Files
opensourcepos/app/Helpers/security_helper.php
T
184918d914 fix(security): handle special characters in .env key values and improve insertion logic (#4656)
* fix(security): handle special characters in `.env` key values and improve insertion logic

- Escape backslashes and dollar signs in `applyEnvKeyReplacement` to prevent unintended value corruption.
- Ensure new keys are inserted after `encryption.key` for better organization and manageability.
- Add explicit cast to int to prevent wrong concatenation operator warning.

Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): handle null return in `applyEnvKeyReplacement` and ensure proper `.env` updates

- Update `applyEnvKeyReplacement` to return `null` on failure, improving error handling.
- Adjust calls to `atomicWriteFile` with updated content to prevent unintended behavior.

Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): improve error logging and exception messages in file locking

- Add detailed logging for file open and locking errors in `security_helper`.
- Remove unused `helper` and `checkThrottleEncryption` calls from `Events` for cleanup.

Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): improve atomic file write and handle encryption key placement

- Throw `RandomException` for better error reporting in `atomicWriteFile`.
- Simplify Windows-specific `rename()` fallback logic.
- Fix `encryption.key` assignment order to ensure consistency in `.env` updates.

Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): improve `.env` file handling and add unit tests for helper functions

- Suppress warnings in `file_get_contents` to prevent unnecessary error logs.
- Update `applyEnvKeyReplacement` to use `preg_replace_callback` for better safety.
- Add comprehensive unit tests for `security_helper` functions to ensure `.env` updates and key management work as expected.

Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): enhance `.env` update logic and add robust exception handling

- Add `RandomException` to improve error reporting in encryption key management.
- Introduce environment file locking for safer `.env` updates.
- Ensure `applyEnvKeyReplacement` properly handles and inserts old key comments.
- Replace direct file writes with `atomicWriteFile` for consistency.

Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): refactor `.env` file initialization and encryption key handling

- Introduce `initializeEnvFile` for reusable `.env` setup logic.
- Add `backupEnvFile` and `writeNewEncryptionKey` for robust key management with backups.
- Simplify and clean up redundant `.env` handling code paths.

Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): clarify `checkEncryption` docblock return value description

Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): escape backslashes and dollar signs in `applyEnvKeyReplacement`

- Ensure `applyEnvKeyReplacement` properly escapes special characters when inserting or appending `.env` keys.
- Add new unit tests to validate correct handling of backslashes and dollar signs.

Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(i18n): add localized error messages and improve error reporting in `security_helper`

- Add missing translations for error messages across multiple language files.
- Update `security_helper` to use localized exception messages with placeholders.

Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com>

* Redesign encryption/throttle key provisioning as read-only runtime

- checkEncryption()/checkThrottleEncryption() are now read-only guards that
  throw when no valid key is provisioned, instead of writing .env at
  request time.
- Add rotateEncryptionKey() and provisionThrottleKey() for explicit,
  idempotent provisioning.
- Add php spark env:provision (app/Commands/EnvProvision.php) so Docker can
  provision keys once at container startup before any request.
- Add app/Libraries/CI3SecretConverter.php shared CI3->CI4 secret converter
  (AES-128-CBC decrypt + CI4 re-encrypt/verify/save) used by both the
  interactive migration and the docker startup path.
- Refactor convertToCI4 migration to use the shared converter.
- Persist .env in a named volume and run spark env:provision on boot; stop
  baking .env into the shipped image.
- Add guard/rotation/throttle + converter tests; clean up orphaned
  msg_pwd_required language keys across all locales.

* fix: save CI4 ciphertext in env:provision and bind-mount a .env file

Addresses CodeRabbit review on PR #4656:

- env:provision CI3 branch was persisting *plaintext* secrets (saveAll($plain))
  instead of the CI4 ciphertext, unlike the ConvertToCI4 migration. Now
  encrypts with encryptAll(), verifies the round trip, and saves the ciphertext.
- The ospos_env named volume mounted at /app/.env made .env a directory, so
  atomicWriteFile's rename() failed and spark env:provision could not start apache.
  Switch to a bind mount of a host file (./.env) which persists and stays a file.
- Add a regression test asserting the command persists ciphertext (not plaintext).

