LocalAI's outbound HTTP clients used Go's default redirect policy, which
follows up to 10 redirects. On a cross-host redirect Go forwards custom
request headers — including credential headers such as Anthropic's
x-api-key — to the redirect target (Go strips Authorization, Cookie and
WWW-Authenticate cross-host, but NOT arbitrary custom headers). An
attacker able to elicit a redirect from an upstream (a hijacked or
spoofed upstream, DNS trickery, or a malicious upstream_url) then
harvests the operator's provider API key.
This was first reported against the cloud-proxy / MITM PII path
(GHSA-3mj3-57v2-4636); the same class affects every other outbound
client. Rather than patch each call site, add pkg/httpclient as the one
sanctioned constructor for outbound HTTP and route everything through it.
pkg/httpclient:
- New(...) refuses redirects, TLS 1.2 floor, no body
deadline (streaming/SSE safe)
- NewWithTimeout(d) simple request/response calls
- WithFollowRedirects opt-in following that still strips credential
headers on any cross-host hop; different
scheme/host/port == different origin, guarding
the curl CVE-2022-27774 port-confusion class
- WithTransport(rt) keep a custom transport (IP-pin, HTTP/2, a
credential-injecting RoundTripper)
- HardenedTransport() base transport with the TLS floor + bounded setup
- Harden(c) apply the policy to a library-supplied *http.Client
- NoRedirect the CheckRedirect policy; wraps ErrRedirectBlocked
Lint: a forbidigo rule flags http.DefaultClient and http.Get/Post/
PostForm/Head, pointing at pkg/httpclient (.golangci.yml,
.agents/coding-style.md). forbidigo cannot match the &http.Client{}
composite literal without also flagging legitimate *http.Client type
references, so that form is enforced by review.
Migrates every non-test outbound call site across core/, pkg/, cmd/, and
the Go backend (backend/go/cloud-proxy). Credential-bearing and
internal-RPC clients refuse redirects; download / CDN / registry clients
use WithFollowRedirects so they keep working while stripping secrets
cross-host. The only credential-bearing client that follows redirects is
the gated-download path (pkg/downloader/uri.go), which strips the token
on the cross-host hop to the CDN. Hardening this closes, in passing:
- MCP remote-server bearer token leaking via a redirect (the
RoundTripper re-injected Authorization on every hop)
- agent multimedia/webhook clients leaking user-supplied auth headers
- cors_proxy following redirects, bypassing its SSRF IP-pin
- downloader's authorized read path leaking the token cross-host
Fixes: GHSA-3mj3-57v2-4636 (cloud-proxy leaks operator provider API key
(x-api-key) to attacker host on cross-host redirect)
Reported-by: tonghuaroot
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code]
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com>
Add a routing middleware stack and a cloud-proxy backend.
* cloud-proxy: a Go gRPC backend that forwards OpenAI- and
Anthropic-shaped chat requests to upstream providers, with an
optional translate mode (OpenAI request -> Anthropic /v1/messages
-> OpenAI response) and full tool-calling support.
* routing: admission control, content-aware model routing
(embedding cache + classifier + rerank + Arch-Router score),
PII detection/redaction (regex + NER) with streaming filter and
OpenAI/Anthropic adapters, and a per-user/per-key billing recorder
backed by GORM or in-memory storage.
* middleware: UsageMiddleware records usage via the billing recorder,
plus admission, route-model, usage-stamp and trace middlewares.
* observability: BackendTrace ring buffer stores full request bodies
(capped), MITM proxy emits structured trace events, and router
classifier decisions surface at /api/router/decide.
* gallery: Arch-Router-1.5B (Q4_K_M and Q8_0).
* UI: cloud-proxy model-editor fields, classifier system-prompt and
score-normalization config, and a Traces page rendering request
bodies.
Assisted-by: claude-code:claude-opus-4-7 [Read] [Edit] [Bash]
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com>
