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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Ettore Di Giacinto
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90eefb24fc |
fix(cluster): pin the derived retention to the sweep that applies it
The retention a worker's departure is kept for is now derived from the reconnect grace, so a purge can never outrun the window Presence measures against. Nothing pinned that. The sweep could be reverted to pass the constant, or the setter emptied out, and the suite stayed green either way: the specs covered the arithmetic helper, and the fix is the wiring. The loop now has a spec of its own. It departs two workers either side of the difference between the floor and the derived retention, and the row that must go is what witnesses the sweep running at all, so the row that must stay cannot survive by nothing happening. The default grace goes from 60s to 90s. Two of the worker's ceiling backoffs is 60s, but the failed dial between them costs its handshake timeout too, which puts the worst case at 70s, and the backoff resets only after a session long enough that a replica accepting a dial and then dying denies it. So the ceiling is reachable exactly during the rolling restart this window exists for, and 60s sat on the edge of it. Too short reports a live worker as gone and costs a model reload; too long reaps a dead one later. The cheaper mistake is the long one. A held row whose owner is dead and whose stamp is stale is the state a rolling upgrade actually produces, and it was the one state no spec built. It has an answer now, and the two ways to get this wrong land either side of it: reading the stamp first says gone, reading held-ness without the liveness join says connected. Two comments claimed more than the code did. There IS a grace at which a live worker is reported as gone, which is the point of it being a duration; and the switch that reads held-ness first is only a partial second gate, since with the SQL gate gone and a dead owner it answers gone rather than reconnecting. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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a8205323f0 |
feat(cluster): answer presence with four values on the database clock
A worker whose tunnel is gone is not, by that fact, a worker that has left. Absence is what makes the scheduler stop placing work, reap the worker's rows and evict its models, and one of those paths runs during inference, so the deployment needs to tell a worker re-homing between frontend replicas from one that is really gone before anything acts. Registry.Presence answers that in one joined statement, with four values and not a boolean: unknown when there is no row at all (this package cannot tell a worker that has never dialled from one whose departure aged out, and must not guess), connected while a live replica holds the tunnel, reconnecting while the departure is inside the grace, and gone once it is older. Only the last is a verdict a caller may act on. Held-ness is asked FIRST and the departure only refines it, in the SQL and again in the switch that reads it. Every writer here clears disconnected_at in the statement that writes the owner, but that is a property of these writers rather than of the table: a replica running a binary from before the column existed re-claims without clearing the stamp, so during a rolling upgrade a held row carries an old departure, and a read that consults the stamp first reports a connected worker as gone for the whole upgrade. Both windows are computed by the database, for the reason every other window in this package is: they are compared across replicas, and replicas disagreeing about whether a worker is gone is the flapping this branch exists to remove. No behavioural spec can see the difference, since the test container shares the host clock, so the statement shape is pinned instead. The grace is an operator's knob, defaulting to twice the worker tunnel's maximum reconnect backoff. That made the fixed departure retention wrong: an operator raising the grace past it gets a purge that deletes departures before the grace elapses, so a worker that is gone reads as unknown forever and nothing ever reaps it. The retention is now derived from the grace, with the old constant as its floor. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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aee35fe86e |
feat(cluster): record a departure instead of erasing the connection
Releasing a worker tunnel deleted its node_connections row, so "this worker's link dropped a moment ago" and "this worker has never connected here" were one observation: no row. Nothing above could tell a worker re-homing between replicas from a worker that is gone, and any grace period built on top would have had nothing to measure from. The row now survives a departure. Release clears owner_instance_id and stamps disconnected_at on the database clock; the membership sweep and Deregister do the same for every connection a dead or departing replica held; Claim clears the stamp in the same upsert that writes the owner, so a reconnect is never observed half-applied. PurgeDepartedBefore deletes a departure once it is older than DepartedRetention, and the membership tick owns that schedule. Owner and OwnerRow report a departed row as ErrNoConnection, through the one predicate connectionIsHeld, the way instanceIsLive is the one predicate for replica liveness. This change records the departure and does not interpret it: how long ago it happened is nobody's answer yet. The sweep only clears rows that are still held. An empty owner is in no instance's id, so without that filter every heartbeat would restamp every departed row and no departure could ever age out. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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6ae93a3d6a |
fix(cluster): keep the refusal vocabulary in one table
The worker re-classified a failure a local service had already classified. classifyServiceFailure preserved exactly one of the four refusal codes, which was faithful to its own comment for as long as there was one worth keeping; once ErrStreamNotServed existed, a service returning the code whose whole job is to say "I learned nothing" had it promoted to ErrStreamTargetUnavailable, which every reap guard acts on. ErrStreamTagUnknown was promoted too, and cost nothing only because both sides of that one reap. No in-tree service produces either, which is the same "unreachable, therefore safe" argument that let the request-frame merge survive a whole phase, and LocalService is exported. The cause was a fifth site enumerating the vocabulary by hand, so the fix is one table. streamRefusals pairs each sentinel with its wire code and with whether a frontend may act on it as evidence about a backend, and the writer, the reader, IsWorkerAnswer and the new IsStreamRefusal all read it. A fifth code is now taught to every one of them at once. The codes are also pinned against literals written out in a spec, the way this branch already pinned the NATS vocabulary. The round-trip table cannot see a rename, because a rename moves the writer and the reader together; an unrecognised code is deliberately not the worker's answer, so renaming "unavailable" would turn every crashed backend on a tunnelled worker into a row nothing can ever reap, silently and with the suite green. Three comments the previous fix falsified, corrected: - tunnelHeaderTimeout still said the window bounds only framing the frontend writes immediately after opening the stream. That is true on the direct path and false on the relay path, and it was the argument for treating an expiry as the frontend's fault. - classifyServiceFailure's deny-list is three causes, not two: on a dial error net.Error.Timeout also covers ETIMEDOUT and EAGAIN. Both are kept deliberately, because reaping a wedged or resource-starved backend is the eviction this phase exists to prevent, and ECONNREFUSED still reaps. isReadTimeout is renamed reportsTimeout, which is what it asks. - The operator table named three refusals and said a refusal is acted on. It now lists four, with when each is sent and whether the row is reaped. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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e8d2563abe |
fix(cluster): stop a late request frame reading as the worker's verdict
Making a worker's refusal reaping evidence created a defect one layer along, at the producer. The worker refused a ReadStreamRequest failure with ErrStreamRequestInvalid and its own comment said "Includes the deadline above expiring", which was harmless while every refusal reached the frontend as "no route" and became a reap the moment one of them did not. So a request frame that had merely not ARRIVED yet was reported as a non-transient verdict about a backend. It is reachable on the relay path, which carries most production traffic: the worker's header timer starts when the OWNING replica opens the stream, while the frame is written by the DIALLING replica only after the relay's acceptance travels back to it, so a whole peer-link round trip runs inside that window, on a link this design deliberately loads with multi-gigabyte artifacts beside token streams. For a long-deadline caller the endpoint is ConnectionEvictingClient, which stops the model across the fleet. It also falsified the "neither clears on its own" argument that licensed the reap. There is now a fourth refusal, ErrStreamNotServed, for what a worker could not serve for a reason of its OWN. It is deliberately outside IsWorkerAnswer, so it reaches a consumer under the no-route umbrella and reaps nothing, which is the same treatment an unrecognised code already gets. Four producers move onto it: a request frame that timed out (a malformed one stays a verdict, because that is a frontend bug no retry fixes), both SetReadDeadline failures, which are facts about the stream and not about a target nothing has dialled yet, and WriteStreamRefusal's default for a reason nobody classified. classifyServiceFailure keeps ErrStreamTargetUnavailable as its default on purpose: inverting it would make errno enumeration the single point of failure for the reap, and a miss there is a row nothing can ever delete. What it gains is a deny-list of two causes that are provably this worker's own clock or its own context. Also: - The read-site caller-deadline guard in the handshake was unpinned: the existing seam spends the budget before the handshake starts, so only the write could ever fail. A spec whose deadline falls between the request and the reply pins it, and each guard now reddens on its own. - The documented worker-first failure line omitted the JSON error envelope the old frontend returns, so an operator grepping it found nothing. - The peer-link disclosure names the aimable per-session receive window in all four places, and LastDialErrorOf records why a third consumer must go through IsWorkerAnswer rather than roll its own list. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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118eea6931 |
fix(distributed): let a worker's own refusal be evidence about its backend
A worker that refuses a stream has answered, and cluster.Dial keeps the three tunnelproto sentinels out of the ErrNoRoute umbrella precisely so a consumer can act on that. No consumer did. Since workers stopped listening, a backend process that crashed on a healthy worker is no longer a dead listener's codes.Unavailable: the worker refuses the stream with ErrStreamTargetUnavailable, gRPC flattens it into Unavailable anyway, and nodes.unroutable reported the whole thing as "this frontend has no route". Every reap path then answered ProbeUnknown and left the row, so the replica slot never freed and at the default MaxReplicasPerModel=1 the only cleanup left was LRU eviction of models that were working. isWorkerAnswer is exported as cluster.IsWorkerAnswer, so the errors the dialer keeps out of the umbrella are by construction the errors the consumers treat as the worker answering. nodes.unroutable and pkg/model's transportFailure both use it; ConnectionEvictingClient, the site reached during inference, goes through transportFailure rather than asking the transport directly. A reply code this frontend does not recognise is still not an answer, so a newer worker's vocabulary costs a retry and not a replica. The reap guards keep the allow-list rather than requiring ErrNoRoute: an unrecognised dial error must mean "no route", never "the backend is gone". Also in this final pass over the branch: - Docs: recommend upgrading FRONTENDS first, with the symptom of each order. Workers-first fails now that a 4xx registration is a verdict rather than an outage, so an old frontend's "address is required for backend workers" makes each restarted worker exit and drains the fleet a node per restart. - Docs: LOCALAI_WORKER_TUNNEL=false is a fatal startup error, not a degraded mode, in both places that described it; and a frontend rollback needs every worker restarted, because re-registration force-clears the address columns. - A replica with no advertised address now says so every five minutes and names the workers only it can reach, instead of one startup warning for a cost paid for the life of the process. - callerRanOut's rule now holds at all three siblings, so an expired caller deadline stops reading as a broken tunnel; probeHealth's withdrawn reason for using the raw client is corrected; the dead DoOrCached is deleted and its coverage kept on DoOrCachedResult; sweepLeakedInFlight enumerates the outcomes that reach it. - The peer route's self-declared id is recorded as a phase-3 deferral, in the handler, in the isolation claim it narrows, and in the operator docs. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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764fe46157 |
test(distributed): prove the worker tunnel end to end, under real inference
Everything this phase built was proven by unit and integration specs. This is the first run of it against the real binaries: a frontend replica per process, a worker that binds nothing routable, real inference over the result. Four scenarios, each with the question "what would make this pass if the tunnel were doing nothing" answered rather than left open. A worker with no advertised address is reached through its tunnel. The roster is asserted to report it advertising nothing, so there is no address a frontend could have dialled instead, and node_connections is asserted to name the replica that serves the request. A request landing on the replica that does NOT own the worker is relayed to the one that does. With N replicas behind round robin that is (N-1)/N of production traffic, so it gets the FIRST request for its model: the backend install, the file staging on the http tag, and the gRPC load and predict all cross the relay. Which replica owns the tunnel is read from the ownership table through the production Owner query and mapped to a frontend index through the address the harness pins per replica; the non-owner is derived from that reading and asserted to be a non-owner immediately before the request, rather than assumed from the harness default. Sending the same request to the owner reddens it. Killing the owning replica re-homes the worker onto the survivor. The worker dials a balancer rather than a replica, because LOCALAI_REGISTER_TO is resolved once at boot and is the tunnel endpoint as well as the registration one: aimed at a single replica, a worker has nowhere to reconnect to when that replica dies, and the re-home cannot happen at all. Removing the kill reddens it. And the negative control for the whole suite, which is why the other three mean anything. Frontend and worker share a host here, so every backend port the frontend names in a stream target is one it could have dialled directly; if it did, the first three would pass with the tunnel inert. LOCALAI_WORKER_TUNNEL is no longer usable for this, because it is a fatal startup error and a worker that never started says nothing about a worker reachable some other way. The balancer answers the tunnel connect path itself instead, leaving a worker that registers, heartbeats, reports healthy and holds no tunnel. It is asserted to have dialled and been refused, asserted to be held by nobody, and then asserted unreachable with the refusal naming the missing route. Then the block is lifted, nothing else changes, and the same request succeeds: that is what attributes the refusal to the tunnel rather than to any of the ordinary reasons an e2e inference fails. The fifth spec measures the head-of-line blocking this phase deferred three times. 128 MiB crosses the session while a warm model is probed back to back, direct and relayed. Median latency is unchanged, the worst probe is about 3x the baseline median and about a seventeenth of the transfer window, and the transfer runs at 415-490 MB/s direct and 222-268 MB/s relayed. A session that head-of-line blocked would park a probe for the length of the window. Leave the yamux windows untuned; and note this is loopback, so it says the multiplexing does not serialise and says nothing about a link with a bandwidth-delay product. The load spec is measured against a control that the first version did not have. It passed with the bulk artifact cut to 4 KiB, because the window it read probes against was mostly cold-load overhead: it would have reported a clean bill on a session carrying no large message. The same cold load now runs twice, once empty and once bulk, and the difference between the windows is asserted to be real before any latency is read from it. Two defects on the base commit came out of this. cluster_peerlink_test.go has been red since the relay landed, deterministically, in isolation and in the suite. It asserted that an accepted peer stream is refused at once, on the premise that phase 1 installs no relay. The relay correctly waits fifteen seconds for a frame naming the worker, and the spec's budget was five. It now writes a relay request for a node no replica holds and asserts the refusal is ErrNotOwner and specifically not ErrNoConnection, which is a stronger spec than the one it replaces and the only thing in the e2e suite that exercises the relay's refusal path. The harness handed a worker's own HTTP port to a backend process. It took two ports from freeport and used one as the gRPC base and the other for the file transfer server; freeport returns adjacent ports often, and the backend allocator hands out base, base+1, base+2, so the second backend started on a worker was regularly given the HTTP server's port and died with EADDRINUSE. No spec had started two backends on one worker before, so it had never fired; the load spec starts five and it failed about one run in three. Each worker now reserves a contiguous bind-probed block laid out the way production lays it out, below the kernel's ephemeral range, with LOCALAI_GRPC_MAX_PORT bounding the allocator to it. The underlying production defect is not fixed here and is recorded in the report: allocatePort never checks that a port is free, and its default range overlaps the ephemeral range on every Linux box. Constraint 6, whether distributed mode should now refuse to start without an advertised address, is DEFERRED, and the comment and the docs that described the cost were understating it. A replica with no advertised address writes no instances row, and Owner joins a connection against a live instance, so a worker whose tunnel lands there is unroutable from every OTHER replica while being registered and healthy. Refusing to start would still be wrong, because the deployments it would break are single-host ones with no peers to be unreachable by, and telling those apart at startup is a design with its own specs. Both places now say what actually happens. Suite wall clock 592s for 15 specs, up from 502s for 10 of which 2 were red. The CI budget of 20 minutes does not move. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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18f5ac8acc |
fix(distributed): refuse a worker that cannot tunnel, and say why it was refused
Review round 1 on the change that stopped workers listening. One blocking item
and seven notes.