* chore: trim redundant docblocks in EnvProvision and provision throttle.key in CI

Follow up on @objecttothis review comments:
- app/Commands/EnvProvision.php: remove the boilerplate docblocks the
  property names already convey (group/name/usage/description, run()),
  the two inline step comments, the anyNonEmpty() param docblock, and the
  legacySecretsPresent() docblock. Keeps the class-level docblock since it
  is the only place that states the read-only runtime design + the
  never-persist-plaintext invariant.
- .github/workflows/phpunit.yml: provision a per-run throttle.key the same
  way the encryption key is already provisioned. The PR makes
  checkThrottleEncryption() a read-only guard that throws when
  env('throttle.key') is unset; CI only started exporting ENCRYPTION_KEY,
  so every test that goes through the Throttle filter (7 ThrottleTest
  cases + 4 LoginTest cases) failed with
  "No throttle key is provisioned. Run `php spark env:provision`".
  Writing `throttle.key=<KEY>` into .env matches what
  `php spark env:provision` does on a real container start.

* fix(ci): write throttle.key into .env instead of exporting an OS env var

The previous attempt exported throttle.key via GITHUB_ENV, but CodeIgniter's
env() helper resolves in the order $_ENV[$key] ?? $_SERVER[$key] ?? getenv($key),
and DotEnv populates $_ENV['throttle.key'] from the .env file first. Because the
.env (copied from .env.example) ships with the empty placeholder throttle.key='',
that $_ENV entry exists as '' and short-circuits the ?? chain before getenv()
is reached — so the OS env var was never consulted and every Throttle/Login test
still threw 'No throttle key is provisioned'.

Write the per-run key into the .env file itself (sed-replacing the empty
placeholder), which is exactly what `php spark env:provision` does in
production and is the single source env() actually reads from.

Verify the replacement happened (grep -Eq '^throttle\.key=.') so a future change
to the placeholder format fails the run loudly instead of silently breaking
the 11 throttle-dependent tests.

* fix(security): restore CI3->CI4 auto-provisioning gated by .env writability

checkEncryption()/checkThrottleEncryption() again provision the keys
inline when .env is writable (empty key -> generate; short key -> decrypt,
rotate, re-encrypt, verify, persist legacy CI3 secrets). When .env is not
writable they assume the key was provisioned externally (e.g. docker
env:provision) and throw. Update helper tests to match and correct the
EnvProvision docblock that claimed the runtime was strictly read-only.

* test(security): make short-key conversion branch injectable and test it

checkEncryption() now accepts an optional CI3SecretConverter so the
CI3->CI4 conversion branch can be exercised in unit tests without a
database. Adds testCheckEncryptionConvertsCi3ShortKeyWhenEnvWritable
which seeds CI3-era ciphertexts via a fake Appconfig model and asserts
the key is rotated and the payload verifies back to the original
plaintext.

* fix(security): abort on backup/read/saveAll failure to avoid data loss

Three related data-integrity fixes:

- backupEnvFile() now returns true/false based on whether the backup
  actually exists and is readable. rotateEncryptionKey() aborts before
  destroying the key when the backup could not be written to disk.

- rotateEncryptionKey() and provisionThrottleKey() throw
  RuntimeException(Error.unable_to_read_env_file) when the .env read
  fails, instead of silently replacing the whole file with an empty
  string. This prevents a permission error from wiping all keys.

- checkEncryption() and EnvProvision::run() now both roll back to the
  backup with abortEncryptionConversion() when the post-rotation
  saveAll() throws, matching the migration path (which already did this).
  A failing fake Appconfig is used to exercise this in the new
  testCheckEncryptionRollsBackWhenSaveAllFails test.

* fix(ci): skip comment job in deploy-pr.yml when prepare was not run

The comment job had if: always(), so it ran even when the prepare job
was skipped (e.g. review was not approved). With PR_NUMBER empty the gh
api call posted to issues//comments, received a 404, and the entire run
showed up as failure. Guard the job with
needs.prepare.result == 'success' so it only runs when PR_NUMBER is valid.

* address coderabbit open items: placeholder guards, message neutrality, ar-EG alignment

- backupEnvFile(): fail when mkdir() or either chmod() fails, so the
  pre-rotation backup is actually persisted before the key is replaced
- email/message config views: only show the 'already set' placeholder when
  the secret is actually present (prevented false positives on fresh installs)
- Error.unable_to_create_env_file / .unable_to_read_env_file (en + en-GB):
  use key-neutral wording since both keys are provisioned with the same keys
- ar-EG/Error.php: align all => arrows on the longest key

Item 7 (filesystem test isolation) is a larger refactor — the tests are
serial on CI and tearDown() restores state per test. Left for follow-up.

