Files
LocalAI/core/services/addons/packages/install.go
T
mudler-agentandEttore Di Giacinto f8b7576dc7 feat(addons): install development add-ons by tag, as backends do (#12883)
A development add-on entry now names a moving tag, sets mutable and has
no digest, the same shape a development backend entry has. A release
entry stays pinned by digest.

One helper, catalog.Pin, turns a mutable entry into a digest at install:
it resolves the tag, checks the digest form and builds the version from
the first 12 hex digits. The backend library installer and the add-on
installer both call it. The add-on installer then verifies the signature
against the resolved digest and records that digest in the receipt. Kind,
platform and install label checks stay in each caller.

The official index lists the development entries as <id>-development,
which the publish workflow already moves in its promote job. The catalog
command renders the development channel as mutable entries. The update
check reports no state for a mutable entry until it resolves the tag too.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5-5 [Claude Code]

Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
2026-10-24 22:04:56 +02:00

411 lines
12 KiB
Go

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// Package packages stages trusted distributions. Publication never activates code.
package packages
import (
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/google/go-containerregistry/pkg/name"
"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/core/services/addons/catalog"
"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/pkg/addons/contract"
"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/pkg/httpclient"
"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/pkg/oci"
"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/pkg/oci/cosignverify"
"github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/pkg/root"
)
type Progress struct {
Phase string
Bytes int64
}
// Root must be a private owner-controlled directory, never addon-writable data.
// Catalog and Host are trusted owner configuration, not request payloads.
type Installer struct {
// SignatureTrust is optional host-provisioned trust, never catalog/artifact input.
// Nil preserves public Sigstore TUF trust and all signature requirements.
SignatureTrust root.TrustedMaterial
Root string
Catalog catalog.Catalog
Host contract.HostCompatibility
// Lookup resolves the tag of a mutable entry to a digest. Nil asks the
// registry; tests replace it.
Lookup catalog.DigestLookup
MaxBytes int64
MaxFiles int
writeFile func(string, os.FileMode) (fileWriter, error)
}
func (i *Installer) byteLimit() int64 {
if i.MaxBytes > 0 {
return i.MaxBytes
}
return catalog.DefaultMaxBytes(catalog.KindAddon)
}
func (i *Installer) fileLimit() int {
if i.MaxFiles > 0 {
return i.MaxFiles
}
return 10000
}
func (i *Installer) Stage(ctx context.Context, r catalog.Release, progress func(Progress)) (out StagedPackage, err error) {
if e := ctx.Err(); e != nil {
return out, e
}
selection := r.Selection
if selection == "" {
selection = r.Version
}
trusted, e := i.Catalog.Resolve(ctx, r.SourceID, r.ID, selection)
if e != nil {
return out, e
}
// Do not accept a caller's substituted artifact, policy, source or digest.
r.Selection = selection
// An add-on library names its signer exactly. A pattern is for backend
// sources only, so an add-on install refuses a policy that carries one.
if r.Policy.IdentityRegex != "" || r.EntryKind() != catalog.KindAddon {
return out, ErrPackage
}
if !r.Equal(trusted) || (r.Digest == "" && !r.Mutable) || r.OS != i.Host.OS || r.Arch != i.Host.Arch {
return out, ErrPackage
}
// A mutable entry (a development image) has no digest in the library. The
// same helper as for backends resolves its tag to a digest here; from then
// on the install is the pinned path and the receipt records that digest.
// Only an OCI artifact can be mutable.
if r.Mutable {
pin, e := catalog.Pin(ctx, r, i.Lookup)
if e != nil {
return out, ErrPackage
}
r.Digest = pin.Digest
}
root, e := filepath.Abs(i.Root)
if e != nil || i.Root == "" {
return out, ErrPackage
}
if e = os.MkdirAll(root, 0700); e != nil {
return out, e
}
info, e := os.Lstat(root)
if e != nil || !info.IsDir() || info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 || info.Mode().Perm()&0077 != 0 {
return out, ErrPackage
}
dir, e := os.MkdirTemp(root, "stage-")
if e != nil {
return out, e
}
defer func() {
if err != nil {
