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* Send an ack over PKC when no channel can carry it PKI needs only the two keys, so a DM can reach us over a channel we do not carry. Its ack is a ROUTING packet, which wouldEncryptWithPKC() excludes, so today it is channel-encoded, fails at setActiveByIndex() with NO_CHANNEL, and is never sent. The sender sees nothing and retransmits to exhaustion for a message that was in fact delivered. Fall back to PKC for exactly that case. This is the one place an ack is deliberately made opaque to relays; normally that costs next-hop learning and intermediate retransmission cancel, which is why ROUTING is PKC-excluded in general, but here there is no readable alternative to lose, because without this the ack does not exist. The predicate is scoped as tightly as that argument reaches: a unicast ROUTING packet we originate, carrying a request_id, to a destination whose key we hold, under the same ham/sim/private-key preconditions PKC always has, and only when the channel index does not resolve. It tests channels.getHash() rather than setActiveByIndex() so it has no side effect; generateHash already returns -1 for an invalid key, so the two agree on which indexes are unusable. Four cases in test_packet_signing pin the corners: the fallback fires, it does not paper over an ack with no destination key, it does not catch a non-ack on the same unusable channel, and an ack on a channel that does resolve still goes out readable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012hLcVif8GDEmA2k77hmFG8 * Short-circuit the fallback so an out-of-range channel logs no error wouldEncryptWithPKC() reaches channels.getName(chIndex) before its portnum exclusion, and getByIndex() logs "Invalid channel index" on the way past. With the general predicate tested first, an ack on an out-of-range index printed that error and then went on to encode successfully. Test ackFallback first so the case that is about to succeed never asks. Also record why the range check leads inside the predicate: getHash() is a bare hashes[i] with no bounds test of its own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012hLcVif8GDEmA2k77hmFG8 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2368 lines
108 KiB
C++
2368 lines
108 KiB
C++
// Tests for XEdDSA packet-signing *policy* - the receive-path accept/reject behavior and the
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// send-path signing policy - as opposed to the raw sign/verify primitive (covered in test_crypto).
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//
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// The decision logic under test lives in Router.cpp free functions. Groups A/B drive a real
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// encode -> decode round-trip through the default channel (perhapsEncode/perhapsDecode, black-box,
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// no production changes); later groups exercise routing order and policy helpers directly.
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//
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// Group A receive-side accept/reject matrix (verify, downgrade protection, signer-bit learning)
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// Group B send-side signing policy (which outgoing packets perhapsEncode signs)
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// Group C routing pipeline ordering (authenticate before duplicate/retry/relay state)
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// Group D encoding invariants the routing gates depend on
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// Group E decoded-ingress policy (checkXeddsaReceivePolicy, the plaintext-MQTT trust boundary)
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#include "MeshTypes.h" // include BEFORE TestUtil.h
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#include "NodeStatus.h"
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#include "TestUtil.h"
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#include "airtime.h"
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#include "support/MockMeshService.h"
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#include <unity.h>
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// The whole suite exercises XEdDSA sign/verify and checkXeddsaReceivePolicy, all of which are
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// compiled out unless both PKI and XEdDSA are enabled (e.g. stm32 sets MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA).
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#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI) && !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
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#include "UptimeClock.h"
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#include "mesh/Channels.h"
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#include "mesh/CryptoEngine.h"
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#include "mesh/MeshRadio.h"
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#include "mesh/MeshService.h"
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#include "mesh/NodeDB.h"
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#include "mesh/ReliableRouter.h"
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#include "mesh/Router.h"
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#include "mesh/SinglePortModule.h"
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#include "modules/NodeInfoModule.h"
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#include "modules/RoutingModule.h"
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#include "mqtt/MQTT.h"
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#include <ErriezCRC32.h>
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#include <cstdio>
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#include <cstring>
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#include <memory>
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#include <pb_decode.h>
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#include <pb_encode.h>
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#include <vector>
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Test fixture identifiers
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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static constexpr NodeNum LOCAL_NODE = 0x0A0A0A0A;
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static constexpr NodeNum REMOTE_NODE = 0x0B0B0B0B;
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// A "small" broadcast payload whose signed encoding easily fits a LoRa frame, and an "oversized"
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// one whose signed encoding does not, yet still encodes within a LoRa frame unsigned.
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static constexpr size_t SMALL_PAYLOAD = 16;
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static constexpr size_t OVERSIZED_PAYLOAD = 180;
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// MockNodeDB - inject nodes with controlled public keys / signer bits.
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// Mirrors the pattern in test/test_hop_scaling. meshNodes/numMeshNodes are public on NodeDB.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class MockNodeDB : public NodeDB
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{
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public:
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void installDefaultsPreservingIdentity() { installDefaultConfig(true); }
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void clearTestNodes()
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{
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testNodes.clear();
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meshNodes = &testNodes;
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numMeshNodes = 0;
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}
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// Add a bare node and return a stable handle (fetch via getMeshNode so the pointer stays valid
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// even if the vector reallocates after later adds).
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void addNode(NodeNum num)
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{
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meshtastic_NodeInfoLite node = meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_init_zero;
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node.num = num;
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testNodes.push_back(node);
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meshNodes = &testNodes;
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numMeshNodes = testNodes.size();
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}
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void setPublicKey(NodeNum num, const uint8_t *pubKey)
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{
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meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *n = getMeshNode(num);
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TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(n);
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n->public_key.size = 32;
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memcpy(n->public_key.bytes, pubKey, 32);
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}
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void setSignerBit(NodeNum num, bool value)
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{
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meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *n = getMeshNode(num);
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TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(n);
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nodeInfoLiteSetBit(n, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_XEDDSA_SIGNED_MASK, value);
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}
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void setLongName(NodeNum num, const char *name)
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{
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meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *n = getMeshNode(num);
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TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(n);
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strncpy(n->long_name, name, sizeof(n->long_name) - 1);
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n->long_name[sizeof(n->long_name) - 1] = '\0';
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}
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const char *longName(NodeNum num)
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{
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meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *n = getMeshNode(num);
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TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(n);
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return n->long_name;
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}
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std::vector<meshtastic_NodeInfoLite> testNodes;
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};
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static MockNodeDB *mockNodeDB = nullptr;
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class AuthPipelineRadio : public RadioInterface
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{
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public:
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ErrorCode send(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p) override
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{
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sendCalls++;
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packetPool.release(p);
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return failSend ? ERRNO_DISABLED : ERRNO_OK;
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}
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bool cancelSending(NodeNum, PacketId) override
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{
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cancelCalls++;
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return true;
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}
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bool findInTxQueue(NodeNum, PacketId) override
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{
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findCalls++;
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return false;
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}
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bool removePendingTXPacket(NodeNum, PacketId, uint32_t) override
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{
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removeCalls++;
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return true;
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}
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uint32_t getPacketTime(uint32_t, bool = false) override { return 7; }
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void reset()
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{
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sendCalls = cancelCalls = findCalls = removeCalls = 0;
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failSend = false;
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}
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bool failSend = false;
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uint32_t sendCalls = 0;
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uint32_t cancelCalls = 0;
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uint32_t findCalls = 0;
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uint32_t removeCalls = 0;
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};
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class AuthPipelineRouter : public ReliableRouter
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{
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public:
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bool filter(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p) { return ReliableRouter::shouldFilterReceived(p); }
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bool historyContains(const meshtastic_MeshPacket *p) { return wasSeenRecently(p, false); }
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void remember(const meshtastic_MeshPacket *p) { wasSeenRecently(p, true); }
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void forgetRelayer(uint8_t relay, PacketId id, NodeNum from) { removeRelayer(relay, id, from); }
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bool handleUpgrade(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p) { return perhapsHandleUpgradedPacket(p); }
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void addPending(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &p, uint32_t nextTx)
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{
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auto *copy = packetPool.allocCopy(p);
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TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(copy);
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const GlobalPacketId key(copy);
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pending.emplace(key, PendingPacket(copy, NUM_INTERMEDIATE_RETX));
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pending.at(key).nextTxMsec = nextTx;
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}
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uint32_t pendingNextTx(NodeNum from, PacketId id)
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{
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PendingPacket *entry = findPendingPacket(from, id);
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return entry ? entry->nextTxMsec : 0;
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}
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uint8_t pendingTotalAttempts(NodeNum from, PacketId id)
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{
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PendingPacket *entry = findPendingPacket(from, id);
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return entry ? entry->initialNumRetransmissions + 1 : 0;
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}
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size_t pendingCount() const { return pending.size(); }
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void clearPending()
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{
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for (auto &entry : pending)
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packetPool.release(entry.second.packet);
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pending.clear();
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}
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};
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class AuthPipelineRoutingModule : public RoutingModule
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{
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public:
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void sendAckNak(meshtastic_Routing_Error, NodeNum, PacketId, ChannelIndex, uint8_t = 0, bool = false,
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const meshtastic_MeshPacket * = nullptr) override
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{
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ackCalls++;
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}
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uint32_t ackCalls = 0;
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};
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class AuthPipelineModule : public SinglePortModule
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{
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public:
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AuthPipelineModule() : SinglePortModule("authPipeline", meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP) {}
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ProcessMessage handleReceived(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &) override
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{
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calls++;
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return ProcessMessage::CONTINUE;
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}
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uint32_t calls = 0;
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};
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class AuthPipelineMqtt : public MQTT
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{
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public:
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int queueSize() { return mqttQueue.numUsed(); }
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void clearQueue()
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{
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while (QueueEntry *entry = mqttQueue.dequeuePtr(0))
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delete entry;
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}
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};
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static AuthPipelineRouter *pipelineRouter = nullptr;
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static AuthPipelineRadio *pipelineRadio = nullptr;
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static AuthPipelineRoutingModule *pipelineRouting = nullptr;
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static AuthPipelineModule *pipelineModule = nullptr;
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static AuthPipelineMqtt *pipelineMqtt = nullptr;
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static MeshService *pipelineService = nullptr;
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Helpers
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Build a decoded packet with a deterministic payload of the requested size.
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static meshtastic_MeshPacket makeDecoded(NodeNum from, NodeNum to, meshtastic_PortNum port, size_t payloadLen)
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{
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meshtastic_MeshPacket p = meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_zero;
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p.from = from;
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p.to = to;
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p.id = 0x12345678;
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p.channel = 0; // primary channel index (perhapsEncode rewrites this to the channel hash)
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p.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag;
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p.decoded.portnum = port;
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p.decoded.payload.size = payloadLen;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < payloadLen; i++)
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p.decoded.payload.bytes[i] = (uint8_t)(i & 0xff);
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return p;
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}
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// Sign a decoded packet with the CryptoEngine's current key - used to simulate a *remote* signer,
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// because perhapsEncode only auto-signs packets that originate from us.
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static void signWithCurrentKey(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
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{
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bool ok = crypto->xeddsa_sign(p->from, p->id, p->decoded.portnum, p->decoded.payload.bytes, p->decoded.payload.size,
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p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.bytes);
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TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(ok, "xeddsa_sign failed in test setup");
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p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.size = XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
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}
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// Encrypt (perhapsEncode) then decrypt+evaluate (perhapsDecode) the same packet in place.
