Follow-up to the FD_SETSIZE fix, covering the points raised in review.
Negative/overflowing I/O timeouts. set_io_timeout() could produce a negative
select_timeout (a peer-supplied MSG_IO_TIMEOUT value was applied unchecked),
and every wait now passes select_timeout * 1000 to poll(), where a negative
millisecond count means "wait forever" -- so a hostile or buggy peer could
stall the other side and bypass keepalives entirely. select() used to reject
that with EINVAL, which kept the loop and check_timeout() running. Clamp a
negative argument to 0, compute allowed_lull without overflowing near INT_MAX
(secs / 2 + secs % 2), ignore a non-positive MSG_IO_TIMEOUT value, and funnel
all three waits through poll_timeout_ms(), which keeps the count positive and
bounded.
The daemon accept loop had the same fd_set overflow. start_accept_loop() still
stored listening sockets in an fd_set, so a daemon started with enough
descriptors already open got listener fds >= FD_SETSIZE and hit the same
undefined behaviour at startup -- verified: with the old code a transfer
through such a daemon yields nothing, with this change it succeeds. Converted
it to poll() as well.
Readiness testing. Treating any non-zero revents as ordinary readiness was
wrong: poll() reports POLLERR/POLLHUP/POLLNVAL unrequested, and an invalid fd
shows up as POLLNVAL on a successful poll() rather than -1/EBADF, which left
the EBADF branches dead and let an invalid ff_forward_fd reach
forward_filesfrom_data() (where EBADF reads as EOF). Use role-specific masks
(POLL_RD_BITS / POLL_WR_BITS), handle POLLNVAL explicitly in all three loops,
and request POLLPRI so select()'s old exception set is not silently dropped.
A bidirectional fd is no longer entered twice. A direct daemon connection uses
one fd for both directions; it now occupies a single pollfd row with OR-ed
events instead of two rows carrying different masks, which also avoids the
Cygwin < 3.3.6 duplicate-entry readiness bug.
poll() is now a declared requirement: configure.ac checks for poll.h and
poll(), failing with a clear message rather than leaving it implicit.
The test no longer hardcodes FD_SETSIZE (1024 on glibc but 65536 on 64-bit
Solaris, where it would have opened too few fds and passed vacuously); it asks
the C library for the real value via a small compiled probe and skips if that
is unavailable. Its description now also covers the fortified-libc case, where
the pre-fix result is an abort rather than a hang.
(cherry picked from commit 7ef165dd45)
The %H allow-list was wrong in both directions.
Several accepted characters change an argument's MEANING rather than its
text when they lead the value, which quoting cannot prevent because the
word stays intact -- that IS the problem:
'-' and '+' introduce options to plenty of programs; with
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="prog %H", hosts "-c" and "+x" arrive as
options, and "sh +x" is as real as "sh -x";
'~' is tilde-expanded by the nested shell, turning ~root into /root;
'%' is expanded by a nested fish, where %self becomes its pid.
An empty host has the same shape from the other end: it survives a direct
exec as an empty argument but disappears when a nested shell re-splits the
command, shifting everything after it. rsync://:873/m/ and ::m/ both
produce one. None of these can begin a real hostname, so refuse them in
first position only -- mid-word each is literal, which matters because an
IPv6 zone id carries its '%' mid-word.
The other direction: '+' and '~' were refused outright. They execute
nothing, and RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG exists for custom transports where %H is
often an alias the program resolves itself rather than a name the
resolver sees. Refusing them mid-word breaks that use case for no gain.
A non-ASCII host stays refused. That is a policy choice rather than a
free one: a custom connect program never calls getaddrinfo, so a Unicode
alias would otherwise work, and this does exclude it. A punycode A-label
is unaffected.
What this cannot do is bound what the named program makes of the value.
"host:-rf" arrives intact, and a program that splits on ':' may
reinterpret the tail; that boundary belongs to whoever writes the
command.
