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LocalAI's outbound HTTP clients used Go's default redirect policy, which
follows up to 10 redirects. On a cross-host redirect Go forwards custom
request headers — including credential headers such as Anthropic's
x-api-key — to the redirect target (Go strips Authorization, Cookie and
WWW-Authenticate cross-host, but NOT arbitrary custom headers). An
attacker able to elicit a redirect from an upstream (a hijacked or
spoofed upstream, DNS trickery, or a malicious upstream_url) then
harvests the operator's provider API key.
This was first reported against the cloud-proxy / MITM PII path
(GHSA-3mj3-57v2-4636); the same class affects every other outbound
client. Rather than patch each call site, add pkg/httpclient as the one
sanctioned constructor for outbound HTTP and route everything through it.
pkg/httpclient:
- New(...) refuses redirects, TLS 1.2 floor, no body
deadline (streaming/SSE safe)
- NewWithTimeout(d) simple request/response calls
- WithFollowRedirects opt-in following that still strips credential
headers on any cross-host hop; different
scheme/host/port == different origin, guarding
the curl CVE-2022-27774 port-confusion class
- WithTransport(rt) keep a custom transport (IP-pin, HTTP/2, a
credential-injecting RoundTripper)
- HardenedTransport() base transport with the TLS floor + bounded setup
- Harden(c) apply the policy to a library-supplied *http.Client
- NoRedirect the CheckRedirect policy; wraps ErrRedirectBlocked
Lint: a forbidigo rule flags http.DefaultClient and http.Get/Post/
PostForm/Head, pointing at pkg/httpclient (.golangci.yml,
.agents/coding-style.md). forbidigo cannot match the &http.Client{}
composite literal without also flagging legitimate *http.Client type
references, so that form is enforced by review.
Migrates every non-test outbound call site across core/, pkg/, cmd/, and
the Go backend (backend/go/cloud-proxy). Credential-bearing and
internal-RPC clients refuse redirects; download / CDN / registry clients
use WithFollowRedirects so they keep working while stripping secrets
cross-host. The only credential-bearing client that follows redirects is
the gated-download path (pkg/downloader/uri.go), which strips the token
on the cross-host hop to the CDN. Hardening this closes, in passing:
- MCP remote-server bearer token leaking via a redirect (the
RoundTripper re-injected Authorization on every hop)
- agent multimedia/webhook clients leaking user-supplied auth headers
- cors_proxy following redirects, bypassing its SSRF IP-pin
- downloader's authorized read path leaking the token cross-host
Fixes: GHSA-3mj3-57v2-4636 (cloud-proxy leaks operator provider API key
(x-api-key) to attacker host on cross-host redirect)
Reported-by: tonghuaroot
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code]
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <io@richiejp.com>
133 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
133 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
package httpclient_test
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import (
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"crypto/tls"
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/pkg/httpclient"
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. "github.com/onsi/ginkgo/v2"
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. "github.com/onsi/gomega"
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)
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func TestHTTPClient(t *testing.T) {
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RegisterFailHandler(Fail)
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RunSpecs(t, "httpclient suite")
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}
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var _ = Describe("httpclient", func() {
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Describe("New (default)", func() {
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It("refuses to follow redirects and never reaches the redirect target", func() {
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sinkHit := make(chan string, 1)
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sink := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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sinkHit <- r.Header.Get("X-Api-Key")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}))
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defer sink.Close()
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redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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http.Redirect(w, r, sink.URL, http.StatusFound)
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}))
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defer redirector.Close()
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req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, redirector.URL, nil)
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req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", "secret")
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_, err := httpclient.New().Do(req)
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Expect(err).To(HaveOccurred(), "redirect must surface as an error")
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Expect(errors.Is(err, httpclient.ErrRedirectBlocked)).To(BeTrue(), "error should wrap ErrRedirectBlocked")
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Expect(sinkHit).NotTo(Receive(), "the redirect target must never be contacted")
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})
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It("sets no overall timeout (streaming-safe) by default", func() {
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Expect(httpclient.New().Timeout).To(BeZero())
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})
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It("sets a TLS 1.2 floor on the default transport", func() {
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c := httpclient.New()
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t, ok := c.Transport.(*http.Transport)
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Expect(ok).To(BeTrue())
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Expect(t.TLSClientConfig).NotTo(BeNil())
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Expect(t.TLSClientConfig.MinVersion).To(Equal(uint16(tls.VersionTLS12)))
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})
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})
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Describe("NewWithTimeout", func() {
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It("applies the overall timeout", func() {
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Expect(httpclient.NewWithTimeout(5 * time.Second).Timeout).To(Equal(5 * time.Second))
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})
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})
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Describe("WithFollowRedirects", func() {
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It("follows same-host redirects keeping the credential header", func() {
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got := make(chan string, 2)
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var srv *httptest.Server
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srv = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.URL.Path == "/start" {
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http.Redirect(w, r, srv.URL+"/end", http.StatusFound)
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return
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}
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got <- r.Header.Get("X-Api-Key")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, srv.URL+"/start", nil)
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req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", "secret")
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resp, err := httpclient.New(httpclient.WithFollowRedirects()).Do(req)
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Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
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_ = resp.Body.Close()
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Expect(<-got).To(Equal("secret"), "same-host redirect should preserve the header")
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})
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It("strips credential headers on a cross-host redirect", func() {
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sinkKey := make(chan string, 1)
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sink := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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sinkKey <- r.Header.Get("X-Api-Key")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}))
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defer sink.Close()
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redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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http.Redirect(w, r, sink.URL, http.StatusFound)
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}))
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defer redirector.Close()
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req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, redirector.URL, nil)
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req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", "secret")
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resp, err := httpclient.New(httpclient.WithFollowRedirects()).Do(req)
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Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
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_ = resp.Body.Close()
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Expect(<-sinkKey).To(BeEmpty(), "x-api-key must be stripped crossing to a different host")
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})
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})
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Describe("Harden", func() {
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It("adds NoRedirect and a TLS floor to a bare client without clobbering existing config", func() {
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c := httpclient.Harden(&http.Client{})
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Expect(c.CheckRedirect).NotTo(BeNil())
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t, ok := c.Transport.(*http.Transport)
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Expect(ok).To(BeTrue())
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Expect(t.TLSClientConfig.MinVersion).To(Equal(uint16(tls.VersionTLS12)))
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})
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It("returns nil for a nil client", func() {
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Expect(httpclient.Harden(nil)).To(BeNil())
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})
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It("preserves a caller-supplied CheckRedirect", func() {
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sentinel := errors.New("mine")
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c := httpclient.Harden(&http.Client{
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CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error { return sentinel },
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})
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Expect(c.CheckRedirect(nil, nil)).To(Equal(sentinel))
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})
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})
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})
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