mirror of
https://github.com/blakeblackshear/frigate.git
synced 2026-09-14 22:54:44 -04:00
Josh Hawkins
3be59c9c18
* Run the frigate service as the frigate user * Run go2rtc as its own restricted user * Run nginx as the frigate user with writable state in /tmp/nginx * Disable bandwidth stats gracefully when not running as root * Hand TensorRT model cache ownership to the runtime user * Document non-root operation and per-hardware device access * Create /media/frigate after the ownership sweep * Assert non-root services, JWT migration, and escape hatch in CI * only write the sweep sentinel when a media volume is mounted * tolerate homekit config chown failures in the go2rtc run script * chown the s6 log pipe so non-root nginx can reopen /dev/stdout * set HOME to /config for non-root services * run smoke nginx -t and the write probe as the runtime user * re-own the nginx shm cache on service restart * discard stdout for the unprivileged smoke nginx -t * unwrap hard-wrapped prose in the installation docs * report progress during the ownership sweep * document EXTRA_GROUPS as the only device access path for dropped services * expand the non-root device access docs with diagnosis steps and udev rules * document network storage ownership and the remaining detector hardware * skip lost+found during the ownership sweep * hand /tmp/cache to the runtime user before services start * make bundled models readable by the runtime user * reload nginx by signaling the master instead of parsing its config as root * harden root writes into unprivileged-owned paths Restrict the sweep sentinel to a mount at or below /media/frigate so a parent /media mount cannot bless a later-shadowed volume. Rebuild /tmp/nginx root-owned each start so root's cp and tempio writes cannot follow a symlink an unprivileged nginx planted in the previous run. * collapse the duplicated sentinel comment * add a service-runs-as-root helper for granular root services * validate FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES and fail fast on unknown names * let services listed in FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES skip the privilege drop * record the root-services mode in the sentinel and sweep small trees each boot * cache the runtime ids in the ownership helper * chown recordings, previews, and exports to the runtime user at create * chown the database files after init * recommend FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES in the bandwidth stats warning * assert granular root services in CI * document FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES * own every directory level created for a recording segment * clear the cached runtime ids when ownership tests finish * skip missing media paths in the per-boot ownership sweep * clarify granular root services docs * clean up * install acl for device access grants * grant runtime users access to mapped device nodes at boot * assert device access grants in CI * document automatic device access grants * stop telling users device access needs host side setup * clarify the non-root docs * link the migration script to the repo * group the manual device setup under one section * harden against symlink attacks /config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink. - go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file - go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES - sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file - ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume - validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids - docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens * tweak docs * stop the ownership sweep chasing entries other mechanisms own * keep custom binaries out of root services only under granular root
56 lines
2.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
56 lines
2.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/bash
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# Ahead-of-time volume ownership migration for switching Frigate to non-root.
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# Run from the host BEFORE enabling PUID/PGID or --user:
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#
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# ./fix-permissions.sh [--dry-run] <config_dir> <media_dir> [PUID] [PGID]
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#
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# Wraps the image's fix-ownership helper so there is exactly one
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# implementation of the chown logic. Requires an image that contains the
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# helper (any release that includes non-root support).
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set -o errexit -o nounset -o pipefail
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IMAGE="${FRIGATE_IMAGE:-ghcr.io/blakeblackshear/frigate:stable}"
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dry_run_flag=""
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if [[ "${1:-}" == "--dry-run" ]]; then
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dry_run_flag="--dry-run"
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shift
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fi
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if [[ $# -lt 2 ]]; then
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echo "Usage: $0 [--dry-run] <config_dir> <media_dir> [PUID] [PGID]" >&2
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exit 2
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fi
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config_dir="$1"
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media_dir="$2"
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puid="${3:-1000}"
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pgid="${4:-1000}"
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# The ids are interpolated into the container's bash -c source below, so
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# anything but digits would be reparsed as shell rather than passed through
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if ! [[ "$puid" =~ ^[0-9]+$ && "$pgid" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
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echo "[ERROR] PUID and PGID must be numeric, got '${puid}' and '${pgid}'" >&2
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exit 2
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fi
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echo "[INFO] Using image ${IMAGE} (override with FRIGATE_IMAGE=...)"
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if ! docker image inspect "${IMAGE}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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echo "[INFO] ${IMAGE} is not present locally and has to be pulled first; this may take a while"
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fi
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if [[ -n "$dry_run_flag" ]]; then
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echo "[INFO] Dry run: reporting what would change under ${config_dir} and ${media_dir}, changing nothing"
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else
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echo "[INFO] Aligning ${config_dir} and ${media_dir} to ${puid}:${pgid}; this may take a while on large filesystems"
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fi
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# shellcheck disable=SC2086
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docker run --rm \
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-v "${config_dir}:/config" \
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-v "${media_dir}:/media/frigate" \
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--entrypoint bash \
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"${IMAGE}" \
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-c "command -v fix-ownership >/dev/null || { echo '[ERROR] this Frigate image predates non-root support; set FRIGATE_IMAGE to a release that includes it' >&2; exit 1; }; exec fix-ownership ${dry_run_flag} ${puid} ${pgid} /config /media/frigate"
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