Files
firmware/test/test_crypto/test_main.cpp
Jonathan Bennett 8267bb22bd Packet Signing via XEdDSA (#10478)
* Test commit for XEdDSA support

* Update to Crypto lib in Meshtatic org

* Generate a new node identity on key generation (#7628)

* Generate a new node identity on key generation

* Fixes

* Fixes

* Fixes

* Messed up

* Fixes

* Update src/modules/AdminModule.cpp

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update src/mesh/NodeDB.cpp

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Figured it out!

* Cleanup

* Update src/mesh/NodeDB.h

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update src/mesh/NodeDB.cpp

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update src/modules/AdminModule.cpp

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update crypto commit hash

* Some fixes for xeddsa pr (#9610)

* fix: add null check for getMeshNode() in NodeInfoModule

getMeshNode() can return nullptr for unknown nodes. Dereferencing
without a check crashes the firmware when receiving NodeInfo from
a node not yet in the database.

* fix: enforce XEdDSA signature verification and prevent stripping

Previously, failed signature verification still allowed the packet
through, making signatures purely cosmetic. Now:

- Failed verification drops the packet (DECODE_FAILURE)
- Successfully verified nodes get HAS_XEDDSA_SIGNED bitfield set
- Unsigned packets from previously-signing nodes are rejected
- Log levels reduced from WARN/ERROR to DEBUG/WARN as appropriate

* fix: include packet metadata in XEdDSA signature

The signature now covers [fromNode | packetId | portnum | payload]
instead of just the payload bytes. This prevents:
- Replay attacks (different packetId fails verification)
- Reattribution (different fromNode fails verification)
- Portnum redirection (different portnum fails verification)

Also adds a key initialization check to xeddsa_sign (returns false
if XEdDSA keys are all zeros) and checks the return value in the
encode path.

* fix: handle existing key pair in AdminModule security config

When a user provides both a valid private key and public key via
admin config, the crypto engine's DH private key and owner public
key were never loaded. DMs and XEdDSA signing would silently break.

Add an else branch to load both keys into the crypto engine.

* perf: cache Ed25519 public key conversion in xeddsa_verify

curve_to_ed_pub() performs field element parsing, inversion, and
multiplication on every call. Since packets from the same node
tend to arrive in bursts, a single-entry cache avoids repeating
this expensive conversion for consecutive packets from one sender.

* fix: skip identity cleanup when node number is unchanged

createNewIdentity() was called on every generateCryptoKeyPair(),
including normal boots where the same key is regenerated. This
caused unnecessary NodeDB writes and old-node cleanup logic to
run when the node number hadn't actually changed.

Also fixes only zeroing byte[0] of the old node's public key
instead of clearing the entire array.

* fix: replace hardcoded 120 with derived XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE constant

The payload size check for XEdDSA signing used a magic number (120).
Replace with a derivation from DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN and XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE
so the limit adjusts automatically if constants change. This also
increases the max signable payload from 120 to 169 bytes, which is
still safe since the actual encoded size is checked after pb_encode.

* fix: add const qualifiers to XEdDSA verify and curve_to_ed_pub inputs

pubKey, payload, and signature parameters in xeddsa_verify are
input-only and should not be modified. Same for curve_pubkey in
curve_to_ed_pub.

* chore: remove commented-out old Crypto dependency in portduino.ini

* Leave out the admin module change for now

---------

Co-authored-by: Jonathan Bennett <jbennett@incomsystems.biz>

* trunk

* protobuf re-update

* Protobufs

* Merge resolution fix

* Put XEDDSA on the right bit

* NodeDB update to new nodeInfoLite accessors, etc

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Refine unsigned packet rejection logic in Router (#10534)

* use hardware random to fill the first 32 signature bytes with entropy prior to signing.

* Add XEdDSA packet-signing policy tests and update dependencies for macos

* Minor fixes

* integrate XEdDSA support and update dependencies across multiple modules

---------

Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Wessel <github@weebl.me>
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: thebentern <9000580+thebentern@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-13 06:45:56 -05:00

