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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Ettore Di Giacinto
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6de095b222 |
feat(distributed): take the backend worker off NATS entirely
A local-ai worker no longer opens a bus connection. connectNATS and its
spec are gone; Run registers once, starts its tunnel, arms /readyz on that
tunnel, and heartbeats. The worker's bus credential flags (--nats-jwt,
--nats-user-seed, --nats-require-auth, the three TLS flags) and
Config.NatsAuthRequired go with it. --nats-url stays, accepted and
ignored, so an existing worker command line still parses.
/readyz was the thing most likely to wedge a tunnel-only worker: it
required a live NATS link, so a worker with no bus would have reported
itself unready forever. nodes.NATSReadiness becomes nodes.TunnelReadiness
over a local interface{ Connected() bool }, and worker.Tunnel gains
Connected(), backed by a mutex-guarded session field the loop publishes
and clears. A closed-but-not-yet-cleared session reads as disconnected:
the loop waits for every in-flight stream before it clears the field, and
the probe must answer not-ready through that wait.
The heartbeat gate is DELETED rather than re-pointed at the tunnel. The
heartbeat is the worker's own answer that its process is alive; whether
the frontend can reach it is a separate fact the frontend already holds
and ages against LOCALAI_WORKER_RECONNECT_GRACE. Withholding the
heartbeat would report an unreachable worker as an absent one on the one
path with no grace, where the health monitor marks it offline and its
pending backend ops are deleted behind it. heartbeatLoop is given no view
of the tunnel, so a gate cannot be added back without changing its
signature.
Removing the NATS credential manager from this path also removes a defect
it carried: its refresh loop re-registered on a timer to renew a JWT, and
Register CLEARS a node's NodeModel rows. Any backend worker running on
frontend-minted credentials had its replica rows deleted roughly every
18 hours.
Of core/cli/workerregistry, everything survives. The manager is still
used in full by core/cli/agent_worker.go, which still needs NATS: Acquire,
Provider, RefreshLoop, HasCredentials and TunnelToken are all untouched.
The backend worker simply calls RegisterFullWithRetry directly now.
WorkerPermissions is documented as serving agent nodes, and its non-agent
branch narrowed to _INBOX.> on both sides. It is NOT deleted: NATS reads
an empty allow list as no restriction, so returning nil would upgrade
every JWT the frontend still mints for a backend node from its own inbox
to the whole account.
Agent workers keep the bus everywhere: their CLI flags, their
subscriptions, the agent branch of WorkerPermissions, and the compose
service with its LOCALAI_NATS_URL and depends_on: nats.
Also corrected two flags the Nodes page advertised that do not exist
(--distributed-nats, --distributed-db), and a log line plus several
comments that still named a bus the code no longer touches.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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94b248666a |
feat(distributed): read worker absence from the database, not from a bus timeout
The scheduler decided whether a worker had gone away from nats.ErrNoResponders: one frontend's observation that nobody answered IT within a request budget. Two replicas asking in the same moment could disagree and demote each other's workers, and a worker re-homing its tunnel between replicas looked identical to one that had died. SmartRouter now reads cluster.Presence instead. Only PresenceGone -- no live replica holds the tunnel AND the departure has outlived the reconnect grace -- excludes a node from placement, and it is a fact every replica reads identically from the database. PresenceReconnecting, PresenceUnknown and a failed presence query are all non-verdicts and place work as normal: excluding on a database hiccup would cost the fleet its capacity for a reason that has nothing to do with any worker. nodeAnswersOnBus is deleted. It excluded on a sentinel no control RPC can produce, so it decided nothing while PingNode cost a relayed round trip per scheduling decision to feed it. PingNode goes with it, from the adapter and from NodeCommandSender. isRequestTimeout drops nats.ErrTimeout: every verb this adapter sends now travels over the worker's tunnel. The predicate is named nodeMayTakeWork rather than nodeHasRoute. "Route" is ErrWorkerUnroutable in this package, the condition nobody may act on; PresenceGone is the one a scheduler may. Spelling them the same way is the collapse this work exists to prevent. Also folds in ReapStale's return rename: it counts connection rows CLEARED, never rows deleted, and reading it as a delete count would make a worker that is re-dialling right now look forgotten. The spec pinning that a message merely quoting "nats: timeout" is not a timeout was scripting a SUCCESSFUL reply carrying the phrase, which comes back with a nil error and never reaches the classifier. Restoring the string match left it green. It now scripts a 5xx whose body carries the phrase, and asserts that the phrase reaches the classifier as a precondition. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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e8d2563abe |
fix(cluster): stop a late request frame reading as the worker's verdict
Making a worker's refusal reaping evidence created a defect one layer along, at the producer. The worker refused a ReadStreamRequest failure with ErrStreamRequestInvalid and its own comment said "Includes the deadline above expiring", which was harmless while every refusal reached the frontend as "no route" and became a reap the moment one of them did not. So a request frame that had merely not ARRIVED yet was reported as a non-transient verdict about a backend. It is reachable on the relay path, which carries most production traffic: the worker's header timer starts when the OWNING replica opens the stream, while the frame is written by the DIALLING replica only after the relay's acceptance travels back to it, so a whole peer-link round trip runs inside that window, on a link this design deliberately loads with multi-gigabyte artifacts beside token streams. For a long-deadline caller the endpoint is ConnectionEvictingClient, which stops the model across the fleet. It also falsified the "neither clears on its own" argument that licensed the reap. There is now a fourth refusal, ErrStreamNotServed, for what a worker could not serve for a reason of its OWN. It is deliberately outside IsWorkerAnswer, so it reaches a consumer under the no-route umbrella and reaps nothing, which is the same treatment an unrecognised code already gets. Four producers move onto it: a request frame that timed out (a malformed one stays a verdict, because that is a frontend bug no retry fixes), both SetReadDeadline failures, which are facts about the stream and not about a target nothing has dialled yet, and WriteStreamRefusal's default for a reason nobody classified. classifyServiceFailure keeps ErrStreamTargetUnavailable as its default on purpose: inverting it would make errno enumeration the single point of failure for the reap, and a miss there is a row nothing can ever delete. What it gains is a deny-list of two causes that are provably this worker's own clock or its own context. Also: - The read-site caller-deadline guard in the handshake was unpinned: the existing seam spends the budget before the handshake starts, so only the write could ever fail. A spec whose deadline falls between the request and the reply pins it, and each guard now reddens on its own. - The documented worker-first failure line omitted the JSON error envelope the old frontend returns, so an operator grepping it found nothing. - The peer-link disclosure names the aimable per-session receive window in all four places, and LastDialErrorOf records why a third consumer must go through IsWorkerAnswer rather than roll its own list. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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118eea6931 |
fix(distributed): let a worker's own refusal be evidence about its backend
A worker that refuses a stream has answered, and cluster.Dial keeps the three tunnelproto sentinels out of the ErrNoRoute umbrella precisely so a consumer can act on that. No consumer did. Since workers stopped listening, a backend process that crashed on a healthy worker is no longer a dead listener's codes.Unavailable: the worker refuses the stream with ErrStreamTargetUnavailable, gRPC flattens it into Unavailable anyway, and nodes.unroutable reported the whole thing as "this frontend has no route". Every reap path then answered ProbeUnknown and left the row, so the replica slot never freed and at the default MaxReplicasPerModel=1 the only cleanup left was LRU eviction of models that were working. isWorkerAnswer is exported as cluster.IsWorkerAnswer, so the errors the dialer keeps out of the umbrella are by construction the errors the consumers treat as the worker answering. nodes.unroutable and pkg/model's transportFailure both use it; ConnectionEvictingClient, the site reached during inference, goes through transportFailure rather than asking the transport directly. A reply code this frontend does not recognise is still not an answer, so a newer worker's vocabulary costs a retry and not a replica. The reap guards keep the allow-list rather than requiring ErrNoRoute: an unrecognised dial error must mean "no route", never "the backend is gone". Also in this final pass over the branch: - Docs: recommend upgrading FRONTENDS first, with the symptom of each order. Workers-first fails now that a 4xx registration is a verdict rather than an outage, so an old frontend's "address is required for backend workers" makes each restarted worker exit and drains the fleet a node per restart. - Docs: LOCALAI_WORKER_TUNNEL=false is a fatal startup error, not a degraded mode, in both places that described it; and a frontend rollback needs every worker restarted, because re-registration force-clears the address columns. - A replica with no advertised address now says so every five minutes and names the workers only it can reach, instead of one startup warning for a cost paid for the life of the process. - callerRanOut's rule now holds at all three siblings, so an expired caller deadline stops reading as a broken tunnel; probeHealth's withdrawn reason for using the raw client is corrected; the dead DoOrCached is deleted and its coverage kept on DoOrCachedResult; sweepLeakedInFlight enumerates the outcomes that reach it. - The peer route's self-declared id is recorded as a phase-3 deferral, in the handler, in the isolation claim it narrows, and in the operator docs. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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778c97aaf7 |
fix(cluster): stop blaming a peer for the caller's own expired deadline
