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39e7aa6a6c3f45fa22515cc3ff24aae75d687758
1374
Commits
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39e7aa6a6c |
Full T-echo card support + Compact UI (#11342)
* T-echo card * Update NRF52I2SOutput.cpp * Update NRF52I2SOutput.h * cleanup * Update buzz.cpp * use consistent runtime compact-panel check instead of mixing with compile-time macro * Update NodeDB.cpp * Update ExternalNotificationModule.cpp * switched to Throttle::isWithinTimespanMs * Update SharedUIDisplay.h * trunk fix * last cleanup * ClockRenderer.cpp for OLED_COMPACT_UI and setup Unit C6L for new UI. * Fixed regressions in standard OLED and TFT --------- Co-authored-by: Jason P <applewiz@mac.com> |
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98813fe79d |
Shared e-ink hardware layer: foundation for target-by-target migration off GxEPD2 (#11142)
* Add shared e-ink hardware layer (graphics/eink) alongside legacy drivers Foundation for a target-by-target migration off the GxEPD2-based EInkDisplay2/EInkDynamicDisplay/EInkParallelDisplay stack: - src/graphics/eink/: chipset drivers, panel profiles, backlight helper (promoted from the InkHUD driver set, shared by BaseUI and InkHUD) - src/graphics/BaseUIEInkDisplay: OLEDDisplay adapter driving the new layer, with EINK_* compat macros matching EInkDynamicDisplay - [niche] build helper in platformio.ini; graphics/eink/ excluded from arduino_base so unconverted targets are unaffected - Screen/CannedMessageModule dispatch between the two stacks per env - InkHUD-specific touch code in TouchScreenImpl1 guarded with MESHTASTIC_INCLUDE_INKHUD (no-op today, required once BaseUI variants define MESHTASTIC_INCLUDE_NICHE_GRAPHICS without InkHUD) No variant is converted and no legacy file is removed; every existing env builds identical firmware. * Fix clang-format comment alignment in Screen.cpp * Address review findings in the e-ink driver layer - Screen.cpp: exclude InkHUD builds from all NicheGraphics BaseUI guards - BaseUIEInkDisplay: size the OLEDDisplay buffer from its actual indexing - EInkParallel: defer update() while an async refresh is in flight, honor the selected clear mode in the async task, never delete a live task - ED047TC1: clean up on failed initPanel, fix inverted bbepI2CWrite checks - UC8175: drop bogus 0x12 soft reset (0x12 is display refresh on UC8175) - LCMEN2R13EFC1: guard absent reset pin, bound the busy wait - SSD16XX/SSD1682: build the RAM window from the instance, not statics - Doc corrections in driver banners and Drivers/README * SSD16XX/SSD1682: send inclusive Y-end address (height - 1) * LCMEN213EFC1: adopt the shared wait timeout / fail-through pattern wait() now bounds the busy poll via Throttle and sets the EInk failed flag on timeout; sendCommand/sendData fail through like the SSD16XX and UC8175 drivers. EInk::runOnce clears the flag after the failed cycle. |
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9e60b23334 | Targeted build fixes, especially Heltec T1 (#11345) | ||
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8c0ef44b0b |
Add one wire i2c bridge support (#10078)
* First version of DS248X bridge * Add first iteration of DS248X sensor * Supports single readings on DS2484 * Supports readings on ch0 for DS2484_800 * Detection of variant for DS248X * Minor fix on retries for sensor init * Allow multiple channel detect passes on 8-ch version * Always read temperature via ROM matching * Small comment to show how to send all channels * Minor logging changes * Prevent one-wire double definitions * Detect ROMs per round * Fix comment * Prevent skipping on DS2482 ALT3 check * Fix comment (again) * Fix style checks * Remove comment for multiple measurements * Address CodeRabbit review findings on DS248X sensor Set _variant on every detectVariant path and branch on the member, so a failed variant probe retries instead of falling into single-channel init. Search DS2482-800 channels into a scratch buffer so a transient one-wire failure cannot erase a ROM found on an earlier pass, and count channels that already hold a ROM. Check every one-wire return value in readTemperatureROM, validate the scratchpad CRC, and return DS248X_INVALID_TEMPERATURE on failure so the existing sentinel checks reject failed reads instead of reporting stale or uninitialised data. * Probe IIS2MDCTR WHO_AM_I before the DS248X status check At HMC5883L_ADDR the DS248X probe reads 0xF0. On the IIS2MDCTR that sub-address sets auto-increment and targets 0x70, which is reserved and returns an unspecified value; any of bits 0x02, 0x04 or 0x10 makes the probe claim the magnetometer as a DS2482. Reading the WHO_AM_I at 0x4F first is deterministic for both parts. A DS2482 does not acknowledge 0x4F, an invalid command code, and leaves its read pointer untouched, so the subsequent read returns Status, Configuration, Channel Selection or Read Data. None of those can hold 0x40 at scan time, so the DS248X probe still runs and detects it. This also restores develop's detection order and matches the structure already used at BMA423_ADDR: specific ID match, then probe, then the generic fallback. * Read only the reported channel in getMetrics getMetrics walked all eight DS2482-800 channels, but only channel 0 is ever written into the measurement. Each populated channel costs a blocking 750ms conversion inside readTemperatureROM, so a fully wired bridge stalled telemetry for roughly 6s per cycle and discarded seven of the eight readings. Channels without a sensor were already cheap thanks to the isValidROM guard, so this only affects boards that actually use more than one channel, which is the reason to fit a DS2482-800 in the first place. Multi-channel reporting is handled separately in #10192; a note records that it should start the conversion on every channel before waiting, rather than reading each channel end to end. * Trim DS248X comments to one line each --------- Co-authored-by: Thomas Göttgens <tgoettgens@gmail.com> |
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5792e8751b |
Fix PMSA003 Enables on RAK4631 (#11331)
* Minor fix for PMSA003I * Remove class from State, make state verbose, sleep after init * Minor changes to gate some ifdefs and state class * Make decision tree explicit in AQ Telemetry. Also enable on phone * Minor change in comment * Fix issue staying on if failed enable. Minor change in log |
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4b4e82bd72 |
SenseCAP Indicator: RP2040 peripherals for the main firmware (#6220)
* indicator: RP2040 peripherals for the main firmware The SenseCAP Indicator RP2040 co-processor serves as a generic peripheral bridge over a serial protobuf link (interdevice.proto): - FakeI2C implements TwoWire and tunnels write and read transactions, so the standard sensor drivers and the I2C scan work unmodified on the bridged second bus (WIRE1) - FakeUART forwards GPS NMEA to the regular GPS driver - SD card access with chunked file transfers, paged directory listings and card statistics; device-ui loads map tiles and map styles from the card behind the RP2040 - link at 2M baud with 4KB chunks, message structs kept off task stacks Log messages carrying their own bracket tag render it like a thread name. Replaces the earlier IndicatorSensor/COBS approach. * indicator: address review Correlate responses with request ids, serialize the shared TX buffer, reject oversized frames, fix RX buffer overflow and NMEA truncation, full-length file paths. * indicator: assign the GPS FakeUART at runtime Static initialization order across translation units is undefined, so createGps() assigns and null-checks the bridged serial instead. Bound the NMEA length defensively. * indicator: bump device-ui pin to 27e6c0c * indicator: ping/pong link probe, non-blocking runOnce, FakeI2C locking The RP2040 sends nothing unsolicited without a GPS module attached, so wait_ready now probes with the new ping message instead of listening passively. runOnce skips its pump while a requester holds link_lock, keeping the main loop from blocking for a full request timeout. FakeI2C serializes transactions between the UI task and the main loop with an owner-tracked lock held from beginTransmission to transaction end. * indicator: link resync, config-honoring GPS, bridged-bus routing, stats validity Frame resync scans to the next magic instead of flushing the RX buffer, and the pump handles all buffered frames per pass. The RX drain reads in bulk and the protobuf encoder gets the correct buffer bound. GPS honors the gps_mode setting on the Indicator instead of always running. RTC, I2C keyboard and motion sensor drivers resolve WIRE1 through ScanI2CTwoWire::fetchI2CBus so bridged buses reach the right transport. FakeUART implements flush/availableForWrite/const-write from the Stream contract and fences its cross-core ring buffer. SdCardInfo.stats_valid is passed through to device-ui, and the remote FS backend gains the remove operation used for cleanup of failed tile saves. * indicator: retry lost link round trips, I2CResult UNSPECIFIED Remote FS operations retry once on a transport timeout. Correlation ids drop late responses of the first attempt; a retried append whose first attempt landed is recognized by the offset conflict carrying the resulting file size. Definitive failures are not retried, missing-tile probes stay a single round trip. Regenerated bindings add the I2CResult.Status UNSPECIFIED zero value so an empty result cannot decode as success. * indicator: nack responses, rename bridge classes to I2CProxy/UARTProxy A request the co-processor cannot decode or handle is nacked, so the requester fails fast instead of burning its timeout. All requests stage the shared tx_message under link_lock. FakeI2C and FakeUART are renamed to I2CProxy and UARTProxy after the pattern they implement, with their instances following suit. Drops dead code (unused NO_NEWS_PAUSE, unreachable not-running branches, doubled include guards) and