Files
firmware/test/test_pki_admin_fallback/test_main.cpp
2026-07-21 09:48:09 +02:00

282 lines
12 KiB
C++

// Tests for the admin-key fallback in Router::perhapsDecode: a PKI unicast from an unknown sender is
// tried against each configured admin_key; on success the packet decodes and the key is persisted to
// NodeDB. Drives the real crypto + NodeDB path with packets encrypted exactly as an admin radio would.
#include "MeshTypes.h" // include BEFORE TestUtil.h
#include "TestUtil.h"
#include <unity.h>
// The whole feature is compiled out when PKI is excluded.
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
#include "mesh/Channels.h"
#include "mesh/CryptoEngine.h"
#include "mesh/NodeDB.h"
#include "mesh/RadioInterface.h" // MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD
#include "mesh/Router.h"
#include <cstring>
#include <pb_encode.h>
#include <vector>
static constexpr NodeNum LOCAL_NODE = 0x0A0A0A0A; // us (the receiver)
static constexpr NodeNum ADMIN_NODE = 0x0B0B0B0B; // an authorized admin, absent from our NodeDB
static constexpr uint32_t PKT_ID = 0x12345678;
// MockNodeDB - inject nodes with controlled public keys (meshNodes/numMeshNodes are public on NodeDB).
// Mirrors test/test_packet_signing.
class MockNodeDB : public NodeDB
{
public:
void clearTestNodes()
{
testNodes.clear();
meshNodes = &testNodes;
numMeshNodes = 0;
}
void addNode(NodeNum num)
{
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite node = meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_init_zero;
node.num = num;
testNodes.push_back(node);
meshNodes = &testNodes;
numMeshNodes = testNodes.size();
}
void setPublicKey(NodeNum num, const uint8_t *pubKey)
{
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *n = getMeshNode(num);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(n);
n->public_key.size = 32;
memcpy(n->public_key.bytes, pubKey, 32);
}
std::vector<meshtastic_NodeInfoLite> testNodes;
};
static MockNodeDB *mockNodeDB = nullptr;
// Keypairs, regenerated fresh each test in setUp(). "our" == the receiver, "admin" == the sender.
static uint8_t ourPub[32], ourPriv[32];
static uint8_t adminPub[32], adminPriv[32];
// Store a 32-byte key into config.security.admin_key[slot].
static void setAdminKey(int slot, const uint8_t *key32)
{
config.security.admin_key[slot].size = 32;
memcpy(config.security.admin_key[slot].bytes, key32, 32);
if (slot + 1 > (int)config.security.admin_key_count)
config.security.admin_key_count = slot + 1;
}
// Build a PKI-encrypted unicast from `from` to us, encrypted with `senderPriv` against our public key,
// leaving the engine holding our private key afterwards (as during receive) so perhapsDecode can decrypt.
static meshtastic_MeshPacket makePkiPacket(NodeNum from, meshtastic_PortNum port, size_t payloadLen, const uint8_t *senderPriv)
{
meshtastic_Data data = meshtastic_Data_init_zero;
data.portnum = port;
data.payload.size = payloadLen;
for (size_t i = 0; i < payloadLen; i++)
data.payload.bytes[i] = (uint8_t)(i & 0xff);
uint8_t plain[meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN];
size_t plainLen = pb_encode_to_bytes(plain, sizeof(plain), &meshtastic_Data_msg, &data);
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(plainLen > 0, "pb_encode_to_bytes failed in test setup");
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t ourPubStruct;
ourPubStruct.size = 32;
memcpy(ourPubStruct.bytes, ourPub, 32);
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_zero;
p.from = from;
p.to = LOCAL_NODE;
p.id = PKT_ID;
p.channel = 0; // PKI packets carry channel hash 0
p.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag;
// Encrypt AS the sender: shared secret = DH(senderPriv, ourPub).
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(const_cast<uint8_t *>(senderPriv));
bool ok = crypto->encryptCurve25519(p.to, p.from, ourPubStruct, p.id, plainLen, plain, p.encrypted.bytes);
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(ok, "encryptCurve25519 failed in test setup");
p.encrypted.size = plainLen + MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD;
// Restore the engine to our private key, as it is when receiving.
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(ourPriv);
return p;
}
// Assert the packet decoded via PKI and that we learned `expectedKey` for its sender.
static void assertDecodedAndLearned(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, const uint8_t *expectedKey)
{
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag, p->which_payload_variant);
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(p->pki_encrypted);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP, p->decoded.portnum);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(32, p->public_key.size);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expectedKey, p->public_key.bytes, 32);
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *learned = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MESSAGE(learned, "sender should have been created in NodeDB");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(32, learned->public_key.size, "sender key should have been persisted");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY_MESSAGE(expectedKey, learned->public_key.bytes, 32, "persisted key mismatch");
}
void setUp(void)
{
// Construct the mock FIRST: the NodeDB ctor can reload persisted host state and repopulate globals.
mockNodeDB = new MockNodeDB();
mockNodeDB->clearTestNodes();
nodeDB = mockNodeDB;
config = meshtastic_LocalConfig_init_zero;
owner = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
myNodeInfo.my_node_num = LOCAL_NODE; // drives isToUs()/getFrom()
channels.initDefaults();
channels.onConfigChanged();
// Fresh keypairs for us and the admin (independent, valid Curve25519 pairs).
crypto->generateKeyPair(ourPub, ourPriv);
crypto->generateKeyPair(adminPub, adminPriv);
// perhapsDecode's PKI gate requires that we have our own key (getMeshNode(p->to)->public_key).