Review round 1 on the end-to-end proof. Zero blocking items, eleven non-blocking, and three of them turned out to be production defects rather than notes on the report. The one that matters is a misclassification the phase is built to prevent. A dial carries the caller's deadline down to the socket, so when the budget runs out the socket's timer fires and the error travels back up through the WebSocket handshake and the multiplexer. The context's cancellation is a separate timer whose func the scheduler has to run before ctx.Err() stops returning nil, and nothing orders the two. Under contention the socket's error is back in PeerPool.Open first, ctx.Err() reads nil, and a peer that is listening and healthy is reported as ErrPeerUnreachable to a caller that simply ran out of time. An unreachable peer is a fact a caller may act on and an expired deadline is not, and core/services/nodes routes around a replica it is told is unreachable. callerRanOut answers that question in one place: ctx.Err() when it is set, and otherwise the wall clock against the caller's own deadline. That is sound because it is the same instant the socket compared itself against, so if the socket's timer fired this comparison is past it too. The ambiguous instant resolves towards the caller, which is the direction that never blames a peer. The spec that caught it, peerlink_test.go's "blames the caller's deadline", was red in three of seven -race runs and had been since Task 5, which is often enough to read as noise and is why single-run verification never saw it. Rather than leave the proof to a coin flip, a second spec makes the window deterministic: Open is handed a context whose deadline has passed and whose cancellation has not been delivered, against an address nothing is listening on, so the dial fails for real. It reddens without the fix. The peer link's yamux windows were applied to one end only. A receive window is advertised by the side that RECEIVES, so configuring the dialler alone tunes exactly one direction, and the direction left on the 256 KiB default is the one that carries a relayed model artifact INTO the replica that owns the worker's tunnel. That is the largest thing the link ever moves and it is the direction the load measurement exercises: the review read it as flowing toward the dialler and it does not. PeerLinkConfig is now exported and used on both ends. Measured, same box, 128 MiB staged through the relay against the same transfer without one: the relayed path cost 1.6x to 2.0x the direct path's transfer window before, and 1.06x to 1.25x after. The SSRF reachability spec could be fooled into reporting an SSRF that did not happen. It bound the victim on 127.0.0.2 at an ephemeral port and required 127.0.0.1 at the same port to refuse, so any other spec in the run holding that number made the dial succeed; red one run in seven, green five of five in isolation. It now picks from below the kernel's ephemeral range, the same fix the harness got for the adjacent-port collision. The rest are the specs and the report saying what they mean. Scenario 1's advertisement assertion could not tell "the worker advertises nothing" from "the JSON key moved", which matters because removing the advertisement is the change it covers. It was green against a renamed key. The roster now keeps the raw key set beside the decoded fields and the spec requires both keys present before reading them as empty. Scenario 4's refusal-body check was a four-way disjunction admitting bare "tunnel", "not connected" and "unroutable". Those alternatives were inert and each would be satisfied by refusals that say nothing about routing, in the one assertion the whole negative control rests on. It is "no route" alone. The head-of-line gate bounded the worst probe by the whole transfer window, which admits about eightfold degradation and loosens as the box slows. It is now half the window, plus a scale-free ratio against the worst probe under the SAME cold load with nothing to transfer, which is the control that isolates the transfer from the load. Not tighter than that, and the reason is measured rather than cautious: under a concurrent -race suite the worst relayed probe reached a fifth of its window, so a quarter-window gate would have had 1.2x of margin, and a spec that fails one run in three is worse than no spec. The report entry printed p90 and p99 off samples of twenty, where both land on the same element and p99 often lands on the max, so one number appeared three times under three names. A quantile is now printed only when the sample can separate it. Two claims in the report were wrong and are withdrawn rather than softened. Scenario 2's race is closed by the trailing re-read of the owner, not by the pre-assertion the report credited: a move to the non-owner mid-request would serve directly and still return 200, and only the trailing read reddens on it. And "the median request is unchanged" holds on this box and not on the reviewer's, where the relayed median rises up to 82% and p99 up to 3.5x. What survives on both is structural: the worst probe is a small fraction of the window in which bytes are moving, so the session interleaves rather than serialising. Sharing a session with a bulk transfer costs latency; it does not cost service. The disk footprint note undercounted, and the reviewer lost a run to a full disk on this box, so it is worth having right: two bulk models seeded into two frontends and staged to the worker is about 768 MiB, not 512 MiB. Left alone deliberately: the worker's backend port allocator still hands out ports without checking they are free, and its default range still overlaps the kernel's ephemeral range. It is confirmed, it is out of scope here, and it is being tracked as a named follow-up rather than fixed under an e2e task. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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f7da9df5fc |
feat(distributed): stop workers listening, and stop them advertising
A worker now opens no listener on a routable interface and states no endpoint at registration. Backend processes and the file-transfer server bind loopback, and the frontend reaches both through the tunnel the worker dials. The bind address is built from loopbackHost, the same constant the tunnel's grpc tag dials, so "the worker binds where its tunnel dials" is one fact in one place rather than two literals that can drift. All three advertisement sites are closed, not one: the registration body, RegisterNodeRequest, and the per-backend address in the install reply. That third one was hiding a live bug. stopModelExact refuses a stop whose ExpectedAddress does not match what the worker recorded for the process. The worker recorded 127.0.0.1:port; handleBackendInstall reported advertiseHost:port; the router stored the reported one and sent it straight back. On any worker whose advertise host was not 127.0.0.1, every acknowledged model stop failed with an address mismatch. Nothing caught it because the e2e harness set LOCALAI_ADVERTISE_ADDR=127.0.0.1, which made the rewrite a no-op. Removing the rewrite makes the two strings the same by construction. The brief was wrong about two of the four functions it called dead. effectiveBasePort is the base of the backend port allocator and resolveHTTPAddr is the file server's bind address; deleting them would have deleted the port allocator and the file server. Only the two advertise* helpers were dead, and addr_test.go is rewritten rather than deleted, because the port arithmetic it pinned still needs pinning. NodeModel.Address survives with a narrowed meaning and is renamed WorkerLocalAddress, along with the install reply field that feeds it. The frontend still has to say WHICH backend process on a worker it means, and the port in this string is how it says it: it travels as a stream target and the worker dials its own loopback. The gorm column and the json key stay "address", so neither a migration nor an API break rides along. Every fall-back to the node's address is gone. installBackendOnNode now errors when a worker reports success without naming one, because substituting the now-always-empty node address would name an empty target, and the worker refuses that as an invalid stream, which is classified as the worker answering about its backend. That is the "a present worker reads as something it is not" class this phase forbids. DistributedModelStore.Range had the same shape and was already wrong: it built each remote model's client from the node's base gRPC port, never the port a backend process listens on, so Free and Status went to the wrong place. It uses the replica's address now. BackendNode.Address and HTTPAddress are kept but made provably inert: no writer, no reader that acts on them, and Register force-clears both on re-registration so an upgraded worker's stale advertisement does not outlive its own upgrade in the API and the Nodes page. Dropping the columns is a ~90-site edit across the specs, the e2e suite, the MCP dto and the UI; it is recorded as a follow-up rather than folded in here. A persistent tunnel 401 still does not trigger re-registration, and now for a reason rather than a deferral. Register CLEARS the node's replica rows, so re-registering on a 401 would delete a live worker's rows on every retry, and under the name collision that causes the 401 the two workers would take turns doing it forever: a credential failure causing model reclamation. It also cannot fix the named cause, since a collision is indistinguishable from a restart. The 401 log now names both causes and says nothing can reach this worker, which is true only now that it has no listener. The container healthcheck did not break the way the brief expected, since the listener still exists on loopback and the probe runs inside the container. It did have a real #10987 defect that this change makes the common case: it read LOCALAI_SERVE_ADDR only, while effectiveBasePort reads LOCALAI_ADDR first, so a worker on a non-default base port was probed on 50050 and reported unhealthy while working. It follows the same precedence now. Docs, the compose file and the e2e harness are updated in step: no inbound rule or published port is needed for a worker, the two advertise variables are gone, the remaining address variables are read for their port only, the firewall-the-file-transfer-port warning is narrowed to the LOCALAI_HTTP_ADDR opt-out, and the upgrade-order note no longer claims the worker still listens. The Nodes page showed node.address, which is now always blank, so it shows the node id instead. Eight mutations, all red on a named spec, including reverting the loopback bind, re-adding the address to the registration body, restoring both node-address fall-backs, dropping the force-clear, storing the endpoint's address again, and un-fixing the healthcheck. One of them caught a defect in a spec I had just written: it asserted 200 where the endpoint returns 201, which went unnoticed because core/http/endpoints/localai is not on the task's verify list. It is run here. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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4945e44595 |
fix(cluster): make "no route" a condition of its own, and let it out of the package
