Before this change, the `{eol}`, `{tab}` and `{chr:XX}` placeholders in a
scenario became raw bytes in the name the harness handed to `Put`. A raw
control character isn't a valid rclone name: rclone names are in the
`Standard` encoding, where a newline is `␊`, and `FsEncoding` in
`fstests` encodes every raw name before uploading it for the same
reason.
The `extended_filenames` scenario dates from 2021, when bisync was tested
on local, Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, S3 and SFTP, but not on crypt or
memory. Its header said that all rclone backends, including local,
return `\n` as a glyph. That was an assumption, and it doesn't hold. A
backend with an encoder lists a raw control character as its glyph
because `ToStandardName` runs `Standard.Encode` on every name it
returns. A backend without one (crypt, memory, linkbox, netstorage,
pixeldrain, storj) lists exactly the name it was given. The same thing
happens with no bisync involved: `rclone touch` with a raw newline in
the name stores a raw newline on crypt, and `sync` from there to local
then copies and deletes the file on alternate runs.
The scenario has never passed on crypt or memory for the right reason.
Its golden listings were recorded on local with `␊`, so until January
2024 they would not have matched the raw names crypt lists, but the
scenario wasn't run there. `57624629d` ran it on crypt, treated the raw
names as an encoding difference, and normalized them away in both the
log and the listings, so from then on the goldens matched. `81d7b6f29`
added the check that each listing matches its path, which that
normalization doesn't cover, and the step has failed on those backends
since: local lists the copy as `␊` while the listing, built from the
source names, holds the raw newline. The pre-flight probe fixed in the
previous commit skipped the scenario on many nightly backends in the
meantime, which kept the failure out of the nightly results.
After this change, a placeholder for a control character (0x01-0x1f and
0x7f) becomes its `Standard` glyph, so every backend receives the same
name. On local the file on disk is unchanged, since the local backend
decodes the glyph to the raw character, and the golden logs are
unchanged. Placeholders for other bytes, such as the invalid UTF-8 in
`{chr:81}` and `{chr:fe}`, still become raw bytes, which `Standard`
leaves as they are.
Before this change, the pre-flight check for the `normalization` and
`extended_filenames` cases uploaded its probe file to the path root, which
already held the scenario's files, and compared the first entry each path
listed. That entry was usually an unrelated file, so the result depended on
listing order rather than on how each backend stored the probe name. On 42
of 71 backends in the 2026-10-15 nightly, the paths appeared to differ and
the cases were skipped; elsewhere the check passed without examining the
probe at all. The check also named `extended_char_paths`, a case renamed to
`ext_paths` in 2024. The probe's uploads counted in the step's transfer
stats, which removed `There was nothing to transfer` lines from the logs of
the checked cases.
After this change, the probe goes in a fresh subdirectory with its own
stats group, and the check compares the name listed back from there. It
names only `normalization` and `extended_filenames`: `ext_paths` uses none
of the probe's invalid UTF-8 or emoji, and doesn't use `--fix-case`. The
`normalization` and `extended_filenames` golden logs gain the lines the
probe's stats had hidden.
deleteObject() replied 404 for any error from newObject(), while
serveObject() in the same file replies 404 only for
fs.ErrorObjectNotFound and 500 otherwise.
restic treats a 404 on DELETE as final and never retries, so a
transient lookup failure while removing a lock left the lock behind
and broke the next exclusive operation (eg forget --prune failing with
"repository is already locked").
This change mirrors serveObject() handling of 404/500 errors in
deleteObject().
Fixes#10100
Co-authored-by: bunnysayzz <bunnysayzz@users.noreply.github.com>
The tcell v2 pin at v2.9.0 is removed as tcell v3 contains the fix for
duplicated key events on Windows (tcell issue 1124).
Note that tcell v3 uses the Windows VT console modes so ncdu requires
Windows 10 build 1703 or later.
See: #9539
This fixes the code to compile with the updated dependencies:
- dlna: pass a *slog.Logger to the ssdp server as required by
anacrolix/dms v1.8.0
github.com/Files-com/files-sdk-go/v3 was not updated as the latest
version requires go 1.26.9.
The tcell and go-systemd pins are kept and github.com/hanwen/go-fuse/v2
is pinned to v2.11.0 as v2.12.0 fails to compile on 32 bit linux - see
https://github.com/hanwen/go-fuse/issues/628
Before this change, the integration tests dropped Dropbox's "Too many
requests or write operations" notice from the logs only in the format it
had when the tests were written, which began with the error code
(`too_many_requests/...`). Since 110bf468a (v1.65), the notice begins with
`Error `, so it was left in the log and caused a miscompare whenever
Dropbox rate limited a run.