LOCALAI_WORKER_TUNNEL=false was the blocking one, and the ruling was to make it
fatal rather than to correct the comment that still promised it fell back to the
advertised address. There is no fallback left: a worker on this branch
advertises nothing and binds only loopback, so turning the tunnel off leaves it
reachable by nothing while it registers, heartbeats and reports healthy, and the
scheduler keeps placing models on it. That is the worst available failure shape,
so a new Config.validateStartup refuses it before prefetch, registration and
NATS, while the worker is still invisible to the cluster. It absorbs the
pre-existing empty-registration-token check, which had the same shape and no
spec. The flag is kept rather than deleted so an operator who set it is told the
promise is gone instead of having the setting ignored, and the guard around
StartTunnel is removed, because a branch nothing can take reads as a supported
no-tunnel mode that does not exist.
The justification for erroring on an install that names no address was wrong,
and the review is right that this is the dangerous form of overclaiming, because
the conclusion holds and the mechanism does not. It said the resulting empty
target would be refused as an invalid stream and that the refusal would read as
the worker answering about its backend. Nothing in this repo branches on
cluster.ErrNoRoute, and nodes.unroutable treats any recorded dial error as
unroutable, so that refusal reaches every reap guard as ProbeUnknown and deletes
nothing. The site now stands on what holds, that an install naming no port
produced nothing routable and the failure belongs to the install rather than to
a later probe, and records the retracted claim so nobody re-derives it. This
retracts the same paragraph in the body of
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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f7da9df5fc |
feat(distributed): stop workers listening, and stop them advertising
A worker now opens no listener on a routable interface and states no endpoint at registration. Backend processes and the file-transfer server bind loopback, and the frontend reaches both through the tunnel the worker dials. The bind address is built from loopbackHost, the same constant the tunnel's grpc tag dials, so "the worker binds where its tunnel dials" is one fact in one place rather than two literals that can drift. All three advertisement sites are closed, not one: the registration body, RegisterNodeRequest, and the per-backend address in the install reply. That third one was hiding a live bug. stopModelExact refuses a stop whose ExpectedAddress does not match what the worker recorded for the process. The worker recorded 127.0.0.1:port; handleBackendInstall reported advertiseHost:port; the router stored the reported one and sent it straight back. On any worker whose advertise host was not 127.0.0.1, every acknowledged model stop failed with an address mismatch. Nothing caught it because the e2e harness set LOCALAI_ADVERTISE_ADDR=127.0.0.1, which made the rewrite a no-op. Removing the rewrite makes the two strings the same by construction. The brief was wrong about two of the four functions it called dead. effectiveBasePort is the base of the backend port allocator and resolveHTTPAddr is the file server's bind address; deleting them would have deleted the port allocator and the file server. Only the two advertise* helpers were dead, and addr_test.go is rewritten rather than deleted, because the port arithmetic it pinned still needs pinning. NodeModel.Address survives with a narrowed meaning and is renamed WorkerLocalAddress, along with the install reply field that feeds it. The frontend still has to say WHICH backend process on a worker it means, and the port in this string is how it says it: it travels as a stream target and the worker dials its own loopback. The gorm column and the json key stay "address", so neither a migration nor an API break rides along. Every fall-back to the node's address is gone. installBackendOnNode now errors when a worker reports success without naming one, because substituting the now-always-empty node address would name an empty target, and the worker refuses that as an invalid stream, which is classified as the worker answering about its backend. That is the "a present worker reads as something it is not" class this phase forbids. DistributedModelStore.Range had the same shape and was already wrong: it built each remote model's client from the node's base gRPC port, never the port a backend process listens on, so Free and Status went to the wrong place. It uses the replica's address now. BackendNode.Address and HTTPAddress are kept but made provably inert: no writer, no reader that acts on them, and Register force-clears both on re-registration so an upgraded worker's stale advertisement does not outlive its own upgrade in the API and the Nodes page. Dropping the columns is a ~90-site edit across the specs, the e2e suite, the MCP dto and the UI; it is recorded as a follow-up rather than folded in here. A persistent tunnel 401 still does not trigger re-registration, and now for a reason rather than a deferral. Register CLEARS the node's replica rows, so re-registering on a 401 would delete a live worker's rows on every retry, and under the name collision that causes the 401 the two workers would take turns doing it forever: a credential failure causing model reclamation. It also cannot fix the named cause, since a collision is indistinguishable from a restart. The 401 log now names both causes and says nothing can reach this worker, which is true only now that it has no listener. The container healthcheck did not break the way the brief expected, since the listener still exists on loopback and the probe runs inside the container. It did have a real #10987 defect that this change makes the common case: it read LOCALAI_SERVE_ADDR only, while effectiveBasePort reads LOCALAI_ADDR first, so a worker on a non-default base port was probed on 50050 and reported unhealthy while working. It follows the same precedence now. Docs, the compose file and the e2e harness are updated in step: no inbound rule or published port is needed for a worker, the two advertise variables are gone, the remaining address variables are read for their port only, the firewall-the-file-transfer-port warning is narrowed to the LOCALAI_HTTP_ADDR opt-out, and the upgrade-order note no longer claims the worker still listens. The Nodes page showed node.address, which is now always blank, so it shows the node id instead. Eight mutations, all red on a named spec, including reverting the loopback bind, re-adding the address to the registration body, restoring both node-address fall-backs, dropping the force-clear, storing the endpoint's address again, and un-fixing the healthcheck. One of them caught a defect in a spec I had just written: it asserted 200 where the endpoint returns 201, which went unnoticed because core/http/endpoints/localai is not on the task's verify list. It is run here. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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f2cc5a25cb |
fix(grpc): let the transport answer through the wrappers, not only past gRPC
Re-review round 2. One blocking defect, and it was the concern I filed myself last round and mis-scoped as a future trap. It was live, and it sat on the most destructive reaping path of the five. RouteResult.Client is an InFlightTrackingClient, over a FileStagingClient when a stager is configured. model_router puts that on the cached remote model and pkg/model's checkIsLoaded asks IT whether the transport failed. Both wrappers embed grpc.Backend, which does not declare LastDialError, so the type assertion read nil and the guard added last round fell straight through to the old eviction. That eviction sends backend.stop over NATS to every node holding the model and deletes every replica row, where the other sites delete one. The spec covering it built a bare client by hand, which is why it passed while production did not. This is the third time in this task a correct fix was disarmed one layer out, so the fix is a mechanism rather than two methods. BackendUnwrapper is one line per decorator, LastDialErrorOf walks the chain, and both consumers now call it instead of each keeping its own assertion. One implementation, no per-caller policy to get wrong. Sweeping every type that embeds or holds a grpc.Backend found a third decorator the review had not named, and it is itself a reaping consumer of the same collapsed signal. ConnectionEvictingClient is built for remote models in initializers.go and its evict callback runs ShutdownModel; it fires during INFERENCE rather than on a health check, so a tunnel blip mid-request was enough to stop a model that was loaded and serving. It consults the transport first now. A locally spawned backend has no custom transport, so that path is unchanged byte for byte. Everything else touching a Backend is a consumer rather than a decorator; there is no fourth. The probe cache joiner shape is pinned. It was the right design last round with nothing holding it: the mutation back to a closed-over variable passed all 602 specs in the package. Eight goroutines coalesced on a probe that blocks on a channel now assert every joiner gets the leader's REASON and not just its answer, which is the difference between a leader declining to reap and its seven joiners reaping on the leader's own observation. The LastDialError scope note claimed an exactness it does not have at checkIsLoaded, which reads a shared long-lived client after releasing opMutex. It now says which caller is not exact, why the imprecision is accepted there, and what making it exact would cost. The four-outcome table in the docs still said a worker with no live owner is treated as absent and rescheduled, contradicting the code and the paragraph nine lines below it. None of those outcomes is absence any more, and the table says so, names the fifth, and points at the heartbeat as the thing that does decide presence. Five mutations, each reddening named specs, including the two the reviewer found surviving. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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4945e44595 |
fix(cluster): make "no route" a condition of its own, and let it out of the package
Review round 1 on task 6. Five blocking findings, all with the same root: the conditions the dialer kept apart were erased one layer out, because every one of them arrived at core/services/nodes as a gRPC codes.Unavailable, which is also what a backend process that died produces. Four call sites acted on that by deleting a replica row, one of them after a single failed probe. The fifth condition is ErrNoRoute: this replica could not get a request to a worker's backend, and no claim at all about the worker. A worker's presence is its HEARTBEAT, which nodes owns; a route is a separate fact that cluster owns, and the two now differ. They differ in normal operation, not exotically: a worker that has not dialled its tunnel yet after a frontend-first upgrade is unroutable on every request while it heartbeats and serves. Two properties, both mutation-tested. Every failure to resolve or open a route carries ErrNoRoute, so a consumer has one check to make. No failure carries an absence sentinel: routeFailure is the single place that rule lives, and it keeps ErrNoConnection and ErrInstanceNotFound in the message and out of the unwrap chain, the guarantee unreachableError already made for peers. Everything else stays matchable, so ErrNotOwner and ErrPeerUnreachable are unchanged for anyone who can act on them. A worker's own refusal carries no umbrella, because a worker that answers has demonstrated it is there and that is the only real evidence on the path. Crossing the boundary needed a value, not a code. NewClientWithDialer wraps the dialer and records each outcome; LastDialError hands it back behind a narrow interface, and nodes.unroutable turns it into ErrWorkerUnroutable with the cluster sentinels still in the chain. A spec asserts a dial failing with ErrNoRoute plus ErrPeerUnreachable arrives matching all three and matching neither absence sentinel. The sweep found a fourth site the review had not named: pkg/model checkIsLoaded evicts a remote model on a connection error, and a tunnel dial failure is one. Four other reap sites were cleared with reasons - inflight and the worker authoritative pass reap only on semantic answers, scale-down is driven by last_used, abandoned loads decide on the node's heartbeat. Every fixed site also grew the opposite spec, so the new check cannot pass by never reaping. probeCache carries the reason through singleflight rather than a closed-over variable. A variable is only written by the goroutine that runs the probe, so the leader would correctly decline to reap while every joiner reaped on the leader's own observation; a mutation reproduces exactly that. The docs sentence promising LOCALAI_WORKER_TUNNEL=false restores direct dialling is gone. There is no such path, so it said the operator could take a worker dark and call it a rollback. Replaced with the upgrade order that is actually safe. The deadline spec the reviewer found vacuous now waits on the dial context's own Done channel before touching the stream, so the armed deadline has really expired; the mutation that survived for the reviewer reddens it. Nine mutations, each reddening a named spec, including both halves of isAbsenceClaim independently. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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d1b33140da |
feat(cluster): reach every worker through its tunnel, never its address
The tunnel, the fence, the registry and the relay were all built and none of them carried a byte: every dial from the frontend still went to the address a worker registered. This is where that stops. One WorkerDialer resolves where a worker's tunnel is held, opens a stream on it locally or relays through the owning replica, and hands back a conn past both handshakes; gRPC, the file stager's HTTP client and the log-streaming WebSocket are all pointed at it. A worker's address stops being somewhere to connect to and becomes the name of which backend process a stream is for. It still appears in URLs, logs and errors, because that is what identifies the process; what it no longer decides is where the bytes go. Nothing falls back to dialling it. BackendClientFactory now has exactly one method, NewClientForNode, and returns an error where there is no way to reach the worker. The direct-dial constructor was removed rather than kept beside it, because leaving one on the interface keeps the bypass one word away from every call site that holds an address, which is all of them. The second construction path is closed too. DistributedModelStore built remote models with a nil client, and pkg/model.Model.GRPC then dialled the raw address lazily on first use - reached in production by ShutdownModel's Free and by the backend monitor's Status. Those models now carry the tunnel-backed client, and a model that cannot be given one is logged and not listed. Four conditions stay unmixable, and one path produces absence: the dialer answers ErrNoConnection only where Owner's liveness join did. A peer that will not answer, a stale ownership row, a worker's own refusal and a missing relay path are each reported as themselves. This matters because nodes ACTS on absence, and the collapse would have it reclaim the models of a worker that is connected and busy. That is not hypothetical. Writing the mutation for it exposed the bug in this change's own first draft: probeHealth returned bare false when it could not build a client, and tryWarmPath deletes the replica row on a false probe. A frontend whose dialer broke would have emptied node_models for the whole deployment while every model kept running. probeHealth now returns alive and probed separately, the reconciler gets a ProbeUnknown outcome that neither advances nor clears a failure streak, and the health monitor skips rather than counting a miss. Task 5 left the relay's open timeout at a fixed 15s and said so: no operator has the information to set it, because the number that matters is the original client's remaining budget, which is invisible on the relay side. The dialer has that budget, so it now states it in the relay request frame and the owner takes the smaller of the two. It can only shorten - a patient client must not be able to park a relay goroutine and a stream slot on a worker that stopped accepting. Zero is written as no budget at all, since on the far side the number zero is a caller with nothing left and would refuse healthy traffic. Seven mutations, each reddening a named spec: peer-unreachable as absence; the local-failure guard dropped; max instead of min on the budget; the nil-client model restored; ProbeUnknown falling through to the reaper; OwnerRow instead of Owner; probed collapsed into alive. The first budget spec passed for the wrong reason - a handshake deadline, not the relay - and was replaced by three that each assert one link, including one where the spec plays the owning replica and reads the budget out of the frame instead of inferring it from a clock. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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4ec400d29d |
fix(worker): spec the tunnel's routing table, which was the SSRF boundary
