). Adds localai_agent_runs_total{agent,outcome}
and localai_agent_run_seconds histogram, recorded at the Chat() response
handoff (single choke point of the local execution path). Lazy meter init,
same pattern as the PII events counter (#10641).
Signed-off-by: Stefan Walcz <stefan.walcz@walcz.de>
|
||
|
LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
|
d7d7721eae |
feat(distributed): SyncedMap component + migrate finetune/quant/agent-tasks to cross-replica state (#10542)
* feat(distributed): add SyncedMap cross-replica in-memory state component Introduce core/services/syncstate.SyncedMap[K,V]: a thread-safe in-memory map that keeps itself consistent across frontend replicas via NATS, with an optional pluggable durable Store and hydrate-from-source convergence. Several features keep process-local state surfaced to the API (finetune/quant jobs, agent tasks, model configs) and each hand-wired the same in-memory + NATS broadcast + read-through-store legs - or forgot to, reintroducing cross-replica staleness. SyncedMap makes that consistency a configuration choice: - local writes mutate the map, write through the Store, then broadcast a delta; - the apply path is memory-only and never re-publishes or re-writes the Store (structural echo-loop guard, mirroring galleryop.mergeStatus); - on Start and on NATS reconnect the map re-hydrates from the source (Store, else Loader); an optional periodic Reconcile repairs silent drift; - standalone mode (nil NATS client) is a strict in-memory no-op. Reconnect re-hydrate is wired via a new *messaging.Client.OnReconnect callback, consumed through an optional type-assertion so MessagingClient stays minimal. Adds messaging.SubjectSyncStateDelta and a reusable testutil.FakeBus (synchronous in-process MessagingClient with wildcard matching) for adopter tests. Component only; service migrations follow in subsequent commits. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code] * refactor(finetune): back jobs with SyncedMap for cross-replica consistency FineTuneService kept jobs in a process-local map and, although it wrote them to Postgres, ListJobs/GetJob never read the store back and the wired natsClient was never used - so in distributed mode a job created on one replica was invisible to the others. Replace the map and the dead client with a syncstate.SyncedMap keyed by job ID, value *schema.FineTuneJob (the exact REST shape, so responses are unchanged). - Add a Store adapter (core/services/finetune/syncstore.go) over FineTuneStore, plus FineTuneStore.ListAll (global hydrate; per-user List kept) and an idempotent Upsert (create-or-update; Create alone fails on dup key). - Writes go through SyncedMap.Set/Delete (write-through + broadcast); reads use List/Get. The on-disk state.json path becomes the standalone Loader, keeping single-node restart recovery (stale->stopped / exporting->failed fixups). - Fold SetNATSClient/SetFineTuneStore into NewFineTuneService; app.go passes the distributed NATS client + store when distributed, nil otherwise. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code] * refactor(agentpool): back agent tasks with SyncedMap for cross-replica consistency AgentJobService.ListTasks read the process-local tasks map only, while ListJobs already read through the DB persister + dispatcher NATS - so in distributed mode a task created on one replica was invisible to the others. Back tasks with a syncstate.SyncedMap keyed by task ID (value schema.Task, the exact REST shape); jobs are left untouched. - Store adapter (task_syncstore.go) over the existing JobPersister (LoadTasks/SaveTask/DeleteTask); reads svc.persister/userID live so a persister swap needs no rebuild. No new persister methods required. - Task reads -> SyncedMap.List/Get; create/update -> Set (write-through + broadcast); delete -> Delete. The file persister now owns its own task set so the write-through path does not re-enter the SyncedMap lock (deadlock guard). - The distributed NATS client is not available at construction (start() precedes initDistributed), so it is injected via SetTaskSyncNATS, which rebuilds the still-empty map before Start/hydrate. Wired at the main, restart, and per-user (UserServicesManager) distributed sites. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code] * refactor(quantization): back jobs with SyncedMap + durable QuantStore QuantizationService kept jobs in a process-local map persisted only to a local state.json, so in distributed mode jobs were neither visible across replicas nor durable cluster-wide. Back jobs with a syncstate.SyncedMap keyed by job ID (value *schema.QuantizationJob, the exact REST shape). - New distributed.QuantStore (GORM, table quantization_jobs) mirroring FineTuneStore: Create/Get/ListAll/Upsert(idempotent)/Delete, registered for AutoMigrate via distributed.InitStores (Stores.Quant). - New adapter (quantization/syncstore.go) over QuantStore implementing syncstate.Store, with record<->schema conversion. - Reads go through List/Get, writes through Set/Delete (write-through + broadcast); state.json is kept as the standalone Loader for single-node restart recovery (stale-job fixups preserved). - app.go passes the distributed NATS client + QuantStore when distributed, nil otherwise; Start/Close lifecycle mirrors finetune. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code] * fix(syncstate): annotate gosec G118 false positive on lifeCtx gosec flagged the WithCancel in Start as "cancellation function not called" because the returned cancel is stored on the struct rather than called/deferred in scope. It is invoked in Close (covered by tests), and lifeCtx must outlive Start to drive the reconnect/reconcile goroutines. Suppress the verified false positive with a justified #nosec G118. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code] * test(distributed): e2e two-replica SyncedMap sync over real NATS + Postgres Adds the real-infrastructure counterpart to the fake-bus unit tests, in the existing distributed e2e suite (testcontainers NATS + PostgreSQL). Two SyncedMap instances stand in for two frontend replicas - each with its OWN NATS connection to a shared server and a SHARED Postgres store (the distributed-mode invariant) - and assert, over the wire: - a create on replica A is observed by replica B; - an update and a delete propagate A -> B (delete prunes, which a reload cannot); - a late-joining replica recovers a job it never received a delta for, via store hydrate on Start (the at-most-once gap a fake bus cannot exercise); - a local Set is written through to the shared Postgres store. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code] --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
||
|
|
d2e6b93369 |
feat(agents): surface KB source citations in RAG responses (#10228)
* dev knowledge.go structure Signed-off-by: Pete Chen <petechentw@gmail.com> * feat(agents): append KB source citations to responses Render structured KB citations as a Sources block after agent responses, linking each source to the existing raw collection entry endpoint. Keep long-term memory writes on the original model response so citation blocks do not get stored back into the knowledge base. Tested with: go test ./core/services/agents Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Pete Chen <petechentw@gmail.com> * Collect KB citations from tool searches Signed-off-by: Pete Chen <petechentw@gmail.com> * fix(agents): append KB sources in local chats Apply the shared KB citation post-processing to standalone LocalAGI chat responses so the React agent chat receives the same clickable Sources block as the native executor path. Also fix the run target to use the current cmd/local-ai entrypoint. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Pete Chen <petechentw@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Pete Chen <petechentw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: shihyunhuang <shihyunhuang88@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: TLoE419 <tloemizuchizu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Ching Kao <0980124jim@gmail.com> |
||
|
Richard Palethorpe
|
12d1f3a697 |
security(http): refuse redirects on outbound clients via hardened pkg/httpclient (#10087)
LocalAI's outbound HTTP clients used Go's default redirect policy, which
follows up to 10 redirects. On a cross-host redirect Go forwards custom
request headers — including credential headers such as Anthropic's
x-api-key — to the redirect target (Go strips Authorization, Cookie and
WWW-Authenticate cross-host, but NOT arbitrary custom headers). An
attacker able to elicit a redirect from an upstream (a hijacked or
spoofed upstream, DNS trickery, or a malicious upstream_url) then
harvests the operator's provider API key.
This was first reported against the cloud-proxy / MITM PII path
(GHSA-3mj3-57v2-4636); the same class affects every other outbound
client. Rather than patch each call site, add pkg/httpclient as the one
sanctioned constructor for outbound HTTP and route everything through it.
pkg/httpclient:
- New(...) refuses redirects, TLS 1.2 floor, no body
deadline (streaming/SSE safe)
- NewWithTimeout(d) simple request/response calls
- WithFollowRedirects opt-in following that still strips credential
headers on any cross-host hop; different
scheme/host/port == different origin, guarding
the curl CVE-2022-27774 port-confusion class
- WithTransport(rt) keep a custom transport (IP-pin, HTTP/2, a
credential-injecting RoundTripper)
- HardenedTransport() base transport with the TLS floor + bounded setup
- Harden(c) apply the policy to a library-supplied *http.Client
- NoRedirect the CheckRedirect policy; wraps ErrRedirectBlocked
Lint: a forbidigo rule flags http.DefaultClient and http.Get/Post/
PostForm/Head, pointing at pkg/httpclient (.golangci.yml,
.agents/coding-style.md). forbidigo cannot match the &http.Client{}
composite literal without also flagging legitimate *http.Client type
references, so that form is enforced by review.
