Files
LocalAI/core/http/middleware/baseurl.go
LocalAI [bot] fe4f425fb5 fix: correct scheme/host on self-referential URLs behind an HTTPS reverse proxy (#10482) (#10504)
* fix(http): harden BaseURL proxy scheme/host detection

Split comma-separated X-Forwarded-Proto and honor the RFC 7239 Forwarded
header so generated links use https behind common reverse-proxy setups.

Refs #10482

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>

* feat(http): honor explicit external base URL in BaseURL

When _external_base_url is set in the request context it dictates the
origin (scheme+host+port); the proxy path prefix is still appended.

Refs #10482

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>

* feat(config): generalize LOCALAI_BASE_URL to ExternalBaseURL

LOCALAI_BASE_URL now sets a single instance-wide external base URL used
for OAuth callbacks and all self-referential links. A Pre middleware
stamps it into the request context for middleware.BaseURL.

Refs #10482

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>

* docs: document LOCALAI_BASE_URL and reverse-proxy headers

Refs #10482

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>

* test(http): cover parseForwarded edge cases; clarify base-url flag group

Adds direct unit coverage for quoted/malformed/multi-element Forwarded
headers and regroups the external base URL flag away from auth-only.

Refs #10482

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>

---------

Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
2026-06-25 08:10:59 +02:00

125 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package middleware
import (
"strings"
"github.com/labstack/echo/v4"
)
// BasePathPrefix returns the URL path prefix that the request was reached
// under (e.g. "/myprefix/"). It always returns a value that starts and ends
// with `/`, defaulting to "/" when the app is not behind a path prefix.
//
// It first looks at the path StripPathPrefix removed (when the proxy forwards
// the prefix in the URL), then falls back to the X-Forwarded-Prefix header
// (when the proxy strips the prefix before forwarding, e.g. Caddy's
// handle_path).
//
// The header fallback is gated through SafeForwardedPrefix because the value
// flows into the SPA HTML response (both <base href> and the path-absolute
// asset URL rewrite in serveIndex). X-Forwarded-Prefix is attacker
// controllable on misconfigured proxy chains; without that gate a value like
// "//evil.com" turns the asset rewrite into a protocol-relative URL that
// loads JS from a foreign origin.
func BasePathPrefix(c echo.Context) string {
path := c.Path()
origPath := c.Request().URL.Path
if storedPath, ok := c.Get("_original_path").(string); ok && storedPath != "" {
origPath = storedPath
}
if path != origPath && strings.HasSuffix(origPath, path) && len(path) > 0 {
prefixLen := len(origPath) - len(path)
if prefixLen > 0 {
pathPrefix := origPath[:prefixLen]
if !strings.HasSuffix(pathPrefix, "/") {
pathPrefix += "/"
}
return pathPrefix
}
}
if validated, ok := SafeForwardedPrefix(c.Request().Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Prefix")); ok {
if !strings.HasSuffix(validated, "/") {
validated += "/"
}
return validated
}
return "/"
}
// BaseURL returns the base URL for the given HTTP request context.
// It takes into account that the app may be exposed by a reverse-proxy under a different protocol, host and path.
// The returned URL is guaranteed to end with `/`.
// The method should be used in conjunction with the StripPathPrefix middleware.
func BaseURL(c echo.Context) string {
// An explicit external base URL (LOCALAI_BASE_URL) is authoritative for
// the origin. The proxy-derived path prefix is still appended so a
// reverse-proxy mount point keeps working. Trailing slashes are
// normalized via BasePathPrefix, which always starts and ends with "/".
if ext, ok := c.Get("_external_base_url").(string); ok && ext != "" {
return strings.TrimRight(ext, "/") + BasePathPrefix(c)
}
fwdProto, fwdHost := parseForwarded(c.Request().Header.Get("Forwarded"))
scheme := "http"
switch {
case c.Request().TLS != nil:
scheme = "https"
case strings.EqualFold(firstToken(c.Request().Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")), "https"):
scheme = "https"
case strings.EqualFold(fwdProto, "https"):
scheme = "https"
}
host := c.Request().Host
if forwardedHost := c.Request().Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"); forwardedHost != "" {
host = forwardedHost
} else if fwdHost != "" {
host = fwdHost
}
return scheme + "://" + host + BasePathPrefix(c)
}
// firstToken returns the first comma-separated token of v, trimmed of spaces.
// Reverse-proxy chains can emit X-Forwarded-Proto as "https,http"; only the
// first hop (closest to the client) is meaningful for scheme detection.
func firstToken(v string) string {
if i := strings.IndexByte(v, ','); i >= 0 {
v = v[:i]
}
return strings.TrimSpace(v)
}
// parseForwarded extracts the proto and host directives from the first element
// of an RFC 7239 Forwarded header (e.g. `for=x;proto=https;host=h, for=y`).
// Values may be quoted. Returns empty strings when absent or malformed so the
// caller can fall through to other signals.
func parseForwarded(header string) (proto, host string) {
if header == "" {
return "", ""
}
// Only the first element (closest proxy to the client) matters here.
if i := strings.IndexByte(header, ','); i >= 0 {
header = header[:i]
}
for _, directive := range strings.Split(header, ";") {
key, value, ok := strings.Cut(strings.TrimSpace(directive), "=")
if !ok {
continue
}
value = strings.Trim(strings.TrimSpace(value), `"`)
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(key)) {
case "proto":
proto = value
case "host":
host = value
}
}
return proto, host
}