Files
LocalAI/core/cli/workerregistry/credentials.go
T
Ettore Di Giacinto 3338d7bc56 fix(distributed): refuse a worker that cannot tunnel, and say why it was refused
Review round 1 on the change that stopped workers listening. One blocking item
and seven notes.

LOCALAI_WORKER_TUNNEL=false was the blocking one, and the ruling was to make it
fatal rather than to correct the comment that still promised it fell back to the
advertised address. There is no fallback left: a worker on this branch
advertises nothing and binds only loopback, so turning the tunnel off leaves it
reachable by nothing while it registers, heartbeats and reports healthy, and the
scheduler keeps placing models on it. That is the worst available failure shape,
so a new Config.validateStartup refuses it before prefetch, registration and
NATS, while the worker is still invisible to the cluster. It absorbs the
pre-existing empty-registration-token check, which had the same shape and no
spec. The flag is kept rather than deleted so an operator who set it is told the
promise is gone instead of having the setting ignored, and the guard around
StartTunnel is removed, because a branch nothing can take reads as a supported
no-tunnel mode that does not exist.

The justification for erroring on an install that names no address was wrong,
and the review is right that this is the dangerous form of overclaiming, because
the conclusion holds and the mechanism does not. It said the resulting empty
target would be refused as an invalid stream and that the refusal would read as
the worker answering about its backend. Nothing in this repo branches on
cluster.ErrNoRoute, and nodes.unroutable treats any recorded dial error as
unroutable, so that refusal reaches every reap guard as ProbeUnknown and deletes
nothing. The site now stands on what holds, that an install naming no port
produced nothing routable and the failure belongs to the install rather than to
a later probe, and records the retracted claim so nobody re-derives it. This
retracts the same paragraph in the body of 1cf847f29.

The reviewer deleted the whole tryWarmPath unnamed-replica guard and the suite
stayed green, including the reservation release. It is specced now, and the
asymmetry the review asked about is decided at the site: the row stays, unlike
the sibling !alive branch which removes it. That branch has observed a backend
dead; this one has observed only that the row is unreadable, which says nothing
about whether a process is running, and the row is the last record that one
might be, since the acknowledged stop path refuses a stop whose ExpectedAddress
does not match and an empty one cannot be cleaned up through it either.

The cross-version wire claim rested on two struct tags nobody asserted:
renaming only the json keys survived mutation while the gorm column rename went
red through raw SQL. Both keys are pinned now, marshal and unmarshal, per
struct.

A worker-first upgrade showed the operator a status code and not the reason. The
registration client discarded the body, so "address is required for backend
workers" was read off the socket and thrown away, and the ladder then spent four
minutes on a verdict the frontend reached instantly. Refusals now quote the body
and carry ErrRegistrationRejected, and both the ladder and the credential
manager's Acquire stop on the first one. Acquire matters more than the ladder:
it is the default path and its bound is 100 attempts, not 10. 408 and 429 are
deliberately not refusals, since both are the frontend asking for the same
request again.

Also: the stale "not blocked by firewalls" troubleshooting line, which now names
the real cause and the knobs that move the port range; and the inert address
fields on the MCP Node DTO, which the Assistant was still being handed. The
review named http_address there and I removed address too, because it is inert
by the same argument and leaving one of a pair is arbitrary.

Five mutations, all red. Deleting the warm-path guard reddens four specs and
falsifying only its reservation release reddens one, so the two halves are
pinned separately. Renaming only the json keys reddens both wire suites.
Discarding the refusal body reddens two. Dropping the rejection classification
does not fail the suite, it hangs it, which is the operator-visible symptom, so
it is recorded red under a ginkgo timeout.

The verify list is now derived from the diff rather than from the brief, which
is what let the previous round ship a spec asserting 200 where the endpoint
returns 201: nine ginkgo suites, the e2e vet, route auth coverage, the leaf
check, build, the healthcheck shell suite and lint. The two jsx files have no
harness in this worktree and are recorded as the one unverified surface.

Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 [claude-code]
Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
2026-09-01 19:36:35 +00:00

228 lines
8.4 KiB
Go

package workerregistry
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/pkg/natsauth"
"github.com/mudler/xlog"
)
// statusPending mirrors nodes.StatusPending. It is duplicated rather than
// imported so the lightweight registration client does not pull in the nodes
// package (and its gorm/DB dependencies).
const statusPending = "pending"
// defaultMaxAttempts bounds how many times Acquire registers (and how many
// consecutive times RefreshLoop may fail) before giving up. It is high enough
// to ride out a slow admin approval or a transient frontend outage, but finite
// so an unauthorized/unapprovable worker exits and surfaces the problem (via a
// non-zero exit and the resulting restart) rather than waiting forever.
const defaultMaxAttempts = 100
// RegisterFunc performs one idempotent registration round-trip.
type RegisterFunc func(ctx context.Context) (*RegisterResponse, error)
// NATSCredentialManager acquires NATS credentials at startup — waiting through
// admin approval when required — and refreshes them before the minted JWT
// expires, by re-registering (which mints a fresh JWT). The live NATS
// connection adopts a refreshed JWT on its next reconnect via Provider. Safe
// for concurrent use.
//
// It addresses two failure modes: a worker that needs credentials but registers
// while still pending approval (it would otherwise give up and never connect),
// and a long-running worker whose 24h JWT expires with no way to renew it.
type NATSCredentialManager struct {
register RegisterFunc
requireCreds bool // block until credentials are present (frontend minting in use)
// Tunables; defaults set by NewNATSCredentialManager, overridable in tests.
initialBackoff time.Duration
maxBackoff time.Duration
maxAttempts int // bound on Acquire attempts / consecutive refresh failures (<=0 = unlimited)
refreshLead float64 // refresh once this fraction of the JWT lifetime has elapsed
refreshRetry time.Duration
expiryOf func(jwt string) (time.Time, bool)
mu sync.RWMutex
jwt string
seed string
nodeID string
// tunnelToken is the node's own tunnel credential from the most recent
// registration. It is kept here because every re-registration this manager
// performs ROTATES it, so the tunnel client has to read the current value
// at dial time rather than be handed one at startup.
tunnelToken string
}
// NewNATSCredentialManager builds a manager over register. When requireCreds is
// true, Acquire blocks until the node is approved and credentials are minted.
func NewNATSCredentialManager(register RegisterFunc, requireCreds bool) *NATSCredentialManager {
return &NATSCredentialManager{
register: register,
requireCreds: requireCreds,
initialBackoff: 2 * time.Second,
maxBackoff: 30 * time.Second,
maxAttempts: defaultMaxAttempts,
refreshLead: 0.75,
refreshRetry: 30 * time.Second,
expiryOf: jwtExpiry,
}
}
// jwtExpiry decodes the expiry of a minted user JWT. ok is false when the token
// is empty/undecodable or carries no expiry (e.g. a non-expiring service JWT).
func jwtExpiry(token string) (time.Time, bool) {
if token == "" {
return time.Time{}, false
}
uc, err := natsauth.DecodeUserClaims(token)
if err != nil || uc.Expires == 0 {
return time.Time{}, false
}
return time.Unix(uc.Expires, 0), true
}
func (m *NATSCredentialManager) store(res *RegisterResponse) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.nodeID = res.ID
if res.NatsJWT != "" && res.NatsUserSeed != "" {
m.jwt, m.seed = res.NatsJWT, res.NatsUserSeed
}
// Guarded the same way the NATS pair is: a response that carries no tunnel
// token (a frontend that predates them, or one whose minting failed) must
// not wipe a working credential this worker already holds. Overwriting with
// "" would lock the tunnel out until the next registration that did carry
// one, which is the opposite of what an empty field means.
if res.TunnelToken != "" {
m.tunnelToken = res.TunnelToken
}
}
// TunnelToken returns the node's current tunnel credential, empty until one has
// been issued. It is the callback the tunnel client reads on every dial.
func (m *NATSCredentialManager) TunnelToken() string {