333 lines
14 KiB
C++

// trunk-ignore-all(gitleaks): These are dummy values. Not real secrets.
#include "CryptoEngine.h"
#include "TestUtil.h"
#include <XEdDSA.h>
#include <unity.h>
void HexToBytes(uint8_t *result, const std::string hex, size_t len = 0)
{
if (len) {
memset(result, 0, len);
}
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < hex.length(); i += 2) {
std::string byteString = hex.substr(i, 2);
result[i / 2] = (uint8_t)strtol(byteString.c_str(), NULL, 16);
}
return;
}
void setUp(void)
{
// set stuff up here
}
void tearDown(void)
{
// clean stuff up here
}
void test_SHA256(void)
{
uint8_t expected[32];
uint8_t hash[32] = {0};
HexToBytes(expected, "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855");
crypto->hash(hash, 0);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(hash, expected, 32);
HexToBytes(hash, "d3", 32);
HexToBytes(expected, "28969cdfa74a12c82f3bad960b0b000aca2ac329deea5c2328ebc6f2ba9802c1");
crypto->hash(hash, 1);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(hash, expected, 32);
HexToBytes(hash, "11af", 32);
HexToBytes(expected, "5ca7133fa735326081558ac312c620eeca9970d1e70a4b95533d956f072d1f98");
crypto->hash(hash, 2);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(hash, expected, 32);
}
void test_ECB_AES256(void)
{
// https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Standards-and-Guidelines/documents/examples/AES_ECB.pdf
uint8_t key[32] = {0};
uint8_t plain[16] = {0};
uint8_t result[16] = {0};
uint8_t expected[16] = {0};
HexToBytes(key, "603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4");
HexToBytes(plain, "6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A");
HexToBytes(expected, "F3EED1BDB5D2A03C064B5A7E3DB181F8");
crypto->aesSetKey(key, 32);
crypto->aesEncrypt(plain, result); // Does 16 bytes at a time
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected, result, 16);
HexToBytes(plain, "AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51");
HexToBytes(expected, "591CCB10D410ED26DC5BA74A31362870");
crypto->aesSetKey(key, 32);
crypto->aesEncrypt(plain, result); // Does 16 bytes at a time
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected, result, 16);
HexToBytes(plain, "30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF");
HexToBytes(expected, "B6ED21B99CA6F4F9F153E7B1BEAFED1D");
crypto->aesSetKey(key, 32);
crypto->aesEncrypt(plain, result); // Does 16 bytes at a time
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected, result, 16);
}
void test_DH25519(void)
{
// test vectors from wycheproof x25519
// https://github.com/C2SP/wycheproof/blob/master/testvectors/x25519_test.json
uint8_t private_key[32];
uint8_t public_key[32];
uint8_t expected_shared[32];
HexToBytes(public_key, "504a36999f489cd2fdbc08baff3d88fa00569ba986cba22548ffde80f9806829");
HexToBytes(private_key, "c8a9d5a91091ad851c668b0736c1c9a02936c0d3ad62670858088047ba057475");
HexToBytes(expected_shared, "436a2c040cf45fea9b29a0cb81b1f41458f863d0d61b453d0a982720d6d61320");
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(private_key);
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->setDHPublicKey(public_key));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected_shared, crypto->shared_key, 32);
HexToBytes(public_key, "63aa40c6e38346c5caf23a6df0a5e6c80889a08647e551b3563449befcfc9733");
HexToBytes(private_key, "d85d8c061a50804ac488ad774ac716c3f5ba714b2712e048491379a500211958");
HexToBytes(expected_shared, "279df67a7c4611db4708a0e8282b195e5ac0ed6f4b2f292c6fbd0acac30d1332");
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(private_key);
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->setDHPublicKey(public_key));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected_shared, crypto->shared_key, 32);
HexToBytes(public_key, "ecffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f");
HexToBytes(private_key, "18630f93598637c35da623a74559cf944374a559114c7937811041fc8605564a");
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(private_key);
TEST_ASSERT(!crypto->setDHPublicKey(public_key)); // Weak public key results in 0 shared key
HexToBytes(public_key, "f7e13a1a067d2f4e1061bf9936fde5be6b0c2494a8f809cbac7f290ef719e91c");
HexToBytes(private_key, "10300724f3bea134eb1575245ef26ff9b8ccd59849cd98ce1a59002fe1d5986c");
HexToBytes(expected_shared, "24becd5dfed9e9289ba2e15b82b0d54f8e9aacb72f5e4248c58d8d74b451ce76");
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(private_key);
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->setDHPublicKey(public_key));
crypto->hash(crypto->shared_key, 32);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected_shared, crypto->shared_key, 32);
}
void test_PKC(void)
{
uint8_t private_key[32];
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t public_key;
uint8_t expected_shared[32];
uint8_t expected_decrypted[32];
uint8_t radioBytes[128] __attribute__((__aligned__));
uint8_t decrypted[128] __attribute__((__aligned__));
uint8_t expected_nonce[16];
uint32_t fromNode = 0x0929;
uint64_t packetNum = 0x13b2d662;
