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690f43578d
Complete Content-Type application/json fix for all AJAX responses - Add missing return statements to all ->response->setJSON() calls - Fix Items.php method calls from JSON() to setJSON() - Convert echo statements to proper JSON responses - Ensure consistent Content-Type headers across all controllers - Fix 46+ instances across 12 controller files - Change Config.php methods to : ResponseInterface (all return setJSON only): - postSaveRewards(), postSaveBarcode(), postSaveReceipt() - postSaveInvoice(), postRemoveLogo() - Update PHPDoc @return tags - Change Receivings.php _reload() to : string (only returns view) - Change Receivings.php methods to : string (all return _reload()): - getIndex(), postSelectSupplier(), postChangeMode(), postAdd() - postEditItem(), getDeleteItem(), getRemoveSupplier() - postComplete(), postRequisitionComplete(), getReceipt(), postCancelReceiving() - Change postSave() to : ResponseInterface (returns setJSON) - Update all PHPDoc @return tags Fix XSS vulnerabilities in sales templates, login, and config pages This commit addresses 5 XSS vulnerabilities by adding proper escaping to all user-controlled configuration values in HTML contexts. Fixed Files: - app/Views/sales/invoice.php: Escaped company_logo (URL context) and company (HTML) - app/Views/sales/work_order.php: Escaped company_logo (URL context) - app/Views/sales/receipt_email.php: Added file path validation and escaping for logo - app/Views/login.php: Escaped all config values in title, logo src, and alt - app/Views/configs/info_config.php: Escaped company_logo (URL context) Security Impact: - Prevents stored XSS attacks if configuration is compromised - Defense-in-depth principle applied to administrative interfaces - Follows OWASP best practices for output encoding Testing: - Verified no script execution with XSS payloads in config values - Confirmed proper escaping in HTML, URL, and file contexts - All templates render correctly with valid configuration Severity: High (4 files), Medium-High (1 file) CVSS Score: ~6.1 CWE: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation) Fix critical password validation bypass and add unit tests This commit addresses a critical security vulnerability where the password minimum length check was performed on the HASHED password (always 60 characters for bcrypt) instead of the actual password before hashing. Vulnerability Details: - Original code: strlen($employee_data['password']) >= 8 - This compared the hash length (always 60) instead of raw password - Impact: Users could set 1-character passwords like "a" - Severity: Critical (enables brute force attacks on weak passwords) - CVE-like issue: CWE-307 (Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts) Fix Applied: - Validate password length BEFORE hashing - Clear error message when password is too short - Added unit tests to verify minimum length enforcement - Regression test to prevent future vulnerability re-introduction Test Coverage: - testPasswordMinLength_Rejects7Characters: Verify 7 chars rejected - testPasswordMinLength_Accepts8Characters: Verify 8 chars accepted - testPasswordMinLength_RejectsEmptyString: Verify empty rejected - testPasswordMinLength_RejectsWhitespaceOnly: Verify whitespace rejected - testPasswordMinLength_AcceptsSpecialCharacters: Verify special chars OK - testPasswordMinLength_RejectsPreviousBehavior: Regression test for bug Files Modified: - app/Controllers/Home.php: Fixed password validation logic - tests/Controllers/HomeTest.php: Added comprehensive unit tests Security Impact: - Enforces 8-character minimum password policy - Prevents extremely weak passwords that facilitate brute-force attacks - Critical for credential security and user account protection Breaking Changes: - Users with passwords < 8 characters will need to reset their password - This is the intended security improvement Severity: Critical CVSS Score: ~7.5 CWE: CWE-305 (Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness), CWE-307 Add GitHub Actions workflow to run PHPUnit tests Move business logic from views to controllers for better separation of concerns - Move logo URL computation from info_config view to Config::getIndex() - Move image base64 encoding from receipt_email view to Sales controller - Improves separation of concerns by keeping business logic in controllers - Simplifies view templates to only handle presentation Fix XSS vulnerabilities in report views - escape user-controllable summary data and labels Fix base64 encoding URL issue in delete payment - properly URL encode base64 string Fix remaining return type declarations for Sales controller Fixed additional methods that call _reload(): - postAdd() - returns _reload($data) - postAddPayment() - returns _reload($data) - postEditItem() - returns _reload($data) - postSuspend() - returns _reload($data) - postSetPaymentType() - returns _reload() All methods now return ResponseInterface|string to match _reload() signature. This resolves PHP TypeError errors.
92 lines
2.6 KiB
PHP
92 lines
2.6 KiB
PHP
<?php
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namespace App\Controllers;
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use App\Libraries\Sms_lib;
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use App\Models\Person;
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use CodeIgniter\HTTP\ResponseInterface;
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class Messages extends Secure_Controller
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{
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private Sms_lib $sms_lib;
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public function __construct()
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{
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parent::__construct('messages');
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$this->sms_lib = new Sms_lib();
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}
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/**
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* @return string
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*/
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public function getIndex(): string
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{
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return view('messages/sms');
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}
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/**
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* @param int $person_id
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* @return string
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*/
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public function getView(int $person_id = NEW_ENTRY): string
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{
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$person = model(Person::class);
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$info = $person->get_info($person_id);
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foreach (get_object_vars($info) as $property => $value) {
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$info->$property = $value;
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}
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$data['person_info'] = $info;
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return view('messages/form_sms', $data);
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}
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/**
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* @return ResponseInterface
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*/
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public function send(): ResponseInterface
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{
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$phone = $this->request->getPost('phone', FILTER_SANITIZE_FULL_SPECIAL_CHARS);
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$message = $this->request->getPost('message', FILTER_SANITIZE_FULL_SPECIAL_CHARS);
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$response = $this->sms_lib->sendSMS($phone, $message);
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if ($response) {
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return $this->response->setJSON(['success' => true, 'message' => lang('Messages.successfully_sent') . ' ' . esc($phone)]);
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} else {
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return $this->response->setJSON(['success' => false, 'message' => lang('Messages.unsuccessfully_sent') . ' ' . esc($phone)]);
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}
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}
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/**
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* Sends an SMS message to a user. Used in app/Views/messages/form_sms.php.
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*
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* @param int $person_id
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* @return ResponseInterface
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* @noinspection PhpUnused
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*/
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public function send_form(int $person_id = NEW_ENTRY): ResponseInterface
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{
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$phone = $this->request->getPost('phone', FILTER_SANITIZE_FULL_SPECIAL_CHARS);
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$message = $this->request->getPost('message', FILTER_SANITIZE_FULL_SPECIAL_CHARS);
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$response = $this->sms_lib->sendSMS($phone, $message);
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if ($response) {
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return $this->response->setJSON([
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'success' => true,
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'message' => lang('Messages.successfully_sent') . ' ' . esc($phone),
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'person_id' => $person_id
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]);
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} else {
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return $this->response->setJSON([
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'success' => false,
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'message' => lang('Messages.unsuccessfully_sent') . ' ' . esc($phone),
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'person_id' => NEW_ENTRY
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]);
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}
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}
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}
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