* test(security): isolate helper FS tests via Config\SecurityEnv

Introduce Config\SecurityEnv holding envPath/backupPath/lockPath so the
security helper reads its target paths from shared configuration instead of
hardcoded ROOTPATH/WRITEPATH literals. security_helperTest.php now redirects
all three to a unique per-run sandbox under sys_get_temp_dir() and tears it
down in tearDown(), so the suite no longer reads/writes the repository's real
.env and is safe to run in parallel.

No helper signature changes; production callers unaffected.

Addresses CodeRabbit item 7 (issue #4700).

Co-Authored-By: opencode <bot@opencode.ai>

* fix(security): run key-conversion as one locked transaction

Address CodeRabbit Major findings from the 4th re-review of the env
helper and its callers:

1. Hold .env.lock for the entire CI3 -> CI4 conversion transaction
   (backup -> rotate -> re-encrypt -> verify -> persist -> cleanup) so a
   concurrent worker cannot interleave a key write between the rotation
   and the ciphertext save. Split rotateEncryptionKey into a lock-free
   core (rotateEncryptionKeyUnlock) plus the existing lock wrapper and a
   new rotateEncryptionKeyTransaction that owns the lock across the full
   unit and performs both the in-lock rollback (abortEncryptionConversion)
   and the in-lock backup removal on success.

2. Treat the legacy value '0' as non-empty data so key rotation still
   persists the re-encrypted ciphertext when '0' is the only stored
   secret (array_filter would have dropped it and skipped saveAll).

3. Wrap the post-rotation re-encrypt/verify/saveAll sequence in a
   catch (Throwable) across all three call-sites so CI4
   EncryptionException, ReflectionException from batch_save, a failed
   round-trip verify, and any other failure all roll the .env key back
   to the pre-rotation state.

4. In Docker Compose, use long-syntax bind with create_host_path: false
   and document in INSTALL.md that the host .env must be a regular file
   (a missing one is no longer auto-created as a directory, and the
   mount now rejects a missing source on Compose implementations that
   support the flag).

Files touched: app/Helpers/security_helper.php, app/Commands/EnvProvision.php,
app/Database/Migrations/20220127000000_convertToCI4.php, docker-compose.yml,
INSTALL.md. All 4 existing helper tests still pass via CI.

* fix(security): make abortEncryptionConversion fail loudly on restore failure

The rollback path restored the .env backup with a suppressed
file_put_contents() and an unchecked file_get_contents(). If the restore
failed after the key had already been rotated, .env was left holding the new
CI4 key while the DB still held CI3-era ciphertext, so the data became
undecryptable after the next restart.

Now the backup read is checked for false and the restore goes through the
existing atomicWriteFile() helper; either failure throws so the error is
surfaced instead of silently corrupting the config. Adds a regression test
that forces an unreadable backup and asserts the throw plus that .env is
left untouched.

* fix(security): guard abortEncryptionConversion backup read before touching it

Validate the backup is a regular readable file (is_file/is_readable) before
reading it, so a missing/malformed backup fails loudly instead of emitting a
file_get_contents() warning. The unreadable-backup regression test now
exercises this guard rather than relying on a promoted warning.

---------

Signed-off-by: objecttothis <17935339+objecttothis@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jekkos <jeroen.peelaerts@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: jekkos <jekkos@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: opencode <bot@opencode.ai>
2026-09-21 17:35:45 +02:00