After this change, the notice is dropped in either format.
Before this change, the integration tests checked whether each remote could
set modtimes on every `bisync` step (`checkPreReqs`, called from
`runBisync`), not once per remote. On a remote that isn't `IsLocal`, each
check sleeps for 1s twice (the Google Cloud Storage per-object rate limit
workaround from be73a10a9), for each side. That added 2-4s to each of the
~110 `bisync` steps in each test, which on a fast remote was most of the
run: on the integration test server, the `:memory:` tests took about 14
minutes.
After this change, the result of the check is remembered for each remote,
so it runs, and sleeps, once per remote per test run. The `:memory:` tests
now take about 7s locally.
Before this change, nothing checked that the rc `sync/bisync` call accepted
every bisync flag, so the rc could fall behind the command line as flags
were added, as in #7799.
After this change, `TestRcFlagParity` passes each non-hidden bisync flag to
the rc, under the parameter name `rc.md` uses, with a value of the wrong
type. Every getter `rcBisync` uses rejects it, so the call fails only if
the parameter is read, and the test names any flag the rc doesn't handle.
Before this change, since v1.74.0 (bb78eb8ab), the rc `sync/bisync` call
read the `backupdir1` and `backupdir2` parameters (the names used before
they were renamed to `backupDir1` and `backupDir2`) only when the new name
was also given with an invalid value, because the fallback sat inside an
`rc.NotErrParamNotFound(err)` check, which is true only for an invalid
value. Otherwise, `backupdir1` and `backupdir2` had no effect.
The same change made an invalid value for any optional parameter (for
example `"resync": "yes"`, or a `filtersFile` that isn't a string) be
treated as if the parameter were missing, instead of returning an error.
After this change, the old backup dir names are read when the new ones are
missing, and an invalid value returns an error again, as it did before
v1.74.0.
Before this change, bisync treated a `--max-delete` above 100 as 100%, so
the `--max-delete` check never triggered. A run that left no file on a side
unchanged was still stopped, by the "all files were changed" or empty
listing checks, but one that deleted most files while leaving even one
unchanged was not.
For bisync, `--max-delete` has always been a
percentage, "in range 0..100" as Ivan put it when he designed it
(https://github.com/rclone/rclone/pull/5164#discussion_r633470815), but the
range was never enforced. So a value meant as a file count, such as
`--max-delete 500`, turned the check off. Now that the rc takes
`--max-delete` from the global config too, that includes a `--max-delete`
the rcd itself was started with.
After this change, a `--max-delete` above 100 is an error, as the rc's
`maxDelete` parameter already was.
Before this change, `--max-delete` and `--dry-run` were read from the
global config by `applyContext`, which only the command line called. The
rc `sync/bisync` call started from empty `Options` and never ran it, so it
ignored both settings:
- A dry run requested through the global option (`_config`
`{"DryRun": true}` or the flat `dry_run` parameter) was ignored.
`setDryRun` resets `ci.DryRun` from `opt.DryRun` before copying, and
`opt.DryRun` was only set by bisync's own `dryRun` parameter.
- When the `maxDelete` parameter was omitted, the `--max-delete` limit was
0%. A `max_delete` set through `_config` or the flat parameter was not
used for that limit, and applied to the inner syncs as a file count
instead.
After this change, `Bisync` runs `applyContext` itself, on its own copy of
the config, so the command line, the rc, and any other caller follow the
same rules, and `Options.MaxDelete` and `Options.DryRun` are set by
`Bisync`. With no `--max-delete` anywhere, the limit is 50%, as #5680 says
the rc should.
The rc's `maxDelete` and `dryRun` parameters now set the call's config.
`maxDelete` overrides the global `--max-delete`. `dryRun: true` asks for a
dry run, but `dryRun: false` doesn't cancel one from the global config, so
the run is a dry run if either asks for one. The `maxDelete` parameter is
also documented again; it was left out when the rc help became generated
from the command's flags.
Before this change, when bisync updated a listing entry, it kept the old
modtime if the new one was less than a second earlier. This dated back to
when bisync truncated modtimes to the destination's precision before
recording them (`ConvertPrecision`), so that a truncated time would not
overwrite the more precise original.