Review follow-up. One blocking finding and seven others. The blocking one first, and it is this project's recurring shape: the untested path. loopbackService is the function whose comment calls the discarded host "the security property this function exists for", and nothing tested it. The reviewer replaced its body with a dial of whatever the frontend named, no port range, and all 131 specs passed. Every spec installed the permissive test dialler, so the real routing table was exercised nowhere. It now has specs, and the property is stated as reachability rather than as a property of the code: a listener on 127.0.0.2 that only the frontend's target names must NOT be reached. Plus the port-range table, fixedService, loopbackAddr, tunnelEndpoint, and the table itself, which moved out of Run into tunnelServices so it can be built without starting a worker. One spec drives a real stream through that table over the wire, so the routing rules are exercised end to end at least once rather than only in isolation. The reviewer's mutation now reddens ten specs, and six narrower ones redden between two and four each, so no spec is riding on another. The shape changed too, not only the coverage. The dial address is built from a loopbackHost constant and strconv.Itoa of a validated int, so nothing derived from the wire reaches DialContext at all: restoring the hole takes ADDING a data flow, not deleting a check. And a taxonomy fix found while specifying it. A port outside this worker's allocator range was reported as unavailable, which tells a frontend to retry something that can never work. It is a bad request now, and a backend that is merely not listening yet stays unavailable, which is the retryable one. Agent nodes no longer get a tunnel credential. Nothing dials into an agent worker, so a tunnel replaces nothing for it and no client would open one, and the gate is at the mint site rather than in the handler: with no credential minted the hash stays empty and the existing empty-hash refusal covers it, so enforcement is structural. Two comments and one doc paragraph said an anonymous registrant gets a "working" credential. With auto-approve off the node is pending and the credential is inert, which is the distinction this same change argues three files away to justify minting for pending nodes at all. A refusal reason over the frame limit was cut on a byte boundary and could split a rune. It cuts on a rune boundary now, and the code survives truncation, which is what keeps a refusal classifiable. Also: the pending-node spec asserted only that a credential was non-empty, so a credential derived from the shared token passed it; it now pins per-node-ness the way the headline spec does. The tunnel handler's citations into nodes.go were stale before this branch landed, having been written against a file the same commit was editing, and are by function name now. The static-NATS path says plainly that an externally forced rotation locks it out until restart, and where that gets fixed. tunnelproto gained direct specs, including that a read failure is never reported as a refusal. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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099e2b00af |
feat(worker): dial, hold and serve the tunnel, on a credential of its own
The worker end of the tunnel. It dials wss://<register-to>/api/cluster/connect, holds one yamux session as the CLIENT, and serves every stream the frontend opens on it. Nothing dials into the worker, which is the point: no inbound port, no reachable address. Each stream opens with a length-prefixed frame naming a tag and a target, and the worker answers before either side speaks the tunnelled protocol. The reply is sent on every stream, not only on refusal, because the protocols carried here are client-speaks-first and a reply sent only sometimes would arrive interleaved with a response body. Two tags today: grpc reaches a backend process, and only on 127.0.0.1 within this worker's own backend port range, because a tunnel terminates inside the worker and letting the frontend name a host would make every worker a proxy into its own LAN; http reaches the worker's file-transfer server, whose address the frontend is not asked about. An unknown tag, an unreachable local service and an unparseable request are three refusals and stay three on the wire. A frontend gives up on the first and retries the second. Each is answered AND the stream is ended: a worker that says why and leaves the stream open has parked the caller on a request nobody will answer, and a deadline on the far side cannot tell that from a slow worker. The specs assert the stream ends rather than that an error occurred, which is what phase 1 shipped in three places and held in none. Reconnects double from 500ms to a 30s ceiling, each wait drawn between half the interval and all of it, and the interval returns to its floor only after a session that LASTED. Resetting on connect is how a rolling restart, where every dial succeeds and dies moments later, becomes a retry storm against the first replica back up. Nothing is assumed to survive a reconnect: the credential is read at dial time, never captured. And the credential is now real. The tunnel endpoint advertised authenticating a worker against its own secret, but registration stored the hash of the shared registration token, so a leak plus a known node ID still opened a tunnel. Registration now mints a per-node secret, returns the plaintext once as tunnel_token, and stores only its SHA-256 in a new column; the endpoint compares against that and does not fall back to the old one. Rotating on every registration follows from storing only the hash, since a re-registering worker cannot be told the secret it already holds; its live tunnel is unaffected, because the credential is checked when a tunnel is dialled and never again. Unlike the agent API key and the NATS JWT next to it, the credential IS issued to a node awaiting approval: the tunnel route re-reads the node's status on every dial and refuses a pending one, so it is inert until an admin acts, and withholding it would strand every worker that registers exactly once. A node that has not registered since this change cannot tunnel, and the column cannot be back-filled because the plaintext only ever existed in the response that minted it. The boot warning that said tunnels need LOCALAI_REGISTRATION_TOKEN is replaced: it was true while the tunnel authenticated against that token's hash, and says the wrong thing now. What is still true, and is what it warns about instead, is that without one, registration itself is unauthenticated. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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15cb4be76e |
fix(cluster): harden the worker tunnel, and stop starting a database per spec
Review follow-up. Twelve findings, none blocking, grouped here by what they protect. Panics. The handler now recovers between the WebSocket upgrade and the hand-off, the way the peer link next door already did: net/http recovers the panic but leaves the hijacked socket open, so without this a worker keeps a session this replica has no entry for and will never detach. The claim gate in Attach and reclaimOne is now released with defer, so a panic under Claim cannot wedge one node's gate for the life of the process. SetTunnels gained the nil-receiver guard its sibling Stop has. Operability. A deployment with no registration token stores an empty token_hash on every worker, so every tunnel dial 401s forever on a frontend that looks correctly configured. That now warns at startup, logs its own line rather than sharing the "wrong token" one, and is stated in the docs together with the fact that setting the token later needs the workers to register again. Authorization. A node still awaiting admin approval is refused with 403. The rest of /api/node/ gates on nothing, but the two places that hand a node something durable, its API key and its NATS credential, both refuse a pending one, and a tunnel is that kind of grant. Draining and unhealthy nodes keep their tunnels on purpose. Comments that claimed more than the code. The global auth middleware does run on this path and then declines to reject; the future per-node secret only lands without a change here if it lands in TokenHash; the empty-hash guard is defensive rather than deciding; ClusterPathPrefix is no longer only replica-to-replica; the docs no longer say a reaped replica re-claims unconditionally. And the test harness. SetupTestDB started a PostgreSQL container per BeforeEach with a readiness deadline it asserted on, which is one chance per spec to fail one spec inside its setup, anywhere, never twice in the same place: the shape of the flake seen twice here and never reproduced. It now starts one container per process and creates a database per call, which is the pattern tests/e2e already proved. Isolation is unchanged and is now asserted for the first time. All 69 call sites are untouched; the eleven consumer packages run 1404 specs green, and jobs went from 34.3s to 3.3s, agents from 13.8s to 1.9s, cluster from 97.4s to 37.5s. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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4d26e648bc |
feat(cluster): open the door a worker dials its tunnel through
A worker needs no inbound port: it dials GET /api/cluster/connect, the connection becomes one multiplexed yamux session, and the frontend opens a stream on it per request. This adds the endpoint that accepts that dial and attaches it to the tunnel registry. The dial is authenticated against the NODE's own stored token hash rather than the deployment's registration token. That is the mechanism, not yet the isolation, since a worker still registers by presenting the shared token; what it rules out is the shortcut of comparing against the configured value, which would have to be unpicked the day workers get their own secrets. Every refusal happens BEFORE the WebSocket upgrade, so a dialer reads an HTTP status rather than a handshake error. The route is registered in every deployment, single-binary ones included, which is what puts it in front of the route-coverage test that holds that rule in place; with no node registry it refuses every dial, and tells a credentialed one the frontend has no cluster rather than that its token is wrong. A lookup that FAILED is answered as a failure. Reporting a database that could not be read as "unauthorized" would send a worker re-registering, throwing away the identity its tunnel and loaded models are keyed by. Wires the tunnel registry in core/application/distributed.go and hands it to the membership loop. Without that call the re-claim after a replica is reaped had no production caller and could never run. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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dca8ce7149 |
feat(cluster): give phase 1 a call site, and prove it against real replicas
Tasks 1 to 5 built an instances table, a splice, both halves of a peer link and an epoch fence, and nothing in the tree called any of it: no replica registered, no route was mounted, no sweeper ran. Proving phase 1 end to end therefore had to start by wiring it. A frontend in distributed mode now publishes the address its peers dial, heartbeats it, and sweeps replicas that stopped answering along with the connection rows they owned, in one pass so the two can never disagree about who is alive. It serves the peer link and owns the sessions peers dial in, refusing streams on them until phase 2 installs a relay: a session nobody accepts on does not fail a peer's Open, it hangs it. The address is the one peers use, not the one the process binds, and it is derived from the route to PostgreSQL. That derivation only holds while the database is remote, so LOCALAI_DISTRIBUTED_ADVERTISE_ADDR sets it explicitly and a replica that can determine neither warns and keeps serving rather than failing to start. Three e2e scenarios run against real local-ai processes, real PostgreSQL and real dials: replicas publish addresses that can actually be connected to; a sibling opens a stream over the peer link and is refused without the cluster token; and a killed replica is reported unreachable, never absent, loses the claim it held, and takes no worker with it. Each was verified by mutation: eight injected defects, each failing the scenario that claims to catch it. Also moves RegisterClusterRoutes to core/http/routes beside every other registrar, folds AutoMigrate and the epoch sequence into one cluster.Migrate, and turns the peer route's auth-coverage spec into a real assertion: it drives the request through the actual auth middleware instead of comparing two string constants, which the old spec would have passed even with the exemption deleted. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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d5256a5584 |
fix(ui): restore node operation controls (#12068)
The node restructure hid backend logs and split related controls across inconsistent layouts. Restore contextual log actions and align the detail page with the fleet dashboard. Make multi-node selection clear and accessible. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Playwright ESLint Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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997d403de4 |
feat(nodes): add fleet operations dashboard (#12046)
* feat(nodes): report CPU telemetry Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(nodes): add fleet view utilities Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(nodes): add fleet operations dashboard Replace the panel roster with aggregate capacity gauges, fleet filtering and selection, bounded bulk actions, and an on-demand node inspector. Extend node details and distributed-mode documentation with CPU and models-disk telemetry. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): harden fleet lifecycle actions Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): restore compact fleet composition Keep fleet health, capacity, and attention in one compact overview at ordinary desktop widths. The inspector now overlays the roster until the workbench can preserve a useful table beside it. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(nodes): add accessible running models workbench Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): correct model view ARIA links Keep each tab panel available for its controlling tab while native hidden state removes inactive content from accessibility navigation. Model controls now expose only supported state and valid inspector relationships. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): align lifecycle and capacity states Pending nodes now expose approval wherever node actions appear, while other lifecycle controls follow the server transition rules. Capacity totals exclude incomplete readings so missing availability remains unknown. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): restore approved dashboard composition Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): integrate operate navigation Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): restore low density fleet view Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): preserve complete operate menu Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): preserve inspector workspace height Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): restore standard operate navigation Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(ui): add collapsible console rail Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(nodes): stop models from fleet view Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): make inspector a full height drawer Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(model): stop mixed local and remote placements Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(ui): announce action menu navigation Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): keep inspector within viewport Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(ui): preserve focus across model actions Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 --------- Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
|
bbd5488871 |
fix(distributed): make backend.stop report what it stopped
backend.stop was the one lifecycle subject a worker never answered. The controller published and returned nil as soon as the local publish succeeded, so a stop that killed nothing, and a stop that failed outright, were indistinguishable from one that worked. The unload endpoint calls model.unload and then StopBackend. Only the first is acknowledged, so the endpoint answered 200 while the backend kept running and held its VRAM, and its own "backend stop failed" branch could never run. The worker logged the failure and nobody saw it. Give the subject a reply. The worker now enumerates the process keys it terminated and reports any per-process error, so StopBackend fails when the stop failed. Resolving to nothing stays a success: stopping a backend that is not running leaves the caller in the state it asked for, and eviction paths stop already-gone models routinely. The empty list is what says nothing matched, and ReportsStoppedProcesses is what makes that emptiness trustworthy, the same way BackendDeleteReply handles it. A worker built before this reply still receives the request and still stops the backend, it only stays silent, so a timeout degrades to the old assumption rather than failing every stop on a fleet mid-upgrade. Only silence degrades: a transport error is still reported, because UnloadRemoteModel skips its registry cleanup for a node it could not reach and needs to keep hearing about that. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 golangci-lint |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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783556bc93 |
feat(prefixcache): index reported KV residency
Add a NATS event contract and exact-residency provider for backend KV cache reports. Keep guessed request observations as the default routing source while maintaining the reported index for future producers. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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a64fc865ba |
fix(distributed): aggregate prefix cache pressure
Broadcast forced-disturb events and successful scale-up resets so every frontend shares the same rolling autoscale signal. Deduplicate NATS echoes, expose an origin-only Prometheus counter, and document cluster behavior. Closes #10083 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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a9f8062dd5 |
feat(nodes): add pluggable routing pipeline
Route prefix-cache replica selection through composable filters, weighted scorers, and a replaceable picker. Preserve the existing load guard and deterministic selection policy while exposing per-model scorer weights through scheduling configuration. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 [go-vet] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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8b5f62cc02 |
fix(distributed): bound ephemeral staging (#11924)
