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14
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 localai-org-maint-botandlocalai-org-maint-bot
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9f62401fca |
feat(traces): show in-flight API requests (#11368)
Register JSON API exchanges before their handlers run so the traces dashboard can surface active work. Replace the live entry with the completed persisted record under the same ID, and clean it up if a handler panics. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Co-authored-by: localai-org-maint-bot <306269227+localai-org-maint-bot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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localai-org-maint-botandlocalai-org-maint-bot
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1189c6825b |
feat(tracing): persist bounded trace histories (#11203)
* feat(tracing): persist bounded trace histories Retain API and backend traces below the data path, restore them at initialization, and serialize clears with asynchronous consumers. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 * fix(tracing): satisfy persistence security checks Document why persisted filenames cannot escape the trace directory and explicitly ignore the best-effort temporary-file cleanup result. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 [golangci-lint] --------- Co-authored-by: localai-org-maint-bot <306269227+localai-org-maint-bot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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mudler's LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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ff299df453 |
perf(http): gzip responses, cache hashed assets, bound the trace endpoints (#11056)
Three measured HTTP-layer regressions on a live deployment, fixed together
because they all shape the bytes on the wire.
1. No compression. The server sent no Content-Encoding regardless of what
the client asked for, confirmed with curl straight at 127.0.0.1:8080 so
it was not an ingress artefact. Adds gzip middleware, on by default and
configurable via LOCALAI_DISABLE_HTTP_COMPRESSION and
LOCALAI_HTTP_COMPRESSION_MIN_LENGTH (default 1024 bytes so tiny bodies
are not wastefully wrapped). Streaming routes are skipped explicitly:
an SSE Accept header, a WebSocket upgrade, and the completion / SSE /
log-tail path prefixes, because whether a completion request streams is
decided by the request body, which the middleware runs too early to see.
Already-compressed formats (woff2, png, mp4, ...) are skipped too; gzip
made those marginally larger. Measured over the embedded React build:
JS+CSS 2815 KB raw to 808 KB gzipped (3.48x).
2. No cache headers on content-hashed assets. Vite hashes the filenames,
so a given /assets/ URL can never change content, yet they shipped with
no Cache-Control, ETag or Last-Modified, and the browser re-fetched the
whole bundle on every navigation with no conditional request available.
/assets/* now carries public, max-age=31536000, immutable. index.html
stays no-cache so a deploy is picked up, and the unhashed locale JSONs
get a short TTL rather than the immutable one.
3. Unbounded trace endpoints. /api/traces returned 21,033,606 bytes in
4.65s and /api/backend-traces 3,471,682 bytes in 1.50s, and the admin
UI polls both every few seconds. The ring buffer holds up to 1024
entries, each embedding full input_text payloads. Both list endpoints
now take limit / offset / full, default to 50 entries, and strip the
heavy fields (request and response bodies plus headers for API traces,
body and data for backend traces) unless full=true. Every trace gets a
process-lifetime ID and GET /api/traces/{id} and
/api/backend-traces/{id} serve the full record, which is what the UI
fetches when a row is expanded. The list body stays a JSON array;
paging metadata rides in X-Total-Count, X-Trace-Offset and
X-Trace-Limit. Reproducing the live shape in a test, the polled payload
goes from 21,131,097 bytes to 7,201 bytes.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
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localai-org-maint-botandEttore Di Giacinto
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4be6e22b5f |
feat(webui): surface user, client IP and user agent in API traces (#10886, #10887) (#10907)
The Operate → Traces "API Traces" panel already recorded who made each request (user_id/user_name) but never showed it, and did not capture the caller's network identity at all. Operators asked to see the requesting user (#10886) and the client IP + user agent (#10887) so a trace can be attributed to who/what issued it. Backend: add ClientIP and UserAgent to APIExchange and populate them from echo's c.RealIP() (honours X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP behind a trusted proxy) and the request's User-Agent header. Both are omitempty and the /api/traces swagger response is map[string]any, so this is additive. UI: add a sortable "User" column to the API traces table and a metadata block (User / Client IP / User Agent) at the top of the expanded row detail. Fields render only when present, so older buffered traces and unauthenticated/local requests degrade cleanly. Adds an e2e spec covering the new column value and the expanded metadata. Assisted-by: Claude:opus-4.8 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Richard Palethorpe
