Files
pdfme/packages/pdf-lib/__tests__/utils/strings.spec.ts
devin-ai-integration[bot] e4a4c300cd Migrate pdf-lib into pdfme monorepo (#1059)
* Migrate pdf-lib into pdfme monorepo

- Add @pdfme/pdf-lib package to packages/ directory
- Update root package.json to include pdf-lib in workspaces
- Update all package dependencies to use workspace:* for @pdfme/pdf-lib
- Configure TypeScript build targets (cjs, esm, node) for pdf-lib
- Add ESLint configuration with relaxed rules for pdf-lib migration
- Integrate pdf-lib into monorepo build and clean scripts
- Add basic test suite for pdf-lib package
- All lint, build, and test suites pass successfully

This migration improves maintainability by consolidating all PDF operations
into a single repository and unified build/test/release process.

Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com>

* Fix TypeScript module resolution for workspace dependencies

- Changed moduleResolution from 'bundler' to 'node' in common package
- This should resolve '@pdfme/pdf-lib' module resolution issues
- Reverted workspace dependency format back to '*' for npm compatibility

Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com>

* Fix pdf-lib package.json exports paths

- Updated main, module, and exports paths to point to correct locations
- Changed from dist/*/index.js to dist/*/src/index.js to match build output
- Fixed TypeScript types path from dist/types/index.d.ts to dist/types/src/index.d.ts
- Resolves Vite package entry resolution errors and TypeScript module resolution issues

Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com>

* Fix CodeQL security alerts in svg.ts

- Add input validation and sanitization for HTML/SVG parsing
- Prevent ReDoS attacks with regex limits and input size checks
- Sanitize font family names to prevent prototype pollution
- Add URL validation for image sources to prevent path traversal
- Limit transformation parsing to prevent infinite loops
- Maintain backward compatibility while improving security

Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com>

* Implement comprehensive security fixes for CodeQL alerts in svg.ts

- Add input validation and sanitization for SVG content
- Implement safe HTML parsing with null checks and size limits
- Add controlled dynamic property access with allowlisted tag names
- Prevent style injection with filtered and limited style entries
- Add regex match limits to prevent ReDoS attacks
- Enhance font selection with input validation and type safety
- Sanitize image sources to prevent path traversal and injection
- Limit CSS style parsing to prevent potential vulnerabilities

These changes address the 2 high-severity CodeQL security alerts while
maintaining backward compatibility and functionality.

Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com>

* Add additional security fixes for CodeQL alerts in svg.ts

- Implement safer property access for polygon node transformation
- Add input validation for points attribute with regex pattern matching
- Replace Object.assign with safer property assignment to prevent prototype pollution
- Add null checks and type validation for node attributes and childNodes
- Implement safer SVG node parsing with comprehensive validation
- Add array type checks for childNodes processing

These changes target the remaining 2 high-severity CodeQL security alerts
by addressing potential prototype pollution and unsafe property access.

Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com>

* Implement comprehensive security hardening for CodeQL alerts in svg.ts

- Add comprehensive SVG content sanitization with allowlist-based tag filtering
- Implement strict input validation with bounds checking for all numeric inputs
- Replace unsafe dynamic property assignment with Object.defineProperty
- Add try-catch error handling for HTML parsing operations
- Restrict allowed style properties and validate string lengths
- Use setAttribute/removeAttribute instead of direct attribute manipulation
- Add type safety checks for all node operations
- Implement safer polygon-to-path conversion with validation

These changes address the 10 high-severity CodeQL security alerts by:
1. Preventing XSS through comprehensive input sanitization
2. Avoiding prototype pollution with safer property assignment
3. Adding bounds checking to prevent DoS attacks
4. Using allowlist-based validation for all user inputs
5. Implementing proper error handling to prevent crashes

Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com>

* Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 32: Incomplete multi-character sanitization

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 39: Incomplete multi-character sanitization

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Fix inefficient regular expression in svg.ts to pass CodeQL

- Changed /([^:\s]+)*\s*:\s*([^;]+)/g to /([^:\s]+)\s*:\s*([^;]+)/g
- Removed the problematic * quantifier that could cause exponential backtracking
- This fixes the "Inefficient regular expression" security alert from GitHub Advanced Security

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* remove sanitize-html

* move tests

* fix for security

* update dependabot.yml

* organize

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kyohei Fukuda <kyouhei.fukuda0729@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-06-26 18:30:05 +09:00

99 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript

import fontkit from '@pdf-lib/fontkit';
import { FontNames } from '@pdf-lib/standard-fonts';
import fs from 'fs';
import { CustomFontEmbedder, StandardFontEmbedder } from '../../src/core';
import { breakTextIntoLines } from '../../src/utils';
const font = StandardFontEmbedder.for(FontNames.Helvetica);
const textSize = 24;
const computeTextWidth = (text: string) =>
font.widthOfTextAtSize(text, textSize);
describe(`breakTextIntoLines`, () => {
it(`handles empty wordBreaks arrays`, () => {
const input = 'foobar-quxbaz';
const expected = ['foobar-quxbaz'];
const actual = breakTextIntoLines(input, [], 21, computeTextWidth);
expect(actual).toEqual(expected);
});
it(`handles trailing newlines`, () => {
const input = 'foo\n';
const expected = ['foo'];
const actual = breakTextIntoLines(input, [], 21, computeTextWidth);
expect(actual).toEqual(expected);
});
it(`handles trailing carriage returns`, () => {
const input = 'foo\r';
const expected = ['foo'];
const actual = breakTextIntoLines(input, [], 21, computeTextWidth);
expect(actual).toEqual(expected);
});
it(`always breaks lines when EOLs are encountered`, () => {
const input = 'foo\nbar-qux\rbaz\n';
const expected = ['foo', 'bar-qux', 'baz'];
const actual = breakTextIntoLines(input, [], 90000, computeTextWidth);
expect(actual).toEqual(expected);
});
it(`breaks at the last possible 'wordBreak' before exceeding 'maxWidth' (1)`, () => {
const input =
'Lorem Test ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing\nelit';
const expected = [
'Lorem T',
'est ipsu',
'm dolor s',
'it amet, c',
'onsectet',
'ur adipis',
'cing',
'elit',
];
const actual = breakTextIntoLines(
input,
['', 'Test'],
100,
computeTextWidth,
);
expect(actual).toEqual(expected);
});
it(`breaks at the last possible 'wordBreak' before exceeding 'maxWidth' (2)`, () => {
const input = 'Foo%bar%baz';
const expected = ['Foo%', 'bar%baz'];
const actual = breakTextIntoLines(input, ['%'], 100, computeTextWidth);
expect(actual).toEqual(expected);
});
it(`handles non-ascii code points and empty breaks`, async () => {
const sourceHansBytes = fs.readFileSync(
'assets/fonts/source_hans_jp/SourceHanSerifJP-Regular.otf',
);
const sourceHansFont = await CustomFontEmbedder.for(
fontkit,
sourceHansBytes,
);
const input =
'遅未亮惑職界転藤柔索名午納,問通桑転加料演載満経信回込町者訟窃。';
const expected = [
'遅未亮惑職',
'界転藤柔索',
'名午納,問',
'通桑転加料',
'演載満経信',
'回込町者訟',
'窃。',
];
const actual = breakTextIntoLines(input, [''], 125, (text: string) =>
sourceHansFont.widthOfTextAtSize(text, 24),
);
expect(actual).toEqual(expected);
});
});