Review round 1 on task 6. Five blocking findings, all with the same root: the conditions the dialer kept apart were erased one layer out, because every one of them arrived at core/services/nodes as a gRPC codes.Unavailable, which is also what a backend process that died produces. Four call sites acted on that by deleting a replica row, one of them after a single failed probe. The fifth condition is ErrNoRoute: this replica could not get a request to a worker's backend, and no claim at all about the worker. A worker's presence is its HEARTBEAT, which nodes owns; a route is a separate fact that cluster owns, and the two now differ. They differ in normal operation, not exotically: a worker that has not dialled its tunnel yet after a frontend-first upgrade is unroutable on every request while it heartbeats and serves. Two properties, both mutation-tested. Every failure to resolve or open a route carries ErrNoRoute, so a consumer has one check to make. No failure carries an absence sentinel: routeFailure is the single place that rule lives, and it keeps ErrNoConnection and ErrInstanceNotFound in the message and out of the unwrap chain, the guarantee unreachableError already made for peers. Everything else stays matchable, so ErrNotOwner and ErrPeerUnreachable are unchanged for anyone who can act on them. A worker's own refusal carries no umbrella, because a worker that answers has demonstrated it is there and that is the only real evidence on the path. Crossing the boundary needed a value, not a code. NewClientWithDialer wraps the dialer and records each outcome; LastDialError hands it back behind a narrow interface, and nodes.unroutable turns it into ErrWorkerUnroutable with the cluster sentinels still in the chain. A spec asserts a dial failing with ErrNoRoute plus ErrPeerUnreachable arrives matching all three and matching neither absence sentinel. The sweep found a fourth site the review had not named: pkg/model checkIsLoaded evicts a remote model on a connection error, and a tunnel dial failure is one. Four other reap sites were cleared with reasons - inflight and the worker authoritative pass reap only on semantic answers, scale-down is driven by last_used, abandoned loads decide on the node's heartbeat. Every fixed site also grew the opposite spec, so the new check cannot pass by never reaping. probeCache carries the reason through singleflight rather than a closed-over variable. A variable is only written by the goroutine that runs the probe, so the leader would correctly decline to reap while every joiner reaped on the leader's own observation; a mutation reproduces exactly that. The docs sentence promising LOCALAI_WORKER_TUNNEL=false restores direct dialling is gone. There is no such path, so it said the operator could take a worker dark and call it a rollback. Replaced with the upgrade order that is actually safe. The deadline spec the reviewer found vacuous now waits on the dial context's own Done channel before touching the stream, so the armed deadline has really expired; the mutation that survived for the reviewer reddens it. Nine mutations, each reddening a named spec, including both halves of isAbsenceClaim independently. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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d1b33140da |
feat(cluster): reach every worker through its tunnel, never its address
The tunnel, the fence, the registry and the relay were all built and none of them carried a byte: every dial from the frontend still went to the address a worker registered. This is where that stops. One WorkerDialer resolves where a worker's tunnel is held, opens a stream on it locally or relays through the owning replica, and hands back a conn past both handshakes; gRPC, the file stager's HTTP client and the log-streaming WebSocket are all pointed at it. A worker's address stops being somewhere to connect to and becomes the name of which backend process a stream is for. It still appears in URLs, logs and errors, because that is what identifies the process; what it no longer decides is where the bytes go. Nothing falls back to dialling it. BackendClientFactory now has exactly one method, NewClientForNode, and returns an error where there is no way to reach the worker. The direct-dial constructor was removed rather than kept beside it, because leaving one on the interface keeps the bypass one word away from every call site that holds an address, which is all of them. The second construction path is closed too. DistributedModelStore built remote models with a nil client, and pkg/model.Model.GRPC then dialled the raw address lazily on first use - reached in production by ShutdownModel's Free and by the backend monitor's Status. Those models now carry the tunnel-backed client, and a model that cannot be given one is logged and not listed. Four conditions stay unmixable, and one path produces absence: the dialer answers ErrNoConnection only where Owner's liveness join did. A peer that will not answer, a stale ownership row, a worker's own refusal and a missing relay path are each reported as themselves. This matters because nodes ACTS on absence, and the collapse would have it reclaim the models of a worker that is connected and busy. That is not hypothetical. Writing the mutation for it exposed the bug in this change's own first draft: probeHealth returned bare false when it could not build a client, and tryWarmPath deletes the replica row on a false probe. A frontend whose dialer broke would have emptied node_models for the whole deployment while every model kept running. probeHealth now returns alive and probed separately, the reconciler gets a ProbeUnknown outcome that neither advances nor clears a failure streak, and the health monitor skips rather than counting a miss. Task 5 left the relay's open timeout at a fixed 15s and said so: no operator has the information to set it, because the number that matters is the original client's remaining budget, which is invisible on the relay side. The dialer has that budget, so it now states it in the relay request frame and the owner takes the smaller of the two. It can only shorten - a patient client must not be able to park a relay goroutine and a stream slot on a worker that stopped accepting. Zero is written as no budget at all, since on the far side the number zero is a caller with nothing left and would refuse healthy traffic. Seven mutations, each reddening a named spec: peer-unreachable as absence; the local-failure guard dropped; max instead of min on the budget; the nil-client model restored; ProbeUnknown falling through to the reaper; OwnerRow instead of Owner; probed collapsed into alive. The first budget spec passed for the wrong reason - a handshake deadline, not the relay - and was replaced by three that each assert one link, including one where the spec plays the owning replica and reads the budget out of the frame instead of inferring it from a clock. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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489550d317 |
fix(worker): make the tunnel credential's node-type gate actually structural
Re-review follow-up, three items. Two are the overclaiming-comment class again, and the first is that class with a real defect underneath it. attachTunnelToken said "enforcement is therefore structural": an ineligible node never gets a credential, so its hash stays empty and the tunnel route's empty-hash branch does the refusing. That was true for a node that had always been an agent and false for one that had not. Register upserts by NAME, so a backend node re-registering as an agent keeps its ID, and Register's struct Updates zero-skips the credential column while writing the new node_type. The early return left the credential the node earned as a backend sitting on a row that is now an agent, and ConnectHandler never looks at node_type. Fixed by making the claim true rather than by softening it, because the mint-site gate was chosen precisely on the grounds that it was structural: an ineligible node now has its column CLEARED, unconditionally, so the invariant does not depend on what the row happened to contain. A spec pins it and was red before the change. Same shape as the Register-upserts-by-name hazard already carried forward: a name is not an identity. Second, loopbackHost claimed to be the only host any tunnel stream is ever dialled on. It is not: fixedService dials whatever Run built it from, which is this worker's own LOCALAI_HTTP_ADDR, and loopbackAddr rewrites only a wildcard bind, so an operator who binds the file-transfer server to a routable address gets a routable dial. The property that matters is narrower and is what the comment says now: the frontend cannot STEER the dial. The grpc tag builds its address from a constant and a validated port with nothing from the wire reaching the dialler, and the http tag ignores its target entirely. Worth stating exactly rather than summarising, because the argument about what a stream can reach rests on knowing which hosts are reachable, and an overstatement at that site is what would let someone conclude the constant alone is doing the work. Third, a spec named "without allocating it" measured no allocation. It now asserts the mechanism the defence actually rests on, that the reader consumes the two length bytes and not one byte of the body, through a counting reader. The input carries a body on purpose: against input that ends after the header the assertion would pass with the limit check deleted. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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4ec400d29d |
fix(worker): spec the tunnel's routing table, which was the SSRF boundary
Review follow-up. One blocking finding and seven others. The blocking one first, and it is this project's recurring shape: the untested path. loopbackService is the function whose comment calls the discarded host "the security property this function exists for", and nothing tested it. The reviewer replaced its body with a dial of whatever the frontend named, no port range, and all 131 specs passed. Every spec installed the permissive test dialler, so the real routing table was exercised nowhere. It now has specs, and the property is stated as reachability rather than as a property of the code: a listener on 127.0.0.2 that only the frontend's target names must NOT be reached. Plus the port-range table, fixedService, loopbackAddr, tunnelEndpoint, and the table itself, which moved out of Run into tunnelServices so it can be built without starting a worker. One spec drives a real stream through that table over the wire, so the routing rules are exercised end to end at least once rather than only in isolation. The reviewer's mutation now reddens ten specs, and six narrower ones redden between two and four each, so no spec is riding on another. The shape changed too, not only the coverage. The dial address is built from a loopbackHost constant and strconv.Itoa of a validated int, so nothing derived from the wire reaches DialContext at all: restoring the hole takes ADDING a data flow, not deleting a check. And a taxonomy fix found while specifying it. A port outside this worker's allocator range was reported as unavailable, which tells a frontend to retry something that can never work. It is a bad request now, and a backend that is merely not listening yet stays unavailable, which is the retryable one. Agent nodes no longer get a tunnel credential. Nothing dials into an agent worker, so a tunnel replaces nothing for it and no client would open one, and the gate is at the mint site rather than in the handler: with no credential minted the hash stays empty and the existing empty-hash refusal covers it, so enforcement is structural. Two comments and one doc paragraph said an anonymous registrant gets a "working" credential. With auto-approve off the node is pending and the credential is inert, which is the distinction this same change argues three files away to justify minting for pending nodes at all. A refusal reason over the frame limit was cut on a byte boundary and could split a rune. It cuts on a rune boundary now, and the code survives truncation, which is what keeps a refusal classifiable. Also: the pending-node spec asserted only that a credential was non-empty, so a credential derived from the shared token passed it; it now pins per-node-ness the way the headline spec does. The tunnel handler's citations into nodes.go were stale before this branch landed, having been written against a file the same commit was editing, and are by function name now. The static-NATS path says plainly that an externally forced rotation locks it out until restart, and where that gets fixed. tunnelproto gained direct specs, including that a read failure is never reported as a refusal. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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099e2b00af |
