Periodic iw-scan-based detection of the 6 heuristics that don't need
monitor-mode hardware (see issue #1789): pwnagotchi/Pineapple signatures,
evil-twin/open clones, baseline-AP-absent-with-clone, security downgrades,
and duplicate-SSID/different-vendor - all evaluated against a user-curated
trusted-AP baseline (WIFICANARY_trusted_aps). A detection creates a
flagged Devices entry even for BSSIDs that never associate, per the
addendum on the same issue.
- WIFICANARY_TRUSTED_SECURITY is multi-select: an observed encryption
exactly matching any selected value is accepted; otherwise it's flagged
if weaker than the strongest selected value (deliberate - comparing
against the weakest would make multi-select pointless, since anything
at/above the weakest would silently pass regardless of the rest of the
selection).
- Added a "known device turned rogue" motor: escalate_known_devices()
cross-references each detection's BSSID against the Devices table via
the new DeviceInstance.getAllByMacs(). This covers the BSSID-identity
half of the issue #1789 addendum's motor 10; the deauth/probe-source-MAC
half still needs monitor-mode data this plugin doesn't have.
- Vendor is deliberately not looked up by this plugin - any device it
creates gets devVendor filled in for free by core's own vendor_update
plugin on its next pass.
43 wificanary unit tests + 10 DeviceInstance.getAllByMacs() tests, all
test_plugin_conventions.py checks pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011meLPKCzVpdZyAUfv5U6mm