* docs: design ephemeral staging retention High-frequency camera and audio inputs can fill a worker before the current six-hour cleanup window expires. Define a one-hour retention policy that preserves recently modified request payloads. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * docs: make ephemeral staging request-owned Time-based retention can still fill a worker under bursty or high-rate input. Define request-lifecycle cleanup with capacity reservation and crash recovery. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(distributed): release exact staged keys Request inputs need transport-neutral cleanup after backend calls. Add authenticated exact-key deletion for HTTP and coordinated cache eviction before shared-object deletion for S3/NATS. Preserve URL metacharacters as filename data, reject unsafe keys, and remove upload sidecars while pruning empty request directories. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(distributed): release staged request inputs Ephemeral inputs remained on workers after inference completed. Release each exact key after synchronous and streaming calls, including partial staging failures. Use a bounded cleanup context so caller cancellation cannot suppress release. Preserve caller requests and backend results when cleanup fails. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(worker): bound ephemeral staging capacity Concurrent staging can otherwise exceed its byte limit or consume reserved filesystem headroom. Explicit states keep bytes charged through each reservation, write, and commit transition. Use a synchronized waiter count to prove Commit blocks until bounded writers close, and retain committed baselines across re-reservation. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(worker): enforce ephemeral staging bounds Share capacity accounting across HTTP and S3 request inputs so workers reject uploads before exhausting their filesystem. Reconcile exact release and crash recovery with the same guard. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(distributed): make staged release race-safe Pin each release path component before removing request-owned inputs and sidecars. Stop pruning when a directory identity changes. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(worker): retain staged input ownership Keep committed request inputs protected from age recovery until exact release ends their ownership. Startup-scanned files remain reclaimable and can acquire ownership through reservation. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(worker): claim cached ephemeral inputs Keep startup-scanned cache hits owned while inference uses them and reconcile their actual size against capacity. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(distributed): enforce staging admission Propagate multimodal staging failures before inference and claim matching ephemeral HTTP cache entries. Fall back to PUT when an older worker does not support claims. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(distributed): close staging accounting gaps Keep unknown-length reservations charged until bytes reach disk and bound NATS release waits by the lifecycle cleanup deadline. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(distributed): restage swept cache hits Treat files removed between cache probing and ownership claims as misses so HTTP and S3 workers can stage them again. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(distributed): release staged inputs by request Release every input from one inference with one fixed-size worker coordination request. Fence request ingress against cleanup, bound staging capacity and cleanup state, and retain exact-key release for rolling upgrades. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 --------- Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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aff9db9758 |
fix(distributed): resolve paths for virtual models (#11911)
Virtual model names have no primary file to anchor the worker path. Companion assets still stage successfully, but relative options retain an incorrect model directory and fail to load. Derive the worker root from successfully staged option assets when the primary path is absent. Cover Buffalo packs, files, directories, overrides, and failed transfers. Document the frontend upgrade. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 golangci-lint Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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e494033607 |
fix(distributed): finalize stalled model uploads (#11910)
A worker can retain all model bytes with an unfinished-upload marker. Retries then start at zero and repeatedly fail with HTTP 416. Verify the existing bytes and finalize same-file retries at full size. Reuse the normal integrity checks so corrupt content cannot be accepted. Add regression coverage and document worker recovery. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 golangci-lint Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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9afe10ba21 |
fix(distributed): survive a slow control-plane database (#11837)
* fix(distributed): evict only when a node is known to be full scheduleNewModel asked the registry for a free replica slot and treated every error as "this node is full", so a control-plane database slow enough to time out the lookup evicted a healthy loaded model. The evicted process died, a peer frontend still holding its address dialled the dead port and retried, and the model thrashed between nodes. The comment on the branch already said it meant a full node; the code never tested for it. Evict only on ErrNoFreeSlot. Any other error now returns and names the lookup that failed, so a slow database degrades into a diagnosable load failure instead of into lost work. An audit of the rest of the router found one branch of the same shape: node selection discarded the error from its last-resort finder, so a database timeout there also produced a nil node and evicted for it. That path now returns unless the finder said gorm.ErrRecordNotFound, which is the only answer that means the cluster had no node to give. No other destructive branch in router.go fires on a generic error. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(distributed): checkpoint heartbeat writes instead of writing every beat Every heartbeat UPDATEd backend_nodes. Six nodes at a ten second beat is roughly 52,000 writes a day against a six-row table, and that churn is what turned a blocked autovacuum into a 460 MB table whose six-row scan cost 867 ms and timed out the queries that place models. A beat carrying only a fresher timestamp now waits for the checkpoint interval. Each reported field is compared against the value last persisted rather than tested for presence, because a worker sends its disk figures on every beat and presence alone would suppress nothing. A node's first beat, a changed total VRAM, total disk or GPU vendor, and a free VRAM, RAM or disk reading that has moved more than 256 MiB from the persisted value all still write at once. A node that is not active is never suppressed, because it recovers only when the health monitor sees a fresh timestamp. The persisted column is up to one interval stale by design, so the stale-node threshold moves from 60s to 5m to cover it. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(distributed): fail worker readiness when a held backend is unreachable The readiness gate tracked only the NATS link, so a worker whose backend processes had died still answered /readyz with 200 and kept receiving loads. One node did exactly that during an incident: it reported healthy while its backend port refused connections, and every load routed to it failed. Readiness is now the NATS link and, for each backend process the worker believes it is running, a short dial of its recorded address. A worker holding no backends stays ready, because idle is a healthy state. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(distributed): keep a starting backend out of the readiness dial set A backend process is inserted into the supervisor map with its gRPC address already recorded, but the address refuses connections until the gRPC server binds, which the startup poll allows up to 30 seconds for and which takes 10 to 15 seconds on a slow node. The new data-path readiness probe dialled that address straight away, so a worker answered /readyz with 503 for the whole of every cold backend start. The container HEALTHCHECK absorbs that, but a Kubernetes readinessProbe at 10s does not, and the worker would leave rotation each time it loaded a model. The skip for a stopping process had no counterpart at the other end of the lifecycle. Backend processes now carry a serving flag, set where the startup health-check gate succeeds, and the probe dials only processes that are serving and not yet stopping. backendStartStillValid becomes markBackendServing: the check and the mark must share one lock hold, so the flag can only ever land on the entry the key currently owns. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(distributed): export control-plane database health gauges Four transactions wedged on a corrupt index held the vacuum horizon open for 42 days. Nothing measured it, so the first symptom anyone saw was models failing to load six weeks later, by which time a six-row table had grown to 460 MB. Export the oldest xmin age, the longest open transaction, and the dead tuple ratio on the registry tables. The first is the number that would have caught it: it sits near zero in health and was 21,002,291. Sampling is scrape-driven behind a cache, and a failed sample reports the last good values rather than failing the scrape, because these gauges matter most when the database is already struggling. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(distributed): rate-limit failed control-plane database samples The cache advanced its clock only on a successful sample, so once the database started failing every scrape retried the query immediately. That turned the cache off in the one regime it exists for: a retry storm at scrape cadence aimed at a database already in trouble. A catalog read that consistently exceeds the 5 second timeout also paid that cost on every scrape, with all scrapes serialised behind the sampler mutex. Time every attempt rather than every success, so failures and timeouts cost the same interval as good samples. Whether a good sample exists moves to its own field, keeping the gauges absent until the first success and holding the last good values through later failures. Also note in the runbook that pg_stat_activity cannot see prepared transactions or replication slot xmins, so a healthy-looking xmin age does not by itself rule out a blocked horizon. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * test(distributed): pin that a failing database evicts nothing Exercises the real distributed stack against a control-plane database that refuses the router's slot lookup, and asserts the scheduler reports the lookup it could not answer instead of falling through to eviction. The failure is injected with privileges rather than a statement timeout. A timeout set with ALTER DATABASE also breaks AutoMigrate, and it leaks into every later spec in the suite unless it is reset, so the spec would end up testing the migration rather than the scheduler. Instead the spec creates a dedicated login role, points a second gorm handle at it, and revokes that role's SELECT on node_models.replica_index. This has to be a separate role: the test container's owner is a PostgreSQL superuser, and superusers bypass every privilege check, so revoking from CURRENT_USER is recorded and then ignored. The revoke is scoped to one column on purpose. Revoking the whole table would also blind node selection, which runs first and has a guard of its own, so the scheduler would never reach the slot lookup this spec is about. Leaving every other column readable lets selection succeed and lands the refusal exactly on NextFreeReplicaIndex, which plucks replica_index. The grant is restored from BeforeEach via DeferCleanup, so a failing assertion or a panic cannot hand the next spec a role that cannot read. Reverting the eviction guard fails this spec, which is the point of it: the router then reports "no replica slot on keeper and eviction failed" for an error that was never evidence the node was full. The surviving-row assertions are secondary under this injection, because the eviction path reads whole node_models rows and the same revoke blinds it too; a comment in the spec says so, so nobody mistakes them for the load-bearing ones. Also documents why the vector store and the control plane must not share a database: the removable-tuple cutoff is per database, not per table, so one transaction left open anywhere stops autovacuum reclaiming the node registry, and a six-row table bloats into hundreds of megabytes. The note names LOCALAI_AUTH_DATABASE_URL and LOCALAI_AGENT_POOL_DATABASE_URL as the two knobs that must differ, and the localai_control_plane_oldest_xmin_age gauge as the way to see it coming. grep for StaleNodeThreshold and HealthCheckInterval in core/config/runtime_settings_registry.go returns no matches: the distributed duration knobs are not exposed as runtime settings, so the new heartbeat checkpoint interval follows them and needs no registry entry. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(distributed): close the review gaps in the heartbeat and health path The stale-node threshold moved from 60 seconds to 5 minutes in this branch because checkpointing makes last_heartbeat up to one checkpoint interval behind by design. Two things were left inconsistent with that. NewHealthMonitor still fell back to a hardcoded 60 seconds when handed a zero threshold, so any future caller that stopped passing the configured value would mark every healthy, beating node offline on every cycle. And the threshold itself had a flag-name constant but no AppOption, no CLI field and no env binding, so an operator who widened --node-heartbeat-checkpoint had no way to widen the threshold to match. The fallback now tracks config.DefaultStaleNodeThreshold, and --stale-node-threshold / LOCALAI_STALE_NODE_THRESHOLD is wired the same way its sibling is. Heartbeat suppression compared the RAW reported free VRAM against the snapshot, but the column persists capAvailable(raw, ceiling). On any node with a VRAM budget set, whose actual free VRAM oscillates above that ceiling, every beat looked material while the persisted value never moved: suppression was defeated on exactly the nodes an operator had configured, and the write amplification this branch exists to remove came straight back there. The comparison and the snapshot now both hold the capped figure, so they measure the same quantity as the column. Fixing that needs the ceiling, and reading it cost a SELECT on every beat, including suppressed ones. The skip decision therefore moved ahead of the updates map and now reuses the ceiling cached on the last durable write, while the write path still re-reads it before capping anything. A ceiling that changed inside the checkpoint window can cost one extra or one late write; it cannot persist a wrong figure. A suppressed beat now costs no query at all. Also: the operations section now says to grant pg_read_all_stats to the LocalAI role, because PostgreSQL blanks backend_xmin and xact_start for sessions owned by other roles, and the transaction that wedged the horizon in the incident was a co-located vector store connecting as a different role, so without the grant the new gauge sees only our own sessions. The compose healthcheck comment now describes readiness covering the backend data path, and the control-plane gauge registration records the otel.SetMeterProvider ordering it depends on. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(distributed): resolve the gauge's table names through gorm The dead-tuple gauge queried pg_stat_user_tables against a hardcoded list of three table names. Those three do not agree on where their name comes from: BackendNode and NodeModel take gorm's default pluralisation, while GalleryOperationRecord overrides TableName, and gallery_operations already had a constant of its own that the list duplicated. A literal list keeps compiling after any of that moves, and the query then matches nothing. The failure is silent and it points the wrong way: a dead-tuple ratio that matched no rows reports the same numbers as a cluster with no bloat, so the gauge would look healthiest exactly when it had stopped working. Ask gorm what each model is stored as instead, which follows a TableName override and the default pluralisation alike. A spec pins that the override really is consulted: naive pluralisation of the type would give gallery_operation_records, so the resolution cannot quietly stop asking the model. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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80e3240f2d |
feat(distributed): key scheduling rules by a model alias (#11771)
Node placement and replica rules could only name a model, so an operator who pinned "llama3" to the GPU tier had to rewrite the rule whenever a different model took over that job. An alias already gives a stable name for whichever model serves it, and a rule on that name makes it a deployment slot: repoint the alias and the placement follows. A rule keeps the name the operator chose. Reads resolve that name through the config loader to the model the rule governs, so the reconciler counts, schedules and trims replicas of the target, and the router finds an alias-keyed rule from the target it is already routing. An alias that resolves to nothing governs nothing loadable, so the reconciler skips it and the write paths refuse it. A replica is shared by every name that resolves to it, so only one rule can decide where it runs. The REST and MCP write paths reject a rule whose target another rule already governs. A pair that arrives some other way, such as a seed file or an alias repointed onto a model that already has a rule, resolves in favour of the rule named after the model itself and then the oldest, and the rest are listed as shadowed. The eviction guard is the exception: it matches rules to replicas in raw SQL inside a locking transaction and cannot resolve an alias. It reads a stored target that the reconciler refreshes each tick, and falls back to the rule's own name when that target is empty. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 golangci-lint eslint Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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29899cd1e0 |
fix(ui): size model fit against the cluster and move node labels into the selector (#11765)