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static DecodeState roundTrip(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
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{
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meshtastic_Routing_Error enc = perhapsEncode(p);
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TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE, enc, "perhapsEncode did not succeed");
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TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag, p->which_payload_variant,
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"perhapsEncode left packet unencrypted");
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return perhapsDecode(p);
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}
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static meshtastic_MeshPacket channelEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket p)
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{
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uint8_t encoded[MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN + 1] = {};
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const size_t encodedSize = pb_encode_to_bytes(encoded, sizeof(encoded), &meshtastic_Data_msg, &p.decoded);
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TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_THAN(0, encodedSize);
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const int16_t hash = channels.setActiveByIndex(p.channel);
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TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_OR_EQUAL(0, hash);
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crypto->encryptPacket(p.from, p.id, encodedSize, encoded);
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memcpy(p.encrypted.bytes, encoded, encodedSize);
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p.encrypted.size = encodedSize;
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p.channel = hash;
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p.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag;
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return p;
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}
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static meshtastic_MeshPacket makeSignedWirePacket(NodeNum from, NodeNum to, PacketId id, uint8_t hopLimit = 1,
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uint8_t hopStart = 2, uint8_t nextHop = NO_NEXT_HOP_PREFERENCE,
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uint8_t relayNode = 0x33, bool valid = true)
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{
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meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(from, to, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
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p.id = id;
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p.hop_limit = hopLimit;
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p.hop_start = hopStart;
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p.next_hop = nextHop;
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p.relay_node = relayNode;
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p.transport_mechanism = meshtastic_MeshPacket_TransportMechanism_TRANSPORT_LORA;
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signWithCurrentKey(&p);
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if (!valid)
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p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.bytes[0] ^= 0x80;
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return channelEncode(p);
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}
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static bool remoteSignerBit()
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{
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return nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned(mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE));
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}
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static void setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy policy)
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{
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config.security.packet_signature_policy = policy;
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}
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// Size a Data message exactly as the wire encoder would.
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static size_t encodedDataSize(const meshtastic_Data *d)
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{
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size_t s = 0;
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TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(pb_get_encoded_size(&s, &meshtastic_Data_msg, d), "pb_get_encoded_size failed");
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return s;
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}
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// Would this Data still fit a LoRa frame with a 64-byte signature attached? Mirror of the
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// production gate in Router.cpp (signedDataFits / the perhapsDecode downgrade predicate).
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static bool signedEncodingFits(const meshtastic_Data *d)
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{
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meshtastic_Data copy = *d;
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copy.xeddsa_signature.size = XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
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return encodedDataSize(©) + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH <= MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN;
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}
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// Append a length-delimited field whose tag this build's Data schema does not define, as a sender
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// on a newer schema would emit. nanopb skips unknown fields at decode, so these bytes count toward
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// the raw wire size but not the decoded struct. Returns the number of bytes appended.
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static size_t appendUnknownField(uint8_t *dst, size_t dstLen, size_t contentLen)
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{
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constexpr uint32_t UNKNOWN_FIELD_NUMBER = 100; // not a field of meshtastic_Data
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std::vector<uint8_t> content(contentLen, 0x77);
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pb_ostream_t stream = pb_ostream_from_buffer(dst, dstLen);
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TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(pb_encode_tag(&stream, PB_WT_STRING, UNKNOWN_FIELD_NUMBER));
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TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(pb_encode_string(&stream, content.data(), content.size()));
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return stream.bytes_written;
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}
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// Channel-encrypt raw Data bytes into a packet, exactly as perhapsEncode's non-PKI path does.
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// Used to inject wire bytes perhapsEncode would never produce (it only encodes p->decoded).
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static void encryptAsChannelPacket(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, uint8_t *wire, size_t size)
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{
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const int16_t hash = channels.setActiveByIndex(0);
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TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_OR_EQUAL_MESSAGE(0, hash, "no usable primary channel");
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crypto->encryptPacket(getFrom(p), p->id, size, wire);
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memcpy(p->encrypted.bytes, wire, size);
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p->encrypted.size = size;
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p->channel = hash; // on the wire the channel field carries the hash, not the index
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p->which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag;
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}
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// Build A10's frame: an unsigned broadcast carrying a POSITION payload plus unknown fields, sized
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// so the raw wire length exceeds the signature-fit threshold while the decoded fields stay under
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// it. Channel-encrypted like a normal sender. The asserts pin that split, which is what makes A10
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// and A11 meaningful.
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static meshtastic_MeshPacket makeBroadcastWithUnknownFields()
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{
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meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
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uint8_t wire[MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN + 1];
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const size_t base = pb_encode_to_bytes(wire, sizeof(wire), &meshtastic_Data_msg, &p.decoded);
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TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_THAN_MESSAGE(0, base, "failed to encode the base Data");
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const size_t raw = base + appendUnknownField(wire + base, sizeof(wire) - base, 160);
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// The decoded fields fit a signature, so a sender that signs would have signed this Data.
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TEST_ASSERT_LESS_OR_EQUAL_MESSAGE(MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN, base + XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_FIELD_BYTES + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH,
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"decoded fields must fit a signature, else the test is vacuous");
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// The unknown fields put the raw size over that threshold, so the two sizings disagree here.
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TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_THAN_MESSAGE(MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN, raw + XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_FIELD_BYTES + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH,
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"unknown fields must push the raw size past the fit threshold");
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// The frame is still one a radio could actually send.
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TEST_ASSERT_LESS_OR_EQUAL_MESSAGE(MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN, raw + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH, "frame must still fit a LoRa frame");
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encryptAsChannelPacket(&p, wire, raw);
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return p;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Unity lifecycle
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void setUp(void)
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{
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service = pipelineService;
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// Construct the mock FIRST: the NodeDB constructor can reload persisted state from the
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// host filesystem (portduino VFS) and repopulate the globals - a saved private key
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// re-enables the PKI encrypt path and fails the unicast tests on hosts with leftover prefs.
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mockNodeDB = new MockNodeDB();
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mockNodeDB->clearTestNodes();
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#if WARM_NODE_COUNT > 0
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mockNodeDB->warmStore.clear();
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#endif
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nodeDB = mockNodeDB;
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// Clean global config/owner AFTER the ctor; zeroed config => rebroadcast ALL (no KNOWN_ONLY
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// drop) and security.private_key.size == 0 (PKI encrypt path skipped => simple channel crypto).
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config = meshtastic_LocalConfig_init_zero;
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moduleConfig = meshtastic_LocalModuleConfig_init_zero;
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owner = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
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// Exercise the downgrade-protection matrix by default. Production defaults to
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// COMPATIBLE so existing meshes remain interoperable; tests that cover that
|
|
// mode opt in explicitly.
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_BALANCED);
|
|
myNodeInfo.my_node_num = LOCAL_NODE; // drives isFromUs()/getFrom()/isToUs()
|
|
|
|
// Working primary channel with the default PSK so encrypt/decrypt round-trips.
|
|
channels.initDefaults();
|
|
channels.onConfigChanged();
|
|
|
|
pipelineRouter->clearPending();
|
|
pipelineRouter->rxDupe = 0;
|
|
pipelineRouter->txRelayCanceled = 0;
|
|
pipelineRadio->reset();
|
|
pipelineRouting->ackCalls = 0;
|
|
pipelineModule->calls = 0;
|
|
pipelineMqtt->clearQueue();
|
|
while (meshtastic_MeshPacket *queued = pipelineService->getForPhone())
|
|
packetPool.release(queued);
|
|
while (meshtastic_QueueStatus *queued = pipelineService->getQueueStatusForPhone())
|
|
pipelineService->releaseQueueStatusToPool(queued);
|
|
resetRoutingAuthEvaluationCount();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set while C14's saturated AirTime is installed; see useDutyCycleSaturatedAirTime() below.
|
|
static AirTime *c14SavedAirTime = nullptr;
|
|
|
|
void tearDown(void)
|
|
{
|
|
delete mockNodeDB;
|
|
mockNodeDB = nullptr;
|
|
nodeDB = nullptr;
|
|
|
|
// Restore globals here, not at the end of a test body: an assertion aborts the body, and these
|
|
// would otherwise leak into every later case. The injected clock is the one the N8-N11
|
|
// suppression-window cases drive; the region and the AirTime swap are C14's duty-cycle setup.
|
|
Time::useRealClock();
|
|
Time::resetMonotonicForTests();
|
|
config.lora.region = meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_US;
|
|
initRegion();
|
|
if (c14SavedAirTime) {
|
|
airTime = c14SavedAirTime;
|
|
c14SavedAirTime = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ===========================================================================
|
|
// Group A - receive-side accept/reject matrix
|
|
// ===========================================================================
|
|
|
|
// A1: valid signature from a node whose key we know -> accepted, marked signed, signer bit learned.
|
|
void test_A1_valid_signature_accepted_and_learns_signer(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv); // engine now holds REMOTE's key
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, pub);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(remoteSignerBit()); // not known as a signer yet
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
signWithCurrentKey(&p);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(remoteSignerBit(), "verified signature must set the signer bit");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A2: a tampered signature from a known key -> dropped.
|
|
void test_A2_bad_signature_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_COMPATIBLE);
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, pub);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
signWithCurrentKey(&p);
|
|
p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.bytes[0] ^= 0xFF; // corrupt the signature
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_POLICY_REJECT, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A3: signed packet but we have no key for the sender -> accepted unverified, signer bit NOT set.
|
|
void test_A3_signed_no_pubkey_accepted_unverified(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_BALANCED);
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE); // node exists, but no public key stored
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
signWithCurrentKey(&p);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(p.xeddsa_signed, "cannot be marked verified without a key");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(remoteSignerBit(), "must not learn signer without verifying");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A4: downgrade protection - unsigned small broadcast from a known signer -> dropped.
|
|
void test_A4_downgrade_unsigned_broadcast_from_signer_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true); // we've seen this node sign before
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
// from != us, so perhapsEncode leaves it unsigned.
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_POLICY_REJECT, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A5: no prior knowledge - unsigned small broadcast from a non-signer -> accepted.
|
|
void test_A5_unsigned_broadcast_from_nonsigner_accepted(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE); // signer bit clear
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A6: unsigned UNICAST from a known signer -> accepted (unicasts are never signed).
|
|
void test_A6_unsigned_unicast_from_signer_accepted(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
// Unicast to us; PRIVATE_APP avoids the unrelated legacy-DM rejection for TEXT_MESSAGE_APP.
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, LOCAL_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A7: unsigned OVERSIZED broadcast from a known signer -> accepted (couldn't have carried a sig).
|
|
void test_A7_unsigned_oversized_broadcast_from_signer_accepted(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, OVERSIZED_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A8: F2 regression - unsigned broadcast from a signer in the old "dead band": its *encoded* Data
|
|
// can't take a 64-byte signature and still fit a LoRa frame, but the old payload-size heuristic
|
|
// (payload + 64 < DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN) judged it signable and dropped it as a downgrade. Must be
|
|
// accepted: an honest signer physically cannot sign this packet.
|
|
void test_A8_unsigned_deadband_broadcast_from_signer_accepted(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
// Shape it like a real sender's Data: perhapsEncode adds the bitfield to packets a node
|
|
// originates, so remote broadcast traffic carries it too.
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, 167);
|
|
p.decoded.has_bitfield = true;
|
|
p.decoded.bitfield = 0;
|
|
|
|
// Pin the payload inside the dead band; if Data's encoding ever shifts, retune the payload
|
|
// size above instead of letting this test pass vacuously.