`ConvertPrecision` was removed in 956c2963f, and since then, bisync has kept
the original precision and relied on the modify window when comparing. But
the rule in `ls.put` was left behind, and it then fired only when a file
really had an earlier modtime, recording a time the file did not have. This
could cause:
- a `--resync` to abort with "path1 and path2 are out of sync" when Path1's
version was slightly older than Path2's
- later runs to report changes that didn't happen, for a file changed to a
version less than a second older, or copied from a remote with lower
modtime precision within the same second as the old version (for example,
from SFTP to local)
After this change, bisync records the modtime it is given, like any other
update. Comparisons already account for differences in precision through
the modify window.
- TestCheckConflictsSkipsCheck: the check for identical files is skipped
with --size-only, and with --ignore-checksum only when the paths have no
hash in common.
- test_equal_skipped: an identical file that is new on both paths with
--ignore-checksum is recorded, so deleting it on Path1 deletes it on
Path2. Adds the "ignore-checksum" scenario argument.
- test_conflict_window: Path1 changes between the listing snapshot and
the check for identical files.
Co-Authored-By: ASRodrigo1 <45823308+asrodrigo1@users.noreply.github.com>
Before renaming a sync conflict, bisync checks whether the two files are
identical. It compares hashes using check or cryptcheck, and as a last
resort, when neither is available, it compares the files by downloading
them (--download), so that the result is certain regardless of checksum
support.
Before this change, the fallback to --download happened only when bisync
knew up front that the remotes had no usable hash. It did not happen
when a hash that was expected to be present turned out to be missing
(for example, a backend that normally supports hashes returned a blank
one, or cryptcheck could not get the underlying hash). Those files were
counted as identical based on size alone.
After this change, a missing hash falls back to --download, the same as
when the remotes have no hash in common. --size-only and
--ignore-checksum still disable the fallback and keep the size-only
comparison.
Co-Authored-By: ASRodrigo1 <45823308+asrodrigo1@users.noreply.github.com>
Before this change, when a file was new or changed on both paths and the pre-sync
conflict check deemed the two copies identical, bisync skipped the copy and then
rechecked the file after the sync to get its listing info. If the recheck could
not confirm equality (for example, hashes unavailable due to --size-only or
(--ignore-checksum + no common hash)), the file was rolled back to be retried on
the next run, and every later run repeated the same check with the same result.
A later change on one side was then handled against a missing or stale listing
entry.
After this change, files we've declared identical pre-sync are no longer
rechecked post-sync. The pre-sync conflict check now also returns the values it
compared, and a skipped file is recorded from the listing snapshot. If either
path changed between the snapshot and the check, the prior listing is kept and
the next run rechecks.
When --size-only or (--ignore-checksum + no common hash) are in use, the "new or
changed on both paths and equal" case skips the conflict check entirely, because
it is unnecessary. The check could only compare sizes, which we already know are
equal from the snapshot.
The new `test_equal_skipped`, `test_conflict_window`, and
`test_conflict_window_size` scenarios cover identical files that change on
one path during the sync, files that change between the listing snapshot and
the check for identical files, and `--size-only` files with the same size but
different content.
Co-Authored-By: ASRodrigo1 <45823308+asrodrigo1@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds a test-only TestFnConflictCheck option, called before checking
potential conflicts, and a "hook <when> <step>" scenario command that runs
an ordinary scenario step once when the next bisync reaches that point:
before-check (TestFnConflictCheck) or during-sync (TestFn). A hook that
never runs is noted in the log so a scenario can't silently skip its setup.
On shutdown the batcher logged "Committing uploads - please wait..."
but nothing once the commit had completed, so the log looked as if
rclone had stopped part way through. Log "Committing uploads - done"
when the pending batches have been committed.
This affects the backends which use the batcher, dropbox and
googlephotos.
This change adds a step to the bisync tests that checks that after a successful
run, the files named in each listing are exactly the files on that path. This
ensures that nothing is silently missing from the listings.
Before this change, when an existing file had changed on both paths, the
conflict winner was chosen using only the attributes that had changed on each
side. An attribute that hadn't changed was treated as zero, so --conflict-resolve
larger could pick the smaller file (for example, when one side only had its
modtime updated), and --conflict-resolve newer could fail to pick a winner when one
side's modtime hadn't changed.
After this change, the current size, modtime, and checksum (to the extent
enabled with compare settings) are now recorded for every changed file.
