* upload: do not launch error group when doing non-parallel upload
* encryption: refactored code to reduce slice allocation, this uncovered a minor subtle bug in index recovery due to manual memory management
* content: fixed use-after-free bug during index recovery that started failing test after encryption memory management improvements
* gather: tweaked retention and chunk sizes
* gather: added typicalContiguousAllocator with 8MB chunks for default configuration
* performance: plumbed through output buffer to encryption and hashing, so that the caller can pre-allocate/reuse it
* testing: fixed how we do comparison of byte slices to account for possible nils, which can be returned from encryption
New ciphers are using authenticated encryption with associated data
(AEAD) and per-content key derived using HMAC-SHA256:
* AES256-GCM-HMAC-SHA256
* CHACHA20-POLY1305-HMAC-SHA256
They support content IDs of arbitrary length and are quite fast:
On my 2019 MBP:
- BLAKE2B-256 + AES256-GCM-HMAC-SHA256 - 648.7 MiB / second
- BLAKE2B-256 + CHACHA20-POLY1305-HMAC-SHA256 - 597.1 MiB / second
- HMAC-SHA256 + AES256-GCM-HMAC-SHA256 351 MiB / second
- HMAC-SHA256 + CHACHA20-POLY1305-HMAC-SHA256 316.2 MiB / second
Previous ciphers had several subtle issues:
* SALSA20 encryption, used weak nonce (64 bit prefix of content ID),
which means that for any two contents, whose IDs that have the same
64-bit prefix, their plaintext can be decoded from the ciphertext
alone.
* AES-{128,192,256}-CTR were not authenticated, so we were
required to hash plaintext after decryption to validate. This is not
recommended due to possibility of subtle timing attacks if an attacker
controls the ciphertext.
* SALSA20-HMAC was only validating checksum and not that the ciphertext
was for the correct content ID.
New repositories cannot be created using deprecated ciphers, but they
will still be supported for existing repositories, until at least 0.6.0.
The users are encouraged to migrate to one of new ciphers when 0.5.0 is
out.
