diff --git a/.changeset/fix-windows-tarball-path-traversal.md b/.changeset/fix-windows-tarball-path-traversal.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..665dde9b1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.changeset/fix-windows-tarball-path-traversal.md
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+---
+"@pnpm/store.cafs": patch
+"pnpm": patch
+---
+
+Fixed a path traversal vulnerability in tarball extraction on Windows. The path normalization was only checking for `./` but not `.\`. Since backslashes are directory separators on Windows, malicious packages could use paths like `foo\..\..\.npmrc` to write files outside the package directory.
diff --git a/store/cafs/src/parseTarball.ts b/store/cafs/src/parseTarball.ts
index 84e88b4635..4098194698 100644
--- a/store/cafs/src/parseTarball.ts
+++ b/store/cafs/src/parseTarball.ts
@@ -104,9 +104,10 @@ export function parseTarball (buffer: Buffer): IParseResult {
       }
     }
 
-    if (fileName.includes('./')) {
-      // Bizarre edge case
-      fileName = path.posix.join('/', fileName).slice(1)
+    if (fileName.includes('./') || fileName.includes('.\\')) {
+      // Normalize path traversal attempts (including Windows backslash traversal)
+      // Replaces backslashes with forward slashes and uses POSIX path normalization to resolve ..
+      fileName = path.posix.join('/', fileName.replaceAll('\\', '/')).slice(1)
     }
 
     // Values '\0' and '0' are normal files.
diff --git a/store/cafs/test/index.ts b/store/cafs/test/index.ts
index 0646a4ac6b..0f5e8dea97 100644
--- a/store/cafs/test/index.ts
+++ b/store/cafs/test/index.ts
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import {
   checkPkgFilesIntegrity,
   getFilePathByModeInCafs,
 } from '../src/index.js'
+import { parseTarball } from '../src/parseTarball.js'
 
 const f = fixtures(__dirname)
 
@@ -145,6 +146,76 @@ test('unpack a tarball that contains hard links', () => {
   expect(Object.keys(filesIndex).length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
 })
 
+// Regression test for Windows path traversal vulnerability
+// A malicious tarball entry like "foo\..\..\..\.npmrc" should have its path normalized
+test('path traversal with backslashes is blocked (Windows security fix)', () => {
+  // Create a minimal valid tarball with a malicious filename
+  const tarBuffer = createTarballWithEntry('foo\\..\\..\\..\\malicious.txt', 'evil content')
+
+  const result = parseTarball(tarBuffer)
+  const fileNames = Array.from(result.files.keys())
+
+  // The path should be normalized - no ".." segments and no path traversal
+  for (const fileName of fileNames) {
+    expect(fileName).not.toContain('..')
+    expect(fileName).not.toContain('\\')
+  }
+})
+
+// Helper to create a minimal tarball buffer with a single entry
+function createTarballWithEntry (fileName: string, content: string): Buffer {
+  const contentBytes = Buffer.from(content, 'utf8')
+
+  // Create a 512-byte header
+  const header = Buffer.alloc(512, 0)
+
+  // File name at offset 0 (max 100 chars)
+  const nameToWrite = `package/${fileName}`
+  header.write(nameToWrite, 0, Math.min(nameToWrite.length, 100), 'utf8')
+
+  // File mode at offset 100 (octal, 8 bytes) - 0644
+  header.write('0000644\0', 100, 8, 'utf8')
+
+  // UID at offset 108 (octal, 8 bytes)
+  header.write('0000000\0', 108, 8, 'utf8')
+
+  // GID at offset 116 (octal, 8 bytes)
+  header.write('0000000\0', 116, 8, 'utf8')
+
+  // File size at offset 124 (octal, 12 bytes)
+  const sizeOctal = contentBytes.length.toString(8).padStart(11, '0')
+  header.write(sizeOctal + '\0', 124, 12, 'utf8')
+
+  // Mtime at offset 136 (octal, 12 bytes)
+  header.write('00000000000\0', 136, 12, 'utf8')
+
+  // File type at offset 156 ('0' for regular file)
+  header[156] = '0'.charCodeAt(0)
+
+  // USTAR indicator at offset 257
+  header.write('ustar\0', 257, 6, 'utf8')
+  header.write('00', 263, 2, 'utf8')
+
+  // Compute checksum (offset 148, 8 bytes) - sum of all header bytes treating checksum field as spaces
+  // First, fill checksum field with spaces
+  header.fill(' ', 148, 156)
+  let checksum = 0
+  for (let i = 0; i < 512; i++) {
+    checksum += header[i]
+  }
+  const checksumOctal = checksum.toString(8).padStart(6, '0')
+  header.write(checksumOctal + '\0 ', 148, 8, 'utf8')
+
+  // Content block (padded to 512 bytes)
+  const contentBlock = Buffer.alloc(512, 0)
+  contentBytes.copy(contentBlock)
+
+  // End-of-archive marker (two 512-byte blocks of zeros)
+  const endMarker = Buffer.alloc(1024, 0)
+
+  return Buffer.concat([header, contentBlock, endMarker])
+}
+
 // Related issue: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/issues/7120
 test('unpack should not fail when the tarball format seems to be not USTAR or GNU TAR', () => {
   const dest = tempy.directory()