606 lines
20 KiB
PHP

<?php
use App\Libraries\CI3SecretConverter;
use CodeIgniter\Encryption\Encryption;
use Config\Services;
use Random\RandomException;
/**
* Opens (creating if needed) and exclusively locks a dedicated mutex file
* for coordinating .env writes. Windows can't rename/delete a file while
* any handle to it is open, so the mutex must be a separate file from
* .env itself — never fopen()/flock() .env directly.
*
* @return resource
*/
function lockEnvFile()
{
$lockPath = config('SecurityEnv')->lockPath;
$handle = @fopen($lockPath, 'c+');
if ($handle === false) {
$reason = error_get_last()['message'] ?? 'unknown error';
log_message('critical', "Unable to open $lockPath: $reason");
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_open_lock_file', ['filePath' => $lockPath, 'reason' => $reason]));
}
if (!flock($handle, LOCK_EX)) {
fclose($handle);
$reason = error_get_last()['message'] ?? 'unknown error';
log_message('critical', "Unable to lock $lockPath: $reason");
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_lock_file', ['filePath' => $lockPath, 'reason' => $reason]));
}
return $handle;
}
/**
* @param resource $handle
* @return void
*/
function unlockEnvFile($handle): void
{
flock($handle, LOCK_UN);
fclose($handle);
}
/**
* Copies .env.example to .env (or creates a stub) if .env does not exist yet.
*
* @param string $configPath
* @return bool true if $configPath exists (already did, or was just created)
*/
function initializeEnvFile(string $configPath): bool
{
if (!file_exists($configPath)) {
$examplePath = ROOTPATH . '.env.example';
if (file_exists($examplePath)) {
@copy($examplePath, $configPath);
} else {
@file_put_contents($configPath, "# OSPOS Configuration\n\n");
}
@chmod($configPath, 0640);
}
return file_exists($configPath);
}
/**
* Replaces or inserts a single `key='value'` line in .env
*
* @param string $envKey
* @param string $value
* @return bool true on success, false if the write could not be completed
*/
function writeEnvKey(string $envKey, string $value): bool
{
$configPath = config('SecurityEnv')->envPath;
if (!initializeEnvFile($configPath)) {
return false;
}
$lock = lockEnvFile();
try {
$configFile = @file_get_contents($configPath);
if ($configFile === false) {
return false;
}
$updated = applyEnvKeyReplacement($configFile, $envKey, $value);
if ($updated === null) {
return false;
}
return atomicWriteFile($configPath, $updated);
} finally {
unlockEnvFile($lock);
}
}
function applyEnvKeyReplacement(string $configFile, string $envKey, string $value): ?string
{
$pattern = '/^\s*' . preg_quote($envKey, '/') . '\s*=.*/m';
$escapedValue = str_replace(['\\', '$'], ['\\\\', '\\$'], $value);
if (preg_match($pattern, $configFile)) {
return preg_replace_callback($pattern, static fn () => "$envKey='$escapedValue'", $configFile, 1);
}
// New keys insert right after encryption.key so it stays first for easy backup/rotation.
if (preg_match('/^encryption\.key\s*=.*$/m', $configFile, $matches, PREG_OFFSET_CAPTURE)) {
$insertAt = (int) $matches[0][1] + strlen($matches[0][0]);
return substr_replace($configFile, "\n$envKey='$escapedValue'", $insertAt, 0);
}
return $configFile . "\n$envKey='$escapedValue'\n";
}
/**
* Writes $contents to a temp file in the same directory as $path, then
* renames it onto $path so readers never observe a partially written file.
*
* @param string $path
* @param string $contents
* @return bool
* @throws RandomException
*/
function atomicWriteFile(string $path, string $contents): bool
{
$tmpPath = $path . '.tmp.' . bin2hex(random_bytes(8));
$handle = @fopen($tmpPath, 'x');
if ($handle === false) {
return false;
}
if (!@chmod($tmpPath, 0640)) {
fclose($handle);
@unlink($tmpPath);
return false;
}
$written = fwrite($handle, $contents);
if ($written === false || $written !== strlen($contents) || !fflush($handle)) {
fclose($handle);
@unlink($tmpPath);
return false;
}
if (function_exists('fsync') && !fsync($handle)) {
fclose($handle);
@unlink($tmpPath);
return false;
}
fclose($handle);
// On Windows rename() does not overwrite an existing destination. Fall back to unlink()+rename().
if (!@rename($tmpPath, $path)) {
if (PHP_OS_FAMILY !== 'Windows' || !@unlink($path) || !@rename($tmpPath, $path)) {
@unlink($tmpPath);
return false;
}
}
@chmod($path, 0640);
return true;
}
/**
* Copies $configPath to $backupPath, creating the backup folder if needed.
*
* @param string $configPath
* @param string $backupPath
* @return bool true when the backup exists and is readable, false otherwise