_ = os.RemoveAll(dir)
}
}()
if progress != nil {
progress(Progress{Phase: "download"})
}
x := &extraction{seen: map[string]bool{}}
verification := "sha256"
if strings.HasPrefix(r.Artifact, "oci://") {
ref, e := name.ParseReference(strings.TrimPrefix(r.Artifact, "oci://"))
if e != nil {
return out, ErrPackage
}
pinned := ref.Context().Digest(r.Digest).Name()
transport := boundTransport{ctx: ctx, base: httpclient.New().Transport, allowLoopbackHTTP: r.AllowLoopbackHTTP}
if r.Policy.RequireSignature {
verifier, e := cosignverify.NewVerifier(cosignverify.Policy{Issuer: r.Policy.Issuer, Identity: r.Policy.Identity}, nil, transport)
if i.SignatureTrust != nil {
verifier, e = cosignverify.NewVerifierWithTrustedMaterial(cosignverify.Policy{Issuer: r.Policy.Issuer, Identity: r.Policy.Identity}, nil, transport, i.SignatureTrust)
}
if e != nil {
return out, ErrPackage
}
if e = verifier.VerifyImage(ctx, pinned); e != nil {
return out, ErrPackage
}
verification = "sha256+sigstore"
}
img, e := oci.GetImage(pinned, r.OS+"/"+r.Arch, nil, transport)
if e != nil {
return out, ErrPackage
}
digest, e := img.Digest()
if e != nil || digest.String() != r.Digest {
return out, ErrPackage
}
cfg, e := img.ConfigFile()
if e != nil || cfg.OS != r.OS || cfg.Architecture != r.Arch {
return out, ErrPackage
}
layers, e := img.Layers()
if e != nil || len(layers) > i.fileLimit() {
return out, ErrPackage
}
var downloaded int64
for _, layer := range layers {
size, e := layer.Size()
if e != nil || size < 0 || size > i.byteLimit()-downloaded {
return out, ErrPackage
}
downloaded += size
h, e := layer.Digest()
if e != nil || h.Algorithm != "sha256" {
return out, ErrPackage
}
rc, e := layer.Compressed()
if e != nil {
return out, ErrPackage
}
f, e := i.download(ctx, rc, h.String(), root)
_ = rc.Close()
if e != nil {
return out, e
}
e = func() error {
defer func() { _ = os.Remove(f.Name()) }()
defer func() { _ = f.Close() }()
gz, e := gzip.NewReader(f)
if e != nil {
return e
}
defer func() { _ = gz.Close() }()
return i.extract(ctx, gz, dir, x)
}()
if e != nil {
return out, e
}
}
} else {
// HTTP archives have a catalog-pinned SHA256. Sigstore image signatures are
// not archive signatures; fail closed instead of silently dropping policy.
if r.Policy.RequireSignature {
return out, ErrPackage
}
req, e := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, r.Artifact, nil)
if e != nil {
return out, ErrPackage
}
resp, e := httpclient.New().Do(req)
if e != nil {
return out, ErrPackage
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
return out, ErrPackage
}
f, e := i.download(ctx, resp.Body, r.Digest, root)
if e != nil {
return out, e
}
defer func() { _ = os.Remove(f.Name()) }()
defer func() { _ = f.Close() }()
if e = i.extract(ctx, f, dir, x); e != nil {
return out, e
}
}
manifestPath := filepath.Join(dir, "manifest.json")
manifestInfo, e := os.Lstat(manifestPath)
if e != nil || !manifestInfo.Mode().IsRegular() || manifestInfo.Size() > contract.DefaultLimits().ManifestBytes {
return out, ErrPackage
}
b, e := os.ReadFile(manifestPath) // #nosec G304 -- path is under the add-on state root and is built from validated identifiers, never from a request
if e != nil {
return out, e
}
m, e := contract.ParseManifest(b)
if e != nil {
return out, e
}
if e = contract.ValidateManifest(m, i.Host); e != nil {
return out, e
}
// A mutable entry names a moving tag, so the version the library shows is a
// label; the package says which build it is, and the digest pins it.
if m.ID != r.ID || (!r.Mutable && m.Version != r.Version) {
return out, ErrPackage
}
assets := []string{m.Executable}
if u := m.Capabilities.UI; u != nil {
assets = append(assets, u.Entry)
assets = append(assets, u.CSS...)
}
for _, asset := range assets {
info, e := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(dir, filepath.FromSlash(asset)))
if e != nil || !info.Mode().IsRegular() || (asset == m.Executable && info.Mode()&0100 == 0) {
return out, ErrPackage
}
}
var icon *PackageIcon
if u := m.Capabilities.UI; u != nil && u.Icon != "" {
if icon, e = verifyIcon(dir, u.Icon); e != nil {
return out, e
}
}
if _, e = os.Lstat(filepath.Join(dir, "receipt.json")); !os.IsNotExist(e) {
return out, ErrPackage
}
if e = ctx.Err(); e != nil {
return out, e
}
if progress != nil {
progress(Progress{Phase: "verified", Bytes: x.bytes})
}
return StagedPackage{&stagedState{owner: i, dir: dir, receipt: PackageReceipt{Digest: r.Digest, SourceID: r.SourceID, SourceURL: r.SourceURL, Channel: r.Channel, Selection: selection, Reference: r.Artifact, Verification: verification, Manifest: m, Icon: icon}}}, nil