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(p.decoded.payload.size + XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE < meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN,
|
|
"payload must sit in the old heuristic's drop range");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(signedEncodingFits(&p.decoded), "signed encoding must NOT fit a LoRa frame");
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A9: the boundary holds - the largest broadcast whose signed encoding still fits is still
|
|
// subject to the downgrade drop when it arrives unsigned from a known signer.
|
|
// (Deliberately non-discriminating: the old heuristic dropped this packet too. A9 pins the
|
|
// boundary against over-correction; A8 and B4 are the F2 regression discriminators.)
|
|
void test_A9_unsigned_boundary_broadcast_from_signer_still_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, 166);
|
|
p.decoded.has_bitfield = true;
|
|
p.decoded.bitfield = 0;
|
|
|
|
// Exactly at the limit: signed encoding fills the frame to the last byte. Pinned so the
|
|
// boundary can't silently drift.
|
|
meshtastic_Data signedCopy = p.decoded;
|
|
signedCopy.xeddsa_signature.size = XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN, encodedDataSize(&signedCopy) + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH,
|
|
"payload no longer sits exactly on the fit boundary - retune it");
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_POLICY_REJECT, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_A10_compatible_accepts_unsigned_broadcast_from_signer(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_COMPATIBLE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_A11_strict_rejects_unsigned_all_portnums_destinations_and_sizes(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
const meshtastic_PortNum ports[] = {
|
|
meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_TELEMETRY_APP,
|
|
meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_WAYPOINT_APP,
|
|
};
|
|
for (const auto port : ports) {
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, port, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_POLICY_REJECT, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket unicast = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, LOCAL_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_POLICY_REJECT, roundTrip(&unicast));
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket oversized =
|
|
makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, OVERSIZED_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_POLICY_REJECT, roundTrip(&oversized));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_A12_strict_rejects_signed_packet_without_key(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
signWithCurrentKey(&p);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_POLICY_REJECT, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_A13_strict_accepts_locally_authenticated_pki_packet(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
uint8_t localPub[32], localPriv[32], remotePub[32], remotePriv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(localPub, localPriv);
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(remotePub, remotePriv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, localPub);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, remotePub);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_Data data = meshtastic_Data_init_zero;
|
|
data.portnum = meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP;
|
|
data.payload.size = SMALL_PAYLOAD;
|
|
memset(data.payload.bytes, 0x5A, data.payload.size);
|
|
uint8_t plaintext[MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN + 1] = {};
|
|
const size_t plaintextSize = pb_encode_to_bytes(plaintext, sizeof(plaintext), &meshtastic_Data_msg, &data);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_THAN(0, plaintextSize);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t localKey = {32, {0}};
|
|
memcpy(localKey.bytes, localPub, sizeof(localPub));
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_zero;
|
|
p.from = REMOTE_NODE;
|
|
p.to = LOCAL_NODE;
|
|
p.id = 0x0CC01234;
|
|
p.channel = 0;
|
|
p.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag;
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(remotePriv);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(crypto->encryptCurve25519(p.to, p.from, localKey, p.id, plaintextSize, plaintext, p.encrypted.bytes));
|
|
p.encrypted.size = plaintextSize + MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD;
|
|
|
|
// Only the receiver's private key can establish the local pki_encrypted authentication marker.
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(localPriv);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(p.pki_encrypted);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP, p.decoded.portnum);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_A13b_strict_rejects_spoofed_pki_flag_on_encrypted_ingress(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, LOCAL_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE, perhapsEncode(&p));
|
|
p.pki_encrypted = true;
|
|
p.public_key.size = 32;
|
|
memset(p.public_key.bytes, 0xAB, p.public_key.size);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_POLICY_REJECT, perhapsDecode(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(p.pki_encrypted);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, p.public_key.size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_A14_strict_bootstraps_identity_bound_signed_nodeinfo(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
const NodeNum signer = crc32Buffer(pub, sizeof(pub));
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_User user = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
user.public_key.size = sizeof(pub);
|
|
memcpy(user.public_key.bytes, pub, sizeof(pub));
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(signer, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, 0);
|
|
p.decoded.payload.size =
|
|
pb_encode_to_bytes(p.decoded.payload.bytes, sizeof(p.decoded.payload.bytes), &meshtastic_User_msg, &user);
|
|
signWithCurrentKey(&p);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(signer);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(node);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT8_ARRAY(pub, node->public_key.bytes, sizeof(pub));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_A15_strict_rejects_nodeinfo_key_without_identity_binding(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_User user = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
user.public_key.size = sizeof(pub);
|
|
memcpy(user.public_key.bytes, pub, sizeof(pub));
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p =
|
|
makeDecoded(crc32Buffer(pub, sizeof(pub)) ^ 1, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, 0);
|
|
p.decoded.payload.size =
|
|
pb_encode_to_bytes(p.decoded.payload.bytes, sizeof(p.decoded.payload.bytes), &meshtastic_User_msg, &user);
|
|
signWithCurrentKey(&p);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_POLICY_REJECT, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NULL(mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(p.from));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_A16_compatible_rejects_invalid_first_contact_nodeinfo(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_COMPATIBLE);
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_User user = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
user.public_key.size = sizeof(pub);
|
|
memcpy(user.public_key.bytes, pub, sizeof(pub));
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p =
|
|
makeDecoded(crc32Buffer(pub, sizeof(pub)) ^ 1, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, 0);
|
|
p.decoded.payload.size =
|
|
pb_encode_to_bytes(p.decoded.payload.bytes, sizeof(p.decoded.payload.bytes), &meshtastic_User_msg, &user);
|
|
signWithCurrentKey(&p);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_POLICY_REJECT, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if WARM_NODE_COUNT > 0
|
|
void test_A17_strict_verifies_signer_from_warm_key_store(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(mockNodeDB->warmStore.absorb(REMOTE_NODE, 1, pub));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NULL(mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE));
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
signWithCurrentKey(&p);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *rehydrated = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MESSAGE(rehydrated, "verified warm signer must be re-admitted to the hot store");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT8_ARRAY(pub, rehydrated->public_key.bytes, sizeof(pub));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned(rehydrated), "re-admitted signer must retain Balanced downgrade memory");
|
|
|
|
// Model its next hot-store eviction and prove Balanced still remembers the signer without
|
|
// allocating a hot node merely to evaluate an unsigned packet.
|
|
// Mirror what NodeDB eviction actually stores for a signer: warmProtectedCategory() yields
|
|
// XeddsaSigner *and* the dedicated warm signer bit is set from nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned().
|
|
// isKnownXeddsaSigner() reads that signer bit, not the protected category.
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(mockNodeDB->warmStore.absorb(REMOTE_NODE, 2, pub, meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_CLIENT,
|
|
static_cast<uint8_t>(WarmProtected::XeddsaSigner), /*signer=*/true));
|
|
mockNodeDB->clearTestNodes();
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_BALANCED);
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket unsignedPacket =
|
|
makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&unsignedPacket),
|
|
"Balanced downgrade memory must survive repeated hot-store eviction");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
void test_A18_unsigned_broadcast_from_signer_with_unknown_fields_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeBroadcastWithUnknownFields();
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(DECODE_POLICY_REJECT, perhapsDecode(&p),
|
|
"unsigned broadcast from a signer must be dropped despite unknown fields");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_A19_unsigned_broadcast_from_nonsigner_with_unknown_fields_accepted(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeBroadcastWithUnknownFields();
|
|
const size_t rawSize = p.encrypted.size;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&p), "frame from a non-signer must still decode");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, p.decoded.portnum, "unknown fields must not disturb the portnum");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(SMALL_PAYLOAD, p.decoded.payload.size, "payload must survive the unknown fields");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_LESS_THAN_MESSAGE(rawSize, encodedDataSize(&p.decoded),
|
|
"unknown fields must drop at decode, leaving decoded size < raw");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ===========================================================================
|
|
// Group B - send-side signing policy (perhapsEncode)
|
|
// ===========================================================================
|
|
|
|
// B1: our own small broadcast is auto-signed (and verifies on the way back in).
|
|
void test_B1_local_broadcast_is_signed(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv); // engine signs with this; store the matching pubkey for us
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, pub);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE, p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size, "broadcast should be auto-signed");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// B2: preserve the existing wire behavior: non-PKI unicast is not signed.
|
|
void test_B2_local_unicast_not_signed(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(0, p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size, "unicast must remain unsigned");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// B3: our own oversized broadcast is NOT signed (signature wouldn't fit).
|
|
void test_B3_local_oversized_broadcast_not_signed(void)
|
|
{
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, OVERSIZED_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(0, p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size, "oversized broadcast must not be signed");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// B4: F2 regression sweep - every broadcast payload size that fits a LoRa frame unsigned must
|
|
// still be deliverable: signing steps aside exactly when the signed encoding stops fitting,
|
|
// never producing TOO_LARGE (the old heuristic dead-banded payloads 167-168). Because the first
|
|
// verified packet sets our signer bit in the mock DB, the later unsigned sizes also prove the
|
|
// receiver's downgrade predicate stays exactly symmetric with the sender's sign gate.
|
|
void test_B4_all_broadcast_sizes_deliverable_no_deadband(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, pub);
|
|
|
|
bool sawSigned = false, sawUnsigned = false;
|
|
for (size_t n = 1; n <= 232; n++) {
|
|
char msg[32];
|
|
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "payload size %u", (unsigned)n);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, n);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p), msg);
|
|
|
|
// Exact oracle: signed iff the signed encoding fits the frame. signedEncodingFits() forces
|
|
// the signature size itself, so it reads the same whether or not p.decoded came back signed.
|
|
const bool isSigned = p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size == XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(signedEncodingFits(&p.decoded), isSigned, msg);
|
|
|
|
if (isSigned) {
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(sawUnsigned, msg); // monotonic: once too big, never signed again
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(p.xeddsa_signed, msg); // and it verified on the way back in
|
|
sawSigned = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
sawUnsigned = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(sawSigned, "sweep never produced a signed packet");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(sawUnsigned, "sweep never crossed the fit boundary");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// B5: a client-preset signature on a packet outside the existing broadcast sign class is discarded.
|
|
void test_B5_preset_signature_on_local_packet_cleared(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size = XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
|
|
memset(p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.bytes, 0xAB, XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(0, p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size, "preset signature must be discarded on unicast");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// B6: the exact-fit gate tracks Data *shape*, not just payload size. A tapback-style broadcast
|
|
// (want_response + reply_id + emoji) carries extra wire bytes that shift the fit boundary; the
|
|
// sweep proves no dead band exists for that shape either, and - once the signer bit is learned -
|
|
// that the receiver's downgrade predicate stays symmetric for it too. Window
|
|
// straddles this shape's boundary; capped at 200 so even the unsigned rich encoding stays well
|
|
// inside the frame (at n=221 it first hits the pre-existing, signing-unrelated TOO_LARGE).
|
|
void test_B6_rich_shape_sweep_no_deadband(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, pub);
|
|
|
|
bool sawSigned = false, sawUnsigned = false;
|
|
for (size_t n = 100; n <= 200; n++) {
|
|
char msg[32];
|
|
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "payload size %u", (unsigned)n);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, n);
|
|
p.decoded.want_response = true;
|
|
p.decoded.reply_id = 0x11223344;
|
|
p.decoded.emoji = 1;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p), msg);
|
|
|
|
const bool isSigned = p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size == XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(signedEncodingFits(&p.decoded), isSigned, msg);
|
|
|
|
if (isSigned) {
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(sawUnsigned, msg);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(p.xeddsa_signed, msg);
|
|
sawSigned = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
sawUnsigned = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(sawSigned, "rich sweep never produced a signed packet");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(sawUnsigned, "rich sweep never crossed the fit boundary");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_B7_infrastructure_port_signing_matrix(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, pub);
|
|
|
|
const meshtastic_PortNum ports[] = {
|
|
meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP,
|
|
meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP,
|
|
meshtastic_PortNum_TRACEROUTE_APP,
|
|
meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP,
|
|
};
|
|
for (const auto port : ports) {
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket broadcast = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, port, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&broadcast));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE, broadcast.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size,
|
|
"signable infrastructure broadcast must be signed");
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket unicast = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, port, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&unicast));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(0, unicast.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size,
|
|
"infrastructure unicast must preserve existing unsigned behavior");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_B8_licensed_broadcast_and_unicast_are_signed(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, pub);
|
|
owner.is_licensed = true;
|
|
channels.ensureLicensedOperation();
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket broadcast =
|
|
makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&broadcast));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE, broadcast.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(broadcast.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket direct = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&direct));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE, direct.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(direct.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_B9_licensed_unicast_never_uses_pki_encryption(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t localPub[32], localPriv[32], remotePub[32], remotePriv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(localPub, localPriv);
|
|
memcpy(config.security.private_key.bytes, localPriv, sizeof(localPriv));
|
|
config.security.private_key.size = sizeof(localPriv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, localPub);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(remotePub, remotePriv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, remotePub);
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(localPriv);
|
|
|
|
owner.is_licensed = true;
|
|
channels.ensureLicensedOperation();
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE, perhapsEncode(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(p.pki_encrypted);
|
|
meshtastic_Data plaintext = meshtastic_Data_init_zero;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(pb_decode_from_bytes(p.encrypted.bytes, p.encrypted.size, &meshtastic_Data_msg, &plaintext));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE, plaintext.xeddsa_signature.size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_B10_licensed_oversized_unicast_remains_unsigned(void)
|
|
{
|
|
owner.is_licensed = true;
|
|
channels.ensureLicensedOperation();
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, OVERSIZED_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_B11_normal_unicast_still_uses_pki(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t localPub[32], localPriv[32], remotePub[32], remotePriv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(localPub, localPriv);
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(remotePub, remotePriv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, localPub);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, remotePub);
|
|
memcpy(config.security.private_key.bytes, localPriv, sizeof(localPriv));
|
|
config.security.private_key.size = sizeof(localPriv);
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(localPriv);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE, perhapsEncode(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(p.pki_encrypted);
|
|
|
|
myNodeInfo.my_node_num = REMOTE_NODE;
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(remotePriv);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, perhapsDecode(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(p.pki_encrypted);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_B12_licensed_receiver_does_not_decrypt_pki(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t localPub[32], localPriv[32], remotePub[32], remotePriv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(localPub, localPriv);
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(remotePub, remotePriv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, localPub);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, remotePub);
|
|
memcpy(config.security.private_key.bytes, localPriv, sizeof(localPriv));
|
|
config.security.private_key.size = sizeof(localPriv);
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(localPriv);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE, perhapsEncode(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(p.pki_encrypted);
|
|
|
|
owner.is_licensed = true;
|
|
channels.ensureLicensedOperation();
|
|
myNodeInfo.my_node_num = REMOTE_NODE;
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(remotePriv);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_FAILURE, perhapsDecode(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_B13_licensed_port_and_destination_signing_matrix(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, pub);
|
|
owner.is_licensed = true;
|
|
channels.ensureLicensedOperation();
|
|
|
|
const meshtastic_PortNum ports[] = {
|
|
meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_TELEMETRY_APP,
|
|
meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP,
|
|
};
|
|
const NodeNum destinations[] = {NODENUM_BROADCAST, REMOTE_NODE};
|
|
for (const auto port : ports) {
|
|
for (const auto destination : destinations) {
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket packet = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, destination, port, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(DECODE_SUCCESS, roundTrip(&packet));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE, packet.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(packet.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(packet.pki_encrypted);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// B14: PKI needs only the two keys, so a DM can arrive over a channel we do not carry. Its ack is a
|
|
// ROUTING packet, which is PKC-excluded, so it would be channel-encoded and die with NO_CHANNEL -
|
|
// and the sender would then retransmit to exhaustion for a message that WAS delivered. Fall back to
|
|
// PKC for exactly that case.
|
|
void test_B14_ack_with_no_usable_channel_falls_back_to_pkc(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t localPub[32], localPriv[32], remotePub[32], remotePriv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(localPub, localPriv);
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(remotePub, remotePriv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, localPub);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, remotePub);
|
|
memcpy(config.security.private_key.bytes, localPriv, sizeof(localPriv));
|
|
config.security.private_key.size = sizeof(localPriv);
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(localPriv);
|
|
|
|
// A secondary channel index that does not resolve - otherwise the test proves nothing.
|
|
const ChannelIndex deadChannel = 1;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_LESS_THAN_MESSAGE(0, channels.getHash(deadChannel), "test needs an unusable channel index");
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket ack = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
ack.decoded.request_id = 0xFEED5150;
|
|
ack.channel = deadChannel;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE, perhapsEncode(&ack),
|
|
"ack on an unusable channel must not fail to send");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(ack.pki_encrypted, "it must have gone out over PKC");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The fallback must not paper over a genuinely unsendable ack: with no key for the destination there
|
|
// is nothing to encrypt to, and NO_CHANNEL is still the honest answer.
|
|
void test_B15_ack_with_no_channel_and_no_key_still_fails(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t localPub[32], localPriv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(localPub, localPriv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, localPub);
|
|
memcpy(config.security.private_key.bytes, localPriv, sizeof(localPriv));
|
|
config.security.private_key.size = sizeof(localPriv);
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(localPriv);
|
|
// REMOTE_NODE deliberately absent from the DB, so we hold no key for it.
|
|
|
|
const ChannelIndex deadChannel = 1;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_LESS_THAN(0, channels.getHash(deadChannel));
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket ack = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
ack.decoded.request_id = 0xFEED5150;
|
|
ack.channel = deadChannel;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(meshtastic_Routing_Error_NO_CHANNEL, perhapsEncode(&ack),
|
|
"without a destination key the ack is genuinely unsendable");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The fallback is scoped to acks: a non-ROUTING unicast on an unusable channel still fails, so this
|
|
// does not quietly turn every channel-less packet into a PKC packet.
|
|
void test_B16_non_ack_on_unusable_channel_still_fails(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t localPub[32], localPriv[32], remotePub[32], remotePriv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(localPub, localPriv);
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(remotePub, remotePriv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, remotePub);
|
|
memcpy(config.security.private_key.bytes, localPriv, sizeof(localPriv));
|
|
config.security.private_key.size = sizeof(localPriv);
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(localPriv);
|
|
|
|
const ChannelIndex deadChannel = 1;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_LESS_THAN(0, channels.getHash(deadChannel));
|
|
|
|
// TRACEROUTE is PKC-excluded like ROUTING, but carries no request_id and is not an ack.
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_TRACEROUTE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
p.channel = deadChannel;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(meshtastic_Routing_Error_NO_CHANNEL, perhapsEncode(&p), "the PKC fallback must apply to acks only");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A ROUTING packet on a channel that DOES resolve keeps taking the channel path, so relays retain
|
|
// the readable acks they use for next-hop learning and retransmission cancel.
|
|
void test_B17_ack_on_a_usable_channel_stays_on_the_channel(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t localPub[32], localPriv[32], remotePub[32], remotePriv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(localPub, localPriv);
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(remotePub, remotePriv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, localPub);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, remotePub);
|
|
memcpy(config.security.private_key.bytes, localPriv, sizeof(localPriv));
|
|
config.security.private_key.size = sizeof(localPriv);
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(localPriv);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket ack = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
ack.decoded.request_id = 0xFEED5150;
|
|
ack.channel = 0; // the primary, which initDefaults() made usable
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE, perhapsEncode(&ack));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(ack.pki_encrypted, "a sendable ack must stay readable to relays");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ===========================================================================
|
|
// Group C - routing pipeline and NodeInfo authentication ordering
|
|
// ===========================================================================
|
|
|
|
class NodeInfoTestShim : public NodeInfoModule
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
using MeshModule::currentRequest; // allocReply() only suppresses while a request is in flight
|
|
using NodeInfoModule::allocReply;
|
|
using NodeInfoModule::handleReceivedProtobuf;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static meshtastic_MeshPacket makeNodeInfoPacket(bool signed_)
|
|
{
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket mp = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
mp.xeddsa_signed = signed_;
|
|
return mp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_N1_unsigned_nodeinfo_from_signer_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket mp = makeNodeInfoPacket(false);
|
|
meshtastic_User user = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
user.is_licensed = owner.is_licensed;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(shim.handleReceivedProtobuf(mp, &user), "unsigned NodeInfo from signer must be dropped");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_N2_signed_nodeinfo_from_signer_not_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket mp = makeNodeInfoPacket(true);
|
|
meshtastic_User user = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
user.is_licensed = owner.is_licensed;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(shim.handleReceivedProtobuf(mp, &user));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_N3_unsigned_nodeinfo_from_nonsigner_not_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket mp = makeNodeInfoPacket(false);
|
|
meshtastic_User user = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
user.is_licensed = owner.is_licensed;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(shim.handleReceivedProtobuf(mp, &user));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_N4_unsigned_unicast_nodeinfo_from_signer_accepted(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket mp = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, LOCAL_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
mp.xeddsa_signed = false;
|
|
meshtastic_User user = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
user.is_licensed = owner.is_licensed;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(shim.handleReceivedProtobuf(mp, &user),
|
|
"unsigned unicast NodeInfo from signer must not be dropped");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void preparePipelineSigner(NodeNum sender)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(sender);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(sender, pub);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void runPipelineIngress(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &p)
|
|
{
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket *copy = packetPool.allocCopy(p);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(copy);
|
|
pipelineRouter->enqueueReceivedMessage(copy);
|
|
pipelineRouter->runOnce();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void assertNoRejectedPipelineEffects(NodeNum sender, uint32_t lastHeardBefore)
|
|
{
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRadio->sendCalls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRadio->cancelCalls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRadio->findCalls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRadio->removeCalls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRouting->ackCalls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRouter->rxDupe);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRouter->txRelayCanceled);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineModule->calls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineMqtt->queueSize());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NULL(pipelineService->getForPhone());
|
|
const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(sender);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(node);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT32(lastHeardBefore, node->last_heard);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C1_invalid_first_copy_does_not_poison_valid_same_id(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
preparePipelineSigner(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
const PacketId id = 0xC1000001;
|
|
const uint32_t lastHeard = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE)->last_heard;
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket invalid = makeSignedWirePacket(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, id, 1, 2, 0, 0x31, false);
|
|
moduleConfig.mqtt.enabled = true;
|
|
runPipelineIngress(invalid);
|
|
assertNoRejectedPipelineEffects(REMOTE_NODE, lastHeard);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(pipelineRouter->historyContains(&invalid));
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket valid = makeSignedWirePacket(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, id);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<int>(RoutingAuthVerdict::ACCEPT), static_cast<int>(passesRoutingAuthGate(&valid)));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag, valid.which_payload_variant,
|
|
"routing auth gate must preserve encrypted relay/MQTT bytes");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(pipelineRouter->filter(&valid), "valid same-ID packet was poisoned by rejected first copy");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(pipelineRouter->historyContains(&valid));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C2_invalid_ordinary_duplicate_has_no_cancel_or_delivery_effects(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
preparePipelineSigner(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
const PacketId id = 0xC2000002;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket prior = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
prior.id = id;
|
|
prior.hop_limit = 1;
|
|
prior.hop_start = 2;
|
|
prior.transport_mechanism = meshtastic_MeshPacket_TransportMechanism_TRANSPORT_LORA;
|
|
pipelineRouter->remember(&prior);
|
|
const uint32_t lastHeard = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE)->last_heard;
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket invalid = makeSignedWirePacket(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, id, 1, 2, 0, 0x32, false);
|
|
runPipelineIngress(invalid);
|
|
assertNoRejectedPipelineEffects(REMOTE_NODE, lastHeard);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(pipelineRouter->historyContains(&prior));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C3_invalid_repeated_packet_cannot_ack_or_change_retry_state(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
preparePipelineSigner(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
const PacketId id = 0xC3000003;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket prior = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
prior.id = id;
|
|
prior.hop_limit = 2;
|
|
prior.hop_start = 2;
|
|
prior.transport_mechanism = meshtastic_MeshPacket_TransportMechanism_TRANSPORT_LORA;
|
|
pipelineRouter->remember(&prior);
|
|
// "Far future, so no retransmission is due." Must be a representable future time, not
|
|
// UINT32_MAX: doRetransmissions() compares with an unsigned half-range test, under which
|
|
// UINT32_MAX is ~1ms in the *past* and would fire a retransmit and rewrite nextTxMsec.
