Every time the OIDC middleware sees a new access token (i.e when it needs
to update the userinfo cache) we consider that as a new login. In this case
the middleware add a new flag to the context, which is then used by the
accountresolver middleware to publish a UserSignedIn event.
The event needs to be sent by the accountresolver middleware, because only
at that point we know the user id of the user that just logged in.
(It would probably makes sense to merge the auth and account middleware into a
single component to avoid passing flags around via context)
Use access token to lookup session id. The userinfo endpoint does
not return the session id. Also add some debug logging.
Co-authored-by: Christian Richter <crichter@owncloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Barz <mbarz@owncloud.com>
* refactor middleware options
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* use ocmemstore micro store implementaiton for token cache
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* refactor ocis store options, support redis sentinel
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* align cache configuration
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* database and tabe are used to build prefixes for inmemory stores
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* add global persistent store options to userlog config
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* log cache errors but continue
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* drup unnecessary type conversion
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* Better description for the default userinfo ttl
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* use global cache options for even more caches
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* don't log userinfo cache misses
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* default to stock memory store
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* use correct mem store typo string
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* split cache options, doc cleanup
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* mint and write userinfo to cache async
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* use hashed token as key
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* go mod tidy
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* update docs
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* update cache store naming
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* bring back depreceted ocis-pkg/store package for backwards compatability
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* update changelog
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: kobergj <jkoberg@owncloud.com>
* revert ocis-pkg/cache to store rename
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
* add waiting for each step 50 milliseconds
* starlack check
---------
Signed-off-by: Jörn Friedrich Dreyer <jfd@butonic.de>
Co-authored-by: kobergj <jkoberg@owncloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Viktor Scharf <scharf.vi@gmail.com>
* Remove unused code from oidc module
* Use already existing Metadata type for jwks discovery
ocis-pkg/oidc already provides a type for the oidc metadata. Switch to
that instead of defining yet another custom type.
* oidc: Add helper to get IDP metadata
The old approach of the authentication middlewares had the problem that when an authenticator could not authenticate a request it would still send it to the next handler, in case that the next one can authenticate it. But if no authenticator could successfully authenticate the request, it would still be handled, which leads to unauthorized access.
Allow to switch jwt access token verification and off. Many (most?) IDP
provide JWT encoded access tokens. If ocis is configure to assume jwt
access tokens (access_token_verify_method==jwt) we now properly verify
the tokens signature and a set of standard claims ("exp", "iat" and nbf"
by way of the jwt module's standard verification and "iss" explicitliy).
This change also allows for introduction of other access token verification
mechanism in the future (e.g. through introspection (RFC7662).
We try to parse the access token as a JWT now. Verifying the signature
using the keys downloaded from the jwks_uri of the IDP. Currently we
only use it to extract the expiry information from the JWT. This could
be reworked to extract other claims from the token for authorization
purposes.
Fixes: #3841
The removed code was broken is serveral ways:
- The key use for verification was always empty
- Using a static key for access_token verification is incompatible
with key rotation
- The type assertion (which was never hit anyways) to convert
the return MapClaims to StandardClaims can't really work
So in the end we were always using the default ttl for caching
the userinfo.