* fix(ui): move node labels into the scheduling selector field The scheduling page kept a node-label browser open above the rules whether or not anyone was writing one, while the field that actually needs labels, the rule's node selector, was two bare text inputs with no hint of what the cluster reports. The browser is gone. The selector's key input now completes against the label keys the cluster uses, and the value input offers only the values that key takes. The roster already loads for the page, so the suggestions cost no request, and a roster that fails to load costs the admin the hints and nothing else. Suggestions stay suggestions: a key no node reports yet still commits as typed, which is how an admin writes a rule before labelling the nodes for it. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 golangci-lint eslint playwright Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(distributed): size model fit against the cluster, not the frontend The models page asked the frontend how much memory a model may occupy. In distributed mode the frontend is usually a GPU-less pod while every model runs on a worker, so a fleet of GPU nodes was told it could only run the smallest CPU build. The variant picker's fits flag and its auto-selection came from the same place, as did the hardware recommendations. The registry now reports the largest single healthy backend node. The largest node, not the fleet total: a model loads into one node, so four 16GB workers are not a home for a 40GB model. An operator-set VRAM budget caps a node's contribution, because the scheduler refuses a load above that ceiling anyway, and a GPU node beats a CPU node holding more system RAM. GET /api/resources and GET /api/models carry this as an additional cluster object. Their aggregate and ram fields keep reporting the frontend's own hardware, which is what the resource monitor shows. Variant selection judges backends against the union of the capabilities present in the cluster, the way backend discovery already did. Every path degrades to the local host: no cluster object in single-node mode, and none when the registry cannot be read, so a hiccup narrows the answer back to single-node behaviour rather than marking the whole catalog too large. The verdicts now name the node they belong to, since a model fits somewhere or nowhere. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 golangci-lint eslint playwright Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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3953448f60 |
fix(distributed): resync stored config revisions at startup
The controller pins a model's replicas to a stored revision and rejects any request carrying a different one. Nothing ever re-derived that value from the configuration on disk: it moved only on an edit, a gallery install, or a peer's change broadcast. An inference request may only establish a revision, never replace one. So any other way for the two to diverge left the model permanently unroutable. A configuration edited while a frontend was down lands there, and so does a change in what the revision is computed over: an upgrade that alters the hashed form leaves every stored revision describing a configuration that no longer exists. The only recovery was deleting the row by hand, which is not something a cluster should need. Each frontend now reconciles the stored revisions against the loaded configurations at startup and republishes the ones that disagree. Only those: republishing quarantines every replica loaded under the old revision, so doing it for a model that did not drift would unload a healthy replica for nothing. A model with no stored revision has never been served and is left for its first request to establish. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [golangci-lint] |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
|
e6269e3cdd |
fix(distributed): reclaim replica slots held by abandoned loads
A replica row in staging or loading holds its slot, because slot allocation counts every state except unloading. Nothing ever reclaimed such a row: every reconciler pass and the router's eviction query filter state = "loaded", and the per-model probe skips rows without an address, which is exactly what a row that never finished loading has. So a worker that dropped out mid-transfer left a row that pinned the only replica slot for that model on that node. Scheduling then found no free slot and eviction found nothing it was allowed to evict, and the request failed with "no replica slot on <node> and eviction failed: all models busy". The state persisted until an operator intervened. The reconciler now reclaims a row stuck before serving when no load job is driving it. Ownership is decided by the job's LastProgress heartbeat, not by elapsed time: staging a large checkpoint legitimately runs for a long while without touching the replica row, so a deadline would either be a model-size cliff or reclaim a healthy transfer. That heartbeat is the same signal job takeover already trusts. Any error reading the job leaves the slot held, because holding one for another pass costs a scheduling opportunity while a wrong reclaim restarts a multi-gigabyte transfer. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [golangci-lint] |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
|
c541dbeef4 |
fix(distributed): check a node answers before scheduling onto it
A node's status comes from its HTTP heartbeat. Backend installs travel over NATS. The two are independent, so a worker that dies stops answering on the bus at once but stays healthy in the database until its heartbeat ages out. Inside that window the scheduler picked a node it could not reach, and the request failed with "no responders available" rather than moving to a node that was up. The scheduler now probes the node it selected and, when nothing answers, marks it unhealthy and selects again. The demotion is what makes the retry terminate: the next selection reads only healthy nodes. It also tells the other frontends what this one learned, so the cluster does not rediscover a dead worker one failed request at a time. Only nats.ErrNoResponders counts as absent. A worker that answers slowly stays eligible, because dropping it would cost capacity that is really there. The probe reuses the models.running subject: a new subject would go unanswered by workers that have not been upgraded, and every one of them would then look dead. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [golangci-lint] |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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cee87d1608 |
fix(distributed): expire staged request files on the worker
A request that carries a file stages it to the worker, which writes it under its staging directory. Nothing removed it afterwards. The frontend expires ephemeral keys from object storage, but that sweep never covered a worker's local disk, so every image, audio clip and video a worker ever served stayed on it. One worker had accumulated 175 request directories over three months. The volume reached 100 percent, and from that point every backend start failed because the process manager could not create a state directory. The worker now sweeps its ephemeral staging directory on a timer and once at startup, so files left by a crash are reclaimed too. Staged model files live beside that directory and are not touched. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [golangci-lint] |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
|
04735cd1f6 |
fix(distributed): stamp config revision at load time
The request middleware merges the caller's prediction parameters into its copy of the model config. core/backend.ModelOptions then hashed that copy, so the revision identified the request body rather than the persisted configuration. EstablishModelConfigRevision stores the first revision it sees and requires an exact match afterwards. The first request after a restart therefore pinned the model to its own temperature, top_p and stop values, and every later request that sent different ones failed with "stale model config revision". No config edit was involved. The loader now stamps the revision when it materializes a config, before any request override reaches it, and ModelOptions reads that stamp. Model administration keeps hashing the same persisted config, so both paths agree on one revision per configuration. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [golangci-lint] |
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
|
82c191afad |
fix(distributed): keep model replicas config-consistent (#11664)
* docs: design configurable copy buffering Document the context-aware copy buffer option and its validation plan. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 * docs: design durable distributed staging operations Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 * docs: design distributed model config revisions Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [apply_patch] [exec_command] * feat(config): add stable model revisions Hash typed model configuration and effective protobuf options deterministically for distributed revision comparisons. Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [apply_patch] [exec_command] * feat(worker): acknowledge exact model stops Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [apply_patch] [exec_command] * feat(nodes): track model config revisions Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [apply_patch] * fix(distributed): retry quarantined model cleanup Stop quarantined replicas by exact process identity, retain failed cleanup as durable capped retries, and compare-and-delete only the claimed registry row. Process one sufficiently leased row at a time so multiple frontends cannot duplicate slow cleanup work. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 * fix(distributed): bind loads to config revisions Assisted-by: Codex: GPT-5 [OpenAI Codex] * fix(modeladmin): apply config revisions consistently Route model edits, patches, state changes, deletion, and peer refreshes through the same revision lifecycle. Quarantine stale replicas before exact cleanup and report durable pending cleanup without failing successful config writes. Assisted-by: Codex: GPT-5 [OpenAI Codex] * feat(distributed): expose model config revision state Document replica revision observability and durable cleanup behavior. Keep pending cleanup explicit in model mutation responses and verify endpoint contracts expose revision state without serialized load options. Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [OpenAI Codex] * test(distributed): cover model revision convergence Exercise cross-frontend quarantine, stale replay rejection, exact cleanup retry, worker re-registration, and current-generation replica convergence against the distributed PostgreSQL harness. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 * fix(distributed): pass config revision CI checks Keep configured gallery sources out of authoritative runtime snapshots only after validating their real schema, and harden rollback snapshots against symlink races and non-regular files. Assisted-by: Codex: GPT-5 [OpenAI Codex] --------- Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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88edd7fc7f |
fix(distributed): run cold model loads as durable jobs instead of holding the advisory lock (#11514)
* fix(advisorylock): set statement_timeout alongside lock_timeout
WithLockCtx already overrides a deployment-wide lock_timeout on its
dedicated connection so a blocking pg_advisory_lock() waits its turn
instead of failing with 55P03. statement_timeout aborts that exact same
statement independently, with SQLSTATE 57014, and was not overridden.
Production roles commonly carry statement_timeout=60s. Any guarded
section longer than that (a cold model load stages for tens of minutes)
therefore killed every concurrent waiter:
advisorylock: acquiring lock 9003261067483446873: ERROR: canceling
statement due to statement timeout (SQLSTATE 57014)
Derive it from the same context budget as lock_timeout, with a matching
RESET so the pooled connection is returned clean.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
* feat(distributed): add ModelLoadJob, the durable cold-load record
A cold load in distributed mode is a long-running background job, but it
was modelled as a synchronous side effect of an inference request: the
whole of it (backend install, multi-GB staging, checkpoint load) ran
inside the per-model advisory lock. Loading a 35.7 GB GGUF held that lock
for ~20 minutes, so every concurrent request for the same model blocked
on pg_advisory_lock and died at the role's 60s statement_timeout.
Introduce the row that lets the lock shrink to a decision. Exactly one
ModelLoadJob may be active per tracking key; that uniqueness — not the
lifetime of a lock — is what de-duplicates concurrent loaders across
replicas. ClaimLoadJob does its read-then-write under the advisory lock
and nothing else: no network, file or gRPC I/O inside the guarded
section, so a claim costs milliseconds no matter how long the resulting
load takes.
LastProgress is a heartbeat rather than a byte counter. A checkpoint load
legitimately moves zero bytes for many minutes, so a reaper keyed on byte
movement would reclaim a healthy job mid-load; byte progress stays the
concern of load_deadline.go. A job whose heartbeat stops for longer than
the orphan window is reclaimable, so a replica killed mid-load cannot
wedge a model permanently.
Failed jobs keep their row for a short grace so an immediately-following
request reports the real cause instead of silently starting a fresh load
of a model that just failed.
No caller yet — the router moves onto this in the next commit.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
* refactor(distributed): run cold loads as jobs, outside the advisory lock
Route wrapped the entire cold load — node selection, backend install,
multi-GB staging and the remote LoadModel — in the per-model advisory
lock. The lock's job is to de-duplicate concurrent loaders, a decision
that takes milliseconds; holding it for the tens of minutes the resulting
work takes is what turned a dedup mechanism into a cluster-wide outage
for that model.
Split it into a claim and a run. The claim is the only thing left inside
the lock. The run is a background job owned by the claiming replica and
bounded by the same progress-extended deadline as before; every other
request for that model — local or on another replica — attaches as a
waiter and is served the moment the model is ready, with no duplicate
load and no lock contention.
Waiters share one broadcast rather than an ordered queue: they all want
the identical outcome, so ordering them would add fairness machinery that
changes no result. The local channel wakes same-replica waiters instantly
and a 2s DB poll is the authority, because a waiter on another replica
has no channel to close. On wake a waiter re-runs the warm path rather
than trusting the signal — the model may have been evicted in between.
A waiter whose client disconnects returns immediately and the job keeps
running; it belongs to the job record, not to the request. A failure is
recorded on the row so every waiter reports the real cause, and the row
survives briefly so the next request does not read "no job" as "not
loading" and start a duplicate load of a model that just failed.
The runner heartbeats the row on a fixed interval whether or not bytes
are moving, which is what keeps a legitimately silent checkpoint load
from being reclaimed as an orphan. Phase (installing/staging/loading) and
placement ride to the heartbeat on the context, the same seam
load_deadline.go already uses, so single-host paths are untouched.
Non-distributed mode (no DB) keeps the inline load exactly as it was.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
* feat(distributed): bound the wait for a loading model and answer with progress
A request whose model is cold-loading now attaches to the running job and
is served the moment the model is ready. That wait has to be bounded: a
held HTTP request cannot survive real infrastructure, and an ingress or LB
idle timeout kills a twenty-minute request regardless of what LocalAI
does.
New LOCALAI_MODEL_LOAD_WAIT (default 60s) bounds the CALLER, never the
load — the job keeps running either way. On expiry the request gets 503
with Retry-After and a structured body naming the model, the node, the
phase, byte progress and an ETA. The `error` envelope keeps OpenAI
clients working; `loading` is additive so they ignore it.
The ETA comes from the job's own observed rate and is omitted rather than
guessed until enough bytes have moved for that rate to mean anything: a
confidently wrong ETA on a twenty-minute wait is worse than none.
Retry-After is that ETA when known, clamped to [5s, 300s], and the wait
budget otherwise.
LOCALAI_MODEL_LOAD_WAIT=0 waits unbounded, for deployments with no proxy
in front. Zero in the config struct still means "unset, use the default",
so the CLI records the operator's zero as ModelLoadWaitUnbounded rather
than losing the distinction.
The distributed branch of ModelLoader.loadModel wrapped the router's
error with %s, which flattened it to a string. Use %w: the typed error is
what the HTTP layer keys the 503 off.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
* feat(api): add GET /api/models/{id}/load-status
A client that receives 503 while a model stages onto a worker needs
somewhere to poll. This returns the same `loading` object the 503 carries
— phase, node, byte progress and ETA — or 404 when no load is running.
Read-only and observability-shaped, so it is deliberately neither
admin-gated nor feature-gated: it explains a 503 the caller just
received, and hiding that behind a per-modality feature would make the
explanation for a failed image request depend on chat permissions. It
also gets no MCP tool, since there is nothing here an admin would manage
conversationally.
Registered on the surfaces from .agents/api-endpoints-and-auth.md: the
swagger block (existing `models` tag, so /api/instructions needs no new
area), the endpoint discovery maps in RegisterLocalAIRoutes, regenerated
swagger, and the distributed-mode docs page. No FLAG_* usecase is
involved, so capabilities.js is unchanged.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
* feat(ui): show cold-load progress in Chat and retry when the model is ready
A chat request for a model that is still staging onto a worker now gets a
503 carrying live progress instead of an error. Render it: the composer
shows the phase (installing / staging / loading), the node, the percent
and the ETA, then polls load-status and re-sends the request the moment
the model is ready.
Reuses the staging progress idiom the page already had rather than
inventing a second one — the two sources are folded into one
loadProgress, with the load job winning because it is authoritative
across frontend replicas and knows the phase, where the staging operation
only knows about a byte transfer this replica happens to be performing.
Waiting is bounded (three send attempts, ~30 min of polling each), so a
load that never finishes still surfaces as an error rather than as a
spinner nobody questions. An aborted generation stops the polling too.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
* fix(distributed): check warm-path cleanup errors
The router moved legacy cleanup calls onto newly linted lines. Report
cleanup failures while preserving the fallback to a cold load.
