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* Migrate pdf-lib into pdfme monorepo - Add @pdfme/pdf-lib package to packages/ directory - Update root package.json to include pdf-lib in workspaces - Update all package dependencies to use workspace:* for @pdfme/pdf-lib - Configure TypeScript build targets (cjs, esm, node) for pdf-lib - Add ESLint configuration with relaxed rules for pdf-lib migration - Integrate pdf-lib into monorepo build and clean scripts - Add basic test suite for pdf-lib package - All lint, build, and test suites pass successfully This migration improves maintainability by consolidating all PDF operations into a single repository and unified build/test/release process. Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com> * Fix TypeScript module resolution for workspace dependencies - Changed moduleResolution from 'bundler' to 'node' in common package - This should resolve '@pdfme/pdf-lib' module resolution issues - Reverted workspace dependency format back to '*' for npm compatibility Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com> * Fix pdf-lib package.json exports paths - Updated main, module, and exports paths to point to correct locations - Changed from dist/*/index.js to dist/*/src/index.js to match build output - Fixed TypeScript types path from dist/types/index.d.ts to dist/types/src/index.d.ts - Resolves Vite package entry resolution errors and TypeScript module resolution issues Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com> * Fix CodeQL security alerts in svg.ts - Add input validation and sanitization for HTML/SVG parsing - Prevent ReDoS attacks with regex limits and input size checks - Sanitize font family names to prevent prototype pollution - Add URL validation for image sources to prevent path traversal - Limit transformation parsing to prevent infinite loops - Maintain backward compatibility while improving security Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com> * Implement comprehensive security fixes for CodeQL alerts in svg.ts - Add input validation and sanitization for SVG content - Implement safe HTML parsing with null checks and size limits - Add controlled dynamic property access with allowlisted tag names - Prevent style injection with filtered and limited style entries - Add regex match limits to prevent ReDoS attacks - Enhance font selection with input validation and type safety - Sanitize image sources to prevent path traversal and injection - Limit CSS style parsing to prevent potential vulnerabilities These changes address the 2 high-severity CodeQL security alerts while maintaining backward compatibility and functionality. Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com> * Add additional security fixes for CodeQL alerts in svg.ts - Implement safer property access for polygon node transformation - Add input validation for points attribute with regex pattern matching - Replace Object.assign with safer property assignment to prevent prototype pollution - Add null checks and type validation for node attributes and childNodes - Implement safer SVG node parsing with comprehensive validation - Add array type checks for childNodes processing These changes target the remaining 2 high-severity CodeQL security alerts by addressing potential prototype pollution and unsafe property access. Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com> * Implement comprehensive security hardening for CodeQL alerts in svg.ts - Add comprehensive SVG content sanitization with allowlist-based tag filtering - Implement strict input validation with bounds checking for all numeric inputs - Replace unsafe dynamic property assignment with Object.defineProperty - Add try-catch error handling for HTML parsing operations - Restrict allowed style properties and validate string lengths - Use setAttribute/removeAttribute instead of direct attribute manipulation - Add type safety checks for all node operations - Implement safer polygon-to-path conversion with validation These changes address the 10 high-severity CodeQL security alerts by: 1. Preventing XSS through comprehensive input sanitization 2. Avoiding prototype pollution with safer property assignment 3. Adding bounds checking to prevent DoS attacks 4. Using allowlist-based validation for all user inputs 5. Implementing proper error handling to prevent crashes Co-Authored-By: Kyohei Fukuda <kyoheif@wix.com> * Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 32: Incomplete multi-character sanitization Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 39: Incomplete multi-character sanitization Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Fix inefficient regular expression in svg.ts to pass CodeQL - Changed /([^:\s]+)*\s*:\s*([^;]+)/g to /([^:\s]+)\s*:\s*([^;]+)/g - Removed the problematic * quantifier that could cause exponential backtracking - This fixes the "Inefficient regular expression" security alert from GitHub Advanced Security 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * remove sanitize-html * move tests * fix for security * update dependabot.yml * organize --------- Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Kyohei Fukuda <kyouhei.fukuda0729@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
62 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
62 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
import fs from 'fs';
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import { decodeFromBase64DataUri } from '../../src/utils';
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const pdfBytes = fs.readFileSync(`${__dirname}/data/simple.pdf`);
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const pdfBase64Bytes = fs.readFileSync(`${__dirname}/data/simple.pdf.base64`);
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// Jest stalls when comparing large arrays, so we'll use this instead
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const arraysAreEqual = (a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array) => {
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if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
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for (let idx = 0, len = a.length; idx < len; idx++) {
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if (a[idx] !== b[idx]) return false;
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}
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return true;
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};
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describe(`decodeFromBase64DataUri`, () => {
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it(`can decode plain base64 strings`, () => {
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const uri = String(pdfBase64Bytes);
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expect(arraysAreEqual(decodeFromBase64DataUri(uri), pdfBytes)).toBe(true);
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});
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it(`can decode complete data URIs`, () => {
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const uri = `data:application/pdf;base64,${pdfBase64Bytes}`;
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expect(arraysAreEqual(decodeFromBase64DataUri(uri), pdfBytes)).toBe(true);
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});
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it(`can decode partial data URIs (1)`, () => {
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const uri = `data:application/pdf;,${pdfBase64Bytes}`;
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expect(arraysAreEqual(decodeFromBase64DataUri(uri), pdfBytes)).toBe(true);
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});
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it(`can decode partial data URIs (2)`, () => {
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const uri = `data:;,${pdfBase64Bytes}`;
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expect(arraysAreEqual(decodeFromBase64DataUri(uri), pdfBytes)).toBe(true);
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});
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it(`can decode partial data URIs (3)`, () => {
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const uri = `data:application/pdf;,${pdfBase64Bytes}`;
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expect(arraysAreEqual(decodeFromBase64DataUri(uri), pdfBytes)).toBe(true);
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});
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it(`can decode partial data URIs (4)`, () => {
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const uri = `:;,${pdfBase64Bytes}`;
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expect(arraysAreEqual(decodeFromBase64DataUri(uri), pdfBytes)).toBe(true);
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});
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it(`can decode partial data URIs (5)`, () => {
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const uri = `;,${pdfBase64Bytes}`;
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expect(arraysAreEqual(decodeFromBase64DataUri(uri), pdfBytes)).toBe(true);
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});
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it(`can decode partial data URIs (6)`, () => {
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const uri = `,${pdfBase64Bytes}`;
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expect(arraysAreEqual(decodeFromBase64DataUri(uri), pdfBytes)).toBe(true);
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});
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it(`can throws an error when it fails to parse the URI`, () => {
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const uri = {} as any;
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expect(() => decodeFromBase64DataUri(uri)).toThrow();
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});
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});
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