m.mu.RLock()
defer m.mu.RUnlock()
return m.tunnelToken
}
// Current returns the latest NATS credentials (both empty until acquired).
func (m *NATSCredentialManager) Current() (jwt, seed string) {
m.mu.RLock()
defer m.mu.RUnlock()
return m.jwt, m.seed
}
// NodeID returns the node ID from the most recent registration.
func (m *NATSCredentialManager) NodeID() string {
m.mu.RLock()
defer m.mu.RUnlock()
return m.nodeID
}
// Provider returns a callback compatible with messaging.WithUserJWTProvider,
// supplying the current credentials on each (re)connect.
func (m *NATSCredentialManager) Provider() func() (string, string) {
return m.Current
}
// HasCredentials reports whether complete NATS credentials have been obtained.
func (m *NATSCredentialManager) HasCredentials() bool {
jwt, seed := m.Current()
return jwt != "" && seed != ""
}
// Acquire registers and, when requireCreds is set, keeps re-registering with
// exponential backoff until the node is approved (status != pending) and
// credentials are minted. Without requireCreds it returns the first successful
// response (the historical one-shot behavior, preserved for anonymous NATS).
func (m *NATSCredentialManager) Acquire(ctx context.Context) (*RegisterResponse, error) {
backoff := m.initialBackoff
var lastReason error
for attempt := 1; m.maxAttempts <= 0 || attempt <= m.maxAttempts; attempt++ {
res, err := m.register(ctx)
switch {
case errors.Is(err, ErrRegistrationRejected):
// The frontend refused rather than failed. Waiting through the full
// attempt ladder would delay the operator's only explanation by the
// length of the ladder and change nothing about the answer.
return nil, err
case err != nil:
lastReason = err
xlog.Warn("Registration failed, retrying", "attempt", attempt, "next_retry", backoff, "error", err)
case !m.requireCreds:
m.store(res)
return res, nil
case res.Status == statusPending:
lastReason = fmt.Errorf("node %s still pending admin approval", res.ID)
xlog.Info("Node pending admin approval; waiting", "node", res.ID, "attempt", attempt, "next_retry", backoff)
case res.NatsJWT == "" || res.NatsUserSeed == "":
lastReason = fmt.Errorf("node %s approved but NATS credentials not minted", res.ID)
xlog.Info("Node approved but NATS credentials not yet minted; waiting", "node", res.ID, "attempt", attempt, "next_retry", backoff)
default:
m.store(res)
return res, nil
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, ctx.Err()
case <-time.After(backoff):
}
backoff = min(backoff*2, m.maxBackoff)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("giving up acquiring NATS credentials after %d attempts: %w", m.maxAttempts, lastReason)
}
// RefreshLoop re-registers to mint a fresh JWT before the current one expires,
// updating the credentials returned by Current/Provider so the NATS connection
// adopts them on its next reconnect. It returns nil when ctx is cancelled or
// when the current credential has no expiry (nothing to refresh), and a non-nil
// error after maxAttempts consecutive refresh failures — letting the caller
// exit the worker so it restarts and re-acquires (or surfaces the outage)
// rather than silently drifting toward an expired, unrenewable JWT.
func (m *NATSCredentialManager) RefreshLoop(ctx context.Context) error {
failures := 0
for {
jwt, _ := m.Current()
exp, ok := m.expiryOf(jwt)
if !ok {
xlog.Debug("NATS credential has no expiry; refresh loop exiting")
return nil
}
wait := max(time.Duration(float64(time.Until(exp))*m.refreshLead), 0)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil
case <-time.After(wait):
}
res, err := m.register(ctx)
if err == nil && res.NatsJWT != "" && res.NatsUserSeed != "" {
m.store(res)
failures = 0
xlog.Info("Refreshed NATS credentials", "node", res.ID)
continue
}
failures++
if err != nil {
xlog.Warn("NATS credential refresh failed; will retry", "attempt", failures, "error", err)
} else {
xlog.Warn("NATS credential refresh returned no credentials; will retry", "attempt", failures)
}
if m.maxAttempts > 0 && failures >= m.maxAttempts {
return fmt.Errorf("NATS credential refresh failed %d times in a row", failures)
}
// Back off before retrying so a persistent failure near expiry does not spin.
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil
case <-time.After(m.refreshRetry):
}
}
}