|
|
const uint32_t notDueTxMsec = Time::getMillis() + 3600000UL;
|
|
pipelineRouter->addPending(prior, notDueTxMsec);
|
|
const uint32_t lastHeard = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(LOCAL_NODE)->last_heard;
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket invalid = makeSignedWirePacket(LOCAL_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, id, 2, 2, 0, 0x34, false);
|
|
runPipelineIngress(invalid);
|
|
assertNoRejectedPipelineEffects(LOCAL_NODE, lastHeard);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(1, pipelineRouter->pendingCount());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT32(notDueTxMsec, pipelineRouter->pendingNextTx(LOCAL_NODE, id));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C4_invalid_fallback_packet_cannot_relay(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
preparePipelineSigner(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
const PacketId id = 0xC4000004;
|
|
const uint8_t ourRelay = mockNodeDB->getLastByteOfNodeNum(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket prior = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, LOCAL_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
prior.id = id;
|
|
prior.next_hop = 0x22;
|
|
prior.relay_node = ourRelay;
|
|
prior.hop_limit = 1;
|
|
prior.hop_start = 2;
|
|
pipelineRouter->remember(&prior);
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket relayed = prior;
|
|
relayed.relay_node = 0x35;
|
|
pipelineRouter->remember(&relayed);
|
|
pipelineRouter->forgetRelayer(ourRelay, id, REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
const uint32_t lastHeard = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE)->last_heard;
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket invalid = makeSignedWirePacket(REMOTE_NODE, LOCAL_NODE, id, 1, 2, 0, 0x35, false);
|
|
runPipelineIngress(invalid);
|
|
assertNoRejectedPipelineEffects(REMOTE_NODE, lastHeard);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C5_invalid_upgrade_cannot_remove_pending_valid_send(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
preparePipelineSigner(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
const PacketId id = 0xC5000005;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket prior = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
prior.id = id;
|
|
prior.hop_limit = 1;
|
|
prior.hop_start = 2;
|
|
pipelineRouter->remember(&prior);
|
|
const uint32_t lastHeard = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE)->last_heard;
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket directInvalid = makeSignedWirePacket(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, id, 2, 2, 0, 0x36, false);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(pipelineRouter->handleUpgrade(&directInvalid));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRadio->removeCalls);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket invalid = makeSignedWirePacket(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, id, 2, 2, 0, 0x36, false);
|
|
runPipelineIngress(invalid);
|
|
assertNoRejectedPipelineEffects(REMOTE_NODE, lastHeard);
|
|
|
|
// The rejected upgrade did not raise the history watermark or remove the queued valid copy;
|
|
// a later authenticated replacement still performs the intended upgrade.
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket valid = makeSignedWirePacket(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, id, 2, 2, 0, 0x36, true);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<int>(RoutingAuthVerdict::ACCEPT), static_cast<int>(passesRoutingAuthGate(&valid)));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(pipelineRouter->filter(&valid));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(1, pipelineRadio->removeCalls);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C6_opaque_unknown_channel_is_relay_only(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket opaque = meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_zero;
|
|
opaque.from = REMOTE_NODE;
|
|
opaque.to = NODENUM_BROADCAST;
|
|
opaque.id = 0xC6000006;
|
|
opaque.channel = 0xFE;
|
|
opaque.hop_limit = 1;
|
|
opaque.hop_start = 2;
|
|
opaque.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag;
|
|
opaque.encrypted.size = 16;
|
|
memset(opaque.encrypted.bytes, 0xA5, opaque.encrypted.size);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<int>(RoutingAuthVerdict::OPAQUE_RELAY_ONLY), static_cast<int>(passesRoutingAuthGate(&opaque)));
|
|
moduleConfig.mqtt.enabled = true;
|
|
runPipelineIngress(opaque);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(1, pipelineRadio->sendCalls, "opaque broadcast should take only the safety-controlled relay path");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRouting->ackCalls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineModule->calls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineMqtt->queueSize());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NULL(pipelineService->getForPhone());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(pipelineRouter->historyContains(&opaque));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NULL(mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE));
|
|
|
|
pipelineRadio->reset();
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket addressed = opaque;
|
|
addressed.to = LOCAL_NODE;
|
|
addressed.id++;
|
|
runPipelineIngress(addressed);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(0, pipelineRadio->sendCalls, "opaque packet addressed to us must not be relayed");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRouting->ackCalls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineModule->calls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineMqtt->queueSize());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NULL(pipelineService->getForPhone());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(pipelineRouter->historyContains(&addressed));
|
|
|
|
// CORE_PORTNUMS_ONLY carries an opaque frame: the portnum filter cannot apply to a payload the relay
|
|
// cannot read, and the ROUTER role defaults to this mode (#11843).
|
|
pipelineRadio->reset();
|
|
config.device.rebroadcast_mode = meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_RebroadcastMode_CORE_PORTNUMS_ONLY;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket core = opaque;
|
|
core.id += 0x10;
|
|
runPipelineIngress(core);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(1, pipelineRadio->sendCalls, "CORE_PORTNUMS_ONLY must relay an opaque frame");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRouting->ackCalls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineModule->calls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineMqtt->queueSize());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NULL(pipelineService->getForPhone());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(pipelineRouter->historyContains(&core));
|
|
|
|
const meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_RebroadcastMode blockedModes[] = {
|
|
meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_RebroadcastMode_LOCAL_ONLY,
|
|
meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_RebroadcastMode_NONE,
|
|
};
|
|
for (const auto mode : blockedModes) {
|
|
pipelineRadio->reset();
|
|
config.device.rebroadcast_mode = mode;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket blocked = opaque;
|
|
blocked.id++;
|
|
blocked.id += static_cast<uint32_t>(mode);
|
|
blocked.transport_mechanism = meshtastic_MeshPacket_TransportMechanism_TRANSPORT_MULTICAST_UDP;
|
|
runPipelineIngress(blocked);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(0, pipelineRadio->sendCalls, "restricted rebroadcast mode must suppress opaque relay");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineRouting->ackCalls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineModule->calls);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, pipelineMqtt->queueSize());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NULL(pipelineService->getForPhone());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(pipelineRouter->historyContains(&blocked));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C7_strict_rejects_unsigned_decoded_simradio_ingress(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
const uint32_t lastHeard = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE)->last_heard;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket injected = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
injected.transport_mechanism = meshtastic_MeshPacket_TransportMechanism_TRANSPORT_LORA;
|
|
runPipelineIngress(injected);
|
|
assertNoRejectedPipelineEffects(REMOTE_NODE, lastHeard);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(pipelineRouter->historyContains(&injected));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C8_trusted_local_decoded_delivery_is_not_filtered(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket *local =
|
|
packetPool.allocCopy(makeDecoded(0, LOCAL_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(local);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ERRNO_SHOULD_RELEASE, pipelineRouter->sendLocal(local, RX_SRC_USER));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(1, pipelineModule->calls, "trusted phone-origin packet must reach local modules");
|
|
packetPool.release(local);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C9_known_channel_malformed_plaintext_has_no_pipeline_effects(void)
|
|
{
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket malformed = meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_zero;
|
|
malformed.from = REMOTE_NODE;
|
|
malformed.to = NODENUM_BROADCAST;
|
|
malformed.id = 0xC9000009;
|
|
malformed.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag;
|
|
malformed.encrypted.size = 3;
|
|
malformed.encrypted.bytes[0] = 0xFF;
|
|
malformed.encrypted.bytes[1] = 0xFF;
|
|
malformed.encrypted.bytes[2] = 0xFF;
|
|
malformed.channel = channels.setActiveByIndex(0);
|
|
crypto->encryptPacket(malformed.from, malformed.id, malformed.encrypted.size, malformed.encrypted.bytes);
|
|
|
|
// Verdict is opaque-relay-eligible now (see test_C17); hop_limit 0 is what keeps this a no-op.
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket verdictCopy = malformed;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<int>(RoutingAuthVerdict::OPAQUE_RELAY_ONLY),
|
|
static_cast<int>(passesRoutingAuthGate(&verdictCopy)));
|
|
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
const uint32_t lastHeard = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE)->last_heard;
|
|
runPipelineIngress(malformed);
|
|
assertNoRejectedPipelineEffects(REMOTE_NODE, lastHeard);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(pipelineRouter->historyContains(&malformed));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C10_legacy_channel_dm_failure_has_no_pipeline_effects(void)
|
|
{
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket legacyDm = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, LOCAL_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
legacyDm = channelEncode(legacyDm);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
const uint32_t lastHeard = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE)->last_heard;
|
|
moduleConfig.mqtt.enabled = true;
|
|
runPipelineIngress(legacyDm);
|
|
assertNoRejectedPipelineEffects(REMOTE_NODE, lastHeard);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(pipelineRouter->historyContains(&legacyDm));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C11_malformed_pki_plaintext_has_no_pipeline_effects(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t localPub[32], localPriv[32], remotePub[32], remotePriv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(localPub, localPriv);
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(remotePub, remotePriv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(LOCAL_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(LOCAL_NODE, localPub);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, remotePub);
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t malformedPlaintext[] = {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF};
|
|
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t localKey = {32, {0}};
|
|
memcpy(localKey.bytes, localPub, sizeof(localPub));
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket malformed = meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_zero;
|
|
malformed.from = REMOTE_NODE;
|
|
malformed.to = LOCAL_NODE;
|
|
malformed.id = 0xCB00000B;
|
|
malformed.channel = 0;
|
|
malformed.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag;
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(remotePriv);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(crypto->encryptCurve25519(malformed.to, malformed.from, localKey, malformed.id, sizeof(malformedPlaintext),
|
|
malformedPlaintext, malformed.encrypted.bytes));
|
|
malformed.encrypted.size = sizeof(malformedPlaintext) + MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD;
|
|
crypto->setDHPrivateKey(localPriv);
|
|
|
|
const uint32_t lastHeard = mockNodeDB->getMeshNode(REMOTE_NODE)->last_heard;
|
|
moduleConfig.mqtt.enabled = true;
|
|
runPipelineIngress(malformed);
|
|
assertNoRejectedPipelineEffects(REMOTE_NODE, lastHeard);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(pipelineRouter->historyContains(&malformed));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C12_exact_authenticated_replay_reuses_verdict_without_collision_bypass(void)
|
|
{
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
preparePipelineSigner(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket valid = makeSignedWirePacket(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, 0xCC00000C);
|
|
// Full ingress replaces this nonzero wire timestamp with the local arrival time. The exact
|
|
// authentication handoff must be consumed before that mutation, avoiding a second evaluation.
|
|
valid.rx_time = 0x12345678;
|
|
runPipelineIngress(valid);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(1, routingAuthEvaluationCount(), "full ingress must consume the primed verdict exactly once");
|
|
runPipelineIngress(valid);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(2, routingAuthEvaluationCount(), "consumed verdict must not authenticate a later replay");
|
|
|
|
// Broadcast, so isToUs() is false like any colliding-hash foreign broadcast (see test_C17);
|
|
// this still guards that the cache is reevaluated per exact bytes, not reused for a same-ID replay.