Before this change, when --conflict-resolve picked Path2 as the winner, the winning
file was copied to Path1 correctly but then removed from both listings while
updating them for the renamed (or deleted) Path1 copy. The next run saw the file
as new on both paths and had to check it again, and a change to it on one path
in that run was handled as if the file had never been synced. When Path1 won,
the listings happened to be updated in an order that avoided this.
This change fixes the issue by adding a guard to remove the file from the
listing only when dstNewName != dstOldName.
See #9939
golang.org/x/net v0.60.0 deprecates its HTTP/2 server and transport in
favour of net/http.
Make the h2c test use http.Transport with unencrypted HTTP/2. serve
restic --stdio still needs http2.Server to serve HTTP/2 on a single
connection as http.Server has no way of doing that.
The metadata of the objects of all users was kept in one store, so with
--auth-proxy or several --auth-key credentials one user storing the
metadata of many objects could make the server forget that of every
other user.
Each user (each access key) now has a store of their own.
--multipart-max-uploads and --multipart-streaming-buffer-total limited
the uploads of all users together, so with --auth-proxy or several
--auth-key credentials one user could use up the limits and stop every
other user uploading.
They now limit the uploads of each user (each access key) separately.
A multipart part which arrives before the parts ahead of it is buffered
and acknowledged to the client, then written to the backend when its
turn comes. If that write failed the part was dropped, possibly with
some of it already written, but the upload carried on as if nothing
had happened, so it could be completed with the part missing, or with
a resend of the part appended to the partial data.
Such an upload is now failed, so the client starts it again.
The SigV4 verification in gofakes3 only checked the headers the
client listed as signed and never looked at the other headers which
arrived. A presigned PUT URL signs only the host header, so a holder
of one could add an unsigned x-amz-copy-source header and have the
server copy any object it can reach - in any bucket, and in any
remote when serving a cloud backend - into the object the URL names,
then read it back with the same URL. This affected both --auth-key
and --auth-proxy. AWS refuses such a request with AccessDenied, as
it requires every x-amz-* header to be signed.
This updates gofakes3 to a version which refuses requests carrying
an x-amz-* header not in their signed headers list with AccessDenied,
and adds tests that a presigned PUT URL can't be turned into a copy
in either auth mode. Real S3 clients always sign x-amz-* headers so
they are unaffected.
In v1.75 the multipart reorder buffer admitted the next part the stream
needed however big, adding its client-declared length to the running
total unchecked. Two concurrent requests for the next part declaring
huge lengths overflowed the total negative, after which out-of-order
parts were admitted past --multipart-streaming-buffer-limit.
The next part is now streamed straight to the backend without being
charged to the buffer, and a buffered part is only admitted if it fits
in what is left of the limits, so this can no longer happen. Add a
test of the attack against both the per-upload and server-wide limits.
serve s3 keeps the metadata of objects uploaded through it in memory.
If the object was then changed some other way - by another --auth-proxy
user sharing the backend, another server or directly on the backend -
serve s3 went on returning the old metadata, including the old
modification time, for the new object.
The size and modification time of the object are now stored with its
metadata, which is ignored if they no longer match.
With --auth-proxy the backend of each user is shut down once it has
been unused for 5 minutes. A request didn't count as using it, so a
long upload or download could have its backend shut down under it and
fail. A multipart upload used the backend it started on throughout, so
failed if the client paused for more than 5 minutes between parts, or
the auth proxy changed the user's secret.
Each request and multipart upload now holds the backend it uses until
it is finished with it. In-progress multipart uploads are aborted when
the server is shut down so their backends are released.
With --auth-proxy each access key ID may be mapped to a different
backend, but gofakes3 kept a single record of multipart uploads for
everyone. Any user could list the uploads of every other user with
ListMultipartUploads (including their upload IDs) and the parts of
them with ListParts.
With --disable-multipart-streaming the uploads are held by gofakes3,
whose upload IDs are sequential so easy to guess. Any user could
upload parts to, abort, or complete another user's upload - which
wrote it to the backend of the user completing it.
This updates gofakes3 to a version which can keep each user's uploads
private and uses the access key ID as the owner.
With --auth-proxy each access key ID may be mapped to a different
backend, but serve s3 found a streaming multipart upload by its upload
ID alone and stored object metadata by path alone.
