emdashes begone (#10847)

src/mesh/NextHopRouter.cpp

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ void NextHopRouter::sniffReceived(const meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, const meshtast
             meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *origTx = nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from);
             // Either relayer of ACK was also a relayer of the packet, or we were the *only* relayer and the ACK came
             // directly from the destination. checkRelayers is read-only on PacketHistory and O(1), so we run it even
-            // when origTx is absent — that lets us still capture the confirmed hop into the TMM overflow cache below.
+            // when origTx is absent - that lets us still capture the confirmed hop into the TMM overflow cache below.
             // Single lookup for both relayer checks on the same (request_id, to) pair
             bool wasAlreadyRelayer = false;
             bool weWereSoleRelayer = false;
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ void NextHopRouter::sniffReceived(const meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, const meshtast
             if ((weWereRelayer && wasAlreadyRelayer) || (getHopsAway(*p) == 0 && weWereSoleRelayer)) {
                 // M1/M2: only learn a next hop whose last byte maps to a single plausible relay. On a dense
                 // mesh the byte may be ambiguous; storing it would aim future DMs at the wrong node. This gate
-                // now protects BOTH the hot-store route (NodeInfoLite.next_hop) AND the TMM overflow cache —
+                // now protects BOTH the hot-store route (NodeInfoLite.next_hop) AND the TMM overflow cache -
                 // the overflow cache deliberately holds many more next-hop bytes (long-tail nodes), so it is
                 // even more collision-prone and must never store an ambiguous byte either. Ambiguous/unknown
                 // -> store nothing and keep flooding (safe).
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ bool NextHopRouter::perhapsRebroadcast(const meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
         if (p->id != 0) {
             if (isRebroadcaster()) {
                 // NOTE: this is a self-identity match (is the addressed next_hop OUR last byte?), so it
-                // cannot be hardened with resolveLastByte() — a remote node that legitimately shares our
+                // cannot be hardened with resolveLastByte() - a remote node that legitimately shares our
                 // last byte will also match here and rebroadcast. That residual collision needs a wider
                 // on-wire field to fix. M1/M2 instead shrink the blast radius by reducing how often an
                 // ambiguous next_hop byte is ever learned (sniffReceived) or originated (getNextHop).
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ int32_t NextHopRouter::doRetransmissions()
                 if (!isBroadcast(p.packet->to)) {
                     if (p.numRetransmissions == 1) {
                         // Last retransmission: this directed delivery went un-ACKed. Record the failure
-                        // (M3 — accumulates across DMs to age out a flapping/dead route) and reset
+                        // (M3 - accumulates across DMs to age out a flapping/dead route) and reset
                         // next_hop so the final try falls back to FloodingRouter.
                         noteRouteFailure(p.packet->to);
                         p.packet->next_hop = NO_NEXT_HOP_PREFERENCE;
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ int32_t NextHopRouter::doRetransmissions()
                     } else {
 #if NEXTHOP_EARLY_FLOOD_ON_UNVERIFIED
                         // M4 (gated): if the route isn't proven healthy, don't spend a second directed
-                        // attempt — start flooding one retry sooner to cut recovery latency. A verified
+                        // attempt - start flooding one retry sooner to cut recovery latency. A verified
                         // route (fresh, zero recent failures) keeps the unchanged directed-retry path so
                         // the sparse-mesh happy path is untouched.
                         RouteHealth *h = findRouteHealth(p.packet->to);