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket collision = valid;
|
|
collision.encrypted.bytes[0] ^= 0x80;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<int>(RoutingAuthVerdict::OPAQUE_RELAY_ONLY),
|
|
static_cast<int>(passesRoutingAuthGate(&collision)));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(3, routingAuthEvaluationCount(), "same packet ID with different bytes must be reevaluated");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A local reliable send that fails before reaching the radio must not outlive the error as a scheduled retransmission.
|
|
void test_C13_failed_initial_reliable_send_does_not_retry(void)
|
|
{
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket initial = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
initial.id = 0xC13C13C1;
|
|
initial.want_ack = true;
|
|
initial.channel = MAX_NUM_CHANNELS; // Out of range, so encoding returns NO_CHANNEL.
|
|
|
|
auto *packet = packetPool.allocCopy(initial);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(packet);
|
|
|
|
pipelineRouter->send(packet);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT32_MESSAGE(1, pipelineRouting->ackCalls,
|
|
"initial encoding failure must be reported to the originating client");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT32_MESSAGE(0, pipelineRouter->pendingCount(),
|
|
"failed initial send must not leave a retransmission pending");
|
|
|
|
pipelineRadio->failSend = true;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket interfaceFailure = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
interfaceFailure.id = 0xC13C13C2;
|
|
interfaceFailure.want_ack = true;
|
|
packet = packetPool.allocCopy(interfaceFailure);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(packet);
|
|
|
|
pipelineService->sendToMesh(packet, RX_SRC_USER);
|
|
meshtastic_QueueStatus *status = pipelineService->getQueueStatusForPhone();
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(status);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ERRNO_DISABLED, status->res);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT32(interfaceFailure.id, status->mesh_packet_id);
|
|
pipelineService->releaseQueueStatusToPool(status);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT32_MESSAGE(1, pipelineRouting->ackCalls,
|
|
"interface errors are reported to the client through QueueStatus, not a routing NAK");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT32_MESSAGE(0, pipelineRouter->pendingCount(),
|
|
"failed interface enqueue must not leave a retransmission pending");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// C14 needs a node that has used its whole hourly duty-cycle allowance. Swaps in a separate AirTime
|
|
// rather than poking the global's buckets, which are private now.
|
|
//
|
|
// Deliberately NOT a scoped guard: Unity's TEST_ABORT() is longjmp, which does not run destructors
|
|
// of automatic objects, so a guard would leave `airTime` dangling into an abandoned stack frame on
|
|
// any assertion failure - and later cases dereference it (NodeInfoModule::allocReply). tearDown()
|
|
// restores the global unconditionally instead. The instance is a function-local static so it
|
|
// outlives the longjmp.
|
|
//
|
|
// Note it also parks channel utilisation at ~6000%, because logAirtime() credits that for every
|
|
// report type. C14 gates on utilizationTXPercent() alone; do not reuse this for an
|
|
// isTxAllowedChannelUtil() path, which would then pass for the wrong reason.
|
|
static void useDutyCycleSaturatedAirTime()
|
|
{
|
|
static AirTime saturated;
|
|
c14SavedAirTime = airTime;
|
|
airTime = &saturated;
|
|
saturated.logAirtime(TX_LOG, MS_IN_HOUR); // utilizationTXPercent() sums every bucket -> 100%
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C14_duty_cycle_limited_reliable_send_remains_pending(void)
|
|
{
|
|
config.lora.region = meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_EU_868;
|
|
config.lora.override_duty_cycle = false;
|
|
initRegion();
|
|
useDutyCycleSaturatedAirTime();
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket initial = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
initial.id = 0xC14C14C1;
|
|
initial.want_ack = true;
|
|
auto *packet = packetPool.allocCopy(initial);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(packet);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(meshtastic_Routing_Error_DUTY_CYCLE_LIMIT, pipelineRouter->send(packet));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT32_MESSAGE(1, pipelineRouting->ackCalls,
|
|
"duty-cycle rejection must still notify the originating client");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT32_MESSAGE(1, pipelineRouter->pendingCount(),
|
|
"duty-cycle rejection must retain the retry for when airtime is available");
|
|
|
|
config.lora.region = meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_US;
|
|
initRegion();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C15_reliable_unicast_tracks_five_total_attempts(void)
|
|
{
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, REMOTE_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
p.id = 0x51530001;
|
|
p.want_ack = true;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ERRNO_OK, pipelineRouter->send(packetPool.allocCopy(p)));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT8(5, pipelineRouter->pendingTotalAttempts(LOCAL_NODE, p.id));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C16_reliable_broadcast_keeps_three_total_attempts(void)
|
|
{
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(LOCAL_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
p.id = 0x51530002;
|
|
p.want_ack = true;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ERRNO_OK, pipelineRouter->send(packetPool.allocCopy(p)));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT8(3, pipelineRouter->pendingTotalAttempts(LOCAL_NODE, p.id));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_C17_colliding_channel_hash_foreign_broadcast_is_relay_only(void)
|
|
{
|
|
// Foreign channel whose PSK collides with our channel 0's one-byte hash (see test_C9/test_C12
|
|
// for the paired tradeoff): indistinguishable from tampering, so it must relay opaquely.
|
|
setPolicy(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_PacketSignaturePolicy_PACKET_SIGNATURE_POLICY_STRICT);
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket foreign = meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_zero;
|
|
foreign.from = REMOTE_NODE;
|
|
foreign.to = NODENUM_BROADCAST;
|
|
foreign.id = 0xC1700017;
|
|
foreign.hop_limit = 1;
|
|
foreign.hop_start = 2;
|
|
foreign.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag;
|
|
const int16_t hash = channels.setActiveByIndex(0);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_OR_EQUAL_MESSAGE(0, hash, "no usable primary channel");
|
|
foreign.channel = (uint8_t)hash; // collides with our channel 0, but the ciphertext below is not ours
|
|
foreign.encrypted.size = 16;
|
|
memset(foreign.encrypted.bytes, 0xA5, foreign.encrypted.size);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<int>(RoutingAuthVerdict::OPAQUE_RELAY_ONLY), static_cast<int>(passesRoutingAuthGate(&foreign)));
|
|
|
|
// Same undecodable frame claiming to be from us must still be dropped: OPAQUE_RELAY_ONLY would
|
|
// reach perhapsGenerateImplicitAckForOwnOverheard, which acts on header bytes alone.
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket spoofed = foreign;
|
|
spoofed.from = LOCAL_NODE;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<int>(RoutingAuthVerdict::REJECT), static_cast<int>(passesRoutingAuthGate(&spoofed)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// C5: the packet survives (C4) but the identity claim inside it must not land - the pubkey guard
|
|
// can't tell a signer from an impersonator replaying its (public) key. Only the write is refused.
|
|
void test_N5_unsigned_unicast_nodeinfo_from_signer_does_not_change_name(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setLongName(REMOTE_NODE, "Genuine");
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket mp = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, LOCAL_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
mp.xeddsa_signed = false;
|
|
meshtastic_User user = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
user.is_licensed = owner.is_licensed;
|
|
strcpy(user.long_name, "Spoofed");
|
|
strcpy(user.short_name, "SPF");
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(shim.handleReceivedProtobuf(mp, &user), "the packet itself must still be accepted");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_STRING_MESSAGE("Genuine", mockNodeDB->longName(REMOTE_NODE),
|
|
"unsigned unicast NodeInfo from a signer must not rewrite its stored name");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// C6: the same exchange signed - the update is authenticated and must land, pinning C5 as a
|
|
// targeted refusal rather than a blanket block on unicast NodeInfo from signers.
|
|
void test_N6_signed_unicast_nodeinfo_from_signer_changes_name(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setLongName(REMOTE_NODE, "Genuine");
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket mp = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, LOCAL_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
mp.xeddsa_signed = true;
|
|
meshtastic_User user = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
user.is_licensed = owner.is_licensed;
|
|
strcpy(user.long_name, "Renamed");
|
|
strcpy(user.short_name, "RNM");
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(shim.handleReceivedProtobuf(mp, &user));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_STRING_MESSAGE("Renamed", mockNodeDB->longName(REMOTE_NODE),
|
|
"a signed update from a signer must still be learned");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// C7: a node that has never signed is unaffected - the ordinary case for most of the mesh.
|
|
void test_N7_unsigned_unicast_nodeinfo_from_nonsigner_changes_name(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE); // signer bit clear
|
|
mockNodeDB->setLongName(REMOTE_NODE, "Genuine");
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket mp = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, LOCAL_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
mp.xeddsa_signed = false;
|
|
meshtastic_User user = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
user.is_licensed = owner.is_licensed;
|
|
strcpy(user.long_name, "Renamed");
|
|
strcpy(user.short_name, "RNM");
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(shim.handleReceivedProtobuf(mp, &user));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_STRING_MESSAGE("Renamed", mockNodeDB->longName(REMOTE_NODE),
|
|
"non-signer identity learning must be unaffected");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// N8-N11: the 12h reply-suppression window.
|
|
//
|
|
// The stamp is uptime SECONDS, not milliseconds: entries live for as long as the node stays in the
|
|
// DB, so a 32-bit millisecond stamp aliased back into the window once uptime passed 49.7 days and
|
|
// suppressed a legitimate reply for up to 12h. Driven through Time::setTestMillis() rather than by
|
|
// waiting.
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
static constexpr uint32_t kSuppressSecs = 12 * 60 * 60;
|
|
|
|
// Deliver a NodeInfo request from `sender` and report whether we would reply to it.
|
|
static bool wouldReplyToNodeInfoRequest(NodeInfoTestShim &shim, NodeNum sender)
|
|
{
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket mp = makeDecoded(sender, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
mp.decoded.want_response = true;
|
|
meshtastic_User user = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
user.is_licensed = owner.is_licensed;
|
|
|
|
shim.handleReceivedProtobuf(mp, &user);
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim::currentRequest = ∓
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket *reply = shim.allocReply();
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim::currentRequest = nullptr;
|
|
|
|
if (reply) {
|
|
packetPool.release(reply);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step the injected clock the way the main loop does - advance, then publish the wrap carry.
|
|
static void advanceUptime(uint32_t deltaMs)
|
|
{
|
|
Time::advanceTestMillis(deltaMs);
|
|
Time::serviceMonotonic();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_N8_second_request_inside_the_window_is_suppressed(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
Time::setTestMillis(60 * 1000);
|
|
Time::serviceMonotonic();
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(wouldReplyToNodeInfoRequest(shim, REMOTE_NODE), "first request must be answered");
|
|
|
|
advanceUptime(60 * 60 * 1000); // 1h later, well inside the 12h window
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(wouldReplyToNodeInfoRequest(shim, REMOTE_NODE), "repeat request inside 12h must be suppressed");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_N9_request_after_the_window_is_answered(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
Time::setTestMillis(60 * 1000);
|
|
Time::serviceMonotonic();
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(wouldReplyToNodeInfoRequest(shim, REMOTE_NODE));
|
|
|
|
advanceUptime((kSuppressSecs + 60) * 1000); // 12h + a minute
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(wouldReplyToNodeInfoRequest(shim, REMOTE_NODE), "request after 12h must be answered");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The regression. A stamp is only aliased by a counter that wraps underneath it, so the failure
|
|
// needs a *full* 2^32 ms of uptime to elapse, not merely a crossing of the boundary: with 32-bit
|
|
// millisecond stamps `now - stamp` then computes as 0 and the sender looks like it was answered
|
|
// this instant. Uptime seconds do not wrap for 136 years, so the entry reads as ~49.7 days old.