A user who learnt another user's upload ID (for example from
ListMultipartUploads on a bucket of the same name) could upload parts
to, complete or abort that upload on the other user's backend. A user
with an object at the same bucket and key as another user was returned
the other user's metadata by HeadObject and GetObject and could
overwrite it.
Keep the uploads and metadata of each access key ID apart.
Refactor the state serve s3 keeps between requests - in-flight
multipart uploads and object metadata - so that it is reached through
a tenant struct for the user making the request. This makes it
possible to keep users' state apart when they are serving different
backends.
There is only one tenant for now, so there is no change in behaviour.
serve s3 keeps the metadata of the objects uploaded to it in memory,
with no limit on the number of objects, so memory use grew with every
object uploaded, and a client could use a lot by uploading many empty
objects with large metadata.
The new --metadata-max-objects (default 100000, 0 for no limit) limits
the number of objects whose metadata is kept, forgetting the metadata of
the least recently used first. As the metadata is only kept in memory
it is already lost when the server restarts; the modification time is
stored on the object itself so is never lost.
When an abandoned multipart upload expired after --multipart-expiry,
gofakes3's record of it was left behind, so it stayed in memory and in
ListMultipartUploads until the server was restarted.
That record is now removed too.
This picks up these fixes to serve s3 from gofakes3:
- XML request bodies (CompleteMultipartUpload, DeleteObjects) bigger
than 10 MiB are rejected rather than read into memory.
- DeleteObjects requests with more than 1000 keys are rejected.
- CompleteMultipartUpload checks the upload exists before reading the
request body.
- With --disable-multipart-streaming, parts are no longer allocated at
their declared size before the data arrives.
- Browser POST uploads hold at most 1 MiB in memory and are limited to
5 GB.
It also brings a SlowDown error, so the SlowDown replies serve s3 sends
when a part waits too long for buffer space, or too many multipart
uploads are in progress, now have status 503 as S3 does rather than
500.
There was no limit on the number of multipart uploads in progress, and
each one holds server resources until it completes or expires - once it
has data, a VFS upload and the buffers of the remote's own upload - so a
client could use unbounded memory by starting many uploads.
The new --multipart-max-uploads (default 1000, 0 for no limit) limits
the streamed multipart uploads in progress. Starting another fails with
SlowDown, which S3 clients retry, before anything is created on the
remote.
With --multipart-expiry 0 nothing ever cleans up abandoned uploads, so
they go on counting towards the limit until no new upload can be
started. A warning is logged at startup when both are set.
Starting a multipart upload opened its VFS upload straight away, which
allocates a 100 KiB buffer (--streaming-upload-cutoff) and starts a
goroutine and a transfer, all held until the upload finished or was
expired after --multipart-expiry (default 24h). A client could make the
server hold about 100 KiB per tiny CreateMultipartUpload request.
The VFS upload is now only opened when the first part is written to it,
so an upload with no parts holds none of these.
--multipart-streaming-buffer-limit only limits the memory buffered for
parts arriving out of order in each upload, so a client could use as
much memory as it liked by starting more uploads.
The new --multipart-streaming-buffer-total (default 1G, 0 for no limit)
limits the memory buffered by all uploads together. A part which would
take either over its limit waits as before. Since the part the stream
needs next is never buffered, every upload can still make progress.
Every multipart part was buffered in memory in full before being written
to the backend, even the part the stream needed next. There is no limit
on part size, and several concurrent requests for the current part were
each admitted, so a client could make the server hold as much memory as
it sent, whatever --multipart-streaming-buffer-limit was set to.
The part the stream needs next is now written straight through to the
backend as it arrives, so only parts which arrive ahead of their turn
are buffered, and those always within the limit - a part bigger than
the limit waits until it is the next part rather than being admitted
when the buffer is empty. Further requests for the part being streamed
wait, holding no memory, and are then checked against it.
Since what reaches the backend can't be taken back, a part whose body
fails part way records how far it got, and the client's retry of the
part, which must have the same content, carries on from there. Such an
upload can't be completed without the rest of the part.
The body is read to its end, so that an error it only reports there -
as the Content-MD5 check does - fails the part rather than being
missed, and a body longer than declared is rejected. A part rejected
once it has been streamed leaves data which can be neither completed
nor replaced, so the whole upload is failed and cleaned up and the
client starts again.
A part waiting for room in the out-of-order buffer waited forever,
ignoring the request being cancelled, and a waiting part stopped its
upload being expired, so a client could hold requests, goroutines and
uploads open indefinitely.