Migrates every non-test outbound call site across core/, pkg/, cmd/, and
the Go backend (backend/go/cloud-proxy). Credential-bearing and
internal-RPC clients refuse redirects; download / CDN / registry clients
use WithFollowRedirects so they keep working while stripping secrets
cross-host. The only credential-bearing client that follows redirects is
the gated-download path (pkg/downloader/uri.go), which strips the token
on the cross-host hop to the CDN. Hardening this closes, in passing:
- MCP remote-server bearer token leaking via a redirect (the
RoundTripper re-injected Authorization on every hop)
- agent multimedia/webhook clients leaking user-supplied auth headers
- cors_proxy following redirects, bypassing its SSRF IP-pin
- downloader's authorized read path leaking the token cross-host
Fixes: GHSA-3mj3-57v2-4636 (cloud-proxy leaks operator provider API key
(x-api-key) to attacker host on cross-host redirect)
Reported-by: tonghuaroot
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code]
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com>
|
||
|
LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
|
ab01ed1a3e |
fix(agentpool): close truncate-then-read race in agent_jobs.json persistence (#9811)
* fix(agentpool): close truncate-then-read race in agent_jobs.json persistence
Three call sites wrote and read agent_jobs.json (and agent_tasks.json)
through three independent mutexes:
- AgentJobService.ExecuteJob spawns go saveJobs(job) -> fileJobPersister
holding p.mu
- AgentJobService.SaveJobsToFile holding service.fileMutex
- AgentJobService.LoadJobsFromFile on a separate service instance holding
a different service.fileMutex
Nothing serialized those mutexes, and both writers used os.WriteFile, which
opens O_TRUNC. A reader landing between the truncate and the write saw a
zero-byte file and surfaced as `unexpected end of JSON input` at offset 0.
The macOS tests-apple job started hitting this consistently once the path
filter was removed from .github/workflows/test.yml and the file-mode race
test ran on every push (run 25823124797 was the first observed failure).
Two changes close the window:
1. fileJobPersister.saveTasksToFile / saveJobsToFile now write to a
same-directory temp file and os.Rename to the final path. rename(2) is
atomic on POSIX, so concurrent readers see either the prior contents or
the new contents and never a zero-byte window. The helper Syncs before
close so a crash mid-write leaves either the old file intact or the temp
behind (cleaned up on next save).
2. AgentJobService.{Load,Save}{Tasks,Jobs}{FromFile,ToFile} are collapsed
to thin wrappers around fileJobPersister, removing the duplicate write
path and the redundant service.fileMutex / service.tasksFile /
service.jobsFile fields. Within a single service all task/job I/O now
serializes on the persister's mutex; the atomic rename handles the
cross-instance case the tests exercise.
Adds a regression test that hammers SaveJobsToFile and LoadJobsFromFile
concurrently for 500ms across two service instances on the same paths.
On master this reproduces `unexpected end of JSON input` on Linux within
~500ms; with the fix the suite ran -until-it-fails for 30s (54 attempts,
all green).
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
* refactor(agentpool): route service flush/load through JobPersister interface
The first cut of the race fix made AgentJobService.{Save,Load}{Tasks,Jobs}*
type-assert s.persister to *fileJobPersister so they could reach the
unexported saveTasksToFile / saveJobsToFile helpers. That defeats the
JobPersister interface: the service is back to reasoning about a concrete
implementation instead of an abstraction.
Promote the bulk-flush operations to the interface as FlushTasks / FlushJobs:
- fileJobPersister.FlushTasks/FlushJobs call the existing private helpers
(atomic temp+rename writes from the prior commit).