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, ourPub);
// During receive the engine holds our private key.
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(ourPriv);
}
void tearDown(void)
{
delete mockNodeDB;
mockNodeDB = nullptr;
nodeDB = nullptr;
}
// Admin key in slot 0: a DM from an unknown sender decrypts via the fallback, and the key is persisted.
void test_admin_key_slot0_decrypts_and_persists(void)
{
setAdminKey(0, adminPub);
TEST_ASSERT_NULL_MESSAGE(mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(ADMIN_NODE), "precondition: sender is unknown to us");
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makePkiPacket(ADMIN_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP, 16, adminPriv);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&p));
assertDecodedAndLearned(&p, adminPub);
}
// The loop scans every admin slot, not just [0]: a key provisioned only in slot 2 still works.
void test_admin_key_slot2_only_decrypts(void)
{
setAdminKey(2, adminPub); // slots 0 and 1 left empty
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makePkiPacket(ADMIN_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP, 16, adminPriv);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&p));
assertDecodedAndLearned(&p, adminPub);
}
// No admin key configured + unknown sender: nothing decrypts, and we must NOT invent a key for anyone.
void test_no_admin_key_unknown_sender_not_decoded(void)
{
// config (incl. admin_key) is zeroed by setUp(); ADMIN_NODE is absent from NodeDB.
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makePkiPacket(ADMIN_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP, 16, adminPriv);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&p));
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag, p.which_payload_variant);
TEST_ASSERT_NULL_MESSAGE(mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(ADMIN_NODE), "must not learn a key when nothing decrypted");
}
// A configured admin key that is NOT the sender's must fail authentication (no bogus key learned).
void test_wrong_admin_key_does_not_decode(void)
{
uint8_t otherPub[32], otherPriv[32];
crypto->generateKeyPair(otherPub, otherPriv); // unrelated key
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(ourPriv); // restore receive key (generateKeyPair changed it)
setAdminKey(0, otherPub); // admin slot holds a key that did NOT encrypt the packet
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makePkiPacket(ADMIN_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP, 16, adminPriv);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&p));
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag, p.which_payload_variant);
TEST_ASSERT_NULL(mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(ADMIN_NODE));
}
// The fallback is budget-limited against flooding; see Router.cpp for why the budget is global.
void test_admin_key_fallback_is_rate_limited(void)
{
// Start from a full bucket regardless of what earlier tests consumed (8 tokens, one per 250ms).
delay(2500);
uint8_t otherPub[32], otherPriv[32];
crypto->generateKeyPair(otherPub, otherPriv);
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(ourPriv);
setAdminKey(0, otherPub); // wrong key, so every attempt below fails and keeps its token spent
// Drain the burst with undecryptable packets, as a flooding attacker would.
for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
meshtastic_MeshPacket junk = makePkiPacket(ADMIN_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP, 16, adminPriv);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&junk));
}
// Budget exhausted: the fallback is skipped, so even a correct admin key does not decrypt.
setAdminKey(0, adminPub);
meshtastic_MeshPacket blocked = makePkiPacket(ADMIN_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP, 16, adminPriv);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&blocked), "fallback should be budget-limited");
// The budget refills, so the throttle is not a permanent lockout.
delay(600);
meshtastic_MeshPacket allowed = makePkiPacket(ADMIN_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP, 16, adminPriv);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&allowed), "budget should refill over time");
assertDecodedAndLearned(&allowed, adminPub);
}
// A pending key is an unverified identity claim from whoever opened a key-verification handshake, so it
// must decrypt only the exchange itself. Otherwise they could send DMs that look PKI-authenticated as a
// node they never proved they are.
void test_pending_key_decrypts_only_key_verification(void)
{
// PEER is unknown to us; the handshake stashed its claimed key as pending.
static constexpr NodeNum PEER = 0x0C0C0C0C;
uint8_t peerPub[32], peerPriv[32];
crypto->generateKeyPair(peerPub, peerPriv);
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(ourPriv); // generateKeyPair changed it
crypto->setPendingPublicKey(PEER, peerPub);
// A DM on any other port must not decode, even though the pending key would decrypt it.
meshtastic_MeshPacket spoofed = makePkiPacket(PEER, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, 16, peerPriv);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&spoofed), "pending key must not decrypt a text DM");
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(spoofed.pki_encrypted, "spoofed DM must not be marked PKI-authenticated");
// The key-verification exchange itself still works, so bootstrapping is unaffected.
meshtastic_MeshPacket handshake = makePkiPacket(PEER, meshtastic_PortNum_KEY_VERIFICATION_APP, 16, peerPriv);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&handshake), "key verification must still decrypt");
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(handshake.pki_encrypted);
// A pending key is never persisted, so the peer stays unknown until verification commits it.
TEST_ASSERT_NULL_MESSAGE(mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(PEER), "pending key must not be learned into NodeDB");
crypto->clearPendingPublicKey();
}
#endif // !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
void setup()
{
delay(10);
delay(2000);
initializeTestEnvironment();
UNITY_BEGIN();
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
RUN_TEST(test_admin_key_slot0_decrypts_and_persists);
RUN_TEST(test_admin_key_slot2_only_decrypts);
RUN_TEST(test_no_admin_key_unknown_sender_not_decoded);
RUN_TEST(test_wrong_admin_key_does_not_decode);
RUN_TEST(test_admin_key_fallback_is_rate_limited);
RUN_TEST(test_pending_key_decrypts_only_key_verification);
#endif
exit(UNITY_END());
}
void loop() {}