*/
function backupEnvFile(string $configPath, string $backupPath): bool
{
$backupFolder = dirname($backupPath);
if (!file_exists($backupFolder) && !@mkdir($backupFolder, 0750, true)) {
return false;
}
if (!@copy($configPath, $backupPath)) {
return false;
}
if (!is_readable($backupPath)) {
return false;
}
if (@chmod($backupPath, 0640) !== true || @chmod($configPath, 0640) !== true) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
/**
* Applies the new encryption.key to $configFile, preserving $oldKey as a
* commented-out backup line immediately before it.
*
* @param string $configFile
* @param string $key
* @param string $oldKey
* @return string|null updated file contents, or null if the replacement failed
*/
function writeNewEncryptionKey(string $configFile, string $key, string $oldKey): ?string
{
$updated = applyEnvKeyReplacement($configFile, 'encryption.key', $key);
if ($updated === null) {
return null;
}
if (!empty($oldKey)) {
$oldLine = "# encryption.key='$oldKey' REMOVE IF UNNEEDED\r\n";
if (preg_match('/^encryption\.key\s*=/m', $updated, $matches, PREG_OFFSET_CAPTURE)) {
$updated = substr_replace($updated, $oldLine, $matches[0][1], 0);
}
}
return $updated;
}
/**
* Returns true when the current process can write to (or create) .env.
*
* A missing .env file is considered writable when the directory is writable.
*
* @return bool
*/
function envFileIsWritable(): bool
{
$configPath = config('SecurityEnv')->envPath;
return file_exists($configPath)
? is_writable($configPath)
: is_writable(dirname($configPath));
}
/**
* Ensures a usable CI4 encryption key is available.
*
* Behaviour:
* - Key present and >= 64 characters: returns true immediately (no I/O).
* - Key missing or CI3-era (< 64 chars) and .env IS writable:
* - Short key: decrypts legacy CI3 secrets, rotates to a fresh CI4 key,
* re-encrypts under the new key, verifies the round-trip, persists result.
* - Missing key: generates a fresh key and persists it.
* - Key missing or CI3-era (< 64 chars) and .env NOT writable:
* throws — the key was presumably already provisioned externally
* (e.g. `php spark env:provision` at container startup); the in-memory
* config simply hasn't been reloaded yet.
*
* @param CI3SecretConverter|null $converter injectable converter used to
* decrypt/re-encrypt legacy CI3
* secrets in the short-key branch;
* defaults to the real converter
* (tests may pass a fake to avoid
* hitting the database)
* @return bool true when a valid key is available
* @throws Throwable when .env is not writable or the CI3 -> CI4 conversion fails
*/
function checkEncryption(?CI3SecretConverter $converter = null): bool
{
$key = (string) config('Encryption')->key;
if ($key !== '' && strlen($key) >= 64) {
return true;
}
if (!envFileIsWritable()) {
log_message('critical', 'Encryption key not provisioned and .env is not writable. Run `php spark env:provision` to generate one.');
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.encryption_key_not_provisioned'));
}
if ($key !== '') {
$converter = $converter ?? new CI3SecretConverter();
// Legacy plaintext is a DB read; safe outside the .env lock (the lock
// only guards the .env file write, which the rotation performs).
$plain = $converter->decryptAll($key);
$nonEmpty = false;
foreach ($plain as $value) {
if ((string) $value !== '') {
$nonEmpty = true;
break;
}
}
// Run the whole backup -> rotate -> re-encrypt -> verify -> persist unit
// under a single .env lock. On any failure, the pre-rotation backup is
// restored (also in-lock); on success the backup is removed (in-lock).
rotateEncryptionKeyTransaction($key, static function () use ($plain, $converter, $nonEmpty): void {
$encrypted = $converter->encryptAll($plain);
if (array_diff_assoc($plain, $converter->verifyAll($encrypted)) !== []) {
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_persist_encryption_key', ['filePath' => config('SecurityEnv')->envPath]));
}
if ($nonEmpty) {
$converter->saveAll($encrypted);
}
});
} else {
// Fresh key (no old key to decrypt): a single atomic write suffices.
rotateEncryptionKey(null);
}
return true;
}
/**
* Returns the persistent HMAC secret used to hash login-throttle cache keys.
*
* Behaviour:
* - Key already present: returned immediately (no I/O).
* - Key missing and .env IS writable: generates a fresh key and persists it.
* - Key missing and .env NOT writable:
* throws — the key was presumably already provisioned externally
* (e.g. `php spark env:provision` at container startup).
*
* @return string the throttle key
* @throws RuntimeException if the key cannot be provisioned
*/
function checkThrottleEncryption(): string
{
$key = (string) env('throttle.key', '');
if ($key !== '') {
return $key;
}
if (!envFileIsWritable()) {
log_message('critical', 'Throttle key not provisioned and .env is not writable. Run `php spark env:provision` to generate one.');
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.throttle_key_not_provisioned'));
}
return provisionThrottleKey();
}
/**
* Generates a strong encryption key, persists it to `.env` (rotating in place
* so callers can re-encrypt CI3 data that was sealed with the old key), and
* applies it to the running config instance.
*
* Standalone key-write path: acquires and holds the `.env` mutex for the
* duration of the write, so concurrent callers see atomic key writes. Callers
* that also run a longer multi-step conversion (re-encrypt, verify, persist)
* must use rotateEncryptionKeyTransaction() instead, so a single lock is held
* for the whole backup -> rotate -> re-encrypt -> persist unit and the
* key-write does not take a nested lock on the same mutex (which would
* deadlock).
*
* @param string|null $oldKey current key to rotate from; when non-empty it is
* preserved as a commented backup line for the
* CI3->CI4 re-encryption pass
* @return string the newly generated key
* @throws RuntimeException if the key could not be generated or persisted
* @throws RandomException
*/
function rotateEncryptionKey(?string $oldKey = null): string
{
$lock = lockEnvFile();
try {
return rotateEncryptionKeyUnlock($oldKey);
} finally {
unlockEnvFile($lock);
}
}
/**
* Lock-free core of rotateEncryptionKey(): generates a key, backs up .env,
* writes the new key (atomic), and applies it to the running config.
*
* Do not call directly from context that does not already hold the lock —
* that leaves a window in which another worker can read or write .env before
* the atomic write lands. The two callers, rotateEncryptionKey() and
* rotateEncryptionKeyTransaction(), each acquire the lock first and pass the
* lock-free core through.
*
* @param string|null $oldKey current key to rotate from
* @return string the newly generated key
* @throws RuntimeException if the key could not be generated or persisted
* @throws RandomException
*/
function rotateEncryptionKeyUnlock(?string $oldKey): string
{
$encryption = new Encryption();
$key = bin2hex($encryption->createKey());
$configPath = config('SecurityEnv')->envPath;
$backupPath = config('SecurityEnv')->backupPath;
if (!initializeEnvFile($configPath)) {
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_create_env_file', ['filePath' => $configPath]));
}
if (file_exists($configPath)) {
if (!backupEnvFile($configPath, $backupPath)) {
log_message('critical', "Unable to back up $configPath to $backupPath before rotation; aborting.");
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_persist_encryption_key', ['filePath' => $configPath]));
}
}
$configFile = @file_get_contents($configPath);
if ($configFile === false) {
log_message('critical', "Unable to read $configPath before rotation; aborting.");
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_read_env_file', ['filePath' => $configPath]));
}
$updated = writeNewEncryptionKey($configFile, $key, (string) $oldKey);
if ($updated === null) {
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_persist_encryption_key', ['filePath' => $configPath]));
}
if (!atomicWriteFile($configPath, $updated)) {
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_persist_encryption_key', ['filePath' => $configPath]));
}
config('Encryption')->key = $key;
log_message('info', "Rotated encryption key in $configPath");
return $key;
}
/**
* Runs the CI3 -> CI4 key conversion as a single transaction on the `.env`
* mutex.
*
* The lock is acquired BEFORE the .env backup and released only AFTER
* $conversion has run, so the entire unit (backup -> rotate -> re-encrypt ->
* verify -> persist) is atomic with respect to any other worker that also
* takes the lock. The $conversion callback must throw on failure; the caller
* is expected to catch the exception and roll back via
* abortEncryptionConversion().
*
* Calls the lock-free rotateEncryptionKeyUnlock() internally so the
* transaction lock is not re-acquired on the same mutex (which would deadlock)
* — the mutex is held across the backup, the key write, the re-encryption,
* verification, and persistence.
*