- dbJobPersister.FlushTasks/FlushJobs are no-ops because SaveTask/SaveJob
are already write-through to the database.
The service's four file-named methods now talk only to the interface:
LoadTasks/LoadJobs read through s.persister.LoadTasks/LoadJobs, and the
Save side calls FlushTasks/FlushJobs. The "FromFile"/"ToFile" suffixes
stay for backward compat with user_services.go and the existing tests,
but they no longer claim a file-only contract.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
---------
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
|
||
|
Richard Palethorpe
|
670259ce43 |
chore: Security hardening (#9719)
* fix(http): close 0.0.0.0/[::] SSRF bypass in /api/cors-proxy The CORS proxy carried its own private-network blocklist (RFC 1918 + a handful of IPv6 ranges) instead of using the same classification as pkg/utils/urlfetch.go. The hand-rolled list missed 0.0.0.0/8 and ::/128, both of which Linux routes to localhost — so any user with FeatureMCP (default-on for new users) could reach LocalAI's own listener and any other service bound to 0.0.0.0:port via: GET /api/cors-proxy?url=http://0.0.0.0:8080/... GET /api/cors-proxy?url=http://[::]:8080/... Replace the custom check with utils.IsPublicIP (Go stdlib IsLoopback / IsLinkLocalUnicast / IsPrivate / IsUnspecified, plus IPv4-mapped IPv6 unmasking) and add an upfront hostname rejection for localhost, *.local, and the cloud metadata aliases so split-horizon DNS can't paper over the IP check. The IP-pinning DialContext is unchanged: the validated IP from the single resolution is reused for the connection, so DNS rebinding still cannot swap a public answer for a private one between validate and dial. Regression tests cover 0.0.0.0, 0.0.0.0:PORT, [::], ::ffff:127.0.0.1, ::ffff:10.0.0.1, file://, gopher://, ftp://, localhost, 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(downloader): verify SHA before promoting temp file to final path DownloadFileWithContext renamed the .partial file to its final name *before* checking the streamed SHA, so a hash mismatch returned an error but left the tampered file at filePath. Subsequent code that operated on filePath (a backend launcher, a YAML loader, a re-download that finds the file already present and skips) would consume the attacker-supplied bytes. Reorder: verify the streamed hash first, remove the .partial on mismatch, then rename. The streamed hash is computed during io.Copy so no second read is needed. While here, raise the empty-SHA case from a Debug log to a Warn so "this download had no integrity check" is visible at the default log level. Backend installs currently pass through with no digest; the warning makes that footprint observable without changing behaviour. Regression test asserts os.IsNotExist on the destination after a deliberate SHA mismatch. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(auth): require email_verified for OIDC admin promotion extractOIDCUserInfo read the ID token's "email" claim but never inspected "email_verified". With LOCALAI_ADMIN_EMAIL set, an attacker who could register on the configured OIDC IdP under that email (some IdPs accept self-supplied unverified emails) inherited admin role: - first login: AssignRole(tx, email, adminEmail) → RoleAdmin - re-login: MaybePromote(db, user, adminEmail) → flip to RoleAdmin Add EmailVerified to oauthUserInfo, parse email_verified from the OIDC claims (default false on absence so an IdP that omits the claim cannot short-circuit the gate), and substitute "" for the role-decision email when verified=false via emailForRoleDecision. The user record still stores the unverified email for display. GitHub's path defaults EmailVerified=true: GitHub only returns a public profile email after verification, and fetchGitHubPrimaryEmail explicitly filters to Verified=true. Regression tests cover both the helper contract and integration with AssignRole, including the bootstrap "first user" branch that would otherwise mask the gate. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(cli): refuse public bind when no auth backend is configured When neither an auth DB nor a static API key is set, the auth middleware passes every request through. That is fine for a developer laptop, a home LAN, or a Tailnet — the network itself is the trust boundary. It is not fine on a public IP, where every model install, settings change, and admin endpoint becomes reachable from the internet. Refuse to start in that exact configuration. Loopback, RFC 1918, RFC 4193 ULA, link-local, and RFC 6598 CGNAT (Tailscale's default range) all count as trusted; wildcard binds (`:port`, `0.0.0.0`, `[::]`) are accepted only when every host interface is in one of those ranges. Hostnames are resolved and treated as trusted only when every answer is. A new --allow-insecure-public-bind / LOCALAI_ALLOW_INSECURE_PUBLIC_BIND flag opts out for deployments that gate access externally (a reverse proxy enforcing auth, a mesh ACL, etc.). The error message lists this plus the three constructive alternatives (bind a private interface, enable --auth, set --api-keys). The interface enumeration goes through a package-level interfaceAddrsFn var so tests can simulate cloud-VM, home-LAN, Tailscale-only, and enumeration-failure topologies without poking at the real network stack. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): regression-test the localai_assistant admin gate ChatEndpoint already rejects metadata.localai_assistant=true from a non-admin caller, but the gate was open-coded inline with no direct test coverage. The chat route is FeatureChat-gated (default-on), and the assistant's in-process MCP server can install/delete models and edit configs — the wrong handler change would silently turn the LLM into a confused deputy. Extract the gate into requireAssistantAccess(c, authEnabled) and pin its behaviour: auth disabled is a no-op, unauthenticated is 403, RoleUser is 403, RoleAdmin and the synthetic legacy-key admin are admitted. No behaviour change in the production path. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): assert every API route is auth-classified The auth middleware classifies path prefixes (/api/, /v1/, /models/, etc.) as protected and treats anything else as a static-asset passthrough. A new endpoint shipped under a brand-new prefix — or a new path that simply isn't on the prefix allowlist — would be reachable anonymously. Walk every route registered by API() with auth enabled and a fresh in-memory database (no users, no keys), and assert each API-prefixed route returns 401 / 404 / 405 to an anonymous request. Public surfaces (/api/auth/*, /api/branding, /api/node/* token-authenticated routes, /healthz, branding asset server, generated-content server, static assets) are explicit allowlist entries with comments justifying them. Build-tagged 'auth' so it runs against the SQLite-backed auth DB (matches the existing auth suite). Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): pin agent endpoint per-user isolation contract agents.go's getUserID / effectiveUserID / canImpersonateUser / wantsAllUsers helpers are the single trust boundary for cross-user access on agent, agent-jobs, collections, and skills routes. A regression there is the difference between "regular user reads their own data" and "regular user reads anyone's data via ?user_id=victim". Lock in the contract: - effectiveUserID ignores ?user_id= for unauthenticated and RoleUser - effectiveUserID honours it for RoleAdmin and ProviderAgentWorker - wantsAllUsers requires admin AND the literal "true" string - canImpersonateUser is admin OR agent-worker, never plain RoleUser No production change — this commit only adds tests. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(downloader): drop redundant stat in removePartialFile The stat-then-remove pattern is a TOCTOU window and a wasted syscall — os.Remove already returns ErrNotExist for the missing-file case, so trust that and treat it as a no-op. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(http): redact secrets from trace buffer and distribution-token logs The /api/traces buffer captured Authorization, Cookie, Set-Cookie, and API-key headers verbatim from every request when tracing was enabled. The endpoint is admin-only but the buffer is reachable via any heap-style introspection and the captured tokens otherwise outlive the request. Strip those header values at capture time. Body redaction is left to a follow-up — the prompts are usually the operator's own and JSON-walking is invasive. Distribution tokens were also logged in plaintext from core/explorer/discovery.go; logs forward to syslog/journald and outlive the token. Redact those to a short prefix/suffix instead. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(auth): rate-limit OAuth callbacks separately from password endpoints The shared 5/min/IP limit on auth endpoints is right for password-style flows but too tight for OAuth callbacks: corporate SSO funnels many real users through one outbound IP and would trip the limit. Add a separate 60/min/IP limiter for /api/auth/{github,oidc}/callback so callbacks are bounded against floods without breaking shared-IP deployments. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(gallery): verify backend tarball sha256 when set in gallery entry GalleryBackend gained an optional sha256 field; the install path now threads it through to the existing downloader hash-verify (which already streams, verifies, and rolls back on mismatch). Galleries without sha256 keep working; the empty-SHA path still emits the existing "downloading without integrity check" warning. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): pin CSRF coverage on multipart endpoints The CSRF middleware in app.go is global (e.Use) so it covers every multipart upload route — branding assets, fine-tune datasets, audio transforms, agent collections. Pin that contract: cross-site multipart POSTs are rejected; same-origin / same-site / API-key clients are not. Also pins the SameSite=Lax fallback path the skipper relies on when Sec-Fetch-Site is absent. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(http): XSS hardening — CSP headers, safe href, base-href escape, SVG sandbox Several closely related XSS-prevention changes spanning the SPA shell, the React UI, and the branding asset server: - New SecurityHeaders middleware sets CSP, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, and Referrer-Policy on every response. The CSP keeps script-src permissive because the Vite bundle relies on inline + eval'd scripts; tightening that requires moving to a nonce-based policy. - The <base href> injection in the SPA shell escaped attacker-controllable Host / X-Forwarded-Host headers — a single quote in the host header broke out of the attribute. Pass through SecureBaseHref (html.EscapeString). - Three React sinks rendering untrusted content via dangerouslySetInnerHTML switch to text-node rendering with whiteSpace: pre-wrap: user message bodies in Chat.jsx and AgentChat.jsx, and the agent activity log in AgentChat.jsx. The hand-rolled escape on the agent user-message variant is replaced by the same plain-text path. - New safeHref util collapses non-allowlisted URI schemes (most importantly javascript:) to '#'. Applied to gallery `<a href={url}>` links in Models / Backends / Manage and to canvas artifact links — these come from gallery JSON or assistant tool calls and must be treated as untrusted. - The branding asset server attaches a sandbox CSP plus same-origin CORP to .svg responses. The React UI loads logos via <img>, but the same URL is also reachable via direct navigation; this prevents script execution if a hostile SVG slipped past upload validation. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(http): bound HTTP server with read-header and idle timeouts A net/http server with no timeouts is trivially Slowloris-able and leaks idle keep-alive connections. Set ReadHeaderTimeout (30s) to plug the slow-headers attack and IdleTimeout (120s) to cap keep-alive sockets. ReadTimeout and WriteTimeout stay at 0 because request bodies can be multi-GB model uploads and SSE / chat completions stream for many minutes; operators who need tighter per-request bounds should terminate slow clients at a reverse proxy. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(auth): pin PUT /api/auth/profile field-tampering contract The handler uses an explicit local body struct (only name and avatar_url) plus a gorm Updates(map) with a column allowlist, so an attacker posting {"role":"admin","email":"...","password_hash":"..."} can't mass-assign those fields. Lock that down with a regression test so a future "let's just c.Bind(&user)" refactor breaks loudly. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(services): strip directory components from multipart upload filenames UploadDataset and UploadToCollectionForUser took the raw multipart file.Filename and joined it into a destination path. The fine-tune upload was incidentally safe because of a UUID prefix that fused any leading '..' to a literal segment, but the protection is fragile. UploadToCollectionForUser handed the filename to a vendored backend without sanitising at all. Strip to filepath.Base at both boundaries and reject the trivial unsafe values ("", ".", "..", "/"). Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): validate persisted MCP server entries on load localStorage is shared across same-origin pages; an XSS that lands once can poison persisted MCP server config to attempt header injection or to feed a non-http URL into the fetch path on subsequent loads. Validate every entry: types must match, URL must parse with http(s) scheme, header keys/values must be control-char-free. Drop anything that doesn't fit. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(http): close X-Forwarded-Prefix open redirect The reverse-proxy support concatenated X-Forwarded-Prefix into the redirect target without validation, so a forged header value of "//evil.com" turned the SPA-shell redirect helper at /, /browse, and /browse/* into a 301 to //evil.com/app. The path-strip middleware had the same shape on its prefix-trailing-slash redirect. Add SafeForwardedPrefix at the middleware boundary: must start with a single '/', no protocol-relative '//' opener, no scheme, no backslash, no control characters. Apply at both consumers; misconfig trips the validator and the header is dropped. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(http): refuse wildcard CORS when LOCALAI_CORS=true with empty allowlist When LOCALAI_CORS=true but LOCALAI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS was empty, Echo's CORSWithConfig saw an empty allow-list and fell back to its default AllowOrigins=["*"]. An operator who flipped the strict-CORS feature flag without populating the list got the opposite of what they asked for. Echo never sets Allow-Credentials: true so this isn't directly exploitable (cookies aren't sent under wildcard CORS), but the misconfiguration trap is worth closing. Skip the registration and warn. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(auth): zxcvbn password strength check with user-acknowledged override The previous policy was len < 8, which let through "Password1" and the rest of the credential-stuffing corpus. LocalAI has no second factor yet, so the bar needs to sit higher. Add ValidatePasswordStrength using github.com/timbutler/zxcvbn (an actively-maintained fork of the trustelem port; v1.0.4, April 2024): - min 12 chars, max 72 (bcrypt's truncation point) - reject NUL bytes (some bcrypt callers truncate at the first NUL) - require zxcvbn score >= 3 ("safely unguessable, ~10^8 guesses to break"); the hint list ["localai", "local-ai", "admin"] penalises passwords built from the app's own branding zxcvbn produces false positives sometimes (a strong-looking password that happens to match a dictionary word) and operators occasionally need to set a known-weak password (kiosk demos, CI rigs). Add an acknowledgement path: PasswordPolicy{AllowWeak: true} skips the entropy check while still enforcing the hard rules. The structured PasswordErrorResponse marks weak-password rejections as Overridable so the UI can surface a "use this anyway" checkbox. Wired through register, self-service password change, and admin password reset on both the server and the React UI. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): drop HTML5 minLength on new-password inputs minLength={12} on the new-password input let the browser block the form submit silently before any JS or network call ran. The browser focused the field, showed a brief native tooltip, and that was that — no toast, no fetch, no clue. Reproducible by typing fewer than 12 chars on the second password change of a session. The JS-level length check in handleSubmit already shows a toast and the server rejects with a structured error, so the HTML5 attribute was redundant defence anyway. Drop it. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): bundle Geist fonts locally instead of fetching from Google The new CSP correctly refused to apply styles from fonts.googleapis.com because style-src is locked to 'self' and 'unsafe-inline'. Loosening the CSP would defeat its purpose; the right fix is to stop reaching out to a third-party CDN for fonts on every page load. Add @fontsource-variable/geist and @fontsource-variable/geist-mono as npm deps and import them once at boot. Drop the <link rel="preconnect"> and external stylesheet from index.html. Side benefit: no third-party tracking via Referer / IP on every UI load, no failure mode when offline / behind a captive portal. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): refresh i18n strings to reflect 12-char password minimum The translations still said "at least 8 characters" everywhere — the client-side toast on a too-short password change told the user the wrong floor. Update tooShort and newPasswordPlaceholder / newPasswordDescription across all five locales (en, es, it, de, zh-CN) to match the real ValidatePasswordStrength rule. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(auth): make password length-floor overridable like the entropy check The 12-char minimum was a policy choice, not a technical invariant — only "non-empty", "<= 72 bytes", and "no NUL bytes" are real bcrypt constraints. Treating length-12 as a hard rule was inconsistent with the entropy check (already overridable) and friction for use cases where the account is just a name on a session, not a security boundary (single-user kiosk, CI rig, lab demo). Restructure ValidatePasswordStrength: - Hard rules (always enforced): non-empty, <= MaxPasswordLength, no NUL byte - Policy rules (skipped when AllowWeak=true): length >= 12, zxcvbn score >= 3 PasswordError now marks password_too_short as Overridable too. The React forms generalised from `error_code === 'password_too_weak'` to `overridable === true`, and the JS-side preflight length checks were removed (server is source of truth, returns the same checkbox flow). Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |
||
|
Ettore Di Giacinto
|
59108fbe32 |
feat: add distributed mode (#9124)
* feat: add distributed mode (experimental) Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix data races, mutexes, transactions Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fixups Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix events and tool stream in agent chat Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * use ginkgo Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(cron): compute correctly time boundaries avoiding re-triggering Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * enhancements, refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * do not flood of healthy checks Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * do not list obvious backends as text backends Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * tests fixups Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * Drop redundant healthcheck Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * enhancements, refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |