mirror of
https://github.com/opensourcepos/opensourcepos.git
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184918d914
* fix(security): handle special characters in `.env` key values and improve insertion logic - Escape backslashes and dollar signs in `applyEnvKeyReplacement` to prevent unintended value corruption. - Ensure new keys are inserted after `encryption.key` for better organization and manageability. - Add explicit cast to int to prevent wrong concatenation operator warning. Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): handle null return in `applyEnvKeyReplacement` and ensure proper `.env` updates - Update `applyEnvKeyReplacement` to return `null` on failure, improving error handling. - Adjust calls to `atomicWriteFile` with updated content to prevent unintended behavior. Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): improve error logging and exception messages in file locking - Add detailed logging for file open and locking errors in `security_helper`. - Remove unused `helper` and `checkThrottleEncryption` calls from `Events` for cleanup. Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): improve atomic file write and handle encryption key placement - Throw `RandomException` for better error reporting in `atomicWriteFile`. - Simplify Windows-specific `rename()` fallback logic. - Fix `encryption.key` assignment order to ensure consistency in `.env` updates. Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): improve `.env` file handling and add unit tests for helper functions - Suppress warnings in `file_get_contents` to prevent unnecessary error logs. - Update `applyEnvKeyReplacement` to use `preg_replace_callback` for better safety. - Add comprehensive unit tests for `security_helper` functions to ensure `.env` updates and key management work as expected. Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): enhance `.env` update logic and add robust exception handling - Add `RandomException` to improve error reporting in encryption key management. - Introduce environment file locking for safer `.env` updates. - Ensure `applyEnvKeyReplacement` properly handles and inserts old key comments. - Replace direct file writes with `atomicWriteFile` for consistency. Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): refactor `.env` file initialization and encryption key handling - Introduce `initializeEnvFile` for reusable `.env` setup logic. - Add `backupEnvFile` and `writeNewEncryptionKey` for robust key management with backups. - Simplify and clean up redundant `.env` handling code paths. Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): clarify `checkEncryption` docblock return value description Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): escape backslashes and dollar signs in `applyEnvKeyReplacement` - Ensure `applyEnvKeyReplacement` properly escapes special characters when inserting or appending `.env` keys. - Add new unit tests to validate correct handling of backslashes and dollar signs. Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(i18n): add localized error messages and improve error reporting in `security_helper` - Add missing translations for error messages across multiple language files. - Update `security_helper` to use localized exception messages with placeholders. Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com> * Redesign encryption/throttle key provisioning as read-only runtime - checkEncryption()/checkThrottleEncryption() are now read-only guards that throw when no valid key is provisioned, instead of writing .env at request time. - Add rotateEncryptionKey() and provisionThrottleKey() for explicit, idempotent provisioning. - Add php spark env:provision (app/Commands/EnvProvision.php) so Docker can provision keys once at container startup before any request. - Add app/Libraries/CI3SecretConverter.php shared CI3->CI4 secret converter (AES-128-CBC decrypt + CI4 re-encrypt/verify/save) used by both the interactive migration and the docker startup path. - Refactor convertToCI4 migration to use the shared converter. - Persist .env in a named volume and run spark env:provision on boot; stop baking .env into the shipped image. - Add guard/rotation/throttle + converter tests; clean up orphaned msg_pwd_required language keys across all locales. * fix: save CI4 ciphertext in env:provision and bind-mount a .env file Addresses CodeRabbit review on PR #4656: - env:provision CI3 branch was persisting *plaintext* secrets (saveAll($plain)) instead of the CI4 ciphertext, unlike the ConvertToCI4 migration. Now encrypts with encryptAll(), verifies the round trip, and saves the ciphertext. - The ospos_env named volume mounted at /app/.env made .env a directory, so atomicWriteFile's rename() failed and spark env:provision could not start apache. Switch to a bind mount of a host file (./.env) which persists and stays a file. - Add a regression test asserting the command persists ciphertext (not plaintext). * chore: trim redundant docblocks in EnvProvision and provision throttle.key in CI Follow up on @objecttothis review comments: - app/Commands/EnvProvision.php: remove the boilerplate docblocks the property names already convey (group/name/usage/description, run()), the two inline step comments, the anyNonEmpty() param docblock, and the legacySecretsPresent() docblock. Keeps the class-level docblock since it is the only place that states the read-only runtime design + the never-persist-plaintext invariant. - .github/workflows/phpunit.yml: provision a per-run throttle.key the same way the encryption key is already provisioned. The PR makes checkThrottleEncryption() a read-only guard that throws when env('throttle.key') is unset; CI only started exporting ENCRYPTION_KEY, so every test that goes through the Throttle filter (7 ThrottleTest cases + 4 LoginTest cases) failed with "No throttle key is provisioned. Run `php spark env:provision`". Writing `throttle.key=<KEY>` into .env matches what `php spark env:provision` does on a real container start. * fix(ci): write throttle.key into .env instead of exporting an OS env var The previous attempt exported throttle.key via GITHUB_ENV, but CodeIgniter's env() helper resolves in the order $_ENV[$key] ?? $_SERVER[$key] ?? getenv($key), and DotEnv populates $_ENV['throttle.key'] from the .env file first. Because the .env (copied from .env.example) ships with the empty placeholder throttle.key='', that $_ENV entry exists as '' and short-circuits the ?? chain before getenv() is reached — so the OS env var was never consulted and every Throttle/Login test still threw 'No throttle key is provisioned'. Write the per-run key into the .env file itself (sed-replacing the empty placeholder), which is exactly what `php spark env:provision` does in production and is the single source env() actually reads from. Verify the replacement happened (grep -Eq '^throttle\.key=.') so a future change to the placeholder format fails the run loudly instead of silently breaking the 11 throttle-dependent tests. * fix(security): restore CI3->CI4 auto-provisioning gated by .env writability checkEncryption()/checkThrottleEncryption() again provision the keys inline when .env is writable (empty