The wait now ends when the request is cancelled, and after a minute the
part fails with SlowDown so the client retries it later.
A part uploaded again after it had been streamed to the backend (a
client retrying after a timeout) was buffered in memory in full just to
compare it with the original, and the buffer limit didn't apply to it.
Such a re-upload is now hashed as it is received and compared with the
original without being buffered.
The out-of-order multipart buffer was charged the declared length of
each part, but a buffered part occupies whole 1 MiB pool pages however
small it is. A client could therefore send up to 10000 one-byte parts
ahead of the part the stream needed and pin about 10 GiB of memory in a
single upload while --multipart-streaming-buffer-limit saw only 10 KB.
Each buffered part is now charged the whole pages it occupies.
rclone selfupdate checked the PGP signature on the clearsigned block
of SHA256SUMS but then looked up the archive hash in the whole
downloaded file. Unsigned data can appear in that file without
invalidating the signature. A hash line placed before or after the
signed text was accepted, allowing whoever controlled the download to
install an arbitrary unsigned archive.
The hash is now only looked up in the signed text.
Affects stable (non --beta) selfupdate since v1.55.0. --beta updates
are not signature checked.
Dir.Create, Dir.Mkdir and Dir.Rename joined whatever name they were
given onto the directory's path. A name of "..", "." or one containing
a "/" isn't a child of the directory, and at the VFS root
path.Join("", "..") preserves the ".." so the new node's path pointed
outside the root. Backends which join the Fs root with the remote then
resolved it to a location above the directory the VFS was created on.
serve nfs was exploitable through this. The go-nfs library refuses a
name of exactly "." or ".." in MKDIR only, doesn't check the name in
CREATE, RENAME or SYMLINK, and never refuses a name containing a "/".
serve webdav was exploitable in the same way and has its own fix. The
other serve front-ends rely on their own or their protocol library's
path cleaning to keep such names out of the VFS.
Reject such names with EINVAL in the VFS itself, so that every
front-end and mount is protected regardless of what the layer above it
checks. This is the fix for serve nfs and defence in depth for the
others. The serve webdav check is kept as the front-end is the trust
boundary and gives the client a clear error. The source name of a
rename is only used to look the node up so it isn't checked.
VFS.Mkdir of the root, which previously went through Dir.Mkdir with an
empty name and added a nameless child node to the root, now makes the
root directory on the backend directly, still honouring --read-only.
serve webdav and serve ftp made directories through Dir.Mkdir rather
than VFS.Mkdir, so they are switched to VFS.Mkdir to keep "MKCOL /" and
"MKD /" working.
A request path with a ".." element, such as "MKCOL /..", was passed
straight through to the VFS. At the VFS root path.Join("", "..")
preserves the "..", so a directory node with the path ".." was added
under the root and every path built beneath it started "../". Backends
which join the Fs root with the remote before encoding it - such as
webdav, ftp, sftp, http and memory - resolved that "../" away, letting
an unauthenticated client create, overwrite, copy, move and delete
objects and directories outside the directory rclone was told to serve.
Moving a directory or file from outside the served tree into it also
made it readable.
Reject any request with a "." or ".." element in the request path, or
in the Destination header of COPY and MOVE, with 400 Bad Request. The
check is made once in ServeHTTP rather than in each webdav.FileSystem
method so that the client gets a consistent error. Rejected requests
are logged at INFO level like other requests.
The webdav handler strips --baseurl from the Destination as a string
prefix, so "/base../x" reaches the FileSystem as "../x". The Destination
is therefore checked after stripping the prefix in the same way.
Before this change the basic, htpasswd and auth proxy authentication
middlewares let every OPTIONS request through without checking
credentials so that browser CORS preflights, which can't carry
credentials, would succeed.
However in serve webdav the OPTIONS request is answered by the WebDAV
handler whose Allow header depends on whether the path is an existing
file, an existing directory or doesn't exist, so an unauthenticated
client could discover the existence and type of any path on the served
remote even with --user/--pass or --htpasswd set.
After this change he authentication middlewares no longer special-case
OPTIONS. Instead the CORS middleware, which runs before authentication
and owns the --allow-origin setting, answers genuine CORS preflights
itself with an empty 200 carrying the CORS headers only when
--allow-origin is set.
All other OPTIONS requests need credentials like any other method, so
clients which probe with OPTIONS before authenticating will get a 401
challenge and must retry with credentials.
nielash