the GPS pin log line that is meaningless on the tunneled port. * indicator: refuse a co-processor that speaks another protocol version The ping/pong handshake now carries InterdeviceVersion. A pong reporting a version other than ours means the RP2040 runs firmware that does not match this build, so the bridge stays shut down for the session and the mismatch is logged with both versions. Requests fail fast instead of being misinterpreted by the other side. * indicator: regen protos, interdevice protocol version 2 * indicator: per-task I2C contexts, gated handshake, retryable link failures The bridged I2C bus is shared between the main loop and the UI task, and TwoWire has no transaction bracket a lock can span: drivers drain the read buffer with available()/read() long after requestFrom() returned. Each calling task therefore gets its own staging and read buffers instead of a lock that could be left held (or that could not protect the read buffer anyway). The transaction is staged inside the link, under its lock. No request is sent before the co-processor has completed the version handshake, and runOnce keeps probing until it does, so a co-processor that boots slowly or reboots on its watchdog no longer leaves the bridge dead for the session. Requests in flight are counted, not flagged: two threads can be in a request and the first one out must not clear the other's state. File operations are retried on a lost frame and on a co-processor busy with card maintenance, but not on a refusal (nack) or a definitive failure, and they release the SPI lock while they wait so a slow link does not starve the radio. * indicator: fail safe on a peer mismatch, wait out card maintenance FileStatus moved to a fresh tag: reusing the tag of the removed success flag made every failure status decode as success on a peer that predates it. A card being mounted (busy) is retried rather than reported as an empty slot, and a co-processor busy with card maintenance is waited out: mounting takes seconds and the free space scan of a large card walks its whole FAT, which is not a reason to report a missing tile. The bridged I2C bus releases the SPI lock as well, so the keyboard scan on the UI task cannot starve the radio either. Slot claims in the I2C proxy are atomic, NMEA is not sent to a peer we refuse to talk to, and the handshake is completed by the unsolicited ping the co-processor sends when it has booted, which also reports a reboot. * indicator: regen protos, FileStatus back on the original tags * indicator: regen protos, ping/pong carry the InterdeviceVersion enum * indicator: point the protobufs submodule at the merged interdevice protos * indicator: pin device-ui to the branch with the remote SD support * indicator: honor the txOnly flag of flush, report dropped GPS writes flush() through a Stream pointer discarded the receive buffer: the flag is txOnly, and HardwareSerial::flush() keeps what has been received. write() reported bytes as written even when the link refused to send them. The link probe uses Throttle for its rate limit. * indicator: decide the log tag on the formatted message, hex request ids The thread tag was suppressed based on the printf template, which disagrees with the rendered message it is compared against: a format starting with a conversion could produce two tags, and one without a trailing bracket-space lost the tag entirely. vprintf now receives the thread name and picks. Also shifts only the bytes actually buffered after a frame, throttles with Throttle and logs request ids as hex. * indicator: SD mount, eject and format commands over the link * indicator: bound how long a busy card state blocks the UI task * indicator: a busy co-processor must not block the UI task for ever The busy retry re-armed its own budget on every busy answer, so a co-processor that stayed busy kept the caller in the loop with no way out. Transport retries and the wait for a busy card are now separate budgets that only count down. * indicator: start each request from an aligned receive buffer A byte run lost mid-response (a UART overflow during a 4KB tile chunk, when the display starves the RX interrupt) misaligns the assembly buffer. The buffer was never reset, so the poison outlived the request and cascaded into the following chunks of the same tile: one glitch dropped a whole multi-chunk tile, while single-chunk tiles resynced in the idle gap and survived. Each request now flushes the buffer first, bounding a glitch to the one chunk it hit. Adds resync/decode/timeout counters, logged rarely, to see the rate. * indicator: enlarge the LVGL heap for low-zoom map tiles The heap was 3MB and the image cache reserves 1.5MB of it, so a low-zoom map tile could not find a large enough contiguous block to decode and rendered white. 5MB of the 8MB PSRAM fixes it with room to spare. * indicator: advance the device-ui and protobufs pins to the merged commits Point the protobufs submodule at the merged SD command protos (protobufs #986) so it matches the checked in interdevice sources, and bump the device-ui archive to the current indicator branch tip that carries the SD button and format UI. * Update device-ui library dependency URL * remove cutom sdkconfig * remove duplicated synchronisation (after PR11278 is in place) * set commit reference to updated RemoteSDService class * Add board_level configuration for release * fix cppcheck errors --------- Co-authored-by: Manuel <71137295+mverch67@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: CodeRabbit <noreply@coderabbit.ai> Co-authored-by: mverch67 <manuel.verch@gmx.de> |
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85c1bd4836 |
Address STM32 cppcheck warnings (#11314)
- Suppress GenericThreadModule warning when DEBUG_MUTE - Suppress warning stemming from check_skip_packages - Cast pointers to uint32_t before subtracting to avoid cppcheck warning |
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e26b6bfc5a |
TMM & Warmstore key source naming (#11119)
* one becomes two * warmstore clarify * Address PR review: key-provenance terminology consistency - Log line now says "not key-proven" (gate is XEdDSA OR manual, not just signer) - Rename markKeySignerProvenForTest -> markKeyXeddsaSignedForTest (sets only the XEdDSA bit) - Docs + test comments: "signer bit" -> "XEdDSA-signed bit" clod helped too * Rename signer-proven -> key-proven for broadened provenance predicate Address PR #11119 review: the copyPublicKey()/copyUser() out-parameter and the cache-path replay gate now report entry->keyProven() (XEdDSA-signed OR manually verified), so the "signerProven" name and "signer-proven" comments were misleading. Rename the public out-param to keyProven, the local cachedKeySignerProven to cachedKeyProven, and update coupled callers, log strings, docs headings, and comments to say "key-proven". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * nitpicks --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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6367132919 |
Fix the NMEA checksum offset and harden the buffer writes around it (#11293)
* Checksum NMEA sentences from the $ delimiter The PositionLite printWPL() format begins with a CRLF, so the fixed start offset of 1 folded the newline and the $ into the checksum and every sentence went out with a wrong value. Locate the $ instead and stop at the terminator or a \*. * Clamp truncated writes and harden the remaining fixed buffers snprintf returns the length it would have written, so a truncated NMEA sentence made buf + len point past the buffer and bufsz - len underflow into a huge size for the checksum append. Clamp after each write. Also pulls in the rest of #11236: the two remaining Dropzone sprintf calls, the dead strcpy in mt_sprintf that wrote one byte past a zero-size allocation for an empty format, and the 10-byte errcode buffer that INT32_MIN overflows. Co-Authored-By: Andrew Yong <me@ndoo.sg> * Bail out on a zero-sized buffer and cast err for %ld snprintf writes nothing at all when bufsz is 0, not even a terminator, so the checksum helper would run strchr over whatever the buffer already held. Return before touching it. int32_t is not long on every target, so cast before formatting with %ld. Co-Authored-By: Andrew Yong <me@ndoo.sg> * Add NMEA sentence regression tests Covers checksum computation from the $ delimiter for both printWPL overloads and printGGA, zero-sized buffers, and truncated buffers down to one byte. Co-Authored-By: Andrew Yong <me@ndoo.sg> * Tighten checksum parsing and pin the WPL fixture checksum Require exactly two hex digits followed by the sentence terminator, and assert both WPL overloads against a known checksum instead of comparing them to each other. * Bump native suite count to 43 --------- Co-authored-by: Andrew Yong <me@ndoo.sg> |
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daf1213580 |
Licensed channel defaults, phone map growth, and payload read bounds (#11286)
* Strip the default PSK when licensed defaults are installed * Only record rate-limited portnums from the phone * Bound payload reads by the received size |
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df6e67f70b |
Signing and ingress hardening (#11282)
* Include warm-tier signers in the identity update gate * Fail the send when PKI encryption fails * Require signatures on licensed unicasts * Include warm-tier signers in the NodeInfo downgrade drop * Clamp hop fields on UDP multicast ingress * Address review comments on signing hardening Condense the updateUser rationale to two lines and stop calling the Balanced-mode drop a broadcast now that licensed unicasts reach it. |
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2024bb8384 |
Arrival time fix perhaps (#11274)