key -> generate; short key -> decrypt, rotate, re-encrypt, verify, persist legacy CI3 secrets). When .env is not writable they assume the key was provisioned externally (e.g. docker env:provision) and throw. Update helper tests to match and correct the EnvProvision docblock that claimed the runtime was strictly read-only. * test(security): make short-key conversion branch injectable and test it checkEncryption() now accepts an optional CI3SecretConverter so the CI3->CI4 conversion branch can be exercised in unit tests without a database. Adds testCheckEncryptionConvertsCi3ShortKeyWhenEnvWritable which seeds CI3-era ciphertexts via a fake Appconfig model and asserts the key is rotated and the payload verifies back to the original plaintext. * fix(security): abort on backup/read/saveAll failure to avoid data loss Three related data-integrity fixes: - backupEnvFile() now returns true/false based on whether the backup actually exists and is readable. rotateEncryptionKey() aborts before destroying the key when the backup could not be written to disk. - rotateEncryptionKey() and provisionThrottleKey() throw RuntimeException(Error.unable_to_read_env_file) when the .env read fails, instead of silently replacing the whole file with an empty string. This prevents a permission error from wiping all keys. - checkEncryption() and EnvProvision::run() now both roll back to the backup with abortEncryptionConversion() when the post-rotation saveAll() throws, matching the migration path (which already did this). A failing fake Appconfig is used to exercise this in the new testCheckEncryptionRollsBackWhenSaveAllFails test. * fix(ci): skip comment job in deploy-pr.yml when prepare was not run The comment job had if: always(), so it ran even when the prepare job was skipped (e.g. review was not approved). With PR_NUMBER empty the gh api call posted to issues//comments, received a 404, and the entire run showed up as failure. Guard the job with needs.prepare.result == 'success' so it only runs when PR_NUMBER is valid. * address coderabbit open items: placeholder guards, message neutrality, ar-EG alignment - backupEnvFile(): fail when mkdir() or either chmod() fails, so the pre-rotation backup is actually persisted before the key is replaced - email/message config views: only show the 'already set' placeholder when the secret is actually present (prevented false positives on fresh installs) - Error.unable_to_create_env_file / .unable_to_read_env_file (en + en-GB): use key-neutral wording since both keys are provisioned with the same keys - ar-EG/Error.php: align all => arrows on the longest key Item 7 (filesystem test isolation) is a larger refactor — the tests are serial on CI and tearDown() restores state per test. Left for follow-up. * test(security): isolate helper FS tests via Config\SecurityEnv Introduce Config\SecurityEnv holding envPath/backupPath/lockPath so the security helper reads its target paths from shared configuration instead of hardcoded ROOTPATH/WRITEPATH literals. security_helperTest.php now redirects all three to a unique per-run sandbox under sys_get_temp_dir() and tears it down in tearDown(), so the suite no longer reads/writes the repository's real .env and is safe to run in parallel. No helper signature changes; production callers unaffected. Addresses CodeRabbit item 7 (issue #4700). Co-Authored-By: opencode <bot@opencode.ai> * fix(security): run key-conversion as one locked transaction Address CodeRabbit Major findings from the 4th re-review of the env helper and its callers: 1. Hold .env.lock for the entire CI3 -> CI4 conversion transaction (backup -> rotate -> re-encrypt -> verify -> persist -> cleanup) so a concurrent worker cannot interleave a key write between the rotation and the ciphertext save. Split rotateEncryptionKey into a lock-free core (rotateEncryptionKeyUnlock) plus the existing lock wrapper and a new rotateEncryptionKeyTransaction that owns the lock across the full unit and performs both the in-lock rollback (abortEncryptionConversion) and the in-lock backup removal on success. 2. Treat the legacy value '0' as non-empty data so key rotation still persists the re-encrypted ciphertext when '0' is the only stored secret (array_filter would have dropped it and skipped saveAll). 3. Wrap the post-rotation re-encrypt/verify/saveAll sequence in a catch (Throwable) across all three call-sites so CI4 EncryptionException, ReflectionException from batch_save, a failed round-trip verify, and any other failure all roll the .env key back to the pre-rotation state. 4. In Docker Compose, use long-syntax bind with create_host_path: false and document in INSTALL.md that the host .env must be a regular file (a missing one is no longer auto-created as a directory, and the mount now rejects a missing source on Compose implementations that support the flag). Files touched: app/Helpers/security_helper.php, app/Commands/EnvProvision.php, app/Database/Migrations/20220127000000_convertToCI4.php, docker-compose.yml, INSTALL.md. All 4 existing helper tests still pass via CI. * fix(security): make abortEncryptionConversion fail loudly on restore failure The rollback path restored the .env backup with a suppressed file_put_contents() and an unchecked file_get_contents(). If the restore failed after the key had already been rotated, .env was left holding the new CI4 key while the DB still held CI3-era ciphertext, so the data became undecryptable after the next restart. Now the backup read is checked for false and the restore goes through the existing atomicWriteFile() helper; either failure throws so the error is surfaced instead of silently corrupting the config. Adds a regression test that forces an unreadable backup and asserts the throw plus that .env is left untouched. * fix(security): guard abortEncryptionConversion backup read before touching it Validate the backup is a regular readable file (is_file/is_readable) before reading it, so a missing/malformed backup fails loudly instead of emitting a file_get_contents() warning. The unreadable-backup regression test now exercises this guard rather than relying on a promoted warning. --------- Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: jekkos <jeroen.peelaerts@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: jekkos <jekkos@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: opencode <bot@opencode.ai>
114 lines
4.3 KiB
Bash
114 lines
4.3 KiB
Bash
#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# ENVIRONMENT
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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CI_ENVIRONMENT=production
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# SECURITY: ALLOWED HOSTNAMES
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# CRITICAL: Whitelist of allowed hostnames to prevent Host Header
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# Injection attacks (GHSA-jchf-7hr6-h4f3).
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#
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# REQUIRED IN PRODUCTION: Application will fail to start if not configured.
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# In development, falls back to 'localhost' with an error log.
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#
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# Configure with comma-separated list of domains/subdomains:
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# app.allowedHostnames='yourdomain.com,www.yourdomain.com'
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#
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# Or via environment variable (useful for Docker/Compose):
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# ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES=yourdomain.com,www.yourdomain.com
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#
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# For local development:
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# app.allowedHostnames='localhost'
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#
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# Note: Do not include protocol (http/https) or port numbers.
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app.allowedHostnames=''
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# DATABASE
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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database.default.hostname='localhost'
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database.default.database='ospos'
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database.default.username='admin'
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database.default.password='pointofsale'
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database.default.DBDriver='MySQLi'
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database.default.DBPrefix='ospos_'
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database.development.hostname='localhost'
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database.development.database='ospos'
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database.development.username='admin'
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database.development.password='pointofsale'
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database.development.DBDriver='MySQLi'
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database.development.DBPrefix='ospos_'
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database.tests.hostname='localhost'
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database.tests.database='ospos_test'
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database.tests.username='admin'
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database.tests.password='pointofsale'
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database.tests.DBDriver='MySQLi'
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database.tests.DBPrefix='ospos_'
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# ENCRYPTION
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Leave blank and the application auto-generates a unique key on first use.
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# For Docker/Compose, pass it via the ENCRYPTION_KEY env var instead:
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# docker run -e ENCRYPTION_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" opensourcepos
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# ENCRYPTION_KEY is read as a fallback when encryption.key is empty, so no
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# shared key needs to be committed or baked into the shipped image.
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encryption.key=''
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# Persistent secret for HMAC-hashing login-throttle cache keys. Left blank and
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# provisioned on startup (php spark env:provision); independent of encryption.key.
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throttle.key=''
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# LOGGER
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# - 0=Disables logging, Error logging TURNED OFF
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# - 1=Emergency Messages - System is unusable
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# - 2=Alert Messages - Action Must Be Taken Immediately
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# - 3=Critical Messages - Application component unavailable, unexpected exception.
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# - 4=Runtime Errors - Don't need immediate action, but should be monitored.
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# - 5=Warnings - Exceptional occurrences that are not errors.
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# - 6=Notices - Normal but significant events.
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# - 7=Info - Interesting events, like user logging in, etc.
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# - 8=Debug - Detailed debug information.
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# - 9=All Messages
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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logger.threshold=0
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app.db_log_enabled=false
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# HONEYPOT
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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honeypot.hidden=true
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honeypot.label='Fill This Field'
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honeypot.name='honeypot'
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honeypot.template='<label>{label}</label><input type="text" name="{name}" value="">'
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honeypot.container='<div style="display:none">{template}</div>'
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# SECURITY: DISALLOW PASSWORD CHANGE
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# When true, disables the "change password" feature for all employees.
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# Useful when passwords are managed by an external system (e.g. SSO/LDAP).
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#
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# DISALLOW_PASSWORD_CHANGE=false
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DISALLOW_PASSWORD_CHANGE=false
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# SECURITY: DISALLOW GRANT CHANGE
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------
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# When true, disables changing an employee's grants for all employees.
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# New employees cannot be created with grants while this is enabled.
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# Useful for demo deployments.
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#
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# DISALLOW_GRANT_CHANGE=false
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DISALLOW_GRANT_CHANGE=false
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