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6a80e23733 |
feat(middleware): Model routing, PII filtering, Cloud model proxies (#9802)
Add a routing middleware stack and a cloud-proxy backend. * cloud-proxy: a Go gRPC backend that forwards OpenAI- and Anthropic-shaped chat requests to upstream providers, with an optional translate mode (OpenAI request -> Anthropic /v1/messages -> OpenAI response) and full tool-calling support. * routing: admission control, content-aware model routing (embedding cache + classifier + rerank + Arch-Router score), PII detection/redaction (regex + NER) with streaming filter and OpenAI/Anthropic adapters, and a per-user/per-key billing recorder backed by GORM or in-memory storage. * middleware: UsageMiddleware records usage via the billing recorder, plus admission, route-model, usage-stamp and trace middlewares. * observability: BackendTrace ring buffer stores full request bodies (capped), MITM proxy emits structured trace events, and router classifier decisions surface at /api/router/decide. * gallery: Arch-Router-1.5B (Q4_K_M and Q8_0). * UI: cloud-proxy model-editor fields, classifier system-prompt and score-normalization config, and a Traces page rendering request bodies. Assisted-by: claude-code:claude-opus-4-7 [Read] [Edit] [Bash] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |
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LocalAI [bot]andEttore Di Giacinto
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61bf34ea2f |
fix(traces): cap captured body size to keep admin Traces UI responsive (#9946)
The trace middleware buffered the full request and response bodies for every JSON exchange. With a chatty agent-pool RAG workload, /embeddings responses (large vector arrays) accumulated to tens of MB in the in-memory buffer; the admin Traces page would then download and parse 40+ MB on every load and on every 5s auto-refresh, locking the UI in a loading state. Add LOCALAI_TRACING_MAX_BODY_BYTES (default 64 KiB) that caps each captured body. The full payload still flows through to the real client; only the trace copy is bounded. Exchanges record body_truncated and original body_bytes so the dashboard can show that truncation happened. The cap is configurable via env, CLI, and runtime_settings.json. Also unblock recovery: the Traces page now keeps the Clear button enabled while loading, since "buffer too large to render" is exactly when the user needs to clear it. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Richard Palethorpe
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670259ce43 |
chore: Security hardening (#9719)
* fix(http): close 0.0.0.0/[::] SSRF bypass in /api/cors-proxy The CORS proxy carried its own private-network blocklist (RFC 1918 + a handful of IPv6 ranges) instead of using the same classification as pkg/utils/urlfetch.go. The hand-rolled list missed 0.0.0.0/8 and ::/128, both of which Linux routes to localhost — so any user with FeatureMCP (default-on for new users) could reach LocalAI's own listener and any other service bound to 0.0.0.0:port via: GET /api/cors-proxy?url=http://0.0.0.0:8080/... GET /api/cors-proxy?url=http://[::]:8080/... Replace the custom check with utils.IsPublicIP (Go stdlib IsLoopback / IsLinkLocalUnicast / IsPrivate / IsUnspecified, plus IPv4-mapped IPv6 unmasking) and add an upfront hostname rejection for localhost, *.local, and the cloud metadata aliases so split-horizon DNS can't paper over the IP check. The IP-pinning DialContext is unchanged: the validated IP from the single resolution is reused for the connection, so DNS rebinding still cannot swap a public answer for a private one between validate and dial. Regression tests cover 0.0.0.0, 0.0.0.0:PORT, [::], ::ffff:127.0.0.1, ::ffff:10.0.0.1, file://, gopher://, ftp://, localhost, 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(downloader): verify SHA before promoting temp file to final path DownloadFileWithContext renamed the .partial file to its final name *before* checking the streamed SHA, so a hash mismatch returned an error but left the tampered file at filePath. Subsequent code that operated on filePath (a backend launcher, a YAML loader, a re-download that finds the file already present and skips) would consume the attacker-supplied bytes. Reorder: verify the streamed hash first, remove the .partial on mismatch, then rename. The streamed hash is computed during io.Copy so no second read is needed. While here, raise the empty-SHA case from a Debug log to a Warn so "this download had no integrity check" is visible at the default log level. Backend installs currently pass through with no digest; the warning makes that footprint observable without changing behaviour. Regression test asserts os.IsNotExist on the destination after a deliberate SHA mismatch. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(auth): require email_verified for OIDC admin promotion extractOIDCUserInfo read the ID token's "email" claim but never inspected "email_verified". With LOCALAI_ADMIN_EMAIL set, an attacker who could register on the configured OIDC IdP under that email (some IdPs accept self-supplied unverified emails) inherited admin role: - first login: AssignRole(tx, email, adminEmail) → RoleAdmin - re-login: MaybePromote(db, user, adminEmail) → flip to RoleAdmin Add EmailVerified to oauthUserInfo, parse email_verified from the OIDC claims (default false on absence so an IdP that omits the claim cannot short-circuit the gate), and substitute "" for the role-decision email when verified=false via emailForRoleDecision. The user record still stores the unverified email for display. GitHub's path defaults EmailVerified=true: GitHub only returns a public profile email after verification, and fetchGitHubPrimaryEmail explicitly filters to Verified=true. Regression tests cover both the helper contract and integration with AssignRole, including the bootstrap "first user" branch that would otherwise mask the gate. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(cli): refuse public bind when no auth backend is configured When neither an auth DB nor a static API key is set, the auth middleware passes every request through. That is fine for a developer laptop, a home LAN, or a Tailnet — the network itself is the trust boundary. It is not fine on a public IP, where every model install, settings change, and admin endpoint becomes reachable from the internet. Refuse to start in that exact configuration. Loopback, RFC 1918, RFC 4193 ULA, link-local, and RFC 6598 CGNAT (Tailscale's default range) all count as trusted; wildcard binds (`:port`, `0.0.0.0`, `[::]`) are accepted only when every host interface is in one of those ranges. Hostnames are resolved and treated as trusted only when every answer is. A new --allow-insecure-public-bind / LOCALAI_ALLOW_INSECURE_PUBLIC_BIND flag opts out for deployments that gate access externally (a reverse proxy enforcing auth, a mesh ACL, etc.). The error message lists this plus the three constructive alternatives (bind a private interface, enable --auth, set --api-keys). The interface enumeration goes through a package-level interfaceAddrsFn var so tests can simulate cloud-VM, home-LAN, Tailscale-only, and enumeration-failure topologies without poking at the real network stack. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): regression-test the localai_assistant admin gate ChatEndpoint already rejects metadata.localai_assistant=true from a non-admin caller, but the gate was open-coded inline with no direct test coverage. The chat route is FeatureChat-gated (default-on), and the assistant's in-process MCP server can install/delete models and edit configs — the wrong handler change would silently turn the LLM into a confused deputy. Extract the gate into requireAssistantAccess(c, authEnabled) and pin its behaviour: auth disabled is a no-op, unauthenticated is 403, RoleUser is 403, RoleAdmin and the synthetic legacy-key admin are admitted. No behaviour change in the production path. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): assert every API route is auth-classified The auth middleware classifies path prefixes (/api/, /v1/, /models/, etc.) as protected and treats anything else as a static-asset passthrough. A new endpoint shipped under a brand-new prefix — or a new path that simply isn't on the prefix allowlist — would be reachable anonymously. Walk every route registered by API() with auth enabled and a fresh in-memory database (no users, no keys), and assert each API-prefixed route returns 401 / 404 / 405 to an anonymous request. Public surfaces (/api/auth/*, /api/branding, /api/node/* token-authenticated routes, /healthz, branding asset server, generated-content server, static assets) are explicit allowlist entries with comments justifying them. Build-tagged 'auth' so it runs against the SQLite-backed auth DB (matches the existing auth suite). Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): pin agent endpoint per-user isolation contract agents.go's getUserID / effectiveUserID / canImpersonateUser / wantsAllUsers helpers are the single trust boundary for cross-user access on agent, agent-jobs, collections, and skills routes. A regression there is the difference between "regular user reads their own data" and "regular user reads anyone's data via ?user_id=victim". Lock in the contract: - effectiveUserID ignores ?user_id= for unauthenticated and RoleUser - effectiveUserID honours it for RoleAdmin and ProviderAgentWorker - wantsAllUsers requires admin AND the literal "true" string - canImpersonateUser is admin OR agent-worker, never plain RoleUser No production change — this commit only adds tests. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(downloader): drop redundant stat in removePartialFile The stat-then-remove pattern is a TOCTOU window and a wasted syscall — os.Remove already returns ErrNotExist for the missing-file case, so trust that and treat it as a no-op. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(http): redact secrets from trace buffer and distribution-token logs The /api/traces buffer captured Authorization, Cookie, Set-Cookie, and API-key headers verbatim from every request when tracing was enabled. The endpoint is admin-only but the buffer is reachable via any heap-style introspection and the captured tokens otherwise outlive the request. Strip those header values at capture time. Body redaction is left to a follow-up — the prompts are usually the operator's own and JSON-walking is invasive. Distribution tokens were also logged in plaintext from core/explorer/discovery.go; logs forward to syslog/journald and outlive the token. Redact those to a short prefix/suffix instead. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(auth): rate-limit OAuth callbacks separately from password endpoints The shared 5/min/IP limit on auth endpoints is right for password-style flows but too tight for OAuth callbacks: corporate SSO funnels many real users through one outbound IP and would trip the limit. Add a separate 60/min/IP limiter for /api/auth/{github,oidc}/callback so callbacks are bounded against floods without breaking shared-IP deployments. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(gallery): verify backend tarball sha256 when set in gallery entry GalleryBackend gained an optional sha256 field; the install path now threads it through to the existing downloader hash-verify (which already streams, verifies, and rolls back on mismatch). Galleries without sha256 keep working; the empty-SHA path still emits the existing "downloading without integrity check" warning. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(http): pin CSRF coverage on multipart endpoints The CSRF middleware in app.go is global (e.Use) so it covers every multipart upload route — branding assets, fine-tune datasets, audio transforms, agent collections. Pin that contract: cross-site multipart POSTs are rejected; same-origin / same-site / API-key clients are not. Also pins the SameSite=Lax fallback path the skipper relies on when Sec-Fetch-Site is absent. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(http): XSS hardening — CSP headers, safe href, base-href escape, SVG sandbox Several closely related XSS-prevention changes spanning the SPA shell, the React UI, and the branding asset server: - New SecurityHeaders middleware sets CSP, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, and Referrer-Policy on every response. The CSP keeps script-src permissive because the Vite bundle relies on inline + eval'd scripts; tightening that requires moving to a nonce-based policy. - The <base href> injection in the SPA shell escaped attacker-controllable Host / X-Forwarded-Host headers — a single quote in the host header broke out of the attribute. Pass through SecureBaseHref (html.EscapeString). - Three React sinks rendering untrusted content via dangerouslySetInnerHTML switch to text-node rendering with whiteSpace: pre-wrap: user message bodies in Chat.jsx and AgentChat.jsx, and the agent activity log in AgentChat.jsx. The hand-rolled escape on the agent user-message variant is replaced by the same plain-text path. - New safeHref util collapses non-allowlisted URI schemes (most importantly javascript:) to '#'. Applied to gallery `<a href={url}>` links in Models / Backends / Manage and to canvas artifact links — these come from gallery JSON or assistant tool calls and must be treated as untrusted. - The branding asset server attaches a sandbox CSP plus same-origin CORP to .svg responses. The React UI loads logos via <img>, but the same URL is also reachable via direct navigation; this prevents script execution if a hostile SVG slipped past upload validation. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(http): bound HTTP server with read-header and idle timeouts A net/http server with no timeouts is trivially Slowloris-able and leaks idle keep-alive connections. Set ReadHeaderTimeout (30s) to plug the slow-headers attack and IdleTimeout (120s) to cap keep-alive sockets. ReadTimeout and WriteTimeout stay at 0 because request bodies can be multi-GB model uploads and SSE / chat completions stream for many minutes; operators who need tighter per-request bounds should terminate slow clients at a reverse proxy. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * test(auth): pin PUT /api/auth/profile field-tampering contract The handler uses an explicit local body struct (only name and avatar_url) plus a gorm Updates(map) with a column allowlist, so an attacker posting {"role":"admin","email":"...","password_hash":"..."} can't mass-assign those fields. Lock that down with a regression test so a future "let's just c.Bind(&user)" refactor breaks loudly. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(services): strip directory components from multipart upload filenames UploadDataset and UploadToCollectionForUser took the raw multipart file.Filename and joined it into a destination path. The fine-tune upload was incidentally safe because of a UUID prefix that fused any leading '..' to a literal segment, but the protection is fragile. UploadToCollectionForUser handed the filename to a vendored backend without sanitising at all. Strip to filepath.Base at both boundaries and reject the trivial unsafe values ("", ".", "..", "/"). Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): validate persisted MCP server entries on load localStorage is shared across same-origin pages; an XSS that lands once can poison persisted MCP server config to attempt header injection or to feed a non-http URL into the fetch path on subsequent loads. Validate every entry: types must match, URL must parse with http(s) scheme, header keys/values must be control-char-free. Drop anything that doesn't fit. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(http): close X-Forwarded-Prefix open redirect The reverse-proxy support concatenated X-Forwarded-Prefix into the redirect target without validation, so a forged header value of "//evil.com" turned the SPA-shell redirect helper at /, /browse, and /browse/* into a 301 to //evil.com/app. The path-strip middleware had the same shape on its prefix-trailing-slash redirect. Add SafeForwardedPrefix at the middleware boundary: must start with a single '/', no protocol-relative '//' opener, no scheme, no backslash, no control characters. Apply at both consumers; misconfig trips the validator and the header is dropped. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(http): refuse wildcard CORS when LOCALAI_CORS=true with empty allowlist When LOCALAI_CORS=true but LOCALAI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS was empty, Echo's CORSWithConfig saw an empty allow-list and fell back to its default AllowOrigins=["*"]. An operator who flipped the strict-CORS feature flag without populating the list got the opposite of what they asked for. Echo never sets Allow-Credentials: true so this isn't directly exploitable (cookies aren't sent under wildcard CORS), but the misconfiguration trap is worth closing. Skip the registration and warn. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(auth): zxcvbn password strength check with user-acknowledged override The previous policy was len < 8, which let through "Password1" and the rest of the credential-stuffing corpus. LocalAI has no second factor yet, so the bar needs to sit higher. Add ValidatePasswordStrength using github.com/timbutler/zxcvbn (an actively-maintained fork of the trustelem port; v1.0.4, April 2024): - min 12 chars, max 72 (bcrypt's truncation point) - reject NUL bytes (some bcrypt callers truncate at the first NUL) - require zxcvbn score >= 3 ("safely unguessable, ~10^8 guesses to break"); the hint list ["localai", "local-ai", "admin"] penalises passwords built from the app's own branding zxcvbn produces false positives sometimes (a strong-looking password that happens to match a dictionary word) and operators occasionally need to set a known-weak password (kiosk demos, CI rigs). Add an acknowledgement path: PasswordPolicy{AllowWeak: true} skips the entropy check while still enforcing the hard rules. The structured PasswordErrorResponse marks weak-password rejections as Overridable so the UI can surface a "use this anyway" checkbox. Wired through register, self-service password change, and admin password reset on both the server and the React UI. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): drop HTML5 minLength on new-password inputs minLength={12} on the new-password input let the browser block the form submit silently before any JS or network call ran. The browser focused the field, showed a brief native tooltip, and that was that — no toast, no fetch, no clue. Reproducible by typing fewer than 12 chars on the second password change of a session. The JS-level length check in handleSubmit already shows a toast and the server rejects with a structured error, so the HTML5 attribute was redundant defence anyway. Drop it. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): bundle Geist fonts locally instead of fetching from Google The new CSP correctly refused to apply styles from fonts.googleapis.com because style-src is locked to 'self' and 'unsafe-inline'. Loosening the CSP would defeat its purpose; the right fix is to stop reaching out to a third-party CDN for fonts on every page load. Add @fontsource-variable/geist and @fontsource-variable/geist-mono as npm deps and import them once at boot. Drop the <link rel="preconnect"> and external stylesheet from index.html. Side benefit: no third-party tracking via Referer / IP on every UI load, no failure mode when offline / behind a captive portal. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(react-ui): refresh i18n strings to reflect 12-char password minimum The translations still said "at least 8 characters" everywhere — the client-side toast on a too-short password change told the user the wrong floor. Update tooShort and newPasswordPlaceholder / newPasswordDescription across all five locales (en, es, it, de, zh-CN) to match the real ValidatePasswordStrength rule. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(auth): make password length-floor overridable like the entropy check The 12-char minimum was a policy choice, not a technical invariant — only "non-empty", "<= 72 bytes", and "no NUL bytes" are real bcrypt constraints. Treating length-12 as a hard rule was inconsistent with the entropy check (already overridable) and friction for use cases where the account is just a name on a session, not a security boundary (single-user kiosk, CI rig, lab demo). Restructure ValidatePasswordStrength: - Hard rules (always enforced): non-empty, <= MaxPasswordLength, no NUL byte - Policy rules (skipped when AllowWeak=true): length >= 12, zxcvbn score >= 3 PasswordError now marks password_too_short as Overridable too. The React forms generalised from `error_code === 'password_too_weak'` to `overridable === true`, and the JS-side preflight length checks were removed (server is source of truth, returns the same checkbox flow). Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 [Claude Code] Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |
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pjbrzozowskiandPawel Brzozowski
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ecf85fde9e |
fix(api): remove duplicate /api/traces endpoint that broke React UI (#9427)
The API Traces tab in /app/traces always showed (0) traces despite requests
being recorded.
The /api/traces endpoint was registered in both localai.go and ui_api.go.
The ui_api.go version wrapped the response as {"traces": [...]} instead of
the flat []APIExchange array that both the React UI (Traces.jsx) and the
legacy Alpine.js UI (traces.html) expect. Because Echo matched the ui_api.go
handler, Array.isArray(apiData) always returned false, making the API Traces
tab permanently empty.
Remove the duplicate endpoints from ui_api.go so only the correct flat-array
version in localai.go is served.
Also use mime.ParseMediaType for the Content-Type check in the trace
middleware so requests with parameters (e.g. application/json; charset=utf-8)
are still traced.
Signed-off-by: Pawel Brzozowski <paul@ontux.net>
Co-authored-by: Pawel Brzozowski <paul@ontux.net>
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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59108fbe32 |
feat: add distributed mode (#9124)
* feat: add distributed mode (experimental) Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix data races, mutexes, transactions Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fixups Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix events and tool stream in agent chat Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * use ginkgo Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix(cron): compute correctly time boundaries avoiding re-triggering Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * enhancements, refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * do not flood of healthy checks Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * do not list obvious backends as text backends Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * tests fixups Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * refactoring and consolidation Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * Drop redundant healthcheck Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * enhancements, refactorings Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Ettore Di Giacinto
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aea21951a2 |
feat: add users and authentication support (#9061)
* feat(ui): add users and authentication support Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat: allow the admin user to impersonificate users Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore: ui improvements, disable 'Users' button in navbar when no auth is configured Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * feat: add OIDC support Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix: gate models Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore: cache requests to optimize speed Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * small UI enhancements Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore(ui): style improvements Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix: cover other paths by auth Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore: separate local auth, refactor Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * security hardening, approval mode Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * fix: fix tests and expectations Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> * chore: update localagi/localrecall Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io> |
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Richard Palethorpe
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35d509d8e7 |
feat(ui): Per model backend logs and various fixes (#9028)
* feat(gallery): Switch to expandable box instead of pop-over and display model files Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(ui, backends): Add individual backend logging Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(ui): Set the context settings from the model config Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |
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Richard Palethorpe
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f9a850c02a |
feat(realtime): WebRTC support (#8790)
* feat(realtime): WebRTC support Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * fix(tracing): Show full LLM opts and deltas Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |
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Richard Palethorpe
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00c72e7d3e |
fix(tracing): Create trace buffer on first request to enable tracing at runtime (#8148)
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |
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Richard Palethorpe
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99b5c5f156 |
feat(api): Allow tracing of requests and responses (#7609)
* feat(api): Allow tracing of requests and responses Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> * feat(traces): Add traces UI Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com> |