* Add explicit presence for MeshPacket.rx_time (arrival time) rx_time is now proto3 optional with a has_rx_time presence bit, matching the rx_rssi treatment. A node with no GPS and no phone connected yet has no time source at all, so a bare 0 was indistinguishable from a genuine 1970-01-01 reading; downstream consumers (replay packets, JSON serialization) now check has_rx_time instead of the value. * Dedupe rx_time stamping into a shared helper; trim a debug log string Extract the repeated haveTime/rx_time/has_rx_time stamp logic (5 call sites across Router.cpp, MeshBeaconModule.cpp, MeshService.cpp) into Router::computeRxTimeStamp()/stampRxTime(). Also shorten the new RTC.cpp LOG_DEBUG string. Saves 48 bytes of flash on rak4631 (measured), no behavior change. * Fix has_rx_rssi presence carried unconditionally through StoreForward replay preparePayload() set has_rx_rssi = true unconditionally on replay, regardless of whether the packet's rx_rssi at store time was a genuine measurement (e.g. MQTT-relayed packets carry no real RSSI). Store the presence bit alongside rx_rssi in PacketHistoryStruct and restore it on replay instead. Flagged by Copilot on #11271 (same root cause the has_rx_time explicit presence work fixes) but never addressed before that PR merged. * Trim comment blocks to the repo's 1-2 line guideline .github/copilot-instructions.md:338 caps code comments at 1-2 lines; several blocks added across the rx_time explicit-presence work ran well past that. Also consolidates Time.cpp's file-level doc comment into Time.h, where the rest of the Time:: API contract already lives. No behavior change. * Add rx_time explicit-presence test coverage - test_meshpacket_serializer: has_rx_time=false fixture plus tests asserting JsonSerialize/JsonSerializeEncrypted emit 0 rather than leaking the millis() placeholder, alongside the has_rx_time=true baseline. - test_stream_api: two tests driving a real PhoneAPI handshake (want_config_id through STATE_SEND_PACKETS) that simulate a phone time-giving transaction arriving before vs. after a queued packet is drained - covering both the reconciled and the ships-with-placeholder-absent paths of MeshService::reconcilePendingRxTimes(). * Fix three correctness issues flagged in review - Time.h: drop the reserved-identifier include guard (_MT_TIME_H); pragma once already covers it, matching convention elsewhere (e.g. RTC.h). - Time.cpp: rebase getMillis64()'s wrap accumulator when the test seam swaps clock sources, so a real<->injected clock jump isn't miscounted as a genuine 32-bit wrap. - NodeInfoModule: the 12h reply-suppression window is a local dedup duration, not a wall-clock reading - switch it to Time::getMillis64() so RTC-quality jumps and replayed packets' stale rx_time can't perturb it. - StoreForwardModule: has_rx_time was derived from *current* RTC quality at replay time rather than stored at capture time, so a history entry saved while time-blind could be misreported as a valid epoch once the clock later improved. Persist the presence bit in PacketHistoryStruct instead. * tryfix CI * post review fixes * more test fixes |
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0fef83d434 |
Add configurable event mode hop limit (#11275)
* feat: resolve event mode hop limit * feat: bake event mode hop limit * fix: honor event mode hop cap in routing * docs: expose event mode hop limit preference * fix: enforce event hop defaults across routing * docs: clarify event hop override behavior * refactor: simplify event mode hop preference * fix: cap equal event hop limit |
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d87cbec45b | Remove esp32c6 guard precluding NonBlockingRTTTL (#11273) | ||
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2c57a17124 |
Phantom node fix perhaps (#11271)
* trying to fix phantom nodes * fix comment spam * oops - missed one |
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a8623a60c5 |
Stream our own position to the phone/UI while mesh position sharing is opt-in (#11270)
* Position: stream our own position to the phone/UI while mesh sharing is opt-in Position broadcasts became opt-in in 2.8 (#10929): with every public channel at position_precision 0, sendOurPosition() finds no eligible channel and returns without queueing anything, so the connected phone or on-device UI never sees the node's own GPS fix ("GPS looks dead" on standalone MUI devices even though the receiver has a lock). Mirror device telemetry's local delivery: once a minute, when the toPhone queue is idle, stream our own position to the connected client at full precision. The packet is handed straight to sendToPhone() and never touches the mesh, so the per-channel opt-in and the public-channel precision clamp still govern everything on the air. Also stop logging "Send pos ... to mesh" before the channel scan has found an eligible channel; when sharing is disabled everywhere the skip is now logged explicitly instead of pretending a send happened. The cadence gate is a pure static (shouldSendPositionToPhone) alongside the existing broadcast-policy helpers, with unit tests covering the first-send, cadence, gating, and millis() rollover cases. * Review: only advance phone cadence on a queued packet; drop the ms==0 sentinel sendOurPositionToPhone() now reports whether a packet actually reached the phone queue, and runOnce() stamps the cadence only on success, so a guard or allocation failure retries on the next tick instead of waiting out a minute. The never-sent state is a dedicated hasSentPositionToPhone flag rather than lastPhoneSendMs == 0, so a send stamped exactly at millis() == 0 still holds the cadence. New regression test covers that case; existing cases updated to the explicit flag. * Review: align the rollover test fixture with its documented elapsed times lastSent now sits exactly 30,000 ms before the uint32 wrap, so the two cases are precisely 70,000 ms (sends) and 40,000 ms (held) - the previous comments claimed 70s/20s against actual elapsed values of 70,001/40,001 ms. |
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80f972655d |
Null-check reply allocations in allocErrorResponse and RemoteHardware (#11260)
allocAckNak returns nullptr when the packet pool is exhausted, but allocErrorResponse passed the result straight to setReplyTo, which dereferences it. Reachable unauthenticated: an ADMIN_APP packet on a known-key channel takes the NOT_AUTHORIZED path, so a flood that empties the pool crashes the node. MemoryDynamic::alloc no longer aborting on failure made this reachable on PSRAM, STM32WL and Portduino targets. Callers already treat a null reply as no response. Same fix for the two RemoteHardwareModule sites. |
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ae16c052d5 |
Time out an abandoned admin edit transaction (#11254)
begin_edit_settings sets a bool that only the matching commit ever clears. If the commit never arrives -- the client dropped its link partway through a bulk config import, or went away entirely -- the transaction stays open indefinitely, and every later config write from any client is applied to RAM, acknowledged, and then never saved. The writes look successful and are visible in get_config, but the node reverts all of them at the next boot, and only a reboot clears it. Give the transaction a one minute idle timeout. Each deferred write restarts the clock, so the window bounds the gap between writes rather than the length of the edit; a bulk import sends them milliseconds apart. The next admin message after it lapses retires the transaction, persisting the segments it had deferred and flushing the warnings it was holding. The check runs after the auth gates and before the switch, so every case sees consistent state and the recovery's flash write happens in the main loop rather than a disconnect callback. It saves rather than rolls back because there is nothing to roll back to: each write already took effect in RAM and was acknowledged, so the transaction only ever deferred the save. That also makes an early expiry cheap -- the worst case for a client that really was still going is that its remaining writes are saved individually instead of batched. Closing on disconnect instead was tempting, but the reporter's captures show iOS dropping and reconnecting within half a second several times per session, which would abort imports that currently survive the blip. Also drops the file-scope hasOpenEditTransaction, shadowed by the class member at every use site and referenced nowhere else in the tree. Reported in #11245 |
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f61f65891c |
fix(promicro): exclude emoji to fit under the warm-store region (#11256)
nrf52_promicro_diy_tcxo has been failing the nrf52 warm-region guard on develop: the image ends at 0xEA0C0, 192 bytes past the 12 KB WarmNodeStore record-ring reserved at 0xEA000. This variant compiles four radio driver families (SX126x/LLCC68, SX127x/RF95, LR11x0/LR1121, LR2021) so any module can be soldered on, which makes it the largest nrf52 image we ship. Building it with -D EXCLUDE_EMOJI saves 6,808 bytes and puts the image at 0xE8618, 6.6 KB clear of the warm region. EXCLUDE_EMOJI was not previously usable: graphics::emotes[] becomes empty, but the canned-message emote picker never checked for that. Entering the picker clamped emotePickerIndex to numEmotes - 1 (i.e. -1), and selecting read emotes[-1].label into a String - an out-of-bounds read of whatever precedes the array in flash. Guard both entry points instead: refuse to open the picker when there are no emotes, and bounce back to freetext if the picker state is somehow reached anyway. Under whole-image LTO those guards fold to constants, so the picker draw and input paths dead-strip entirely on builds that set EXCLUDE_EMOJI - which is where the savings come from beyond the bitmap data itself. Received messages containing emoji render as text on this variant, and the emote-list key is a no-op. Verified rak4631 (emoji enabled) is unaffected: 0xE46D8, 22 KB clear. |
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1e982fa78c |
Sign plaintext packets in licensed mode (#10969)
* feat: sign licensed plaintext packets Preserve and publish identity keys in licensed mode so existing XEdDSA signatures can authenticate plaintext traffic. Sign licensed broadcasts and direct messages when they fit, while keeping PKI encryption disabled and normal routing behavior unchanged. * fix(security): persist licensed channel sanitation * fix(security): close licensed migration lifecycle gaps * fix(security): address licensed signing review feedback * test: restore signing globals from Unity teardown * fix(baseui): allow confirmed ham region selection * fix(baseui): guard region picker validation * style: trunk fmt --------- Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Austin <vidplace7@gmail.com> |
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5c5cb094e6 |
fix(admin): stop the admin dispatcher from overflowing the ESP32 loopTask stack (#11239)
AdminModule::handleReceivedProtobuf carried a 3008-byte stack frame - 37% of the 8 KB Arduino loopTask stack. GCC inlines the eight handleGet* helpers into it, each of which builds a whole meshtastic_AdminMessage (480 B), so the dispatcher reserved a slot for every one of them at once even though only one case ever runs. Two more full AdminMessages lived directly in the function. That left any admin write short of stack for what runs beneath it: NodeDB::saveToDisk -> saveProto -> pb_encode -> SafeFile -> LittleFS -> flash. On heltec-v4 the canary fired at 7824 of 8192 bytes while writing /prefs/config.proto, so no setting ever persisted and the device rebooted. Mark the response builders NOINLINE and move the module-API and observer responses into their own functions. Pure refactor; measured on heltec-v4 the dispatcher frame drops 3008 -> 384 bytes, taking the crashing path from 368 bytes of headroom to 2992. Fixes #11237 |
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8e104a909b |
fix(admin): persist TAK module config (team color / member role) (#11216)
Setting TAK team/role ACKed and rebooted but stored nothing: handleSetModuleConfig had no tak case, saveToDisk never set has_tak, and handleGetModuleConfig had no TAK_CONFIG case. Add all three, plus a native suite sweeping every ModuleConfig submessage through set -> save -> load -> get and a TAK value-fidelity suite. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9e529da460 | replace screens with unique_ptr (#11163) | ||
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cad3a3a5c7 |
Always exclude range test
Range test is excluded on every target as of 2.8, so set MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_RANGETEST=1 globally in [env] build_flags and drop the now-redundant per-variant flags from esp32, rak11200 and stm32. Guard RangeTestModule.cpp with the same condition used in Modules.cpp so the translation unit compiles to nothing rather than relying on --gc-sections to strip it, and always report RANGETEST_CONFIG in the device metadata excluded_modules bitmask so clients hide the config. |
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c6669a4ed8 |
Merge pull request #11128 from RCGV1/agent/keyverification-allocation-safety
keyverification: handle response allocation failure |
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72aac12b8d | Merge branch 'develop' into agent/keyverification-allocation-safety | ||
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d195ec6748 | fix(security): round-trip packet policy defaults | ||
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dbe41e42a1 | keyverification: handle response allocation failure | ||
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e11635baa2 | Merge branch 'develop' into codex/packet-auth-policy | ||
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d587f08481 |
Pin admin responses to the stored peer key and request id (#11092)
* Pin admin responses to the stored peer key and request id noteOutgoingAdminRequest derived its PKC pin from p.public_key, which nothing populates on the outgoing path, so keyValid was false for every client request and the pin never engaged. The accepted-response predicate reduced to an unauthenticated from plus variant and subtype. Resolve the destination key from NodeDB the way perhapsEncode does, and pin it only when the request would actually be PKC-encrypted. Extract that condition from perhapsEncode as wouldEncryptWithPKC so both use one predicate. Also record the request's packet id and require the response to echo it. * Treat a zero request id as no pairing token |
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7d954e668d |
Merge branch 'develop' into codex/packet-auth-policy
Resolve conflicts against the NodeDB signer/key primitives (#11050) and the admin-key PKI decrypt budget (#11100). - NodeDB: drop this branch's hasSeenXeddsaSigner in favour of develop's isKnownXeddsaSigner. They answer the same question, but develop's reads the dedicated warm signer bit (warmSignerOf) rather than the WarmProtected category, and TrafficManagementModule already depends on it. Keep develop's copyPublicKey/copyPublicKeyAuthoritative, isVerifiedSignerForKey and commitRemoteKey/KeyCommitTrust. - checkXeddsaReceivePolicy: keep this branch's Strict/Balanced/Compatible policy, which is a superset of develop's balanced-only downgrade gate, and call isKnownXeddsaSigner from it. develop's !pki_encrypted term is dropped because the policy returns early for PKI packets before that check. - perhapsDecode: keep develop's key resolution (NodeDB then pending-key, only for real PKI candidates) plus its admin-key token bucket, and re-apply this branch's pkiAttempted flag feeding the DECODE_OPAQUE verdict. Keep both passesRoutingAuthGate and adminKeyFallbackAllowed/Refund. - test_A17: model eviction the way NodeDB actually does it, passing the warm signer bit as well as the XeddsaSigner category, since isKnownXeddsaSigner reads the former. Native suite: 38 suites, 743/743 cases, no sanitizer findings. |
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1872e5b306 |
TMM extend to ephemeral 3rd tier store (#11050)
* Harden TMM NodeInfo direct-response: staleness, key hygiene, throttle The NodeInfo direct-response path answered queries on behalf of other nodes from an unauthenticated, never-expiring cache while suppressing the genuine request (STOP). That let a long-gone or forged identity be served as a fresh-looking, authoritative reply indefinitely. Three fixes: - Staleness gate: refuse to spoof a reply for a node not actually heard within ~6h (PSRAM cache via lastObservedMs; NodeDB fallback via sinceLastSeen, which tolerates last_heard==0 when the clock is unset). A stale entry now falls through so the real request propagates instead of being answered for a dead node. - Key hygiene: mirror NodeDB::updateUser() PKI checks when caching overheard NodeInfo - reject a packet advertising our own public key, and pin keys (drop a NodeInfo whose key mismatches an already-known key from NodeDB or from our own cache). Prevents cache poisoning / key substitution via the spoofed-reply path. - Response throttle: at most one spoofed reply per target node per 30s. Direct responses bypass the per-sender rate limiter (they STOP the request first) and the reply target is attacker-controlled, so this bounds airtime exhaustion and reflected floods. Recorded in a new NodeInfoPayloadEntry.lastResponseMs (PSRAM; self-expiring timestamp compare, no sweep needed). Tests: native NodeDB-fallback staleness (stale drops, fresh serves) plus PSRAM-guarded staleness, throttle, and key-mismatch cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Add TODO(T1-T9) markers for code-review findings on NodeInfo hardening Comment-only. Tags each site flagged in the review of the direct-response throttle/staleness/key-hygiene change so the follow-ups are visible in-context: T1 throttle black-holes distinct requestors; T2 per-target key doesn't bound aggregate TX; T3 non-PSRAM fallback unthrottled; T4 millis-wrap defeats the staleness gate; T5 redundant second O(n) scan for the throttle stamp; T6 duplicated 32-byte key compares; T7 sinceLastSeen() called twice; T8 two 6h constants can desync; T9 clockMs()==0 collides with the 0 sentinel. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Address code-review cleanups T6, T7, T8 in NodeInfo direct-response T8: derive kNodeInfoMaxServeAgeSecs from kNodeInfoMaxServeAgeMs so the PSRAM and NodeDB-fallback staleness windows cannot desync. T6: collapse the three duplicated 32-byte key compares in cacheNodeInfoPacket (owner-impersonation + NodeDB pin + cache TOFU pin) into one pubKeysEqual() helper, so the compare lives in one place. T7: compute sinceLastSeen(node) once on the fallback staleness path so the tested age and the logged age cannot diverge (it calls getTime() each time). Remaining review items still marked in-code: T1/T2/T3 (throttle design), T4/T9 (millis-wrap + 0-sentinel), T5 (redundant throttle-stamp scan). Native test_traffic_management suite: 48/48 passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Throttle the NodeDB fallback direct-response path (T3) The per-target NodeInfo response throttle lived only in the PSRAM NodeInfoPayloadEntry, so non-PSRAM boards - which answer from the NodeDB fallback path - emitted spoofed direct replies with no rate limit at all, leaving the airtime/reflection surface the throttle exists to close. Add a single module-global fallback stamp (nodeInfoFallbackLastResponseMs, 4 bytes, guarded by cacheLock) that throttles the fallback path to one spoofed reply per window across all targets. Coarser than the PSRAM per-target throttle, but the fallback path has no per-node slot to stamp, and a global cap still bounds spoofed transmissions - which is the point. Add a native test exercising the fallback throttle window. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Make NodeInfo staleness/throttle wrap- and sentinel-safe (T4, T9) T9: the millis-based fields that use 0 as a "never" sentinel (lastObservedMs, lastResponseMs, nodeInfoFallbackLastResponseMs) could be stamped with a literal 0 during the one-millisecond clockMs()==0 instant at each ~49.7-day wrap, momentarily colliding with the sentinel and disabling the staleness/throttle gate for that entry. Route all such stamps through a new nowStampMs() that maps 0 -> 1; the 1 ms skew is irrelevant to every window these fields feed. T4: the staleness gate's modular age compare is only unambiguous while true age < 2^32 ms (~49.7 days); an entry that lingered unrefreshed that long could wrap to a small age and read as fresh, defeating the gate. Add a NodeInfo eviction pass to the maintenance sweep that drops entries past the serve window, so an entry is removed long before its age can approach the wrap boundary. This also frees slots holding stale identities. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Stamp PSRAM throttle entry by captured index, not a rescan (T5) The post-send throttle stamp did a second full O(n) scan of the PSRAM NodeInfo array under a fresh lock, even though findNodeInfoEntry() had already located the slot at the top of shouldRespondToNodeInfo(). Capture the slot index during that initial lookup and address the entry directly on the stamp path. Because the cache lock is released between the two accesses, the slot could have been evicted or reused, so re-validate node == p->to under the lock before stamping. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Document accepted per-target throttle tradeoffs (T1, T2) Convert the T1/T2 TODO markers into a NOTE: the per-target PSRAM throttle keying and its lack of an aggregate bound are deliberate design choices, not pending work. A distinct requestor being throttled for one window is harmless on a redundant mesh, and keeping the PSRAM path per-target preserves throughput for legitimate multi-target responders (the fallback path already bounds aggregate via its global stamp). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Track signed-provenance of cached NodeInfo public keys Add keySignerProven to NodeInfoPayloadEntry, set when an observed NODEINFO frame's XEdDSA signature was verified (mp.xeddsa_signed). This distinguishes a trust-on-first-use key from one proven to belong to a signer. The flag is monotonic - once proven it stays proven, and the existing key-pin checks forbid the underlying key from changing - so a later unsigned frame cannot downgrade it. A signature can only be verified against a key we already held, so a first-contact key is always TOFU until a later signed frame upgrades it. Groundwork for using the TMM cache as a last-resort public-key source, where this flag serves as a trust tier. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Draw public keys from the TMM NodeInfo cache as a last resort Add TrafficManagementModule::copyPublicKey() and consult it from NodeDB::copyPublicKey() after the hot (NodeInfoLite) and warm (WarmNodeStore) tiers miss. This extends the pool of peers the node can encrypt to: a key the NodeInfo direct-response cache overheard for a node that has since aged out of both NodeDB tiers can still be used. The getter reports whether the key is signer-proven or trust-on-first-use. NodeDB serves TOFU keys here too - the same first-contact trust NodeDB already applies in updateUser() - so the pool actually expands to new long-tail nodes rather than only re-confirming known keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Retain keyed NodeInfo entries as a pubkey pool; trust-tier eviction Now that NodeDB::copyPublicKey() draws keys from the NodeInfo cache, the flat 6 h serve-window eviction would discard useful keys the moment a node stops being servable. Split retention: an entry carrying a 32-byte public key is kept for kNodeInfoKeyRetentionMs (7 d), while a keyless entry still expires at the serve window. Both windows stay well under the ~49.7-day millis wrap, preserving the T4 wrap-safety guarantee. Make LRU victim selection trust-tiered to match: a keyless slot is sacrificed before any keyed one, and a trust-on-first-use key before a signer-proven key; within a tier the oldest loses. Mirrors WarmNodeStore's keyed-first admission so the most valuable keys are the stickiest under memory pressure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Test signed-provenance flag and copyPublicKey key-pool source PSRAM-gated tests (run on the ESP32 build, alongside the existing NodeInfo PSRAM tests): - copyPublicKey serves a TOFU key learned from an unsigned NodeInfo and reports signerProven=false - a later signature-verified NodeInfo upgrades provenance to signer-proven while the pinned key bytes stay unchanged - copyPublicKey reports a miss for an uncached node Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Inherit signer provenance from NodeDB when caching a re-found node When the TrafficManagement NodeInfo cache re-caches a node, mark its key signer-proven if NodeDB already knows the node as a verified signer for that same key - even if this particular (unicast/unsigned) frame carried no signature. Previously the flag only upgraded on a frame we verified ourselves, so a node we had already proven elsewhere looked TOFU here. Add NodeDB::isVerifiedSignerForKey(), which checks both tiers - the hot store's signed bitfield and the warm tier's cached signer bit - and requires the key to match so a rotated/mismatched key never inherits a stale verdict. Add WarmNodeStore::isVerifiedSigner() to expose the warm signer bit (the rebase onto develop added the bit itself; this surfaces it for lookups). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Lock NodeInfoPayloadEntry packing with a size assert keySignerProven cost zero bytes: sourceChannel, the two bools, and decodedBitfield are four 1-byte fields that fill a single 4-byte tail word (struct alignment is 4), so the flag consumed former padding rather than growing the 2000-entry PSRAM array. Add a static_assert pinning the entry to sizeof(meshtastic_User) + 20 so a future 5th trailing byte - which would open a fresh word (~8 KB PSRAM across the array) - fails the build instead of silently costing memory, prompting new flags to be packed into existing bytes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Pack NodeInfo cache booleans into 1-bit fields Fold hasDecodedBitfield and keySignerProven into adjacent uint8_t:1 bitfields so they share a single byte, reserving 6 spare bits for future flags without growing the 2000-entry PSRAM array. sizeof is unchanged (still one packed tail word, sizeof(meshtastic_User) + 20); access is by name exactly as before, so no call sites change. Reorders decodedBitfield ahead of the flags so the two 1-bit members stay adjacent and the compiler packs them together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Gate NodeInfo replay on signer-proven provenance (compile-time, default on) Add TMM_NODEINFO_REPLAY_REQUIRE_SIGNED (default 1): the direct-response path now only spoofs a reply for a node whose key is signer-proven, in addition to the staleness gate - so replay is based on flagging AND staleness. Replay is a courtesy feature, and vouching for an unverified (trust-on-first-use) identity to other nodes is the risk this closes, so signed-only is the safer default. Define the macro to 0 at build time to also serve fresh TOFU-only nodes. Both paths are gated: the PSRAM path checks the cached keySignerProven flag, the NodeDB fallback checks nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned(node). The effective gate (TMM_NODEINFO_REPLAY_SIGNED_GATE) is bypassed when PKI is excluded from the build, since nothing can be signed there and the courtesy feature would otherwise be disabled outright. Tests: existing reply-expecting tests establish signer-proven state (a new markKeySignerProvenForTest hook for the PSRAM cache, the NodeDB signed bit for the fallback path); add fallback and PSRAM tests asserting an unsigned/TOFU node is withheld under the default gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Rehydrate re-admitted node names from the TMM NodeInfo cache The warm tier keeps an evicted node's key but not its name (the 40-byte record has no room), so a re-admitted long-tail node is nameless until its next NodeInfo broadcast. The TrafficManagement NodeInfo cache is much larger (2000 PSRAM entries) and commonly still holds the full User, so use it as a name reservoir the warm tier structurally cannot be. On re-admission (getOrCreateMeshNode), after the warm-tier restore, copy the cached identity from the TMM cache via a new copyUser() getter - but only when its cached key matches the key just restored from warm, so a name never attaches to a different identity than the one we encrypt to (key-matched trust). Guarded by HAS_TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT and a null check; a no-op without the PSRAM cache or when no key is present. CopyUserToNodeInfoLite sets only user-related bits, so the warm-restored signer bit is preserved. Limitations (by design): PSRAM-only, and the TMM cache is RAM-only, so this helps within an uptime session, not across reboot. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Drop non-portable NodeInfoPayloadEntry size assert (fixes pico build) The static_assert pinned sizeof(NodeInfoPayloadEntry) to sizeof(meshtastic_User) + 20, but nanopb packs the generated User struct differently per platform: on pico its size is not a multiple of 4, so alignment padding before the uint32 timestamps makes the overhead 22, not 20, and the assert failed the build (native happened to be +20 and passed, hiding it). The bitfield packing it was guarding still stands; replace the fixed-count assert with a comment, since no portable byte count exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Run the NodeInfo cache paths in native tests (TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE) The NodeInfo direct-response cache and everything layered on it - key pinning, signer provenance, staleness, throttle - was compiled only for ARCH_ESP32 + BOARD_HAS_PSRAM, so its entire test set was skipped by the native CI suite and ran nowhere but real hardware. Fold the scattered platform guards into one TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE macro that also enables the cache (plain heap, delete[] path already existed) for ARCH_PORTDUINO unit-test builds. Production portduino and embedded test builds are unchanged. Tests that exercise the NodeDB fallback path drop the cache explicitly via a new dropNodeInfoCacheForTest() hook, so both response paths are covered in one binary. Native suite: 60/60 (was 50 with the 10 cache tests compiled out). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit b2dafbbbd6501b42fc27175e599fb38be292b0e3) * Pin NodeInfo cache keys against the warm tier, not just the hot store cacheNodeInfoPacket() mirrored NodeDB::updateUser()'s key pin but checked only getMeshNode() - the hot store. updateUser's own pin effectively covers the warm tier too (getOrCreateMeshNode rehydrates the warm key before the check), so the mirror had a gap: for a node evicted to the warm tier whose cache slot was also gone, an attacker's NodeInfo with a bogus key passed the pin, and the cache's TOFU pin then locked the genuine node's frames out until the poisoned entry aged away. Split the authoritative lookup out of NodeDB::copyPublicKey() as copyPublicKeyAuthoritative() (hot store, then warm tier - never the opportunistic TMM tier, which would compare the cache against itself) and pin against that. Test: warm-tier-only key rejects a mismatching NodeInfo and accepts the matching one. Native suite: 61/61. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit 28e880875ef1f8bf16bdf301a4e6036537a84b4b) * Convert NodeInfo cache clocks to uint8 tick counters Replace the entry's uint32 millis stamps (lastObservedMs, lastResponseMs) with three uint8 free-running tick clocks - the same modular scheme the UnifiedCache counters already use: obsTick 3 min/tick (12.8 h period) - replay staleness gate respTick 5 s/tick (21.3 min) - per-target response throttle retTick 1 h/tick (10.67 d) - retention TTL + LRU age Validity is an explicit flag bit (hasObserved / hasResponded), not a 0 sentinel, and the maintenance sweep saturates a stamp (clears its flag) once its window passes, so no stamp can age toward its ~256-tick aliasing horizon. That retires the wrap/sentinel special cases (T4, T9) - nowStampMs() survives only for the fallback path's module-global millis stamp. obsTick is separated from retention by design: only a genuinely heard NODEINFO frame stamps it, so later membership-based retention refresh can never make a silent node look servable. Also drops lastObservedRxTime, which was only echoed in a debug log. Entry shrinks 136 -> 128 B; the 2000-entry array 272 kB -> 256 kB, 8 kB below the original develop footprint while keeping the throttle and retention features. Tick granularity costs at most one tick per window (+-5 s on 30 s, +-3 min on 6 h, +-1 h on 7 d). Native suite: 61/61. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit e48ed9cfacfed0131b77ed2f1992e8720720d387) * Keep the NodeInfo cache a superset of NodeDB (seed + keep-alive) The cache learned identities only from overheard NODEINFO frames, so its membership was opportunistic: a NodeDB-tier node whose frame was never heard this boot had no entry (no key pin to protect it, no name to rehydrate), and the retention TTL evicted entries for nodes that still lived in the hot store or warm tier. Add an anti-entropy pass to the maintenance sweep (reconcileNodeInfoMembershipLocked): every hot-store / warm-tier node gets an entry - full identity from the hot store (hasFullUser), key-only from the warm tier - with signer provenance inherited key-matched, and NodeDB's key adopted wholesale on conflict. Member entries (isMember) are re-stamped each sweep, so they never age toward the retention TTL; when a node leaves both tiers the keep-alive stops and its entry ages out from its final member re-stamp. Membership also outranks key trust in LRU victim selection, and the reconcile pass skips seeding rather than churn one member out for another when hot+warm exceeds the cache. Two properties are load-bearing: - seeding/keep-alive never touch obsTick/hasObserved, so a seeded or retained entry is never served as a spoofed reply - only genuinely heard frames make a node servable; - copyUser() now requires hasFullUser, so a key-only warm seed can never stamp HAS_USER onto a nameless node via name-rehydration. Native suite: 64/64. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit 4f1b30d838b2f7b11173373b8f1ba97cf91bef6b) * Write-through NodeDB identity commits into the NodeInfo cache updateUser() is the single chokepoint through which every remote identity/key write enters NodeDB (key-verification keys stay in CryptoEngine's pending buffer until a NodeInfo carries them here), so one hook at its tail lets the NodeInfo cache reflect a commit immediately instead of waiting up to a minute for the reconcile sweep - which stays in place as the anti-entropy backstop. onNodeIdentityCommitted() upserts the full User: NodeDB's key is authoritative (a conflicting cached key is stale residue - replaced, provenance dropped), a keyless commit keeps an already-cached TOFU key, and signer provenance transfers only for the committed key. The observation stamp is never touched: knowledge is not observation, so a hook write can never make a never-heard node servable - covered by the new test alongside immediate copyUser/copyPublicKey visibility. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit e160b899728be8d951d4e7bdf5106c777832b917) * Purge TrafficManagement caches on explicit node removal NodeDB::removeNodeByNum() already forgets the node everywhere NodeDB owns - hot store, satellite stores, warm tier - but the TrafficManagement caches kept the deleted identity: the NodeInfo entry went on feeding the key pool (NodeDB::copyPublicKey) and name rehydration, and the unified slot kept its role/next-hop/dedup state, resurrecting the node on next contact. Add purgeNode(): clears both the unified cache slot and the NodeInfo cache entry, called from removeNodeByNum() alongside the warm-tier removal. Removal means full removal; passive eviction never calls this, and the reconcile sweep will not re-seed a node absent from both NodeDB tiers. Test: an observed identity plus a next-hop hint both vanish after removeNodeByNum(). Left for CI to execute per request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit b5564c173337de99e15ef998a5c698550238fd3c) * Document the tmm-fix-2 / tmm-fix-superset reconciliation decisions Two parallel implementations of the same superset design are being combined on this branch. This decision matrix records every divergence and which side each reconciled feature takes, ahead of the code commits that apply them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT * Reconcile retention: no timed eviction, obsTick LRU, hourly seeding Adopt tmm-fix-superset's retention model (reconciliation decisions #3, #4, #9 in .notes/tmm-super-superset-reconciliation.md): - Entries are never evicted on a timer. The 7-day retention TTL and its third tick clock (retTick) are gone; wrap-safety rests entirely on the sweep's presence-bit saturation, and a quiet entry keeps its value (pubkey pool, name rehydration). Slots are reclaimed only by trust/membership-tiered LRU on insert - age scored by obsTick, with never-observed entries counting oldest - or by an explicit purge. - Membership refresh (entry -> NodeDB contains checks) runs every sweep; the heavy seeding pass runs at boot and then hourly, with the write-through hooks carrying immediacy in between. - Tick constants and helpers move into the header beside the existing UnifiedCache tick idiom, with static_asserts tying the tick windows to the fallback path's seconds/ms forms. Kept from tmm-fix-2 (decision #4): the warm tier is still seeded (key-only records via WarmNodeStore::entryAt) so the invariant remains cache superset-of hot AND warm, and the spareMembers guard still stops seeding from churning one member out for another when hot+warm exceeds the cache. Entry shrinks to 128 B (2000 entries = 256 kB). The TTL-based retention test is superseded by a no-timed-eviction test: a quiet keyed entry survives 9 days of sweeps while the serve gate saturates as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT * Reconcile hooks: key-commit write-through, purgeAll, key-matched signer Adopt tmm-fix-superset's hook coverage (reconciliation decisions #5-#8): - onNodeKeyCommitted(): write-through for the two key-write sites that bypass NodeDB::updateUser - the Router's admin-key learn (TOFU-grade) and KeyVerificationModule's manual-verification commit (proven=true, the strongest provenance the cache can carry). Both were coverage gaps in the tmm-fix-2 write-through design. - updateUser's hook call now transfers signer status key-matched (isVerifiedSignerForKey) instead of the node's bare signed flag, and runs on acceptance rather than only on change. - purgeAll(): factoryReset() and resetNodes() clear both TMM tables - removal-is-full-removal applies to bulk resets too, without relying on the usual post-reset reboot. - purgeNode() reuses the existing finders instead of open-coded scans and logs the (user-initiated) purge. - peekNodeInfoFlagsForTest(): flag introspection so saturation and membership tests can assert sweep effects directly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT * Merge the two branches' test suites for the reconciled design Port tmm-fix-superset's unique tests, adapted to run natively under TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE (reconciliation decision #11): - keyHook_upsertsAndGovernsProvenance: TOFU learn -> manual-verification upgrade -> NodeDB-senior rotation resets provenance. - tickSaturation_sweepClearsObserved: the sweep saturates hasObserved past the serve window, the entry persists (no TTL), and a full 256-tick clock wrap cannot alias a saturated stamp back to fresh. - sweepMembershipMarking: reconciliation seeds a hot identity as member+fullUser+unobserved; the next sweep clears membership once the node leaves NodeDB, while the entry itself persists. tmm-fix-2's tests (warm pin, hot/warm seeding, updateUser write-through, removal purge - now also asserting the entry is gone via the new peek hook - and the no-timed-eviction rewrite) were already on this branch. Suite now counts 70 test functions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT * Adapt cherry-picked and seeding tests to the reconciled semantics Two tests needed updating for interactions the validation run surfaced: - The #11035 test (ignoresUnsignedSignerIdentity) was written for a world without the native NodeInfo cache: it needs the NodeDB fallback path (dropNodeInfoCacheForTest) and the signed replay gate satisfied for its target, like the other fallback tests on this branch. - The hot-seed test's "observed frame makes it servable" step now sends a signature-verified frame: its node is a known signer, and per #11035 an unsigned frame from a signer must not (and does not) drive cache writes - the gate working as designed. Full native suite: 70/70 under ASan. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT * trunk fml * Doc tidyup * TrafficManagement: key NodeInfo-cache maintenance to its own guard runOnce() nested the entire NodeInfo maintenance block (tick-stamp saturation, membership refresh, boot/hourly reconcile) inside #if TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT_CACHE_SIZE > 0, so a variant overriding the unified cache to 0 on a PSRAM board would compile the NodeInfo cache without its maintenance: hasObserved would never saturate, obsTick would alias past its 12.8 h wrap, and the 6 h staleness gate - whose wrap-safety explicitly depends on the sweep - would serve spoofed replies for long-gone nodes. Extract maintainNodeInfoCacheLocked(), guarded by TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE alone, and give runOnce() the same independent-guard structure purgeAll() already has. Also close the runtime cousin of the same mismatch: the write-through hooks (onNodeIdentityCommitted / onNodeKeyCommitted) now no-op while moduleConfig.has_traffic_management is off. Previously they kept filling the cache from NodeDB commits while runOnce() returned INT32_MAX, accumulating entries that were never swept or reconciled. Purges and reads stay ungated: removal must always work, and reads just miss an empty cache. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * TrafficManagement: forward throttled NodeInfo requests instead of consuming them The direct-response throttle returned true, which made handleReceived() STOP the request: within the 30 s window a repeat request was neither answered nor forwarded toward the genuine target, and the call site still logged "respond" and bumped nodeinfo_cache_hits for a reply that was never sent. A requester whose first reply was lost on a noisy link got silence for the whole window. Return false instead: the request flows through normal relay handling, so the genuine node (or another cache-holder) can answer, while our own spoofed TX stays bounded. Repeats of the same packet id are already absorbed by the router's duplicate detection, and the stats counter now only counts replies actually sent. Also log purgeNode() only when a slot was actually cleared - it runs for every NodeDB removal, including nodes the caches never tracked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * TrafficManagement: consolidate NodeInfo-cache #if sprawl into one region Fourteen scattered #if TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE guards (one per function, each with its own #else stub of (void) casts) collapse into a single guarded region holding every NodeInfo-cache-only function, terminated by one #else block of no-op stub definitions. Because the stubs now exist on every build, the call sites in runOnce(), purgeNode() and purgeAll() drop their guards too; inner guards remain only for orthogonal features (PKI, warm tier) and for real conditional work (constructor allocation, PSRAM paths in shouldRespondToNodeInfo). No behavior change. Compile-checked on both sides of the macro: the native app build (stubs) and the native unit-test build (region). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Router: resolve sender key only for PKI-decrypt candidates perhapsDecode() resolved the sender's public key unconditionally for every encrypted packet, before even checking whether the packet could be PKI-decrypted (channel 0, unicast to us). Since copyPublicKey() grew its TrafficManagement fallback tier, a full hot+warm miss - the common case for channel traffic from senders outside both NodeDB tiers - additionally walked the 2000-entry NodeInfo cache under its lock, per packet, for a key that was then discarded. Move the resolution inside the PKI-candidate branch; remotePublic and haveRemoteKey had no consumers outside it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * TrafficManagement: refresh NodeInfo membership hourly, not per-sweep The 60 s sweep re-derived isMember with a per-entry NodeDB lookup: O(entries x members) - about 700k node-number comparisons per minute on a full PSRAM cache (2000 entries x 250 hot + 100 warm), with strided PSRAM reads, all while holding cacheLock against the packet path. Move the refresh into the hourly reconcile pass, which is already O(members x entries): after the seeding loops (so the upsert pass still sees last pass's bits for spareMembers protection), clear every isMember bit and re-mark from both NodeDB tiers - including keyless warm records, which seed nothing but are still members. Accepted tradeoff, now documented on the field: membership lags a passive NodeDB eviction by up to an hour (the entry just stays LRU-sticky slightly longer). Additions stay immediate via the write-through hooks, explicit removals via purgeNode(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * NodeDB: centralize bare-key commits in commitRemoteKey() The two key-write sites that bypass updateUser() (admin-channel learn in Router::perhapsDecode, manual verification in KeyVerificationModule) each carried their own #if HAS_TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT write-through boilerplate - the pattern this PR itself had to retrofit twice, and which any future direct key write would silently miss, leaving the TrafficManagement cache divergent until the next hourly reconcile. Add NodeDB::commitRemoteKey(n, key32, KeyCommitTrust): writes the key to the hot store and routes the TrafficManagement write-through in one place, with provenance explicit at the call site (AdminChannelProven maps to TOFU-grade, ManuallyVerified to proven). The bypass sites keep their reason for existing - bare-key commits with provenance that updateUser's User-payload/TOFU-pin path cannot express - but no longer know about TrafficManagement at all; both stale includes are dropped (Router's was already unused on develop). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: tick wrap-safety analysis, updated cadences, CodeRabbit doc fixes node_info_stores.md gains a "Tick clocks and wrap safety" section recording which mechanism keeps each modular tick clock honest: the unified-cache clocks pair the 60 s sweep with read-time window resets, the NodeInfo obs/resp clocks are sweep-only (hence the compile-time invariant that maintainNodeInfoCacheLocked() is guarded by TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE alone), and the warm tier is immune by design - absolute unix-seconds, no wrap until 2106. Also brought current with this series: membership refresh moved to the hourly reconcile, throttled direct-response requests forward instead of being consumed, the commitRemoteKey() bare-key funnel, and the module-disabled gate on the write-through hooks. CodeRabbit doc review (PR #11050): present the NodeInfo payload cache as the third *identity* tier with the unified cache beside the chain, and describe NodeInfoLite's flattened fields / satellite copy-out accessors instead of the removed nested members. Two stale docs/tmm_node_stores.md references in the header now point at the real file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * TrafficManagement: adapt tests to forwarded throttles and hourly membership Throttle tests (PSRAM and NodeDB-fallback paths): a request inside the 30 s window now CONTINUEs into normal relay handling instead of being consumed - assert no spoofed TX, no NAK suppression, and (PSRAM path) that nodeinfo_cache_hits counts only replies actually sent. Membership test (renamed reconcileMembershipMarking): the per-minute sweep no longer refreshes isMember, so the test now pins down both halves of the new contract - the very next sweep after a passive NodeDB eviction still shows the stale member bit (the documented up-to-an-hour lag), and a reconcile interval's worth of sweeps clears it. Disabled-module test additionally proves the write-through hooks share the has_traffic_management gate: a key commit while disabled must not land in the NodeInfo cache. Not covered here: a build permutation with TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT_CACHE_SIZE overridden to 0 (the configuration the maintenance-guard fix protects) would need its own PlatformIO env plus guards on every unified-cache test - left as a follow-up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * expand test coverage * nitpicks and docs update * more comment fixes * nitpicks * test: make TMM fixture cleanup abort-safe in tearDown() Several tests reset per-test global state (trafficManagementModule pointing at a stack `module`, owner.public_key, the RTC fake clock) only after their assertions. A TEST_ASSERT_* failure longjmps out and skips that trailing cleanup, leaving the state to dangle into later cases - concretely, the next setUp()'s resetNodes() would