HexToBytes(public_key.bytes, "db18fc50eea47f00251cb784819a3cf5fc361882597f589f0d7ff820e8064457");
public_key.size = 32;
HexToBytes(private_key, "a00330633e63522f8a4d81ec6d9d1e6617f6c8ffd3a4c698229537d44e522277");
HexToBytes(expected_shared, "777b1545c9d6f9a2");
HexToBytes(expected_decrypted, "08011204746573744800");
HexToBytes(radioBytes, "8c646d7a2909000062d6b2136b00000040df24abfcc30a17a3d9046726099e796a1c036a792b");
HexToBytes(expected_nonce, "62d6b213036a792b2909000000");
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(private_key);
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->decryptCurve25519(fromNode, public_key, packetNum, 22, radioBytes + 16, decrypted));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected_shared, crypto->shared_key, 8);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected_nonce, crypto->nonce, 13);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected_decrypted, decrypted, 10);
uint32_t toNode = 0; // Only impacts logging
uint8_t encrypted[128] __attribute__((__aligned__));
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->encryptCurve25519(toNode, fromNode, public_key, packetNum, 10, decrypted, encrypted));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected_shared, crypto->shared_key, 8);
// The extraNonce is random, so skip checking the nonce and encrypted output here
// Copy the nonce to check it after encryption
memcpy(expected_nonce, crypto->nonce, 16);
// Decrypt the re-encrypted bytes and check they are the same as what we expect
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->decryptCurve25519(fromNode, public_key, packetNum, 22, encrypted, decrypted));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected_shared, crypto->shared_key, 8);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected_nonce, crypto->nonce, 13);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected_decrypted, decrypted, 10);
}
void test_XEdDSA(void)
{
uint8_t private_key[32];
uint8_t x_public_key[32];
uint8_t ed_private_key[32];
uint8_t ed_public_key[32];
uint8_t ed_public_key2[32];
uint8_t message[] = "This is a test!";
uint8_t message2[] = "This is a test.";
uint8_t signature[64];
uint32_t fromNode = 0x1234;
uint32_t packetId = 0xDEADBEEF;
uint32_t portnum = 1;
for (int times = 0; times < 10; times++) {
printf("Start of time %u\n", times);
crypto->generateKeyPair(x_public_key, private_key);
XEdDSA::priv_curve_to_ed_keys(private_key, ed_private_key, ed_public_key);
crypto->curve_to_ed_pub(x_public_key, ed_public_key2);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(ed_public_key, ed_public_key2, 32);
// Sign and verify with metadata
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->xeddsa_sign(fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), signature));
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->xeddsa_verify(x_public_key, fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), signature));
// Different payload fails
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(
crypto->xeddsa_verify(x_public_key, fromNode, packetId, portnum, message2, sizeof(message2), signature));
// Different fromNode fails
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(
crypto->xeddsa_verify(x_public_key, fromNode + 1, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), signature));
// Different packetId fails
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(
crypto->xeddsa_verify(x_public_key, fromNode, packetId + 1, portnum, message, sizeof(message), signature));
// Different portnum fails
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(
crypto->xeddsa_verify(x_public_key, fromNode, packetId, portnum + 1, message, sizeof(message), signature));
}
}
// A signature only verifies under the signer's own key; a different key (or an all-zero key) fails.
void test_XEdDSA_cross_key_reject(void)
{
uint8_t pubA[32], privA[32];
uint8_t pubB[32], privB[32];
uint8_t signature[64];
uint8_t message[] = "cross-key check";
uint32_t fromNode = 0x4242, packetId = 0xABCD1234, portnum = 7;
crypto->generateKeyPair(pubA, privA); // engine now holds key A
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->xeddsa_sign(fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), signature));
crypto->generateKeyPair(pubB, privB); // unrelated key pair
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(crypto->xeddsa_verify(pubA, fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), signature));
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(crypto->xeddsa_verify(pubB, fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), signature));
uint8_t zeroKey[32] = {0};
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(crypto->xeddsa_verify(zeroKey, fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), signature));
}
// Signing with an unset (all-zero) private key must fail rather than emit a bogus signature.
void test_XEdDSA_empty_key_sign_fails(void)
{
CryptoEngine fresh; // freshly constructed: xeddsa_private_key is all zero
uint8_t signature[64];
uint8_t message[] = "no key";
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(fresh.xeddsa_sign(0x1, 0x2, 0x3, message, sizeof(message), signature));
}
// curve_to_ed_pub caches the last converted key; verifying A, then B, then A must stay correct.
void test_XEdDSA_curve_to_ed_cache(void)
{
uint8_t pubA[32], privA[32], sigA[64];
uint8_t pubB[32], privB[32], sigB[64];
uint8_t message[] = "cache check";
uint32_t fromNode = 0x11, packetId = 0x22, portnum = 3;
crypto->generateKeyPair(pubA, privA);
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->xeddsa_sign(fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), sigA));
crypto->generateKeyPair(pubB, privB);
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->xeddsa_sign(fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), sigB));
// Interleave keys to exercise both cache hits and cache invalidation.
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(crypto->xeddsa_verify(pubA, fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), sigA));
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(crypto->xeddsa_verify(pubB, fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), sigB));
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(crypto->xeddsa_verify(pubA, fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), sigA));
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(crypto->xeddsa_verify(pubA, fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), sigB));
}
// A payload at the maximum signable size (DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN - signature) round-trips and detects tampering.
void test_XEdDSA_max_payload(void)
{
const size_t len = meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN - XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
uint8_t payload[meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN];
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++)
payload[i] = (uint8_t)(i * 7 + 1);
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32], signature[64];
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
uint32_t fromNode = 0xFEED, packetId = 0xC0DE, portnum = 1;
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->xeddsa_sign(fromNode, packetId, portnum, payload, len, signature));
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->xeddsa_verify(pub, fromNode, packetId, portnum, payload, len, signature));
payload[0] ^= 0x01;
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(crypto->xeddsa_verify(pub, fromNode, packetId, portnum, payload, len, signature));
}
// Signing the same message twice yields signatures that both verify. This XEdDSA implementation is
// deterministic in practice (the two signatures are typically byte-identical, even though
// HardwareRNG::fill provides real entropy on this platform), so we assert only the security-relevant
// property — every produced signature verifies — rather than asserting (non-)determinism.
void test_XEdDSA_repeated_sign_verifies(void)
{
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32], sig1[64], sig2[64];
uint8_t message[] = "same message";
uint32_t fromNode = 0x9, packetId = 0x9, portnum = 9;
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->xeddsa_sign(fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), sig1));
TEST_ASSERT(crypto->xeddsa_sign(fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), sig2));
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(crypto->xeddsa_verify(pub, fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), sig1));
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(crypto->xeddsa_verify(pub, fromNode, packetId, portnum, message, sizeof(message), sig2));
}
void test_AES_CTR(void)
{
uint8_t expected[32];
uint8_t plain[32];
uint8_t nonce[32];
CryptoKey k;
// vectors from https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3686#section-6
k.length = 32;
HexToBytes(k.bytes, "776BEFF2851DB06F4C8A0542C8696F6C6A81AF1EEC96B4D37FC1D689E6C1C104");
HexToBytes(nonce, "00000060DB5672C97AA8F0B200000001");
HexToBytes(expected, "145AD01DBF824EC7560863DC71E3E0C0");
memcpy(plain, "Single block msg", 16);
crypto->encryptAESCtr(k, nonce, 16, plain);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected, plain, 16);
k.length = 16;
memcpy(plain, "Single block msg", 16);
HexToBytes(k.bytes, "AE6852F8121067CC4BF7A5765577F39E");
HexToBytes(nonce, "00000030000000000000000000000001");
HexToBytes(expected, "E4095D4FB7A7B3792D6175A3261311B8");
crypto->encryptAESCtr(k, nonce, 16, plain);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MEMORY(expected, plain, 16);
}
void setup()
{
// NOTE!!! Wait for >2 secs
// if board doesn't support software reset via Serial.DTR/RTS
delay(10);
delay(2000);
initializeTestEnvironment();
UNITY_BEGIN(); // IMPORTANT LINE!
RUN_TEST(test_SHA256);
RUN_TEST(test_ECB_AES256);
RUN_TEST(test_DH25519);
RUN_TEST(test_AES_CTR);
RUN_TEST(test_PKC);
RUN_TEST(test_XEdDSA);
RUN_TEST(test_XEdDSA_cross_key_reject);
RUN_TEST(test_XEdDSA_empty_key_sign_fails);
RUN_TEST(test_XEdDSA_curve_to_ed_cache);
RUN_TEST(test_XEdDSA_max_payload);
RUN_TEST(test_XEdDSA_repeated_sign_verifies);
exit(UNITY_END()); // stop unit testing
}
void loop() {}