|
|
void test_N10_stale_stamp_does_not_alias_after_a_full_wrap(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
Time::setTestMillis(0x80000000u); // ~24.8 days of uptime
|
|
Time::serviceMonotonic();
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(wouldReplyToNodeInfoRequest(shim, REMOTE_NODE));
|
|
|
|
// A whole millis() cycle, in two serviced halves - one publish per window is the contract.
|
|
advanceUptime(0x80000000u);
|
|
advanceUptime(0x80000000u);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(wouldReplyToNodeInfoRequest(shim, REMOTE_NODE),
|
|
"a stamp one full wrap old must read as ~49.7 days, not as this instant");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Suppression must still behave normally either side of the boundary: still suppressing inside the
|
|
// window, and answering again once 12h have passed, with the stamp and the reading on opposite
|
|
// sides of the wrap.
|
|
void test_N11_window_still_applies_across_the_wrap(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
Time::setTestMillis(0xFFFF0000u); // just short of the wrap
|
|
Time::serviceMonotonic();
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(wouldReplyToNodeInfoRequest(shim, REMOTE_NODE));
|
|
|
|
advanceUptime(0x20000u); // ~131s later, and now past the wrap
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(wouldReplyToNodeInfoRequest(shim, REMOTE_NODE),
|
|
"the window must still bite when the stamp sits the other side of the wrap");
|
|
|
|
advanceUptime((kSuppressSecs + 60) * 1000);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(wouldReplyToNodeInfoRequest(shim, REMOTE_NODE),
|
|
"and must still release once 12h have passed across the wrap");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_L1_licensed_nodeinfo_publishes_public_key(void)
|
|
{
|
|
owner.is_licensed = true;
|
|
owner.public_key.size = 32;
|
|
memset(owner.public_key.bytes, 0x5A, owner.public_key.size);
|
|
|
|
NodeInfoTestShim shim;
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket *reply = shim.allocReply();
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(reply);
|
|
meshtastic_User published = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(
|
|
pb_decode_from_bytes(reply->decoded.payload.bytes, reply->decoded.payload.size, &meshtastic_User_msg, &published));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(published.is_licensed);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(32, published.public_key.size);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT8_ARRAY(owner.public_key.bytes, published.public_key.bytes, 32);
|
|
packetPool.release(reply);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_L2_licensed_identity_key_is_generated_and_preserved(void)
|
|
{
|
|
owner.is_licensed = true;
|
|
config.lora.region = meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_US;
|
|
config.security = meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_init_zero;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(mockNodeDB->generateCryptoKeyPair());
|
|
uint8_t privateKey[32], publicKey[32];
|
|
memcpy(privateKey, config.security.private_key.bytes, sizeof(privateKey));
|
|
memcpy(publicKey, config.security.public_key.bytes, sizeof(publicKey));
|
|
const NodeNum migratedNodeNum = myNodeInfo.my_node_num;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(LOCAL_NODE, migratedNodeNum);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(mockNodeDB->licensedIdentityMigrationPending);
|
|
|
|
MockMeshService mockService;
|
|
service = &mockService;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(mockNodeDB->notifyPendingLicensedIdentityMigration());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(1, mockService.notificationCount);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(mockNodeDB->licensedIdentityMigrationPending);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(mockNodeDB->notifyPendingLicensedIdentityMigration());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(1, mockService.notificationCount);
|
|
service = pipelineService;
|
|
|
|
config.security.public_key.size = 0;
|
|
owner.public_key.size = 0;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(mockNodeDB->generateCryptoKeyPair());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(migratedNodeNum, myNodeInfo.my_node_num);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT8_ARRAY(privateKey, config.security.private_key.bytes, sizeof(privateKey));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT8_ARRAY(publicKey, config.security.public_key.bytes, sizeof(publicKey));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT8_ARRAY(publicKey, owner.public_key.bytes, sizeof(publicKey));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_L3_factory_config_reset_preserves_valid_identity_private_key(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t publicKey[32], privateKey[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(publicKey, privateKey);
|
|
config.has_security = true;
|
|
config.security.private_key.size = 32;
|
|
memcpy(config.security.private_key.bytes, privateKey, sizeof(privateKey));
|
|
|
|
mockNodeDB->installDefaultsPreservingIdentity();
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(32, config.security.private_key.size);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT8_ARRAY(privateKey, config.security.private_key.bytes, sizeof(privateKey));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, config.security.public_key.size);
|
|
|
|
owner.is_licensed = true;
|
|
config.lora.region = meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_US;
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(mockNodeDB->generateCryptoKeyPair());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT8_ARRAY(privateKey, config.security.private_key.bytes, sizeof(privateKey));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT8_ARRAY(publicKey, config.security.public_key.bytes, sizeof(publicKey));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void test_L4_licensed_low_entropy_identity_is_regenerated(void)
|
|
{
|
|
static const uint8_t compromisedPublicKey[32] = {
|
|
0xac, 0xaf, 0x8c, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x1c, 0x37, 0xac, 0x4f, 0x03, 0xa1, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0x37, 0x23, 0x29,
|
|
0xc8, 0xa3, 0x5d, 0x7f, 0x05, 0x26, 0xeb, 0x00, 0xbd, 0x26, 0xb8, 0x2e, 0xb1, 0x94, 0x7d, 0x24,
|
|
};
|
|
owner.is_licensed = true;
|
|
config.lora.region = meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_US;
|
|
config.security.private_key.size = 32;
|
|
memset(config.security.private_key.bytes, 0xA5, 32);
|
|
config.security.public_key.size = 32;
|
|
memcpy(config.security.public_key.bytes, compromisedPublicKey, sizeof(compromisedPublicKey));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(mockNodeDB->checkLowEntropyPublicKey(config.security.public_key));
|
|
|
|
uint8_t oldPrivateKey[32];
|
|
memcpy(oldPrivateKey, config.security.private_key.bytes, sizeof(oldPrivateKey));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(mockNodeDB->generateCryptoKeyPair());
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(mockNodeDB->keyIsLowEntropy);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(mockNodeDB->checkLowEntropyPublicKey(config.security.public_key));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(memcmp(oldPrivateKey, config.security.private_key.bytes, sizeof(oldPrivateKey)) == 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ===========================================================================
|
|
// Group D - encoding invariants the routing gates depend on
|
|
// ===========================================================================
|
|
|
|
// D1: the encoded overhead of the signature field must be exactly XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_FIELD_BYTES
|
|
// (1 tag byte + 1 length byte + 64 signature bytes). The receiver downgrade predicate adds this
|
|
// constant to the unsigned size; this test pins that it matches the real wire overhead the
|
|
// sender's encoder produces, keeping the two sides symmetric. It drifts if the field number ever
|
|
// moves to >= 16 or the signature grows past 127 bytes.
|
|
void test_D1_signature_field_overhead_exact(void)
|
|
{
|
|
meshtastic_Data d = meshtastic_Data_init_zero;
|
|
d.portnum = meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP;
|
|
d.payload.size = 100;
|
|
|
|
const size_t without = encodedDataSize(&d);
|
|
d.xeddsa_signature.size = XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
|
|
const size_t with = encodedDataSize(&d);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_FIELD_BYTES, with - without, "signature field wire overhead drifted");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ===========================================================================
|
|
// Group E - decoded-ingress policy (checkXeddsaReceivePolicy)
|
|
// ===========================================================================
|
|
// Already-decoded packets never reach perhapsDecode's crypto path (it early-returns), so
|
|
// plaintext-MQTT downlink applies this policy function directly at ingress (MQTT.cpp). These
|
|
// tests drive it the same way: decoded packets, sized from p->decoded exactly as the RF path is.
|
|
// End-to-end MQTT wiring is covered in test_mqtt.
|
|
|
|
// E1: unsigned small broadcast from a known signer -> dropped (downgrade protection holds on
|
|
// the decoded-ingress path too - the F3 bypass).
|
|
void test_E1_decoded_unsigned_broadcast_from_signer_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// E2: unsigned broadcast from a non-signer -> accepted.
|
|
void test_E2_decoded_unsigned_broadcast_from_nonsigner_accepted(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE); // signer bit clear
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// E3: valid signature with a known key -> accepted, marked verified, signer bit learned.
|
|
void test_E3_decoded_valid_signature_verified_and_learns_signer(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, pub);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
signWithCurrentKey(&p);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(remoteSignerBit(), "verified signature must set the signer bit");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// E4: corrupted signature with a known key -> dropped.
|
|
void test_E4_decoded_bad_signature_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t pub[32], priv[32];
|
|
crypto->generateKeyPair(pub, priv);
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setPublicKey(REMOTE_NODE, pub);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
signWithCurrentKey(&p);
|
|
p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.bytes[0] ^= 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p));
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// E5: unsigned oversized broadcast from a signer -> accepted (packets whose signed encoding
|
|
// wouldn't fit are exempt, identically to the RF path: both size p->decoded).
|
|
void test_E5_decoded_unsigned_oversized_broadcast_from_signer_accepted(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, OVERSIZED_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// E6: Balanced accepts unsigned unicast from a signer for legacy compatibility.
|
|
void test_E6_decoded_unsigned_unicast_from_signer_accepted(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, LOCAL_NODE, meshtastic_PortNum_PRIVATE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// E8: a crafted partial (non-0, non-64) signature must not let a forged broadcast dodge the
|
|
// downgrade drop. A 63-byte junk signature inflates the encoded size past the fit threshold, so
|
|
// a size-only predicate would treat the packet as "too big to sign" and accept it as an
|
|
// impersonation of signer REMOTE. The malformed-size reject drops it before that math runs.
|
|
void test_E8_decoded_partial_signature_from_signer_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
// 146-byte payload sits in the band that WOULD fit a signature (so an honest unsigned one is a
|
|
// downgrade), but the 63 bogus signature bytes push the raw size over the frame limit.
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, 146);
|
|
p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size = XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE - 1;
|
|
memset(p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.bytes, 0xCD, p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p), "partial signature from a signer must be dropped");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// E9: the malformed-size reject is unconditional - a partial signature is dropped even from a
|
|
// node we've never seen sign (an honest sender never emits a 1..63-byte signature field).
|
|
void test_E9_decoded_partial_signature_from_nonsigner_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE); // signer bit clear
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, SMALL_PAYLOAD);
|
|
p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size = 10;
|
|
memset(p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.bytes, 0x5A, p.decoded.xeddsa_signature.size);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p), "partial signature must be dropped as malformed");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Build an unsigned broadcast whose inner message is padded with an unknown field, and pin that the
|
|
// padding pushes the RAW size past the fit threshold - the exemption the attacker is buying - while
|
|
// the frame stays sendable. Without canonical inner sizing these packets are wrongly accepted.
|
|
static meshtastic_MeshPacket makePayloadPaddedBroadcast(meshtastic_PortNum port, const pb_msgdesc_t *fields, const void *inner,
|
|
size_t padLen)
|
|
{
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, port, 0);
|
|
const size_t innerLen = pb_encode_to_bytes(p.decoded.payload.bytes, sizeof(p.decoded.payload.bytes), fields, inner);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_THAN_MESSAGE(0, innerLen, "failed to encode the spoofed inner message");
|
|
p.decoded.payload.size =
|
|
innerLen + appendUnknownField(p.decoded.payload.bytes + innerLen, sizeof(p.decoded.payload.bytes) - innerLen, padLen);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(signedEncodingFits(&p.decoded), "padding must push the raw size past the fit threshold");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_LESS_OR_EQUAL_MESSAGE(MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN, encodedDataSize(&p.decoded) + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH,
|
|
"padded frame must still be one a radio could send");
|
|
return p;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// E10: unknown fields buried inside Data.payload are discarded by the module's own pb_decode, so
|
|
// they must not sway the downgrade decision the way A10 already pins for Data-level unknown fields.
|
|
void test_E10_decoded_unsigned_position_padded_inside_payload_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_Position pos = meshtastic_Position_init_zero;
|
|
pos.has_latitude_i = pos.has_longitude_i = true;
|
|
pos.latitude_i = 371234567;
|
|
pos.longitude_i = -1221234567;
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makePayloadPaddedBroadcast(meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, &meshtastic_Position_msg, &pos, 163);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p), "payload-padded unsigned Position from a signer must be dropped");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// E11: over-correction guard. Telemetry (272 bytes max) and Waypoint (199) can legitimately exceed
|
|
// the signable budget, so canonical sizing must not shrink an honest one into the drop range.
|
|
void test_E11_decoded_unsigned_oversized_telemetry_from_signer_accepted(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_Telemetry t = meshtastic_Telemetry_init_zero;
|
|
t.which_variant = meshtastic_Telemetry_host_metrics_tag;
|
|
t.variant.host_metrics.uptime_seconds = 123456;
|
|
t.variant.host_metrics.has_user_string = true;
|
|
memset(t.variant.host_metrics.user_string, 'x', sizeof(t.variant.host_metrics.user_string) - 1);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makeDecoded(REMOTE_NODE, NODENUM_BROADCAST, meshtastic_PortNum_TELEMETRY_APP, 0);
|
|
p.decoded.payload.size =
|
|
pb_encode_to_bytes(p.decoded.payload.bytes, sizeof(p.decoded.payload.bytes), &meshtastic_Telemetry_msg, &t);
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_THAN_MESSAGE(0, p.decoded.payload.size, "failed to encode the oversized Telemetry");
|
|
|
|
// Every byte here is a field this build understands, so canonical sizing must leave it alone.
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(signedEncodingFits(&p.decoded), "telemetry must be too big to sign, else the test is vacuous");
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p), "honest oversized telemetry from a signer must not be dropped");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// E12: E10 for the Waypoint branch of the canonical-sizing switch.
|
|
void test_E12_decoded_unsigned_waypoint_padded_inside_payload_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_Waypoint w = meshtastic_Waypoint_init_zero;
|
|
w.id = 42;
|
|
w.has_latitude_i = w.has_longitude_i = true;
|
|
w.latitude_i = 371234567;
|
|
w.longitude_i = -1221234567;
|
|
strcpy(w.name, "spoofed");
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makePayloadPaddedBroadcast(meshtastic_PortNum_WAYPOINT_APP, &meshtastic_Waypoint_msg, &w, 150);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p), "payload-padded unsigned Waypoint from a signer must be dropped");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// E13: E10 for the NodeInfo/User branch. Router drops it before rebroadcast; NodeInfoModule's own
|
|
// check (Group C) is receiver-local and would not stop the packet propagating.
|
|
void test_E13_decoded_unsigned_nodeinfo_padded_inside_payload_dropped(void)
|
|
{
|
|
mockNodeDB->addNode(REMOTE_NODE);
|
|
mockNodeDB->setSignerBit(REMOTE_NODE, true);
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_User u = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
|
|
strcpy(u.id, "!0b0b0b0b");
|
|
strcpy(u.long_name, "spoofed node");
|
|
strcpy(u.short_name, "SPF");
|
|
|
|
meshtastic_MeshPacket p = makePayloadPaddedBroadcast(meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, &meshtastic_User_msg, &u, 150);
|
|
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(&p), "payload-padded unsigned NodeInfo from a signer must be dropped");
|
|
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(p.xeddsa_signed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void setup()
|
|
{
|
|
initializeTestEnvironment();
|
|
AirTime *savedAirTime = airTime;
|
|
meshtastic::NodeStatus *savedNodeStatus = nodeStatus;
|
|
AirTime testAirTime;
|
|
meshtastic::NodeStatus testNodeStatus;
|
|
airTime = &testAirTime;
|
|
nodeStatus = &testNodeStatus;
|
|
|
|
config.lora.region = meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_US;
|
|
initRegion();
|
|
pipelineRouter = new AuthPipelineRouter();
|
|
auto pipelineRadioOwner = std::make_unique<AuthPipelineRadio>();
|
|
pipelineRadio = pipelineRadioOwner.get();
|
|
pipelineRouter->addInterface(std::move(pipelineRadioOwner));
|
|
router = pipelineRouter;
|
|
routingModule = pipelineRouting = new AuthPipelineRoutingModule();
|
|
pipelineModule = new AuthPipelineModule();
|
|
service = pipelineService = new MeshService();
|
|
mqtt = pipelineMqtt = new AuthPipelineMqtt();
|
|
|
|
UNITY_BEGIN();
|
|
|
|
printf("\n=== Group A: receive-side accept/reject ===\n");
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A1_valid_signature_accepted_and_learns_signer);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A2_bad_signature_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A3_signed_no_pubkey_accepted_unverified);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A4_downgrade_unsigned_broadcast_from_signer_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A5_unsigned_broadcast_from_nonsigner_accepted);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A6_unsigned_unicast_from_signer_accepted);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A7_unsigned_oversized_broadcast_from_signer_accepted);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A8_unsigned_deadband_broadcast_from_signer_accepted);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A9_unsigned_boundary_broadcast_from_signer_still_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A10_compatible_accepts_unsigned_broadcast_from_signer);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A11_strict_rejects_unsigned_all_portnums_destinations_and_sizes);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A12_strict_rejects_signed_packet_without_key);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A13_strict_accepts_locally_authenticated_pki_packet);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A13b_strict_rejects_spoofed_pki_flag_on_encrypted_ingress);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A14_strict_bootstraps_identity_bound_signed_nodeinfo);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A15_strict_rejects_nodeinfo_key_without_identity_binding);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A16_compatible_rejects_invalid_first_contact_nodeinfo);
|
|
#if WARM_NODE_COUNT > 0
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A17_strict_verifies_signer_from_warm_key_store);
|
|
#endif
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A18_unsigned_broadcast_from_signer_with_unknown_fields_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_A19_unsigned_broadcast_from_nonsigner_with_unknown_fields_accepted);
|
|
|
|
printf("\n=== Group B: send-side signing policy ===\n");
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B1_local_broadcast_is_signed);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B2_local_unicast_not_signed);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B3_local_oversized_broadcast_not_signed);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B4_all_broadcast_sizes_deliverable_no_deadband);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B5_preset_signature_on_local_packet_cleared);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B6_rich_shape_sweep_no_deadband);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B7_infrastructure_port_signing_matrix);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B8_licensed_broadcast_and_unicast_are_signed);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B9_licensed_unicast_never_uses_pki_encryption);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B10_licensed_oversized_unicast_remains_unsigned);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B11_normal_unicast_still_uses_pki);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B12_licensed_receiver_does_not_decrypt_pki);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B13_licensed_port_and_destination_signing_matrix);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B14_ack_with_no_usable_channel_falls_back_to_pkc);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B15_ack_with_no_channel_and_no_key_still_fails);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B16_non_ack_on_unusable_channel_still_fails);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_B17_ack_on_a_usable_channel_stays_on_the_channel);
|
|
|
|
printf("\n=== Group C: routing pipeline authentication ordering ===\n");
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C1_invalid_first_copy_does_not_poison_valid_same_id);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C2_invalid_ordinary_duplicate_has_no_cancel_or_delivery_effects);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C3_invalid_repeated_packet_cannot_ack_or_change_retry_state);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C4_invalid_fallback_packet_cannot_relay);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C5_invalid_upgrade_cannot_remove_pending_valid_send);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C6_opaque_unknown_channel_is_relay_only);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C7_strict_rejects_unsigned_decoded_simradio_ingress);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C8_trusted_local_decoded_delivery_is_not_filtered);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C9_known_channel_malformed_plaintext_has_no_pipeline_effects);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C10_legacy_channel_dm_failure_has_no_pipeline_effects);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C11_malformed_pki_plaintext_has_no_pipeline_effects);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C12_exact_authenticated_replay_reuses_verdict_without_collision_bypass);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C13_failed_initial_reliable_send_does_not_retry);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C14_duty_cycle_limited_reliable_send_remains_pending);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C15_reliable_unicast_tracks_five_total_attempts);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C16_reliable_broadcast_keeps_three_total_attempts);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_C17_colliding_channel_hash_foreign_broadcast_is_relay_only);
|
|
printf("\n=== Group N: NodeInfoModule authentication ===\n");
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_N1_unsigned_nodeinfo_from_signer_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_N2_signed_nodeinfo_from_signer_not_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_N3_unsigned_nodeinfo_from_nonsigner_not_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_N4_unsigned_unicast_nodeinfo_from_signer_accepted);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_N5_unsigned_unicast_nodeinfo_from_signer_does_not_change_name);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_N6_signed_unicast_nodeinfo_from_signer_changes_name);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_N7_unsigned_unicast_nodeinfo_from_nonsigner_changes_name);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_N8_second_request_inside_the_window_is_suppressed);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_N9_request_after_the_window_is_answered);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_N10_stale_stamp_does_not_alias_after_a_full_wrap);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_N11_window_still_applies_across_the_wrap);
|
|
|
|
printf("\n=== Group L: licensed identity and plaintext signing ===\n");
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_L1_licensed_nodeinfo_publishes_public_key);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_L2_licensed_identity_key_is_generated_and_preserved);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_L3_factory_config_reset_preserves_valid_identity_private_key);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_L4_licensed_low_entropy_identity_is_regenerated);
|
|
|
|
printf("\n=== Group D: encoding invariants ===\n");
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_D1_signature_field_overhead_exact);
|
|
|
|
printf("\n=== Group E: decoded-ingress policy ===\n");
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E1_decoded_unsigned_broadcast_from_signer_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E2_decoded_unsigned_broadcast_from_nonsigner_accepted);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E3_decoded_valid_signature_verified_and_learns_signer);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E4_decoded_bad_signature_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E5_decoded_unsigned_oversized_broadcast_from_signer_accepted);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E6_decoded_unsigned_unicast_from_signer_accepted);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E8_decoded_partial_signature_from_signer_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E9_decoded_partial_signature_from_nonsigner_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E10_decoded_unsigned_position_padded_inside_payload_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E11_decoded_unsigned_oversized_telemetry_from_signer_accepted);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E12_decoded_unsigned_waypoint_padded_inside_payload_dropped);
|
|
RUN_TEST(test_E13_decoded_unsigned_nodeinfo_padded_inside_payload_dropped);
|
|
|
|
const int result = UNITY_END();
|
|
airTime = savedAirTime;
|
|
nodeStatus = savedNodeStatus;
|
|
exit(result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void loop() {}
|
|
|
|
#else // XEdDSA or PKI excluded
|
|
|
|
void setUp(void) {}
|
|
void tearDown(void) {}
|
|
void setup()
|
|
{
|
|
initializeTestEnvironment();
|
|
UNITY_BEGIN();
|
|
exit(UNITY_END());
|
|
}
|
|
void loop() {}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|