call trafficManagementModule->purgeAll() on a destroyed object. Move the resets into tearDown(), which runs unconditionally between tests, and drop the now-redundant per-test cleanups. Addresses a CodeRabbit review comment on PR #11050. clod helped too * docs tidy * Throttle NodeInfo direct responses A direct response is addressed to the requesting packet's from field, which is unauthenticated, and is sent by every neighbour that holds the target in cache. One request therefore makes several nodes transmit at an address the requester chose, and nothing limited how often that could be repeated. Replies are now spaced per requester, which bounds how much any single node can be made to receive, plus a global floor on how much airtime the feature can consume. The check sits where a reply is about to be sent, so requests declined for other reasons do not consume the budget. * test: reconcile TMM direct-response tests with #11104 throttle Makes the suite green for now. #11104's per-requester + global-floor throttle (60 s) is layered over the branch's per-target throttle, so the three existing "served again" checks (psram, fallback, sweep) now use a fresh requester to avoid the per-requester window masking the mechanism each one actually exercises. Adds a dedicated test for the new per-requester + 1 s global-floor behaviour (the reflector-flood gap the per-target throttle leaves open, and the bound that survives on non-PSRAM builds). Deferred: the branch's now-redundant fallback global stamp (nodeInfoFallbackLastResponseMs) is left in place as a follow-up cleanup. Clod wants credit. * TMM: unify direct-response throttles into per-sender + per-target RAM tables Replace the two path-specific NodeInfo-spoof throttles (per-entry respTick on the PSRAM cache path, single global stamp on the fallback path) with three symmetric bounds that behave identically with and without PSRAM: - per requester (60 s): how much any one node can be made to receive; - per target (60 s): how often we vouch for the same identity; - global floor (1 s): total airtime, the backstop once an attacker cycles requester/target past the 8-slot tables. Both axes are fixed 8-slot LRU tables in internal RAM (not the PSRAM NodeInfo cache), compared by wrap-safe uint32 ms subtraction, so there is no tick clock and no sweep to maintain. directResponseAllowed() resolves both slots before stamping either, so a reply one axis throttles never consumes the other's budget, and records the send itself. Retires: nodeInfoFallbackLastResponseMs, kNodeInfoResponseThrottleMs, nowStampMs, the respTick byte + hasResponded bit on every cache entry, currentRespTick/kNodeInfoRespTickMs/kNodeInfoThrottleTicks, and the sweep's respTick clear. Renumbers peekNodeInfoFlagsForTest (drops the responded bit). Tests: the psram/fallback throttle tests now assert the per-target axis at 60 s, isolated via a different requester, proving it holds with and without PSRAM; perRequesterAndGlobalFloor isolates the other two axes; the obsolete respTick wrap-safety test is removed. 83/83 native cases pass. clod helped too * whats up, doc? * trimming the comments * test: bump native-suite-count to 38 after upstream rebase Upstream develop carries 38 test_* suite directories but its native-suite-count file still reads 37 (a suite was added without bumping the count). Rebasing onto develop inherits that stale file, so the runner flags AMBER. Correct the registered total to 38. clod helped too --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Thomas Göttgens <tgoettgens@gmail.com> |
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0165e914a9 | fix: gate module replies by request port (#11094) | ||
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6bff231d53 | Throttle NodeInfo direct responses (#11104) | ||
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077c6e72f4 | Corroborate traceroute next-hop updates against the relaying node (#11108) | ||
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53e510199a |
Bound remote-initiated key verification sessions (#11101)
* Bound remote-initiated key verification sessions Opening a session raises a 30 second banner and a client notification and occupies the only verification slot, all before the peer has authenticated anything, and nothing limited how often that could happen. Adds an absolute session cap that incoming packets cannot refresh, a cooldown between remote-initiated sessions measured from when the previous one ended, and refreshes the idle deadline only when the protocol actually advances rather than on any arriving packet. The busy path now sets ignoreRequest so it no longer answers with a NAK. Also replaces the getTime() - 60 timeout comparison, which underflowed before the clock passed 60. * Use elapsed-time comparison for the session timeout and condense comments |
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b8fb42c065 |
Fix bell-append off-by-one write past payload buffer (#11099)
The send_bell append writes bytes[size] and bytes[size+1] while the guard only checked size < DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN, overrunning the 233-byte payload array by one when size == DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN - 1. Guard on size + 1. |
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6f522aad17 |
Return the secret sentinel for remote admin config gets (#11093)
writeSecret is a setter, so calling it on the NETWORK_CONFIG get path was a no-op: the buffer already holds the stored psk, never the sentinel. MQTT_CONFIG returned the broker password verbatim. Both get paths now return secretReserved when req.from != 0, and the matching set paths call writeSecret so a read-modify-write round trip keeps the stored value. |
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fb75410e53 |
Null-check packet allocations in allocForSending and its callers (#11086)
* Null-check packet allocations in allocForSending and its callers
Sibling of
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09de848fbe | Ignore notification (#11076) | ||
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51019b14f4 |
Hold cryptLock around RNG use in admin and key verification (#11096)
setPassKey drew the session passkey outside cryptLock, unlike the signing and key verification paths. Also replaces random() for the key verification nonce with the hardware RNG. |
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beb9a3095d | Merge branch 'develop' into codex/packet-auth-policy | ||
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e061335055 |
Reserve the [Exit] slot when splitting canned messages (#11095)
splitConfiguredMessages capped the split loop at CANNED_MESSAGE_MODULE_MESSAGE_MAX_COUNT and then appended [Exit] unconditionally, so messages[] could be written one past its last index and messagesCount could exceed the array size. |
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08cfb3d683 | Merge upstream develop into packet authentication policy | ||
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0199a1f3ff | Bounds-check detection sensor trigger type (#11091) | ||
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5cf346311c |
fix: don't wipe admin keys when regenerating the keypair (#11088)
A client's "regenerate keys" action sends a blank SecurityConfig carrying only the new private key rather than the config it read from the device, so assigning it wholesale cleared admin_key, is_managed, serial_enabled, debug_log_api_enabled, admin_channel_enabled and packet_signature_policy. Losing the admin keys locks the owner out of remote admin with no recourse but a physical connection to the node. Detect that bare-rotation shape and swap in just the keypair, leaving the rest of the security config intact. Deliberately clearing admin keys still works through a SET that leaves the private key alone. Fixes #11073 |
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290967f739 | Release packets the interface declines to send (#11087) | ||
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5ded0ec8c5 | Gate identity learning on signature in NodeDB::updateUser (#11084) | ||
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023351a979 |
Remove dead code (#11082)
Removed: - MessageStore::addFromPacket and addFromString, superseded by tryAddFromPacket - GeoCoord rangeRadiansToMeters, distanceTo, bearingTo - Router::rawSend, declared virtual with no override and no caller - ContentHandler handleHotspot, handleFs, handleAdminSettings, handleAdminSettingsApply, handleDeleteFsContent and their commented route registrations, plus the now unreachable htmlDeleteDir and the handleUpdateFs declaration that had no definition - ContentHelper replaceAll - OnScreenKeyboardModule popup chain: showPopup, clearPopup, drawPopup, drawPopupOverlay and their state, unreachable since the frame based UI was replaced by baseUI - DebugRenderer drawDebugInfoTrampoline, drawDebugInfoSettingsTrampoline and the orphaned drawFrameSettings - NodeListRenderer calculateMaxScroll, drawColumns and a stale extern haveGlyphs declaration with no definition - UIRenderer::haveGlyphs, Screen::blink, NotificationRenderer::showKeyboardMessagePopupWithTitle, VirtualKeyboard::getInputText - InkHUD touchNavLeft, touchNavRight, Applet::getActiveNodeCount, ThreadedMessageApplet::saveMessagesToFlash - TwoButton::setHandlerUp, TwoButtonExtended setHandlerUp, setJoystickDownHandlers, setJoystickUpHandlers - CannedMessageModule LaunchRepeatDestination, isCharInputAllowed, hasMessages - TrafficManagementModule resetStats, recordRouterHopPreserved, saturatingIncrement - UnitConversions::MetersPerSecondToMilesPerHour - EncryptedStorage getSessionRemainingSeconds - BMI270Sensor::writeRegisters, GPS::hasFlow, FSCommon copyFile, SerialConsole consolePrintf, buzz playLongPressLeadUp, memGet displayPercentHeapFree |
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59ab12675a | Merge develop into packet authentication policy |