mirror of
https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware.git
synced 2026-10-31 04:19:58 -04:00
Jonathan BennettandClaude Opus 5
c7826791d4
* feat(portduino): admin keys in config.yaml, beyond the protobuf's three meshtasticd can now list the public keys authorized to administer the node in its own config, as Security.AdminKeys, and list more than the three config.security.admin_key holds. The host's file is the authority: it is root-owned, so unlike the persisted protobuf an authorized remote cannot rewrite it, and applyHostKeys() re-asserts it at boot and after every remote write of the security config. A key removed from the file loses access on the next boot instead of lingering in flash. The protobuf array stays at three. It is not an arbitrary cap: a security set_config already encodes to ~207 bytes against the 221 a PKC admin packet can carry (233 payload bytes less 12 of PKC overhead), so a fourth key would not fit in one admin message on any platform. Four sites decided who may administer a node, each unrolling admin_key[0..2] by hand - the PKC gate in AdminModule, the same gate in DMShell, the is_managed guard, and the admin-key trial decrypt in Router::perhapsDecode. They now share AdminKeys::isAuthorized(), so a key source reaches all four at once, and enumeration skips empty slots rather than trusting admin_key_count. Each configured key costs one trial decryption per PKI packet from an unknown sender, so the host list is capped at 16 and duplicates are dropped. Files in config.d append to the list, one per operator. A key that is not exactly 32 canonical base64 bytes stops meshtasticd rather than silently authorizing something else, and --check reports it with its line instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SP5hpFwdTBC2K9ggGFLpcs * test(portduino): config-check fixtures for Security.AdminKeys bin/test-config-check.sh drives a built meshtasticd against the fixtures, which is the only place the two process-level behaviours here are reachable: what --check reports, and that a normal boot refuses the file. A clean two-key list, a key three characters short of 32 bytes, and one key written as a scalar instead of a list - the last two as errors under --check and as a non-zero exit on a normal boot, since a truncated admin key would authorize something other than what was written and a file whose only key is unreadable would otherwise boot a node nobody can administer. adminkeys-append/ pins the append-across-config.d rule by value through --output-yaml, with the first key in config.yaml so the effective list does not depend on the filesystem's order. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SP5hpFwdTBC2K9ggGFLpcs --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>