}
// verifyIcon opens the declared icon inside the staged package without
// following links, bounds its size and checks that its bytes have the
// signature of the declared type. An icon that cannot be served as an
// immutable image is a package error, never a warning.
func verifyIcon(dir, name string) (*PackageIcon, error) {
media := contract.IconTypes[strings.ToLower(filepath.Ext(name))]
if media == "" || !filepath.IsLocal(name) {
return nil, ErrPackage
}
root, e := os.OpenRoot(dir)
if e != nil {
return nil, ErrPackage
}
defer func() { _ = root.Close() }()
info, e := root.Lstat(name)
if e != nil || !info.Mode().IsRegular() || info.Size() <= 0 || info.Size() > contract.MaxIconBytes {
return nil, ErrPackage
}
f, e := root.Open(name)
if e != nil {
return nil, ErrPackage
}
defer func() { _ = f.Close() }()
b, e := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(f, contract.MaxIconBytes+1))
if e != nil || int64(len(b)) != info.Size() {
return nil, ErrPackage
}
signature := false
switch media {
case "image/png":
signature = bytes.HasPrefix(b, []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n"))
case "image/jpeg":
signature = bytes.HasPrefix(b, []byte{0xff, 0xd8, 0xff})
case "image/webp":
signature = len(b) >= 12 && string(b[:4]) == "RIFF" && string(b[8:12]) == "WEBP"
}
if !signature {
return nil, ErrPackage
}
sum := sha256.Sum256(b)
return &PackageIcon{Path: name, Digest: fmt.Sprintf("sha256:%x", sum), Size: int64(len(b)), MediaType: media}, nil
}
func (i *Installer) download(ctx context.Context, r io.Reader, digest, root string) (f *os.File, err error) {
f, err = os.CreateTemp(root, "download-")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer func() {
if err != nil {
_ = f.Close()
_ = os.Remove(f.Name())
}
}()
h := sha256.New()
n, e := io.Copy(io.MultiWriter(f, h), io.LimitReader(contextReader{ctx, r}, i.byteLimit()+1))
if e != nil {
return f, e
}
if n > i.byteLimit() || fmt.Sprintf("sha256:%x", h.Sum(nil)) != digest {
return f, ErrPackage
}
_, err = f.Seek(0, 0)
return f, err
}
// go-containerregistry creates its own client, so redirects are decided here.
// Registries such as quay.io answer a blob GET with a redirect to a CDN. That
// one case is followed: the request must be a GET of a digest-pinned blob, the
// target must pass the same scheme and host rules as a direct request, and the
// registry credential is never sent to the target. Any other redirect is
// refused, so credentials cannot follow to another origin. The caller still
// verifies the digest of the bytes it receives.
type boundTransport struct {
ctx context.Context
base http.RoundTripper
allowLoopbackHTTP bool
}
// maxBlobRedirects bounds a CDN redirect chain.
const maxBlobRedirects = 3
// allowed applies the scheme rule: https always, plaintext http only to a
// loopback address and only when the source opted in.
func (t boundTransport) allowed(u *url.URL) bool {
if u.Host == "" || u.User != nil {
return false
}
switch u.Scheme {
case "https":
return true
case "http":
ip := net.ParseIP(u.Hostname())
return t.allowLoopbackHTTP && ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback()
}
return false
}
// pinnedBlob reports whether the request is a GET of /v2/<name>/blobs/sha256:<hex>.
func pinnedBlob(req *http.Request) bool {
if req.Method != http.MethodGet {
return false
}
p := req.URL.Path
i := strings.LastIndex(p, "/blobs/sha256:")
if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "/v2/") || i < 0 {
return false
}
hex := p[i+len("/blobs/sha256:"):]
if len(hex) != 64 {
return false
}
for _, c := range hex {
if (c < '0' || c > '9') && (c < 'a' || c > 'f') {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func (t boundTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if !t.allowed(req.URL) {
return nil, ErrPackage
}
follow := pinnedBlob(req)
cur := req.Clone(t.ctx)
for hops := 0; ; hops++ {
resp, e := t.base.RoundTrip(cur)
if e != nil || resp.StatusCode < 300 || resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
return resp, e
}
loc, le := resp.Location()
_ = resp.Body.Close()
if !follow || hops >= maxBlobRedirects || le != nil || !t.allowed(loc) {
return nil, ErrPackage
}
next, ne := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.ctx, http.MethodGet, loc.String(), nil)
if ne != nil {
return nil, ErrPackage
}
next.Header.Set("User-Agent", req.Header.Get("User-Agent"))
cur = next
}
}