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 [golangci-lint]
---------
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: localai-org-maint-bot <306269227+localai-org-maint-bot@users.noreply.github.com>
|
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localai-org-maint-botandlocalai-org-maint-bot
|
034df6ceb1 |
fix(worker): report RAM alongside GPU memory (#11167)
* fix(worker): report RAM alongside GPU memory Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 * feat(ui): show worker RAM on node views Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 --------- Co-authored-by: localai-org-maint-bot <306269227+localai-org-maint-bot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
|
0f7186f214 |
feat(ui): replace the stacked operations bar with a one-line strip and an Activity page (#11163)
* feat(ui): record finished gallery operations in a bounded history ring The operations panel drops an operation the moment it succeeds, so a user who steps away cannot tell whether an install finished, failed or was never started. OpCache now keeps the last 50 terminal operations, recorded from the point where an op leaves the cache. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * test(ui): pin the history ring's dedupe, outcome order and start stamp Review of the history ring found four gaps. The dedupe guard and the bounded seen set were unreachable through the exported API and so had no coverage; an in-package spec file now drives opHistory directly. The outcome switch claimed an ordering was load bearing that nothing pinned, so an errored op that never reached Processed now has a spec. Two behaviour fixes come with it. StartedAt was the zero time for ops recovered from the store or replicated from a peer, since neither path stamps a start time, which would have rendered as a two-millennia duration; it now falls back to the finish time. Reusing a cache key with a fresh job ID orphaned the previous stamp, so Set and SetBackend now drop it. The comment on the outcome switch described a state the code cannot be in: CancelOperation sets Cancelled and Processed synchronously before the handler removes the entry, so status.Cancelled already covers the cancel endpoint. The !Processed clause stays for the dismiss endpoint firing on an in-flight op, and the comments now say so. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(ui): record operations that end on a peer replica The NATS end event is the only signal a replica gets for an install another replica ran. Record from applyEnd too, deduped by job ID so the originating replica does not record its own broadcast twice. Three start-stamp defects in the same path go with it. applyEnd now drops the stamp unconditionally, since recordTerminal only cleans up on the path where it found a cache key and an end event can overtake the local Set. applyStart drops the stamp of the job whose cache key it replaces, which a peer-driven retry previously stranded. And recordTerminal reads the stamp once instead of testing Exists and then reading, so a concurrent record for the same job can no longer delete the stamp between the two and let the zero time overwrite the finish-time fallback, which the Activity page would render as a two-millennia run. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(ui): do not guess the outcome of a peer operation with no local status A replica that restarts mid-operation hydrates its OpCache keys from PostgreSQL, but gallery statuses are in-memory only and come back empty. The end broadcast then landed on recordTerminal's nil-status branch, which reads a missing status as queued-and-removed and filed a successful install as cancelled. That reading is right locally and wrong on the peer path, where a missing status means the outcome was never held here. recordTerminal now takes the source of the terminal event and records nothing when the peer path finds no status, restoring what the replica did before the end event started recording. The local path is unchanged. Also move the ApplyEndForTest seam to the conventional export_test.go, and stop the dedupe spec from claiming to guard the ring's seen set: the local delete removes the status keys, so the broadcast that follows returns before reaching it. An in-package spec that calls recordTerminal twice does the pinning. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(api): add GET and DELETE /api/operations/history Admin gated like the rest of the operations API. The live /api/operations payload is unchanged so the one second poll stays small. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(ui): expose operation history through OperationsContext Fetched on demand and when the live list shrinks, never on the one second poll interval. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(ui): detect operation departure by identity and ignore committing ops in the ETA gate Refetching history on a shrinking live count missed a completion that coincided with a start, which is the common case during a batch install. Track the live job IDs instead, so any departure triggers the refetch regardless of how the count moved. An operation that has finished downloading stays live at currentBytes == totalBytes for the whole commit and install phase and can never produce an estimate, so counting it in the all-or-nothing gate blanked every other operation's time remaining for as long as it lasted. Only operations still moving bytes get a vote. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(ui): let only downloading operations gate the time remaining estimate Verifying pins an operation flat below its total for the whole sha256 pass: the AfterDownload hook reports completedBytes plus the finished file against a total summed over every file, then hashes synchronously without emitting progress. Files download sequentially, so a 15 shard model enters that window 14 times, and a byte comparison cannot see it because the counter is genuinely below the total throughout. Gating on phase closes resolving, verifying, committing and persisting in one predicate, so a quiet neighbour no longer blanks every other operation's estimate for minutes at a time. The byte clauses stay: a producer can report downloading with bytes already at the total. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(ui): collapse the operations bar to a single line Four concurrent installs used to take four rows above every page. The strip now shows one operation, failure first, with a counter linking to Activity. The close button hides the strip and no longer cancels an install. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(ui): keep the operations strip from widening the page and from muting a failure A long install error made the strip report a 1600px minimum width, which sized main-content to fit and gave every page under it a horizontal scrollbar. Inline-size containment plus shrinkable detail and bytes cells keep it inside the viewport. Hiding is no longer able to swallow the hidden job's own failure, a completed removal or staging says so instead of claiming an install, a cancelling operation renders as cancelling, and the live region no longer covers the per-second percentage. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(ui): shrink main-content instead of containing the strip, and expose progress min-width on .main-content is what actually lets a long install error shrink, and unlike inline-size containment it has no browser support floor and no latent collapse if the strip ever lands in a shrink-to-fit context. It matches what .app-layout-chat .main-content already does, and it clears pre-existing horizontal overflow on narrow viewports as a side effect. The progress track is now a labelled progressbar, so assistive tech can read the value on demand rather than losing it to the aria-hidden that stopped the live region re-announcing every poll. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(ui): add the live operation card for the Activity page Carries the detail the one-line strip has to drop: phase, bytes, the per-node breakdown for cluster installs, and a labelled Cancel button. Cancelling is destructive, so it gets a labelled button rather than a glyph. A cancelling operation drops its progress bar and its time estimate, the same call the strip makes: a percentage still climbing under "Cancelling" reads as the cancel not having taken. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(ui): give the operation card a verb, live node disclosure and its per-node detail The card carried no verb, so an install, a removal and a staging op rendered as spinner plus name plus kind tag and were indistinguishable. It now runs the same verb and icon chain as the one-line strip, which is what stops the page that is meant to carry more detail from carrying less. The auto-expand default was evaluated once at mount. An operation is listed as soon as it is admitted but its nodes are filled in only when the fan-out starts reporting, so a card mounted at creation latched on the empty list and stayed collapsed. The default is a live expression now, and state holds only an explicit choice. Also: an optional onRetry gates a Retry button, so the page can own the install reconstruction without the card ever showing a control with nothing behind it; the disclosure moved above the region it controls and gained aria-controls; the toggle is gated at more than one node so the count is never "1 nodes"; an unmapped node status is passed through instead of being relabelled "Queued"; error text is clamped with the full string in the title; and file_name plus the per-node progress bar are rendered again, reviving three CSS rules that had gone dead along with the detail they styled. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(ui): add the Activity page Live operations, unacknowledged failures and the record of what finished, at /app/activity in the Operate console. Cancelling an install now lives here behind a labelled button rather than on the strip, and a failed install can be retried: the retry dismisses the failure first so it still reaches the record, then reissues the model, backend or node-scoped backend install. The sidebar Operate entry carries the operation count. The console rail is only rendered on an Operate route and can be collapsed, so a badge there could vanish while operations were still running. Two follow-ups from review fold in here: a failed removal or staging job no longer reports a failed install on either the card or the strip, and the card's error text can shrink so one unbroken token cannot widen the card. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(ui): dismiss operations by job, and stop the Activity page contradicting itself Dismissing resolved the job by display id, but /api/operations strips the "node:<nodeID>:" prefix before emitting, so a local install and a node-scoped install of one backend arrive as two jobs sharing one id. Dismissing by id retired whichever came first. That defeated the guarantee retry was built around: with the wrong job dismissed, the reinstall overwrote the acted-on failure's opcache entry in place, bypassing recordTerminal, while an unrelated failure vanished from Needs attention. dismissFailedOp, the card's dismiss control and the strip now all pass the jobID, which is what the endpoint takes. A filter matching nothing rendered the "nothing has ever run" empty state while the header counted the records the filter had hidden. The empty state is now gated on the All chip and a narrowed view gets its own message plus a way back; the header counts the instance rather than the chip, so selecting Backends no longer reports "Nothing running" over running model installs. Also: the summary drops a zero clause instead of rendering "0 needs attention" on the happy path and pluralises both counts; a record duration is floored at "< 1s" and rejected above a day, so a zero-value start stamp cannot render a span of millennia and a zero span cannot render "installed in" with nothing after it; a deletion cancelled mid-flight reports the cancellation rather than claiming it was removed; and the retry variant comment names the fix instead of calling the gap closed. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: document the Activity page and the operations history endpoints Adds an Activity page under Operations covering the one-line operations strip, the /app/activity sections and filters, per-operation cancel, retry and dismiss, the in-memory 50-entry record, and the sidebar count. Documents GET and DELETE /api/operations/history, and fills the gap in the admin-only endpoint list, which also omitted the pre-existing POST /api/operations/:jobID/dismiss. Corrects the distributed-mode install-watching section: the per-node breakdown now lives on the Activity page rather than on the strip, which rolls a fan-out up into a single phrase. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: correct nine details in the Activity page documentation The operations strip never renders a file name: its detail line is the error, the node roll-up, the target node, the phase or the queued note. Drops the stale clause in the distributed-mode section, where the per-node bullet is now the only place a file name is described. Scopes the phase vocabulary to artifact-backed gallery models, since a plain GGUF install emits no phase. Corrects the per-node list: the toggle exists for any fan-out of two or more workers and the four-node threshold only governs whether it starts open, while the N nodes tag needs more than one node. Notes that a cancelled operation can sit in the live section reading Cancelling, that cluster staging never reaches the record, and that Clear history appears only when the record has something in it. Names the operations response envelope, with a JSON example, so callers do not index a bare array, and stops describing the icon-only dismiss control as a labelled button. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: drop the unreachable Cancelling state and scope the byte claims An operation can only report isCancelled while it is unprocessed, but every writer of Cancelled sets Processed in the same breath, on the peer path as much as the local one, and the cache evicts cancelled entries before the handler sees them. The state cannot reach the page, so the live section is described again as running or queued operations. Byte counts come from the artifact bridge alone, the same producer as the phase, so a plain GGUF install, a removal and a backend install report none. Scopes both to artifact-backed gallery models and leaves the verb, the name and the percentage as what every operation shows. A worker backend install reports its bytes through fields the operations payload does not carry, so the distributed section now describes the percentage and the node roll-up, with per-file counts pointed at the per-node detail. Also: staging jobs carry no error, so they never reach Needs attention and Retry never had a staging case to exclude; an install that involves workers is no longer called node-scoped, which this page uses for node-targeted installs; and the record timestamps carry nanoseconds. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: state only the verb and the name as unconditional on the strip The percentage is as conditional as the bytes were: it renders only for a running operation that has reported progress, so a queued operation, a failed one and a removal never carry it. A removal in particular sits at progress zero for its whole visible life, since the delete path reports none and its completion is filtered out. Both the strip and the card paragraphs now lead with what always shows and list the rest as conditions. The Cluster chip matches on a node list that finished operations do not carry, so a fan-out install leaves the chip once it reaches the record. Scoped that claim to the live sections. Two more of the same shape, found by re-reading each clause alone: the strip also appears for a failure, which is not running, and the four-second hold only applies when nothing replaces the operation that just finished. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(ui): stop reporting a cancelled install as installed, and make queued real Three defects that all trace to one root cause: `isCancelled: true` is unreachable from /api/operations. Every writer of Cancelled=true also sets Processed=true, the handler skips Processed && Cancelled, and OpCache.GetStatus evicts a cancelled op before the handler iterates it. Cancelling the last running operation put a green "Installed model X" on the strip for four seconds: the completion hold was guarded by `!previous.isCancelled`, which is dead. A cancellation deletes the operation server side, so the strip sees exactly what it sees on a completion, and nothing in the payload separates the two. The signal now comes from the side that issued the cancel: the operations context remembers the job IDs it cancelled (pruned after a minute) and the strip asks before it holds anything. A cancelled operation goes as soon as it stops; the record already reports it as cancelled. isQueued was set only when the gallery status was missing, but markQueued publishes a "queued" status at admission, so a queued op has a status for its whole queued life and the state was unreachable outside a microsecond window. Every operation waiting behind a running install rendered as "Installing model X" with a spinner. The queued phase is now the signal, via an exported PhaseQueued and a nil-safe OpStatus.IsQueued() next to the writer. With those two fixed, the Cancelling state has no way to be entered: cancelling is instantaneous from the API's point of view. Its branches, CSS, locale key and the isCancelled field itself are removed rather than left for a future reader to assume they work. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(ui): keep a removal a removal, and say what an install is doing OpStatus.Deletion was set once, at admission, and lost on the next status write: UpdateStatus replaces the whole status and only carried Nodes forward. Every later writer (the worker's first write, the progress ticks, the failure path) leaves the field at its zero value, so the flag survived only the queued window, and both surfaces test isQueued first. The reachable consequence is that a failed removal reported itself as a failed install, which is exactly the shape the Activity page offers Retry for, and Retry installs: pressing it on a removal that failed re-downloaded the model. A running delete also rendered as "Installing model X" with a spinner, and a successful one as "Installed model X". Carry Deletion forward the way Nodes already is. A job is a delete or an install for its whole life; an unset flag means "no new information", not "this is an install". Pinned by Go specs on both the service and /api/operations: the existing Playwright specs were green only because they stubbed a payload the server could not emit. Also restore the operation's own status message on the Activity card. Phases and byte counters exist only on the managed-artifact path, so a legacy files: gallery model and every backend install rendered a sub-row with nothing in it but the verb. The strip stays terse on purpose. And give the strip's name a min-width floor: overflow: hidden zeroes its automatic minimum, so a long error squeezed the name down to "mod…" and the identity of the thing that broke was the first thing lost. primaryOperation is made module-private: its comment claimed the Activity page selected the same operation, but that page shows all of them, partitioned into failed and running, and never imported it. Assisted-by: Claude Code:Opus 5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(activity): read the operations record from PostgreSQL The Activity page's record of finished installs and removals was a 50-entry in-memory ring per frontend replica. In distributed mode that is the wrong place for it: each replica keeps its own copy, a replica added by a scale-out or a rolling deploy starts empty and never backfills, and "Clear history" clears only the replica that served the request, so the record reappears on the next poll routed elsewhere. The data is already in gallery_operations. Read it from there. GalleryStore gains ListTerminal and ClearTerminal, sharing a lifted terminalStatuses set with CleanOld so there is one definition of "finished". ListTerminal orders by updated_at, when the operation reached its terminal status, because the record reports what finished and when. OpCache.History and ClearHistory dispatch on whether a store is wired, so the HTTP handlers and the OpRecord JSON shape are unchanged and the page needed no change. A failed store read falls back to the local ring rather than blanking the page, and ClearHistory empties the ring as well so a database blip cannot resurrect a record the admin just cleared. The name derivation in recordTerminal is lifted into operationDisplayName and used by both paths, so the ring and the store cannot name the same operation differently. Also fixes a pre-existing bug the store path made visible: the backend channel hardcoded op_type "backend_install" even for a removal, while the model channel derives model_install/model_delete from op.Delete. Both channels carry the same ManagementOp, whose Delete field the backend handler already branches on, so the backend channel now derives backend_delete the same way. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(activity): keep a cancelled operation cancelled, and report a failed clear Review follow-up on the store-backed Activity record. A cancelled install was recorded as a failure. The cancel handler persists "cancelled" synchronously, then the handler goroutine unwinds with the context error and Start hands that to updateError unconditionally, which overwrote the row with "failed: context canceled". The page rendered a cancelled install as a red failure card offering Retry, with a raw context error as the reason. Fixed in GalleryStore rather than in Start, because an operation finishes once and the paths that retire one are not mutually exclusive: UpdateStatus now refuses to rewrite a row that already reached a terminal status. That also pins updated_at to when the operation really finished, which is the key the record is ordered by, and Create's upsert now freezes the same columns so a worker dequeuing an operation the admin cancelled while it was queued cannot reopen it as pending. ClearHistory returned nothing, so a failed delete logged a warning while the handler still answered 200. The admin watched the record clear and come back on the next fetch with nothing said about why. It now returns the error, the DELETE handler answers 500, and the store is cleared before the local ring so a failure leaves the fallback record intact rather than faking an empty one. Hydrate is the only reader that decides from op_type whether an operation is a removal, and it tested for "model_delete" exactly, so the backend_delete added in the previous commit hydrated as an install: a replica restarting during a backend removal rendered "Installing backend X". Both discriminations now go through IsDeleteOpType/IsBackendOpType so a fifth op_type cannot silently read as an install in whichever consumer was missed. Also: the backend channel now persists Cancellable as !op.Delete, matching the model channel; IsBackend falls back to the op_type prefix, since is_backend_op is only written by UpsertCacheKey and the rows needing the name fallback were reporting backend operations as models; and an unrecognized terminal status is logged rather than quietly filed as a success, which is what the comment already claimed. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(activity): keep a reaped operation correctable by its real outcome The terminal-status freeze added in the previous commit was too wide. It froze "failed" alongside "completed" and "cancelled", and the stale reaper writes "failed" onto operations that are still going to run. The gallery worker is a single goroutine consuming both channels serially, so an operation queued behind a large download sits in "pending" with nothing bumping updated_at, and ReapStaleOperations gives up on it after 30 minutes. That used to be self-healing: the worker dequeued it, Create reset the row to "pending", and the operation reported its real outcome. With the freeze the row stayed "failed" forever while the install ran and succeeded underneath it: a red failure card offering Retry for a model that is installed, omitted from ListActive so no replica hydrates it, and no longer deduped cluster-wide by FindDuplicate. Freeze on ("completed", "cancelled") instead. That is all the cancelled-install fix ever needed, and it leaves a failure correctable by what actually happened. The set is separate from terminalStatuses, which ListTerminal, ClearTerminal and CleanOld all still want in full, because the two mean different things: a failure can be superseded by a real outcome, a completion or a cancellation is the real outcome. UpdateStatus now writes the error column unconditionally, so a corrected outcome drops the previous attempt's reason rather than being recorded as completed while still carrying "stale operation reaped" as its error. Also adds the route-level spec for the 500 branch of DELETE /api/operations/history, and trims a comment that credited the persisted cancellable column with more than it survives long enough to do. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(activity): offer Cancel in the phase that can honour it The cancellable flag was set at both ends of an operation's life and was wrong at both, in opposite directions. A queued operation is cancellable whatever it is. EnqueueModelOp and EnqueueBackendOp select on the operation context, so cancelling one that is still waiting releases the delivery goroutine and abandonQueued retires it: the worker never sees it, nothing is downloaded, nothing is deleted. markQueued nevertheless wrote Cancellable: !deletion, so a queued removal reported cancellable: false and the UI hid the Cancel button in the one window where pressing it both works and leaves no trace. A removal queued behind a large install was stuck there until the install finished. A running removal is not cancellable at all. DeleteModel and DeleteBackend take no context, and modelHandler only checks the operation context after the call returns, so a "cancelled" verdict would land after the model was already gone. Both handlers nevertheless wrote Cancellable: true unconditionally at entry, ahead of the op.Delete branch, offering a Cancel button the server cannot honour. So the queued phase is more cancellable than the running phase, which is the reverse of the usual shape. markQueued now reports true unconditionally, and the handler-entry writes report !op.Delete. Both sites carry a comment saying why, because reading either one alone suggests the other is a bug. GalleryStore.Create keeps !op.Delete: it runs at dequeue, so its value already describes the running phase. Its comment now says so. Specs cover queued removal, queued install, running removal and running install through the handlers, plus the queued-removal case through /api/operations where the flag is consumed, plus the behaviour the whole asymmetry rests on: a removal cancelled while queued never reaches the worker and deletes nothing. No existing spec asserted the old values. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Write] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(activity): clamp the installer message, and add a real-binary e2e spec Running the page against a real local-ai showed the legacy installer message wrapping to three lines and dominating the card: it embeds an absolute file path, so it is both long and a single unbreakable token. One line, ellipsised, full text in the title, matching what the error string already does. The spec that found it runs with no route stubbing at all. Every other spec here stubs /api/operations, which is how a payload the server cannot emit (isDeletion true on a live operation) stayed green through a full review while the UI rendered a removal as an install. It is skipped unless LOCALAI_REAL_BINARY is set, so CI is unaffected. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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6584db992f |
fix(nodes): never schedule a model onto a node that cannot store it (#11054)
* fix(nodes): never schedule a model onto a node that cannot store it
A worker whose models filesystem was 100% full kept advertising
`status: healthy`, stayed a scheduling candidate, was picked to host a
70 GB video model, accepted the staging request, transferred ~17 GB and
only then failed:
staging .../whisper-large-v3/model.fp32-00001-of-00002.safetensors:
upload to node b7bacbf4-... failed with status 500:
writing file: /models/longcat-video-avatar-1.5/...: no space left on device
The node was at 937G/937G/0-avail. Total elapsed before the truth
surfaced: 16 minutes, for a decision that could never have succeeded.