* @param string|null $oldKey current key to rotate from
* @param callable $conversion callback(): void, called after the new key
* has been persisted and applied to the running
* config; expected to perform re-encryption,
* verification, and persistence. Must throw on
* failure; the pre-rotation backup is restored
* before the exception propagates.
* @return string the newly generated key
* @throws Throwable from $conversion (the lock is released in `finally`)
* @throws RuntimeException
* @throws RandomException
*/
function rotateEncryptionKeyTransaction(?string $oldKey, callable $conversion): string
{
// Hold one lock for the entire transaction (backup -> rotate -> re-encrypt
// -> verify -> persist -> cleanup). If we cannot acquire it, we fail
// rather than silently run without synchronisation — the invariant (no
// interleaved key + ciphertext writes) requires it.
$lock = lockEnvFile();
try {
// Lock-free inner write: the outer lock IS the transaction lock, so no
// nested re-acquire on the same mutex (which would deadlock).
$newKey = rotateEncryptionKeyUnlock($oldKey);
// Multi-step conversion (re-encrypt -> verify -> persist) runs while
// still holding the lock, so a concurrent worker cannot interleave its
// key write between the rotation and this ciphertext save.
$conversion();
// Success: drop the pre-rotation backup, in-lock.
removeBackup();
return $newKey;
} catch (Throwable $e) {
// Failure (CI4 EncryptionException / ReflectionException from saveAll,
// or a failed round-trip verify, or the rotation itself failed):
// restore the pre-rotation .env while still holding the lock, then
// rethrow. catch runs before finally, so the restore is atomic with
// the held lock.
abortEncryptionConversion();
throw $e;
} finally {
unlockEnvFile($lock);
}
}
/**
* Ensures a persistent throttle secret exists, generating and persisting one
* to `.env` if it is missing. Idempotent: safe to call on every startup.
*
* @return string the throttle key
* @throws RuntimeException if the key could not be created or persisted
*/
function provisionThrottleKey(): string
{
$configPath = config('SecurityEnv')->envPath;
if (!initializeEnvFile($configPath)) {
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_create_env_file', ['filePath' => $configPath]));
}
$lock = lockEnvFile();
try {
$configFile = @file_get_contents($configPath);
if ($configFile === false) {
log_message('critical', "Unable to read $configPath while provisioning throttle key; aborting.");
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_read_env_file', ['filePath' => $configPath]));
}
$key = '';
if (preg_match('/^\s*throttle\.key\s*=\s*[\'"]?([^\'"\r\n]*)/m', $configFile, $matches)) {
$existing = trim($matches[1]);
if ($existing !== '') {
$key = $existing;
}
}
if ($key === '') {
$key = bin2hex(random_bytes(32));
}
$updated = applyEnvKeyReplacement($configFile, 'throttle.key', $key);
if ($updated === null || !atomicWriteFile($configPath, $updated)) {
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_persist_throttle_key', ['filePath' => $configPath]));
}
} finally {
unlockEnvFile($lock);
}
putenv("throttle.key=$key");
$_ENV['throttle.key'] = $key;
$_SERVER['throttle.key'] = $key;
log_message('info', 'Provisioned throttle key in ' . config('SecurityEnv')->envPath);
return $key;
}
/**
* @return void
*/
function abortEncryptionConversion(): void
{
$configPath = config('SecurityEnv')->envPath;
$backupPath = config('SecurityEnv')->backupPath;
if (!file_exists($backupPath)) {
return;
}
// A backup exists, so the restore must succeed or fail loudly; a silent
// failure would leave .env holding the new key while the DB still holds the
// old ciphertext, making the data undecryptable after the next restart.
if (!is_file($backupPath) || !is_readable($backupPath)) {
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_read_env_file', ['filePath' => $backupPath]));
}
$configFile = file_get_contents($backupPath);
if ($configFile === false) {
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_read_env_file', ['filePath' => $backupPath]));
}
if (!atomicWriteFile($configPath, $configFile)) {
throw new RuntimeException(lang('Error.unable_to_persist_encryption_key', ['filePath' => $configPath]));
}
log_message('info', "Restored $configPath from backup");
}
/**
* @return void
*/
function removeBackup(): void
{
$backupPath = config('SecurityEnv')->backupPath;
if (!file_exists($backupPath)) {
return;
}
@unlink($backupPath);
log_message('info', "Removed $backupPath");
}