feat(worker): dial, hold and serve the tunnel, on a credential of its own
The worker end of the tunnel. It dials wss://<register-to>/api/cluster/connect, holds one yamux session as the CLIENT, and serves every stream the frontend opens on it. Nothing dials into the worker, which is the point: no inbound port, no reachable address. Each stream opens with a length-prefixed frame naming a tag and a target, and the worker answers before either side speaks the tunnelled protocol. The reply is sent on every stream, not only on refusal, because the protocols carried here are client-speaks-first and a reply sent only sometimes would arrive interleaved with a response body. Two tags today: grpc reaches a backend process, and only on 127.0.0.1 within this worker's own backend port range, because a tunnel terminates inside the worker and letting the frontend name a host would make every worker a proxy into its own LAN; http reaches the worker's file-transfer server, whose address the frontend is not asked about. An unknown tag, an unreachable local service and an unparseable request are three refusals and stay three on the wire. A frontend gives up on the first and retries the second. Each is answered AND the stream is ended: a worker that says why and leaves the stream open has parked the caller on a request nobody will answer, and a deadline on the far side cannot tell that from a slow worker. The specs assert the stream ends rather than that an error occurred, which is what phase 1 shipped in three places and held in none. Reconnects double from 500ms to a 30s ceiling, each wait drawn between half the interval and all of it, and the interval returns to its floor only after a session that LASTED. Resetting on connect is how a rolling restart, where every dial succeeds and dies moments later, becomes a retry storm against the first replica back up. Nothing is assumed to survive a reconnect: the credential is read at dial time, never captured. And the credential is now real. The tunnel endpoint advertised authenticating a worker against its own secret, but registration stored the hash of the shared registration token, so a leak plus a known node ID still opened a tunnel. Registration now mints a per-node secret, returns the plaintext once as tunnel_token, and stores only its SHA-256 in a new column; the endpoint compares against that and does not fall back to the old one. Rotating on every registration follows from storing only the hash, since a re-registering worker cannot be told the secret it already holds; its live tunnel is unaffected, because the credential is checked when a tunnel is dialled and never again. Unlike the agent API key and the NATS JWT next to it, the credential IS issued to a node awaiting approval: the tunnel route re-reads the node's status on every dial and refuses a pending one, so it is inert until an admin acts, and withholding it would strand every worker that registers exactly once. A node that has not registered since this change cannot tunnel, and the column cannot be back-filled because the plaintext only ever existed in the response that minted it. The boot warning that said tunnels need LOCALAI_REGISTRATION_TOKEN is replaced: it was true while the tunnel authenticated against that token's hash, and says the wrong thing now. What is still true, and is what it warns about instead, is that without one, registration itself is unauthenticated. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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27f9e78c8a |
fix(testutil): stop the shared-database change from disarming two regressions
Two advisory-lock specs named their database by literal, ALTER DATABASE testdb. Once the test helper started handing every spec its own database on a shared server, that statement landed on the maintenance database and did nothing to the one the spec was holding, so both specs went green having never reproduced the condition they exist for. They regress a model-load advisory-lock wedge that has already shipped to production once, so the previous commit's de-flaking silently disarmed a regression test for a real deployed bug. Both sites now read the name back with current_database() and, more importantly, assert the override actually landed before relying on it. A literal name can go stale again; an assertion that the setting is in force cannot pass while it is not. Removing either production override now fails the matching spec with the real 55P03 and 57014 again. That literal also meant every CREATE DATABASE and every DROP ... WITH (FORCE) ran under the 300ms bound it set on the maintenance database, which is a new load-dependent single-spec flake inside the change that was meant to remove one. The helper's maintenance connections now pin one connection and clear both timeouts on it, so no setting a spec makes can bound them, and a white-box spec imposes the leak deliberately and proves it does not reach them. Also pins the reclaimOne gate deferral the previous commit added without a test, by panicking inside the re-claim's own claim statement, and drops the per-dial empty-token log line to debug now that the boot warning says it once. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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15cb4be76e |
fix(cluster): harden the worker tunnel, and stop starting a database per spec
Review follow-up. Twelve findings, none blocking, grouped here by what they protect. Panics. The handler now recovers between the WebSocket upgrade and the hand-off, the way the peer link next door already did: net/http recovers the panic but leaves the hijacked socket open, so without this a worker keeps a session this replica has no entry for and will never detach. The claim gate in Attach and reclaimOne is now released with defer, so a panic under Claim cannot wedge one node's gate for the life of the process. SetTunnels gained the nil-receiver guard its sibling Stop has. Operability. A deployment with no registration token stores an empty token_hash on every worker, so every tunnel dial 401s forever on a frontend that looks correctly configured. That now warns at startup, logs its own line rather than sharing the "wrong token" one, and is stated in the docs together with the fact that setting the token later needs the workers to register again. Authorization. A node still awaiting admin approval is refused with 403. The rest of /api/node/ gates on nothing, but the two places that hand a node something durable, its API key and its NATS credential, both refuse a pending one, and a tunnel is that kind of grant. Draining and unhealthy nodes keep their tunnels on purpose. Comments that claimed more than the code. The global auth middleware does run on this path and then declines to reject; the future per-node secret only lands without a change here if it lands in TokenHash; the empty-hash guard is defensive rather than deciding; ClusterPathPrefix is no longer only replica-to-replica; the docs no longer say a reaped replica re-claims unconditionally. And the test harness. SetupTestDB started a PostgreSQL container per BeforeEach with a readiness deadline it asserted on, which is one chance per spec to fail one spec inside its setup, anywhere, never twice in the same place: the shape of the flake seen twice here and never reproduced. It now starts one container per process and creates a database per call, which is the pattern tests/e2e already proved. Isolation is unchanged and is now asserted for the first time. All 69 call sites are untouched; the eleven consumer packages run 1404 specs green, and jobs went from 34.3s to 3.3s, agents from 13.8s to 1.9s, cluster from 97.4s to 37.5s. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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4d26e648bc |
feat(cluster): open the door a worker dials its tunnel through
A worker needs no inbound port: it dials GET /api/cluster/connect, the connection becomes one multiplexed yamux session, and the frontend opens a stream on it per request. This adds the endpoint that accepts that dial and attaches it to the tunnel registry. The dial is authenticated against the NODE's own stored token hash rather than the deployment's registration token. That is the mechanism, not yet the isolation, since a worker still registers by presenting the shared token; what it rules out is the shortcut of comparing against the configured value, which would have to be unpicked the day workers get their own secrets. Every refusal happens BEFORE the WebSocket upgrade, so a dialer reads an HTTP status rather than a handshake error. The route is registered in every deployment, single-binary ones included, which is what puts it in front of the route-coverage test that holds that rule in place; with no node registry it refuses every dial, and tells a credentialed one the frontend has no cluster rather than that its token is wrong. A lookup that FAILED is answered as a failure. Reporting a database that could not be read as "unauthorized" would send a worker re-registering, throwing away the identity its tunnel and loaded models are keyed by. Wires the tunnel registry in core/application/distributed.go and hands it to the membership loop. Without that call the re-claim after a replica is reaped had no production caller and could never run. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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3daf889f5e |
fix(cluster): share one lock order, and correct the phase 1 comments
ReapStale deleted from instances then node_connections while Deregister took them the other way round, both inside one transaction and both running concurrently by design: a replica shuts down while a peer sweeps it. Opposite orders let each hold the row the other waits for. PostgreSQL breaks the cycle by aborting one side, so the cost today is a warning rather than lost data, but the inversion costs nothing to remove. Deregister now deletes the instance row first. That is the order ReapStale is forced into anyway, since its connection delete asks which instance rows survived, so the sweeper is the fixed side. Both functions say the order is deliberate and shared, and name the other. A spec records the statements each path issues and asserts they delete from the same two tables in the same order; racing two transactions until they really deadlock would be flaky and could pass for the wrong reason. The rest is comment and spec accuracy, deferred from the phase 1 task reviews: - co-location does not imply loopback. Compose's usual host=postgres resolves to a bridge address and discovery works there; it is a DSN that NAMES localhost that yields a loopback source address. Corrected in the DiscoverAdvertisedAddr doc and in the spec comment that repeated it. - unroutableReason labelled every scoped address "link-local", including the class the check exists for, and formatted the IP with %s, which drops the %iface, so the reported address was not the one being rejected. Split into two cases, both rendered with their zone. CheckAdvertisedAddr passed zone "" and net.ParseIP rejects fe80::1%eth0, so a scoped literal looked like a name and collected no warning at all; the zone is now split off before parsing. - Splice's "Both callers satisfy it" claimed callers that still do not exist. It now names the two stream types the wake-on-Close property was verified against and says a phase 2 caller over anything else has to check it. - restored, short, why a socket-level ECONNRESET stays reported while a yamux reset does not: the yamux endings are the teardown Splice's own Close provokes, and whether an aborted request is routine is the relay's policy. - the real-yamux spec's far.Read had no deadline, so a stall parked the suite rather than failing it. - gorilla's SetWriteDeadline is conn.go:796, not 787. - ClusterPathPrefix is no longer derived from: the peer route spells its path out, because core/services/cluster must not import core/http/auth. The comment now points at the spec that holds them together instead of claiming a derivation the move removed. - the epoch spec asserted e2 > e1, an ordering Claim's doc tells callers not to rely on. It asserts uniqueness, which is what the fence guarantees, and is named for that. A sibling spec still described the epoch as incrementing in SQL when it is drawn from a sequence. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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bb4719e67d |
fix(cluster): hold the guarantees phase 1's comments were claiming
Review found the recurring class: assertions that a wrong implementation also satisfies. The "refuse promptly, never park the peer" guarantee was stated in three places and tested in none. Removing the Close from the no-relay branch left the whole cluster suite green, because the specs asserted only that some error arrived and yamux reports a read deadline as ErrTimeout: a parked stream satisfied that as well as a refused one. Both specs now require an ENDING, EOF or a reset, inside a deadline short enough that parking is unmistakable, and both go red when the Close is removed. Deregistration existed only in a comment. Membership.Stop ended the loop and left the row behind, so every clean rolling restart had peers dialling a corpse for the full liveness window; the shutdown comment described the opposite. Registry.Deregister deletes the row and the connections that replica owned, in one transaction, for the reason the sweeper does both, and an e2e spec pins departure inside a budget shorter than the liveness window so it cannot pass on the sweeper doing the work. Before: the spec times out with both replicas still live. After: 3.6s. The configured advertised address bypassed every check discovery makes, so the one value most likely to be copied between hosts, 127.0.0.1, was taken verbatim and would make every peer dial itself. Both paths now share one rejection rule: unparseable is refused, "this host" is warned about once and honoured, because a single-host deployment uses it correctly. Two comments claimed more than the code does. The sweeper said a stalled replica recovers via re-register; only its instance row does, while the connections another replica reaped stay gone and the sockets stay held here - phase 2 must re-claim, on re-register, every connection a replica still holds locally. And Owner became OwnerRow, documenting that the owner it names may be dead for up to InstanceLiveness plus a heartbeat and that any caller acting on it must join instances itself, so the deferred constraint lives at the call site rather than in a report; the plain name is left free for the joining version. Minors: warn once when the peer link mounts with no registration token, so an operator sees the cause rather than 401s; Stop no longer blocks forever when Start was never called; corrected the NewRegistry migration doc and an e2e comment that described a 6s window as "throughout". Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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dca8ce7149 |
feat(cluster): give phase 1 a call site, and prove it against real replicas
Tasks 1 to 5 built an instances table, a splice, both halves of a peer link and an epoch fence, and nothing in the tree called any of it: no replica registered, no route was mounted, no sweeper ran. Proving phase 1 end to end therefore had to start by wiring it. A frontend in distributed mode now publishes the address its peers dial, heartbeats it, and sweeps replicas that stopped answering along with the connection rows they owned, in one pass so the two can never disagree about who is alive. It serves the peer link and owns the sessions peers dial in, refusing streams on them until phase 2 installs a relay: a session nobody accepts on does not fail a peer's Open, it hangs it. The address is the one peers use, not the one the process binds, and it is derived from the route to PostgreSQL. That derivation only holds while the database is remote, so LOCALAI_DISTRIBUTED_ADVERTISE_ADDR sets it explicitly and a replica that can determine neither warns and keeps serving rather than failing to start. Three e2e scenarios run against real local-ai processes, real PostgreSQL and real dials: replicas publish addresses that can actually be connected to; a sibling opens a stream over the peer link and is refused without the cluster token; and a killed replica is reported unreachable, never absent, loses the claim it held, and takes no worker with it. Each was verified by mutation: eight injected defects, each failing the scenario that claims to catch it. Also moves RegisterClusterRoutes to core/http/routes beside every other registrar, folds AutoMigrate and the epoch sequence into one cluster.Migrate, and turns the peer route's auth-coverage spec into a real assertion: it drives the request through the actual auth middleware instead of comparing two string constants, which the old spec would have passed even with the exemption deleted. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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393797e7e3 |
refactor(cluster): make the cluster service a leaf and blame the caller's deadline
The peer link's WebSocket adapter and route constant lived in core/http/endpoints/cluster, so the dialler in core/services/cluster had to import an HTTP endpoints package to reach them. That pulled echo, core/http/auth and core/config into a package whose doc says it is deliberately free of such dependencies, and it made core/services/nodes reach an endpoints package transitively. It also has no way forward: the worker-connect handler needs the tunnel registry and the node token store, both of which are cycles from there. Move WebsocketConn and PeerPath into core/services/cluster and let the endpoints package import it, which is the direction the rest of core/http flows. The route and the auth exemption still cannot drift apart, now asserted where both are visible rather than by a const reference across the boundary, and the assertion is stronger than the one it replaces: it pins the route under the prefix instead of pinning the prefix's spelling. Also guard the fresh-dial path with ctx.Err(), mirroring the cached path. A caller with a 300ms deadline dialling a live, listening peer was told the peer was unreachable, which would be enough for one impatient client to get a healthy replica routed around once the relay consults these errors. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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9fdd0bef55 |
fix(cluster): own the peer auth prefix in auth, and pin what the specs claimed
The prefix constant moves to core/http/auth beside the check that uses it, and the endpoints package derives its route from there. Seven sibling endpoint packages already import auth, so the previous direction would have deadlocked the build as soon as this one registered in RouteFeatureRegistry, and it was dragging echo, gorilla/websocket and yamux into unrelated service packages. Four properties were argued in comments and held by nothing. Flipping the empty-token check to fail open, making SetWriteDeadline a no-op, returning a zero-length read for a zero-length message, and dropping the recover around the callback all left the suite green. Each now fails a spec that asserts the behaviour rather than the setter's return value. SetWriteDeadline takes the write mutex because gorilla keeps that deadline in a plain struct field applied at the next flush; SetReadDeadline must not take the read mutex, since it goes straight to the net.Conn and would otherwise block behind the read it exists to unblock. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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c2162f712a |
feat(cluster): accept authenticated peer links on /api/cluster/peer
Upgrades to a WebSocket, wraps it as a yamux server session and hands it to the caller. Rejects before upgrading so an unauthenticated dial sees a 401 rather than a WebSocket error, which is what the route-coverage test asserts. The adapter keeps the reader of a partially consumed message across Read calls. yamux reads through a 4 KiB bufio.Reader, so a small-payload test cannot see a dropped message tail; the framing specs drive the adapter directly with buffers smaller than the message. An empty configured token authorizes nobody here, unlike the worker file transfer server's check: this route is registered in every deployment, so failing open would publish an unauthenticated mux. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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1e5f5dbe52 |
test(distributed): correct the claims the e2e comments make
Review of the whole branch found five comments that would send a reader to the wrong place, plus three smaller inaccuracies. Nothing here changes behaviour. The KNOWN RACE note on both backend-log WebSocket handlers said the fix needs an atomic snapshot-plus-subscribe "under the store lock". It does not: BackendLogStore.mu guards only the buffers map, and AppendLine enqueues and fans out under the per-buffer buf.mu. Whoever took the store lock would ship and the race would survive, so both notes now name buf.mu and say what s.mu does and does not exclude. Two comments in the cluster harness quoted Eventually(c.FrontendAlive) .Should(BeFalse()). FrontendAlive takes an index, so Gomega rejects that with "requested 1 arguments but received 0". Both now quote the closure form the specs actually use, and say why the closure is needed. proveHealthCheckingIsAlive claimed to prove the health monitor ran for the whole preceding window. It proves the monitor was alive at the end of it, and inferring backwards needs any wedge to be sticky. In the peer-replica-death spec that inverts: health checks are single-flighted by a session-scoped pg_try_advisory_lock, the spec SIGKILLs the replica that may hold it, and until Postgres reaps the session the survivor acquires nothing and checks nothing silently. Consistently(healthy) can then pass because nothing was checking, with the positive control still succeeding once the lock frees. The doc now states what is proven, names that gap, and says the assertion is a floor rather than a proof. The Makefile still called DISTRIBUTED_TEST_FLAKES a retry count, which is what seeded that error into the two docs just corrected against it, and the workflow called the 15s window a reconcile tick when the mechanism is HealthCheckInterval in the node health monitor. Also: the cluster suite measured 509.1s / 509.8s / 512.3s, so about 8m30s and not the 8m39s/8m40s three files claimed; the dead-worker spec title implied two independent detectors when both probes read one advisory-lock-serialised verdict out of the same row; and the sanitizeDBName length assertion used <= 50, which an empty string also satisfies, where the invariant for an over-long input is exactly 50. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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1dc7998520 |
test(distributed): scope the log-subscriber wait and mark the race it works around
Three corrections from review of the previous commit. The lock-order comment on SubscriberCount claimed no path takes s.mu and a buffer lock together. Subscribe does exactly that, holding s.mu.RLock across replica registrations that take buf.mu. State the rule that is actually true — s.mu precedes any buffer lock, so counting after releasing it preserves the order — and say what follows from it: the total is a sample, not a snapshot. waitForLogSubscriber read as general-purpose but unblocks on the first registered subscription. Subscribe attaches the exact-key buffer and each replica buffer one at a time, so for a replicated model the count goes positive while later replicas are still unattached and the race survives. Rename it waitForSingleLogSubscriber, document that it holds only where Subscribe resolves to one buffer, and assert on exactly 1: misuse then fails loudly on the count rather than going quietly back to being flaky. Taking the expected count as a parameter was the alternative, but that makes callers predict a store-internal number and an under-count fails the same silent way as the original bug. The snapshot-then-subscribe race had no artifact outside a report, and review found a second site carrying it. Mark both handlers identically, including the point that swapping the two calls duplicates rather than drops and so is not the fix. The race itself is left alone; this branch stays test infrastructure. Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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mudler-agentandEttore Di Giacinto
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42c58a5838 |
feat(vllm-cpp): unify decision pipeline through Score RPC with vllm_decide ABI v29 (#12247)
* feat(vllm-cpp): unify decision pipeline through Score RPC with vllm_decide ABI v29 Replace the model-specific SystemOne gRPC approach with a generic Score RPC extension. The pre-existing Score RPC (previously unused by any backend) now carries question_type and response_json fields: - question_type="systemone" routes kev/laya decision-pipeline requests through the unified vllm_decide C ABI (v29), returning the full response JSON in response_json. - question_type empty routes cua-s1-forms candidate scoring through the same vllm_decide ABI, returning CandidateScore probabilities. The vllm-cpp backend's Score() method calls vllm_decide and dispatches by architecture internally. The /v1/systemone HTTP endpoint checks whether the model's backend supports Score; if so, it forwards the raw request JSON and returns the backend response as-is. Other backends fall through to the existing NER-based path. This mirrors the vllm.cpp C ABI refactor (PR #3301) that replaced vllm_systemone + vllm_score with a single vllm_decide function. The purego bindings bump abiVersion from 27 to 29 and resolve vllm_decide and vllm_decide_free symbols. Also fixes validModelPath to accept cua-s1-forms.json and rl_agent_config.json alongside config.json, matching the engine's model_loader.cpp config-filename ordering. AI-Assisted: true Assisted-by: Maki:regolo/glm5.2 [maki] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore: ⬆️ Update mudler/vllm.cpp to e28ec46c6 (fix macOS -Werror build) Bumps vllm.cpp to e28ec46c6 which fixes a -Wnull-conversion error in qwen3_5.cpp:12483 that broke the macOS Metal CI build under -Werror. Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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mudler-agentandEttore Di Giacinto
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543fb4bd24 |
fix(gallery): verification follow-ups for oci:// galleries (#12243)
* fix(gallery): verification follow-ups for oci:// galleries Follow-ups from the post-merge review of #12238 and #12239. Only a policy decision is a refusal now. cosignverify wraps ErrPolicyRejected around a failed signature check, an identity or source-repository mismatch, a not_before cutoff and a missing or unparseable bundle. A TUF, registry or network failure during verification, or a timeout, is an outage: the gallery falls back to the copy verified under the current policy, as it does when the registry is down. An oci:// gallery with a verification block, or any oci:// gallery under strict integrity, is no longer answered by an https://, github: or file:// mirror. Such a mirror is ignored with a warning, because nothing can check its signature. The index of an HTTP gallery, whose policy only covers its backend images, is cached under the URL-only name again, so no unchecked body is stored under a policy-keyed name. The in-memory index cache key now includes the policy. After a runtime policy change the index is fetched again, and entries with a relative url install again. The registry digest lookups after install and upgrade, and in the upgrade check, run only for real registry references (new URI.LooksLikeRegistryOCI), not for ollama:// or ocifile://. The refusal message names strict integrity when that is the cause, and the gallery name is no longer repeated. Specs pin the URL-only cache name for galleries without a policy, a fixed key for a fixed policy, and that every GalleryVerification field changes the key. The docs describe refusal, outage, mirrors and strict integrity. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(gallery): reset listings on gallery changes, classify referrer outages Review follow-ups for this PR. The React UI lists from AvailableGalleryModelsCached, which is keyed by nothing. A gallery change through the settings API or a runtime_settings.json edit now drops that listing when the model or backend gallery configuration differs. Before, the UI kept the old list, with local paths into the old policy's tree, until the next background refresh, or for good when the new policy refused the gallery. In cosignverify, a referrer the registry fails to serve now makes the lookup an outage whatever other referrers failed and in any order, since the unread one may be the valid signature. An invalid policy (Validate in NewVerifier, an unparseable not_before) is ErrPolicyRejected, because no fetch can make it usable. The docs say that only an oci:// gallery with a verification block skips non-OCI mirrors, and list an unusable policy as a refusal. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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21c5495a99 |
feat(vllm-cpp): add GLiNER2.5 NER via TokenClassify (#12140)
* feat(vllm-cpp): add GLiNER2.5 NER via TokenClassify Wire the vllm-cpp backend to the C ABI NER surface (vllm_gliner_ner, ABI v27) so LocalAI can serve zero-shot named entity recognition through the existing TokenClassify gRPC method. backend.go: TokenClassify method on *VllmCpp calls vllm_gliner_ner with the text and labels, copies the C-owned entity array into protobuf TokenClassifyEntity messages, and frees the result. govllmcpp.go: cNerEntity and cNerResult Go POD mirrors matching the C structs; vllmGlinerNer and vllmNerResultFree purego bindings; abiVersion bumped 26 -> 27. options.go: ner_labels, ner_threshold, ner_max_width parsed from engine_args. pkg/grpc: ClassifyModel interface and TokenClassify server handler (follows the Embedding locking pattern). core/config: vllm-cpp backend declares MethodTokenClassify and UsecaseTokenClassify. docs/content/features/vllm-cpp.md: NER section documenting the engine_args keys and the host-forward contract. Assisted-by: MAKI:regolo/glm5.2 [maki] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(vllm-cpp): correct NER pointer lint directive Use the govet directive for the C-owned NER array, matching the other purego pointer conversions. The array remains valid until its deferred free; the misspelled directive caused CI to flag this conversion. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 golangci-lint Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat(vllm-cpp): add kev-compatible SystemOne API endpoints Add POST /v1/systemone, /v1/systemone/permute, and /v1/systemone/separate to LocalAI, mirroring the kev project's structured-extraction API. Each endpoint runs zero-shot NER over the rendered state text and builds kev-compatible answers for three question types: noul (binary entity presence), choice (pick one option), and score (pick one level). The TokenClassifyRequest proto gains a `repeated string labels` field so each question can supply its own labels at inference time, and TokenClassifier gains TokenClassifyWithLabels for per-call label selection. The vllm-cpp backend uses request labels when non-empty, falling back to configured ner_labels then the built-in defaults. Helpers (renderState, softmax, choiceConfidence, scoreConfidence, r2) are ported from kev/api.py and mirrored in vllm.cpp's api_server.cpp so both servers produce the same answer shape. Following-Agents-Protocol: true AI-Assisted: true Assisted-by: AGENT:regolo/glm5.2 [maki] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(vllm-cpp): suppress gosec G404 on seeded permutation RNG The SystemOne permute endpoint uses math/rand with a caller-supplied seed for reproducible option permutations, matching kev's random.seed. gosec flags this as G404 (weak RNG). Add #nosec with a comment naming the intent: this is reproducibility, not cryptography. Following-Agents-Protocol: true AI-Assisted: true Assisted-by: AGENT:regolo/glm5.2 [maki] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore(vllm-cpp): bump vllm.cpp pin to GLiNER2.5 merge commit Advance VLLM_CPP_VERSION from f3cd97e to 5058268d, the commit that landed GLiNER2.5 zero-shot NER support (PR #3224) in vllm.cpp. This brings the DeBERTa v2 encoder, GLiNER2 boundary head, C ABI NER functions, and server endpoints into the LocalAI vllm-cpp backend. The ABI version (27) and Go struct mirrors already match. Following-Agents-Protocol: true AI-Assisted: true Assisted-by: AGENT:regolo/glm5.2 [maki] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(vllm-cpp): use instruction text as NER label in SystemOne handler The SystemOne handler was passing question IDs as NER labels for noul questions and bare key names for choice questions, so the model never matched any entities. Port the label mapping from vllm.cpp's ParseSystemOneBody: - noul: use the rendered instructions field (with instr alias) as the NER label, not the question ID - choice: use optionText(name, desc) — "name: description" or "name" when the description is null/empty — not the bare key - score: already correct (rendered criteria text) - permute: shuffle indices and build parallel key/label arrays so the NER call uses the optionText labels while the response is keyed by the original option names Also add the instructions field to the SystemOneQuestion schema struct (accepted alongside the instr backward-compat alias). Verified end-to-end against the real GLiNER2.5 model: noul questions now find "Apple Inc. is" (organization, 0.999) and "Tim Cook is" (person, 0.852) where they previously returned zero entities. Following-Agents-Protocol: true AI-Assisted: true Assisted-by: AGENT:regolo/glm5.2 [maki] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: localai-org-maint-bot <306269227+localai-org-maint-bot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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636c43baa5 |
fix(openai): return HTTP errors for pre-stream failures and report per-slot context (#12204)
* fix(capabilities): report the per-request context with split KV slots With parallel slots and kv_unified:false, llama.cpp gives each slot n_ctx/n_parallel, padded up to a multiple of 256. /models/capabilities still reported the full n_ctx. A client that budgets a request against context_size then overflows at a fraction of it. EffectiveRequestContextSize returns the per-slot size in that case and the full context otherwise. With the unified KV cache, the grpc-server default, one request may use all of n_ctx. The capabilities endpoint and the router's prompt trimmer now use it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(openai): return an HTTP error when a stream fails before any chunk A streamed chat request set the SSE headers, then waited for the backend. When the backend failed before the first token, LocalAI sent a 200 with a `data: {"error":...}` chunk and [DONE]. Clients that do not parse error chunks saw an empty reply. cogito's LocalAI client was one of them: nib users got "streaming decision produced no content" instead of the context overflow that caused it. Nothing has been written at that point, so the handler now returns the error as a normal HTTP response. A failure after the first chunk keeps the in-stream error chunk. A prompt that exceeds the context is now a 400 on both paths, as in the OpenAI API and llama-server, and no longer a 500. The message is kept whole, because clients read the token counts from it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * test(e2e): check the error from closing the response body golangci-lint's errcheck flags the unchecked resp.Body.Close in the new pre-stream error helper. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Richard Palethorpe
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7034d353b1 |
feat(kimodo): Add observability hooks (#12184)
feat(kimodocpp): add API and backend request observability Capture animation requests, phase timings, output metadata, and failures in traces. Record correct API error statuses and cover completed, running, failed, and disabled tracing. Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-6 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |
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Richard Palethorpe
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66e3a06ce6 |
fix(auth): require validated header credentials for CSRF exemption (#12185)
Track successful header authentication before allowing cross-site requests to bypass CSRF checks. Arbitrary headers on unauthenticated servers and cookie-authenticated requests no longer grant an exemption. Share the production CSRF middleware with multipart tests, add regression coverage for credential sources, and document the exemption behavior. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 golangci-lint Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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c0b7e64973 |
feat(ui): show running models and host gauges on single-node installs (#12189)
On a single-node install nothing in Operate listed the models loaded on this machine or let an admin stop one. The System page that did was retired in #11548, and its replacements (the Nodes workbench) only work in distributed mode. The Nodes page also mis-detected single-node mode: the cluster routes are not registered there, so /api/nodes answers 404, but only 503 was treated as "distributed off", which sent every single-node install to the empty worker-registration card. The rail hid the entry anyway. Nodes route on a single node becomes "This machine": - the Nodes page's VRAM / RAM / CPU / models-disk gauges, fed from this host by mapping /api/resources onto the worker heartbeat fields - a memory bar splitting host RAM by running model - a running-models table (backend, RSS, CPU share, uptime, PID) with search, sorting, logs and a confirmed Stop - the distributed setup behind an "Add machines" button The Operate overview gains a "Running now" preview (heaviest five, with Stop) on single node and a pointer to Nodes > Running models on a cluster. The rail shows "This machine" in Runtime with a running count. Backend, additive only: - /system: each loaded model carries a `process` block (pid, rss_bytes, memory_percent, cpu_percent, started_at). A sampler keeps one gopsutil handle per PID so CPU is the share since the previous poll rather than the lifetime average; it is omitted on the first reading. - /api/resources: host `cpu` and models-path `disk`, the same readings workers send in their heartbeat. Also fixes the fleet tables widening the page on phones: the headers' absolutely positioned sr-only labels escaped the scroll wrapper. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 [Playwright] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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36d800ebd1 |
fix(api): report an alias's target in /v1/models/capabilities (#12183)
An alias config is a pure redirect with no backend of its own, so the capabilities listing described it from its stub: no capabilities, no modalities, and the default 4096 context_size. Clients that size their context budget from this endpoint (nib, for one) then compacted every turn against a model that really serves 100k. Resolve the alias and report the target's capabilities, modalities and context_size under the alias's id. A dangling or chained alias now reports no enrichment instead of defaults no model runs with. Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Richard Palethorpe
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495165266f |
feat(kimodocpp): track usage through generic backend metadata (#12162)
Report input tokens and frame-step output units in response metadata and record them through the existing usage accounting pipeline. Preserve the accounting rule and model-specific dimensions as JSON without extending the gRPC schema for each modality. Expose animation usage only under metadata.usage, validate counts before recording, and document the response contract and loaded-model location. Add coverage for transport, defaults, failures, persistence, and recording requests once with statistics enabled or disabled. Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-6 Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |
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mudler-agentandEttore Di Giacinto
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96ccb8e96c |
fix: correct stale symbol names in doc comments (#12139)
Fixes 7 doc comments whose names no longer match their function: - ToggleStateModelEndpoint (was ToggleModelEndpoint) - Messages.ToProto (was MessagesToProto) - NewUserCancellableContext (was newUserCancellableContext) - CalculateRMS16 (was calculateRMS16) - NewLocalAIMetricsService + Shutdown TODO (was copied setupOTelSDK) Supersedes #12084 and #12085 (DCO not signed by contributors). Assisted-by: MAKI:regolo/glm5.2 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Plamen K. Kosseff
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65264635ef |
fix(ui): make text selection visibly contrast the background (#12123)
The global ::selection used --color-primary-light (14% primary), which composites to about 1.1:1 against the dark page ground — selected text was nearly indistinguishable from unselected. Give selection its own token in both palettes and align the CodeMirror themes with the same strengths. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5 Signed-off-by: Plamen K. Kosseff <p.kosseff@gmail.com> |
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lqp
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dbee3db07f |
feat(openai): add negative_prompt field to image generation request (#12031)
Expose a negative_prompt string parameter on the image endpoints, matching Stable Diffusion WebUI / vLLM-Omni conventions. When both the negative_prompt parameter and a '|'-suffixed negative prompt in the main prompt are present, they are joined with a comma so callers can keep a global negative prompt in negative_prompt and add per-image negative tags after '|'. Assisted-by: Pi: DeepSeek V4 Pro Signed-off-by: Fedor Zuev <Fedor.Zuev@gmail.com> |
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Richard Palethorpe
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2facfc0d88 |
feat: Add kimodo.cpp and 3D animation API/UI (#12095)
* fix(vulkan): preserve host ICD discovery for packaged backends Add bundled Mesa manifests through VK_ADD_DRIVER_FILES instead of replacing the system driver list. Merge inherited and model-specific additive paths while preserving explicit operator overrides, with regression coverage. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 golangci-lint Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(3d): add Kimodo CPU and Vulkan animation backend Introduce a distinct animation capability and model-described 3D operations, with a typed /3d/animate API, RPC transport, distributed media staging, permissions, and tracing. Add a persistent kimodo.cpp adapter, skeleton GLB export, CPU/Vulkan packages, model and backend galleries, importer support, CI builds, and documentation. Adapt Studio inputs to each model and provide real-time skeleton playback, seeking, and history. Cover backend validation, packaging, API behavior, importer inventories, distributed staging, and Studio workflows. Validate real-model CPU/Vulkan generation and deploy the integration to the local QA instance. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 golangci-lint Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(kimodocpp): adopt monolithic encoders and resident inference Update upstream for resident weights, packed execution paths, and cached motion graphs. Default to all 32 text layers while retaining configurable streaming and legacy bundle support. Use monolithic Q8_0 encoders by default and offer all six published quantizations through the gallery and importer. Refresh pinned hashes, tests, and documentation; remove the obsolete thread patch and ensure cached source checkouts follow the upstream pin. Validated CPU and Vulkan generation, lower-bit streaming, gallery/importer suites, packaging, lint, and cold/warm Studio generation on localai-dev. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 golangci-lint Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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2d30d28f32 |
feat: expose context_size in /v1/models/capabilities (#12083)
* fix(ui): restore node operation controls The node restructure hid backend logs and split related controls across inconsistent layouts. Restore contextual log actions and align the detail page with the fleet dashboard. Make multi-node selection clear and accessible. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Playwright ESLint * feat: expose context_size in /v1/models/capabilities The /v1/models/capabilities endpoint already enriches the OpenAI models listing with capabilities and modalities. Add context_size to that enrichment so clients (e.g. nib) can size their context budget for auto-compaction and pruning without guessing. The value comes from backend.EffectiveContextSize, which resolves the configured context_size or falls back to DefaultContextSize (4096) — the same number the backend itself runs with. It is omitempty so a loose file with no config surfaces 0 (unknown) rather than a misleading default, and existing clients that don't know the field see no change. --------- Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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15de88d361 |
fix(ui): test backend actions through their menu (#12069)
The node detail redesign moved backend operations into an action menu. Four existing specs still search for the removed direct buttons, so the UI E2E workflow fails consistently on master. Open the backend action menu before checking or activating its items. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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d5256a5584 |
fix(ui): restore node operation controls (#12068)
The node restructure hid backend logs and split related controls across inconsistent layouts. Restore contextual log actions and align the detail page with the fleet dashboard. Make multi-node selection clear and accessible. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Playwright ESLint Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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997d403de4 |
feat(nodes): add fleet operations dashboard (#12046)
* feat(nodes): report CPU telemetry Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(nodes): add fleet view utilities Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(nodes): add fleet operations dashboard Replace the panel roster with aggregate capacity gauges, fleet filtering and selection, bounded bulk actions, and an on-demand node inspector. Extend node details and distributed-mode documentation with CPU and models-disk telemetry. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): harden fleet lifecycle actions Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): restore compact fleet composition Keep fleet health, capacity, and attention in one compact overview at ordinary desktop widths. The inspector now overlays the roster until the workbench can preserve a useful table beside it. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(nodes): add accessible running models workbench Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): correct model view ARIA links Keep each tab panel available for its controlling tab while native hidden state removes inactive content from accessibility navigation. Model controls now expose only supported state and valid inspector relationships. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): align lifecycle and capacity states Pending nodes now expose approval wherever node actions appear, while other lifecycle controls follow the server transition rules. Capacity totals exclude incomplete readings so missing availability remains unknown. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): restore approved dashboard composition Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): integrate operate navigation Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): restore low density fleet view Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): preserve complete operate menu Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): preserve inspector workspace height Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): restore standard operate navigation Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(ui): add collapsible console rail Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * feat(nodes): stop models from fleet view Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): make inspector a full height drawer Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(model): stop mixed local and remote placements Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(ui): announce action menu navigation Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(nodes): keep inspector within viewport Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 * fix(ui): preserve focus across model actions Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 --------- Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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db12122329 |
fix(reasoning): ignore preclosed prompt markers
Do not seed streaming reasoning state when the latest prompt thinking marker is already followed by its matching closing marker. This keeps direct Gemma 4 output in content when its template disables thinking with a preclosed channel. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacintoandxingyifeng
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df70ff311d |
feat: add FunASR speech recognition backend (#10090)
Adds FunASR/SenseVoice as a Python backend for speech-to-text with support for CPU, CUDA 12/13, ROCm, Intel SYCL, L4T, and Apple MPS. Co-authored-by: xingyifeng <xingyifeng@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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6983477a71 |
fix(agent-ui): keep chat open for status
Agent Status replaced the chat route and unmounted its EventSource. Any response still in flight could then disappear from the conversation.\n\nOpen status in a separate tab so the chat keeps its live connection until the response completes.\n\nAssisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 [eslint] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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db09452d54 |
feat(tts): support multi-reference personalities
Saved profiles previously resolved to one audio path and transcript, so cloning backends could not use several examples of one personality. Store ordered audio and transcript pairs while preserving the legacy first-reference fields. Fish Speech and audio.cpp receive all pairs, including on distributed workers. Other backends retain their single-reference behavior. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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ddda0436a3 |
fix(ui): exclude navigation from the TTS mock
The API mock also matched navigation to /app/tts and returned a WAV download instead of the React page. Let non-POST requests reach the test server. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 [Playwright] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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1bcbff586b |
fix(ui): target the TTS input in history tests
TTS instructions add a second textarea to the page. Target the speech input by its placeholder so the history test does not depend on the page having one textarea. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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919b5c96fa |
feat(ui): add per-request TTS instructions
Let studio users guide speech delivery for backends that support request instructions. Blank guidance stays out of requests and media history. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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d55474a149 |
feat(audio): list available TTS voices
Clients cannot discover the named voices that an installed TTS model accepts without consulting backend-specific documentation. Expose voice metadata through the audio API and let custom model configs declare their own catalog. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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a9f8062dd5 |
feat(nodes): add pluggable routing pipeline
Route prefix-cache replica selection through composable filters, weighted scorers, and a replaceable picker. Preserve the existing load guard and deterministic selection policy while exposing per-model scorer weights through scheduling configuration. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 [go-vet] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Leoy
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aeac5e86dc |
fix(auth): bypass API-key auth for CORS preflight (OPTIONS) requests (#11113)
* fix(auth): bypass API-key auth for CORS preflight (OPTIONS) requests When API-key auth is enabled, a browser making a cross-origin API call first sends an OPTIONS CORS preflight, which cannot carry credentials by HTTP spec. The auth middleware is registered (app.go:324) before the CORS middleware (app.go:337-347), so the preflight hit auth first and returned 401 before the CORS middleware could answer it, blocking the actual call. Bypass auth for OPTIONS so the request reaches the CORS middleware, which answers the preflight with 200 + headers. Real API requests (GET/POST/etc.) still require auth. Regression test added (red on master, green on branch). Refs #4576 Signed-off-by: supermario_leo <leo.stack@outlook.com> * fix(auth): exempt CORS preflights via publicRouteRegistry instead of middleware bypass Route the global OPTIONS exemption through publicRouteRegistry (OPTIONS on every path, replacing the OPTIONS-under-/api/auth/ rule it subsumes) instead of a hardcoded method check inside Middleware, so "which requests skip auth" has one mechanism. Preflights now flow through the same authenticate-then-public-rules path as other public routes, which also lets a credentialed OPTIONS request keep its user context. Update the route-coverage allowlist and the near-prefix lookalike table for the new semantics (OPTIONS is public on every path by design; near-prefix privacy stays pinned by the non-OPTIONS entries), and fix the authentication docs' exempt-route enumeration, which still described OPTIONS as an /api/auth/-only exemption. Signed-off-by: supermario_leo <leo.stack@outlook.com> --------- Signed-off-by: supermario_leo <leo.stack@outlook.com> |
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QiuLG
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e588d463dc |
fix(ui): preserve percent signs in route parameters (#11883)
fix(ui): preserve decoded route parameters React Router already decodes dynamic path segments before exposing them through useParams. Decoding those values again crashes pages for names containing a literal percent sign and mutates escape-like substrings. Use route parameters as-is, encode the model editor API path at the outbound boundary, and cover all affected pages with Playwright. Fixes #11882 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 eslint playwright Signed-off-by: QiuLG <l237455523@outlook.com> |