The worker health signal only ever proved liveness. `/readyz`
(WorkerReadiness/NATSReadiness) checks the NATS link; `status: healthy`
in the registry is driven by heartbeat recency. Node capacity carried
VRAM and RAM but no disk figure at all, and the router compared model
size against VRAM only — nothing anywhere looked at free space on the
filesystem that staging actually writes to.
Report it, then use it:
- Workers now measure the filesystem backing their MODELS directory
(not `/` -- staged weights land in the models path, and that mount is
very often separate) and report `total_disk`/`available_disk` on
registration and on every heartbeat. Free disk moves faster than VRAM
under staging traffic, so the per-heartbeat refresh matters.
- The SmartRouter drops nodes that cannot store the model before it
picks one. The requirement comes from `modelPayloadBytes` -- the same
local paths `stageModelFiles` uploads, already computed for the
size-derived load budget -- plus a 5% / 1 GiB margin, rather than a
fixed percentage of the node's disk. A percentage threshold would take
a small-but-usable node out of rotation for models it could hold, and
on a homogeneous cluster would strand every node at once.
- When no node fits, scheduling fails immediately with an error naming
the requirement and each node's free space, instead of picking one and
discovering it mid-transfer.
Two deliberate non-changes. Low disk does not mark a node `unhealthy`:
the check is per model, so a node too small for one model stays a valid
target for smaller ones. And `total_disk == 0` means "does not report
disk" (pre-upgrade worker, or a failed stat), not "full" -- such nodes
pass through untouched so a rolling upgrade never empties the candidate
pool. A genuinely full node is distinguishable: non-zero total, zero
available. Registry read failures are logged and scheduling continues
unfiltered; a database hiccup must not wedge a cluster.
Free space is surfaced on the node detail page next to VRAM, since the
incident's signature was a node that looked entirely healthy.
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-4-8[1m] [Read] [Edit] [Bash]
* feat(nodes): make the disk-headroom check operator-controllable
The admission check added in the previous commit had no off switch. A
scheduler-side veto with no escape hatch is a liability: our size
estimate can be wrong (deduplicating or compressing filesystems, a
backend that fetches its own weights rather than loading the staged
copy), and an operator who hits that has no way out but a downgrade.
Add one knob with two surfaces that share a single source of truth:
- `--distributed-disk-headroom-check` / `LOCALAI_DISTRIBUTED_DISK_HEADROOM_CHECK`
(default true), following the `--distributed-prefix-cache` pattern for
a default-on distributed feature.
- `distributed_disk_headroom_check` in the runtime-settings registry, so
it can be flipped without a restart from `POST /api/settings` and from
Settings -> Distributed in the WebUI.
Both write `DistributedConfig.DiskHeadroomDisabled`, and the SmartRouter
reads that member LIVE on every scheduling decision through a closure
over the application config rather than a value snapshotted at
construction. Env/CLI sets the boot value, the runtime setting overrides
it live, last write wins, and there is exactly one member to read.
Snapshotting would have made the runtime toggle a no-op until restart.
Disabled means WARN, not SKIP. Selection goes back to ignoring free disk
-- byte for byte the pre-check behaviour -- but the check still runs, and
when it would have rejected every node it says so, naming the knob that
suppressed it. Going quiet when switched off would reproduce the exact
condition that made the original incident expensive: a cluster doing
something that could not work and saying nothing. Disabling is also
logged once at startup. Warning only on the total-rejection case keeps
it actionable rather than chatty on a heterogeneous cluster.
Also fixes a false positive in the check itself: shared-models mode
(LOCALAI_DISTRIBUTED_SHARED_MODELS) stages nothing at all -- every node
already mounts this models directory at this path -- so demanding the
full checkpoint size of free space per node would have rejected a
cluster that needs no new bytes. The check is skipped there entirely.
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-4-8[1m] [Read] [Edit] [Bash]
---------
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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01fca9c9b2 |
fix(distributed): scale the remote model-load deadline with checkpoint size (#11030)
The gRPC deadline for the remote LoadModel call was a fixed 5m. It starts
only after the backend install and file staging have completed, so it
covers the worker's checkpoint read and pipeline init alone - work whose
duration is proportional to the bytes on disk. A fixed value is therefore
a model-size cliff, not a timeout.
Measured in production: a 70 GB video checkpoint (longcat-video-avatar-1.5)
on an NVIDIA Jetson Thor worker failed reproducibly with
"rpc error: code = DeadlineExceeded" after 953.5s of wall clock. Backend
install plus staging consumed ~11m, then LoadModel got its 5m and expired.
The load never had a chance, and the operator saw only a generic
DeadlineExceeded with no hint that a config value was the cause.
Raising the constant does not fix this. It moves the cliff to the next
larger model - the cluster has to support 600 GB checkpoints - and it makes
a genuinely wedged SMALL model hang for the whole inflated duration before
anyone notices, which is a real regression in failure latency.
So derive the budget from the checkpoint size instead:
budget = 5m + 20s/GiB, capped at 6h
2 GiB -> 5m40s, 70 GiB -> 28m20s, 600 GiB -> 3h25m. The per-GiB rate is
deliberately pessimistic (~54 MB/s of weight read) because the errors are
not symmetric: too long costs only failure latency on a load that was going
to fail anyway, too short is a guaranteed false failure on a healthy load.
The size is measured from the frontend's local model files, over the same
path set stageModelFiles uploads. When those files are not present locally -
a backend handed a bare HuggingFace repo id fetches its own weights on the
worker - there is nothing to measure and the budget stays at today's 5m.
An explicit LOCALAI_NATS_MODEL_LOAD_TIMEOUT still wins outright, in both
directions: a shorter override is honoured, so an operator who wants fast
failure is not silently extended by the heuristic.
The cold-load hold needed widening to match. It extends on staging progress,
but LoadModel reports none, so once the last byte lands the hold expires a
stall window later and would cancel a load still well inside its own budget.
scheduleAndLoad now extends the hold by the load budget plus the staging
margin as it enters the load phase; ModelLoadCeilingFor stays the hold's
starting budget rather than its maximum.
Finally, a deadline that does expire now names the budget, the checkpoint
size it was derived from, and the knob that overrides it, instead of
surfacing a bare "context deadline exceeded".
Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-4-8[1m] [Read] [Edit] [Bash]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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a4a181d2f7 |
fix(distributed): count staging verification as progress, not as a stall (#11026)
Testing the progress-based cold-load deadline on the live cluster surfaced a false positive. The stall window observed UPLOAD bytes only, but the staging path has a phase that does real work while moving zero upload bytes: the resumable-upload verify phase. When a shard is already present on the worker from an earlier attempt, the frontend HEADs it, hashes the local copy to confirm it matches, and skips the transfer. Staging a 70 GB model with 56 GB already staged: 17:27:34 INFO Upload skipped (file already exists with matching hash) ... 17:28:20 INFO Upload skipped (file already exists with matching hash) ... 17:29:07 INFO Upload skipped (file already exists with matching hash) ... ... six-plus consecutive minutes, no bytes uploaded at all ~45s per skipped ~4 GB shard. That is correct and desirable - it is what makes resume work - but it was indistinguishable from a stall. At 45s per shard it sits inside the 5m window, so the run in flight was fine; the problem is the 600 GB scale this machinery exists to enable, where one shard can plausibly hash for longer than the window. The guard would then fire during verification of a transfer that is working perfectly. Verified mechanism: probeExisting() HEADs the worker and then calls downloader.CalculateSHA(). The staging progress callback is only consulted inside doUpload(), which the skip path never reaches, so observeLoadProgress was called zero times for the whole verify phase. Verification exposed a second, worse bug in the same path: CalculateSHA consults no context at all. An expired cold load kept hashing to completion, compared the hashes, and returned success - reporting a file as staged on a dead load. The failure only surfaced on the NEXT file, whose HEAD died immediately. That is exactly the shape of the red test here, which fails on shard 3. Fix: hash in 1 MiB chunks via hashFileWithActivity(), ticking the cold-load deadline per chunk and checking ctx per chunk. A successful HEAD also counts, since a 200 with a content hash proves the worker is serving right now. Counting hash progress does not make a dead transfer look alive: hashing is bounded, terminating work proportional to file size, in probeExisting it runs only after a HEAD proved the worker was up, and the 24h absolute cap still bounds the whole hold. The alternative of simply widening the window was rejected - it would reintroduce the size cliff this work removes. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-4-8[1m] [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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b700a78ae4 |
fix(distributed): make the cold-load hold scale with progress, not wall-clock (#11019)
A 70 GB video checkpoint (longcat-video-avatar-1.5) could not be loaded on a
distributed cluster. The request failed with HTTP 500 after 1499.98s - exactly
the 25m00s cold-load ceiling - while staging was demonstrably healthy: 26 of 57
files and 39 GB transferred at a sustained ~26 MB/s, zero errors, no stalls. It
was not wedged, it was killed by a timer.
ModelLoadCeilingFor covers node selection, backend install, file staging and the
remote LoadModel. Install and load carry their own budgets; staging was covered
only by a FIXED 5-minute margin. But staging time is bytes over bandwidth, not a
constant: 70 GB at 26 MB/s needs ~45m against a 25m ceiling, so the failure is
deterministic for any sufficiently large model rather than a flake. Simply
raising the constant moves the cliff to the next model size - the deployment
target here is checkpoints of 600 GB and beyond.
The ceiling's real purpose is that "a wedged worker can never pin the lock
indefinitely". Progress, not elapsed time, is what distinguishes a wedged worker
from a large one. The hold is now a deadline that extends whenever the transfer
reports bytes and expires a 5-minute stall window after they stop:
- A large model transferring fine continues, for hours if needed.
- A worker that died mid-transfer still fails within the stall window.
Progress is observed at byte level on the transfer itself, via the existing
staging progress callback. Per-file completion would be too coarse - a single
600 GB shard would be indistinguishable from a stall for hours. The observation
point is back-pressured by the socket, so it reflects the network rather than
local disk reads. Observation is coarsened to one timer touch per stall/20 so
the per-read callback stays cheap.
The base budget (unchanged, and still derived from the install and load
timeouts) continues to cover the steps that report no progress, so
LOCALAI_NATS_MODEL_LOAD_TIMEOUT keeps working exactly as before. An absolute
cap of 24h bounds the hold even while progress keeps arriving, so a peer
trickling bytes forever cannot pin the advisory lock; 600 GB at the measured
26 MB/s is ~6.5h, so the cap sits far above any legitimate transfer.
Also fixes the incoherent layering the same error exposed: the resumable upload
carried a 1h retry budget nested inside the 25m ceiling, so the inner budget was
unreachable and the message still blamed it ("failed after 1 attempts within
1h0m0s budget") while the 25m parent was the actual killer. The upload now
adopts the caller's deadline when there is one, and applies its fixed budget
only when nothing above bounded it - which also stops a fixed 1h from
reintroducing the size cliff under the now-extendable parent.
This is the successor to #10968, where a hardcoded 5-minute LoadModel gRPC
timeout was replaced by this derived ceiling. Fixing the inner timeout exposed
the outer ceiling as the new binding constraint.
Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-4-8[1m] [Read] [Edit] [Bash]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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0eb8a1188d |
fix(worker): give the worker a real health endpoint and a mode-aware HEALTHCHECK (#10999)
fix(worker): give the worker a real health endpoint (#10987) The image bakes in a single HEALTHCHECK that curls http://localhost:8080/readyz, but the same image also runs `local-ai worker`, which serves HTTP on the gRPC base port minus one and never binds 8080. Every worker container was therefore permanently `unhealthy` (43 consecutive failures observed on a production node), which is worse than having no healthcheck: a genuinely broken worker and a perfectly good one both report `unhealthy`, so the signal carries no information and orchestration that keys on it misbehaves. The worker already served /readyz on that port via the file-transfer server, but as a constant 200 — it only proved the listener was bound, which is precisely the failure mode at issue. Readiness now tracks the live NATS connection: all of a worker's actual work (backend lifecycle events, inference dispatch, file staging) arrives over NATS, so a worker whose link is dead is up and useless. Registration is already implied, since the server only starts after registration succeeds. This reports something the controller cannot already see. The node registry's status/last_heartbeat is fed by an HTTP heartbeat to the frontend, a different network path from NATS — a worker can keep heartbeating while its NATS connection is dead and still look healthy in the registry. /healthz stays a constant 200: liveness must not follow readiness, or a NATS blip becomes a cluster-wide restart storm. The HEALTHCHECK is now a script that derives its endpoint from the mode the container is actually running plus the env vars that configure the bind address, so a frontend moved off 8080 with LOCALAI_ADDRESS (broken the same way) and a worker on a non-default base port are both probed correctly. Modes with no HTTP surface (agent-worker, one-shot commands) report healthy rather than false-unhealthy. HEALTHCHECK_ENDPOINT remains as an explicit override, so the workaround shipped in docker-compose.distributed.yaml keeps working; both overrides in that file are now unnecessary and have been removed. Also fixes the latent --start-period gap. Since #10949 a frontend's startup preload materializes HuggingFace artifacts before the HTTP server binds (31 GB observed on a live cluster), so a healthy replica can legitimately fail probes for a long time. --start-period is Docker's knob for exactly this: failures inside it leave the container `starting` instead of burning retries, and it ends early on the first success, so a generous 60m costs a fast-starting container nothing. --timeout drops from 10m to 10s — it is a per-probe deadline, and a localhost curl that has not answered in 10s is itself the fault being detected. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-4-8[1m] [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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e55cc3e2a7 |
fix(worker): bound the gRPC port allocator and stop leaking dead backends' ports (#10968)
The worker's gRPC port allocator grew monotonically with no upper bound: nextPort started at the base port and incremented whenever freePorts was empty, and nothing checked 65535. Past that it handed out integers that cannot be bound, surfacing as an opaque "backend won't start". #10961 estimated this needed ~15,000 concurrent-peak allocations, i.e. effectively unreachable. It is not, because of a second defect: the "process died unexpectedly" branch in startBackend deleted the process map entry without releasing its port at all. That port was leaked, never quarantined and never reused. A crash-looping backend leaks one port per restart, so a backend dying every 30s walks 50051 to 65535 in about five days. The leak, not concurrent peak, is the realistic route to exhaustion. Fixing the leak alone would have been wrong. Releasing that port makes it re-bindable, and the death path is the one teardown path with no request/reply to carry StoppedProcessKeys back to the controller (#10952's eager row removal), so a stale NodeModel row could then resolve to a live listener belonging to a different backend. probeHealth verifies liveness, not identity, so the request is silently misrouted. The 15s port quarantine does not cover this: the only reaper is the per-model health check at ~45s, and it can be disabled outright. The residual was masked only because the port was never rebound. So both are fixed together: - The allocator takes an explicit [basePort, LOCALAI_GRPC_MAX_PORT] range and returns ErrNoFreePort naming the range, the live backend count, the quarantined count, and the knob to raise. Exhaustion is now diagnosable instead of surfacing as an unbindable port. - Released ports carry per-key affinity: a port is offered back to the process key that last held it before any other key. Process keys (modelID#replica) and NodeModel rows (nodeID, modelName, replicaIndex) are isomorphic, so a port that can only be re-bound by its previous owner can only ever be named by that owner's row, which that key's re-registration overwrites. Misrouting to a different model becomes impossible by construction rather than by racing the quarantine timer. Affinity is a preference, not a reservation: under range pressure an owned port is stolen with a warning, because a guaranteed outage is worse than a rare misroute window on a port long out of quarantine. Claiming a port evicts its previous owner's entry, keeping ownership injective over ports so the affinity map can never exceed the range width regardless of how many distinct model keys the worker sees. Ownership also expires. It is only load-bearing while a controller row could still name the port, which the per-model reaper bounds at roughly 45s, so it lapses after five minutes and the port becomes ordinary free space again. Holding it indefinitely would have made every distinct model the worker ever served consume a port permanently: every release path is keyed, so nothing would ever be unowned, the allocator would climb to the end of its range on distinct-key count rather than concurrency, stealing would become routine, and the steal warning would tell operators to widen a range that was not the constraint. With expiry, reaching the steal branch means the worker is genuinely out of concurrent capacity, so that advice is correct when it appears. Closes #10961 Closes #10952 Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-4-8[1m] [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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fb4c61d1c9 |
fix(distributed): configurable remote model-load timeout, and reap the load when it times out (#10948)
* fix(distributed): make the remote LoadModel deadline configurable
The router hardcoded a 5 minute gRPC deadline for the remote LoadModel
call. Staging finishes before the timer starts, so those five minutes
cover only the worker backend's own checkpoint load and pipeline init.
A cold load of meituan-longcat/LongCat-Video-Avatar-1.5 (~83 GB) on an
ARM64 Thor worker fails at exactly 302s with DeadlineExceeded while the
backend process is still making progress (CPU time accumulating, RSS
moving as weights are mapped), so the load was cut short rather than
wedged.
Add LOCALAI_NATS_MODEL_LOAD_TIMEOUT / --model-load-timeout mirroring the
existing backend-install timeout knob, defaulting to 5m so unset
clusters keep today's behaviour.
The cold-load hold ceiling (which bounds how long one load may hold the
per-model advisory lock) was derived from the install timeout alone, so
raising the load deadline past it would have been silently clipped.
Derive it from both budgets via ModelLoadCeilingFor:
max(install + load + 5m staging margin, 25m)
With the defaults that is 15m + 5m + 5m = 25m, identical to the previous
constant, and the 25m floor means shrinking either budget can never
tighten the ceiling below what clusters relied on before.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 golangci-lint
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
* fix(distributed): reap the abandoned replica when a remote load times out
The gRPC deadline on the remote LoadModel call only cancels the client
side. A backend blocked in a synchronous weight load never observes its
cancelled handler context, so when scheduleAndLoad gave up it left the
worker loading with nobody waiting for the result.
Observed on an ARM64 Thor worker loading LongCat-Video-Avatar-1.5: the
client returned DeadlineExceeded at 302s, and the backend process was
still alive 30 minutes later having pulled ~57GB from HuggingFace. Every
retry stacked another multi-GB loader on the worker; they had to be
reaped by hand via POST /api/nodes/:id/models/unload.
Send backend.stop for the exact `modelID#replicaIndex` process key we
just abandoned. The exact key matters: a bare model ID stops every
replica on that node, including healthy ones serving traffic.
Only a deadline or cancellation triggers the reap. Any other LoadModel
failure is the backend answering, which means its handler returned and
the process is idle - stopping it there would discard a warm process and
its downloaded weights. The reap is best-effort and never replaces the
load error the caller is waiting on.
The `modelID#replicaIndex` format was already hand-rolled in two places
(the worker's buildProcessKey and pkg/model's log store). Rather than add
a third, export model.BackendProcessKey from pkg/model, the lowest common
dependency of both sides.
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 golangci-lint
---------
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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40d35c0385 |
docs: onboarding overhaul, dedup, and error docs (#7711) (#10895)
* docs: fix CPU image tag (latest, not latest-cpu) Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: use canonical localai/localai registry in models guide Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: replace dead llama-stable backend with llama-cpp Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: correct mitm-proxy intercept config and redaction tier Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: fix text-to-audio endpoint and broken notice block Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: fix VAD example, stale FAQ, broken link, CLI list, whats-new dump Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: render advanced/reference section indexes (consolidate _index) Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: remove duplicate getting-started build/kubernetes pages Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: fold container image reference into installation/containers Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: remove stale advanced fine-tuning page (superseded by features/fine-tuning) Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: fold distribution/longcat/sound pages into their parents Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: make getting-started index accurate and complete Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: carry one concrete model through the getting-started path Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: add end-to-end 'build your first agent' walkthrough Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: add runtime errors reference; consolidate troubleshooting from FAQ Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: add agent actions catalog Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: agent-scoped MCP, skills walkthrough, agentic disambiguation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: add concrete gallery install lines to media feature pages Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: merge installation into getting-started (URLs preserved via aliases) Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: add Operations section; move operator pages and P2P API reference Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: journey-ordered top nav and grouped feature sections Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: add docs-with-code process gate (PR template + agent instructions) Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs: remove em/en dashes from documentation prose Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
|
8cec22c3b7 |
feat(vram): per-node VRAM allocation budget (LOCALAI_VRAM_BUDGET) (#10833)
* feat(vram): add vrambudget primitive for per-node VRAM caps Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(vram): apply default VRAM budget in xsysinfo aggregate getters Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(vram): wire LOCALAI_VRAM_BUDGET flag to xsysinfo default budget Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(vram): persist VRAM budget via runtime settings with live apply Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * test(vram): reset process-global VRAM budget after runtime-settings spec Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(vram): add VRAM budget field to Settings page Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(vram): store and enforce per-node VRAM budget in the node registry Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(vram): apply per-node VRAM budget in router hardware defaults Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(vram): report worker VRAM budget in node registration The distributed worker now reports its operator-set VRAM budget string (LOCALAI_VRAM_BUDGET) to the server on registration. The worker keeps reporting RAW total/available VRAM and never sets the xsysinfo process-global budget (that stays standalone-only); the server resolves and enforces the budget uniformly (Task 6). Also closes a Task 6 gap: on re-registration, a struct Updates zero-skips an empty budget, so a worker that dropped LOCALAI_VRAM_BUDGET left the stale cap in place. For non-admin-override nodes the budget columns are now force-written (map Updates) even when empty, so removing the env var clears the cap; admin overrides are preserved unchanged. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * style(vram): drop em dash from worker-clear comment Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(vram): add node VRAM budget admin endpoints Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(vram): add node VRAM budget control to the node UI Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(vram): expose set_node_vram_budget MCP admin tool Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * docs(vram): document LOCALAI_VRAM_BUDGET and node VRAM budget UI Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(vram): avoid double-applying VRAM budget in GetResourceAggregateInfo The GPU-branch aggregate returned by GetResourceInfo is sourced from GetGPUAggregateInfo, which already caps total/free/used against the process-wide VRAM budget. GetResourceAggregateInfo then applied the budget a second time. For an absolute budget this is idempotent, but for a percentage budget b.Apply resolves the ceiling as a fraction of its input total, so a second pass yields P*(P*T) instead of P*T and distorts UsagePercent (read by the memory reclaimer in pkg/model/watchdog.go). Remove the redundant second application so the budget is applied exactly once, against the raw physical totals, upstream in GetGPUAggregateInfo. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(vram): implement SetNodeVRAMBudget on mcp assistant test stub The LocalAIClient interface gained SetNodeVRAMBudget; the stubClient in core/http/endpoints/mcp used by the assistant tests is a separate implementer and needs the method too (broke golangci-lint typecheck and both test jobs). Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
|
3601174ce0 |
fix(distributed): make per-node backend upgrade actually upgrade (#10838)
* test(core/http): make the suite's HTTP port overridable app_test.go and openresponses_test.go hardcoded 127.0.0.1:9090. When another service already listens on 9090 the suite does not fail fast: the server goroutine logs the bind error and the specs then poll whatever is squatting the port until Eventually times out. On machines where 9090 is permanently taken this makes the pre-commit coverage gate impossible to pass. Introduce testHTTPAddr, defaulting to 127.0.0.1:9090 (what CI has always used) and overridable via LOCALAI_TEST_HTTP_PORT for local runs. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5 golangci-lint Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(distributed): make per-node backend upgrade actually upgrade The node detail page's Upgrade button reused the node-scoped install path (POST /api/nodes/:id/backends/install). That fires NATS backend.install with force=false, and the worker's install handler is deliberately "ensure installed": when the backend binary already exists on disk it short-circuits without touching the gallery. Since only an installed backend can be upgraded, the whole chain was a guaranteed successful no-op - the UI then toasted "backend upgraded" without even waiting for the async job. Route upgrades through the real force-reinstall path instead: - BackendManager.UpgradeBackend now receives the ManagementOp (like InstallBackend already did) so implementations can honor op.TargetNodeID. - DistributedBackendManager.UpgradeBackend scopes the backend.upgrade fan-out to op.TargetNodeID when set, and errors when the target node does not report the backend as installed. - New POST /api/nodes/:id/backends/upgrade endpoint enqueues an Upgrade=true node-scoped op (async 202 + jobID, mirroring install). - NodeDetail UI calls the new endpoint and reports the dispatch ("Upgrading ... on this node...") instead of claiming success; the Operations panel tracks the actual job. Verified against a live local cluster (NATS + Postgres + two workers): the target worker stops the running process, force-reinstalls from the gallery and re-downloads the OCI image; the second worker receives no backend.upgrade event; upgrading a backend missing from the target node fails the job with a clear error. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5 golangci-lint Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
|
bcc41219f7 |
feat: materialize Hugging Face model artifacts (#10825)
* feat(config): add model artifact source contract Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * feat(downloader): add authenticated raw-byte progress Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * feat(huggingface): resolve immutable snapshot manifests Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * feat(models): add artifact storage primitives Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * feat(models): materialize pinned Hugging Face snapshots Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * feat(models): bind managed snapshots at runtime Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * feat(gallery): materialize model artifacts during install Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * feat(gallery): declare managed Hugging Face artifacts Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * feat(models): preload managed model artifacts Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * fix(gallery): retain shared artifact caches on delete Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * feat(models): report artifact acquisition progress Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * refactor(backends): load managed models from ModelFile Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * refactor(backends): load staged speech model snapshots Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * refactor(backends): use staged snapshots in engine backends Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * test(distributed): cover staged artifact snapshots Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * docs: explain managed model artifacts Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * docs: add product design context Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * feat(ui): show model artifact download progress Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [Codex] * Eagerly materialize Hugging Face artifacts Materialize HF-backed model references as managed GGUF artifacts during load, with lazy download retained only as fallback. Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [shell] * Refactor HF downloads through a shared executor Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 [shell] * drop Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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f3d829e2ef |
feat(distributed): add LOCALAI_DISTRIBUTED_SHARED_MODELS to skip staging on shared volumes (#10556) (#10566)
In distributed mode, even when the frontend and workers share the same models directory via a shared volume mount, starting a model on a worker re-staged (re-downloaded) it: stageModelFiles always uploads model files into a tracking-key-namespaced subdir on the worker, and the staging probe only checks that staged location, so a file already present on the shared volume at the canonical path was never reused. Add a config switch LOCALAI_DISTRIBUTED_SHARED_MODELS (default false). When enabled, the operator asserts that all nodes mount the SAME models directory at the SAME path, so staging is unnecessary: the frontend's absolute model paths are already valid on the worker. In that mode stageModelFiles returns the cloned opts unchanged without uploading, leaving the path fields pointing at their canonical absolute paths so the worker loads them directly from the shared volume. The value is plumbed from DistributedConfig through SmartRouterOptions into the SmartRouter. Docs and docker-compose.distributed.yaml updated. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |