Use Content-Type application/json for AJAX responses (#4357)

Complete Content-Type application/json fix for all AJAX responses

- Add missing return statements to all ->response->setJSON() calls
- Fix Items.php method calls from JSON() to setJSON()
- Convert echo statements to proper JSON responses
- Ensure consistent Content-Type headers across all controllers
- Fix 46+ instances across 12 controller files
- Change Config.php methods to : ResponseInterface (all return setJSON only):
  - postSaveRewards(), postSaveBarcode(), postSaveReceipt()
  - postSaveInvoice(), postRemoveLogo()
  - Update PHPDoc @return tags

- Change Receivings.php _reload() to : string (only returns view)
- Change Receivings.php methods to : string (all return _reload()):
  - getIndex(), postSelectSupplier(), postChangeMode(), postAdd()
  - postEditItem(), getDeleteItem(), getRemoveSupplier()
  - postComplete(), postRequisitionComplete(), getReceipt(), postCancelReceiving()
- Change postSave() to : ResponseInterface (returns setJSON)
- Update all PHPDoc @return tags

Fix XSS vulnerabilities in sales templates, login, and config pages

This commit addresses 5 XSS vulnerabilities by adding proper escaping
to all user-controlled configuration values in HTML contexts.

Fixed Files:
- app/Views/sales/invoice.php: Escaped company_logo (URL context) and company (HTML)
- app/Views/sales/work_order.php: Escaped company_logo (URL context)
- app/Views/sales/receipt_email.php: Added file path validation and escaping for logo
- app/Views/login.php: Escaped all config values in title, logo src, and alt
- app/Views/configs/info_config.php: Escaped company_logo (URL context)

Security Impact:
- Prevents stored XSS attacks if configuration is compromised
- Defense-in-depth principle applied to administrative interfaces
- Follows OWASP best practices for output encoding

Testing:
- Verified no script execution with XSS payloads in config values
- Confirmed proper escaping in HTML, URL, and file contexts
- All templates render correctly with valid configuration

Severity: High (4 files), Medium-High (1 file)
CVSS Score: ~6.1
CWE: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation)

Fix critical password validation bypass and add unit tests

This commit addresses a critical security vulnerability where the password
minimum length check was performed on the HASHED password (always 60
characters for bcrypt) instead of the actual password before hashing.

Vulnerability Details:
- Original code: strlen($employee_data['password']) >= 8
- This compared the hash length (always 60) instead of raw password
- Impact: Users could set 1-character passwords like "a"
- Severity: Critical (enables brute force attacks on weak passwords)
- CVE-like issue: CWE-307 (Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts)

Fix Applied:
- Validate password length BEFORE hashing
- Clear error message when password is too short
- Added unit tests to verify minimum length enforcement
- Regression test to prevent future vulnerability re-introduction

Test Coverage:
- testPasswordMinLength_Rejects7Characters: Verify 7 chars rejected
- testPasswordMinLength_Accepts8Characters: Verify 8 chars accepted
- testPasswordMinLength_RejectsEmptyString: Verify empty rejected
- testPasswordMinLength_RejectsWhitespaceOnly: Verify whitespace rejected
- testPasswordMinLength_AcceptsSpecialCharacters: Verify special chars OK
- testPasswordMinLength_RejectsPreviousBehavior: Regression test for bug

Files Modified:
- app/Controllers/Home.php: Fixed password validation logic
- tests/Controllers/HomeTest.php: Added comprehensive unit tests

Security Impact:
- Enforces 8-character minimum password policy
- Prevents extremely weak passwords that facilitate brute-force attacks
- Critical for credential security and user account protection

Breaking Changes:
- Users with passwords < 8 characters will need to reset their password
- This is the intended security improvement

Severity: Critical
CVSS Score: ~7.5
CWE: CWE-305 (Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness), CWE-307

Add GitHub Actions workflow to run PHPUnit tests

Move business logic from views to controllers for better separation of concerns

- Move logo URL computation from info_config view to Config::getIndex()
- Move image base64 encoding from receipt_email view to Sales controller
- Improves separation of concerns by keeping business logic in controllers
- Simplifies view templates to only handle presentation

Fix XSS vulnerabilities in report views - escape user-controllable summary data and labels

Fix base64 encoding URL issue in delete payment - properly URL encode base64 string

Fix remaining return type declarations for Sales controller

Fixed additional methods that call _reload():
- postAdd() - returns _reload($data)
- postAddPayment() - returns _reload($data)
- postEditItem() - returns _reload($data)
- postSuspend() - returns _reload($data)
- postSetPaymentType() - returns _reload()

All methods now return ResponseInterface|string to match _reload() signature.
This resolves PHP TypeError errors.

.github/workflows/opencode.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+name: opencode
+
+on:
+  issue_comment:
+    types: [created]
+  pull_request_review_comment:
+    types: [created]
+
+jobs:
+  opencode:
+    if: |
+      contains(github.event.comment.body, ' /oc') ||
+      startsWith(github.event.comment.body, '/oc') ||
+      contains(github.event.comment.body, ' /opencode') ||
+      startsWith(github.event.comment.body, '/opencode')
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      id-token: write
+      contents: read
+      pull-requests: read
+      issues: read
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@v6
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Run opencode
+        uses: anomalyco/opencode/github@latest
+        env:
+          ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
+        with:
+          model: anthropic/claude-3-haiku-20240307