The test asserted only that a marker file was absent -- equally true when
rsync failed to parse its arguments, when socketpair_tcp is blocked, or
when touch was missing. Worse, the marker path was absolute, and a URL
authority ends at the first '/', so the injected `touch` never received
an operand and the check could not fail even with the guard gone. It now
runs with cwd set to the scratch directory and injects a bare name, so
the marker is genuinely reachable; requires the specific refusal message;
checks the exit status; and checks that ordinary hosts still arrive at
the connect program with their text intact, which is the part an
absence-only test can never show.
Fault-injected separately: dropping the guard, dropping just the
first-character check, and narrowing the set back each fail the test on
their own, in both the default and --use-tcp transports.
Adds the coverage/regression tests from the code-scanner run and the
gcov plumbing they rely on:
- scanner-argv-bounds, scanner-batch-flag-mismatch,
scanner-delete-delay-overread, scanner-daemon-log-checksum:
regression tests for the argv/-v/--info/--skip-compress bounds, the
batch metadata-ndx corruption, the read_delay_line off-by-one, and
the daemon -c/%C checksum-slot leak.
- daemon-proxy-protocol, daemon-early-exec-nameconv, daemon-auth-group,
daemon-standalone-detach, misc-coverage, nonroot-restrictive-perms,
backup-acl-xattr-cache: daemon and path coverage tests.
- rsyncfns.py: CAP_MKNOD probe in devices_supported().
- gcov_flush() macro (rsync.h) + calls in the daemon fork/_exit paths
(clientserver.c, socket.c); no-op without --enable-coverage. Makefile.in
COVERAGE_EXCLUDE / gcovr / setuid .gcda refinements.
- CI: list the new TCP/root/ACL tests in the per-platform
RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED sets.
Co-authored-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
authenticate.c: seed gen_challenge() from /dev/urandom, add an "auth digest" floor
to refuse weak negotiated digests, and fstat the opened --password-file fd rather
than re-stat the pathname; checksum.c carries auth_digest_rank(). socket.c: reject
control bytes in the daemon host before a proxy CONNECT and bind the stunnel server
cert to the requested hostname. clientserver/access: warn when proxy-protocol
fail-closes. loadparm + daemon-parm: only shell-quote %RSYNC_*% for shell-executed
hooks, and add the auth-digest / proxy-protocol-hosts module parameters.
clang's static analyzer doesn't model SIVAL/SIVAL64/SIVALu or
getpeername/getsockname as initializing their target bytes, so it
reports false "garbage value" reads. Zero-init the affected buffers;
the bytes are always overwritten at runtime, so this only quiets the
analyzer.
io.c: write_varint/write_varlong b[]
hashtable.c: hash_search buf[]
socket.c: accepted_peer/our_local
socketpair_tcp() fakes a connected socket pair via a loopback TCP
self-connect (socket -> bind 127.0.0.1:0 -> listen -> connect ->
accept), used by sock_exec() for RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG. Its comment has
long promised that "nobody else can attach to the socket, or if they
do that this function fails", but nothing actually verified it: the
code accept()ed whatever connection arrived first without checking it
was the one our own connect() made.
Between listen() and accept() the ephemeral loopback port is
connectable by any local user. With backlog 1 a same-host attacker who
races a connection in before our connect() lands could have their
socket returned by accept(), handing them one end of the rsync
protocol stream. The exposure is small (loopback only, random
ephemeral port, sub-millisecond window, local users only), but the
promised guarantee was simply not enforced.
Enforce it: after the connection is established, require that the peer
address of the accepted end (fd[0]) equals the local address of our
connecting end (fd[1]), and that both are 127.0.0.1. A hijacked
connection has a different source port and is rejected (errno EPERM,
fail closed). The legitimate self-connect always matches, so there is
no behaviour change for the normal path.
Verified: rebuilds clean with -Wall -W; the full testsuite still
passes in both transports (pipe `make check` 57/3, `runtests.py
--use-tcp` 59/1) -- the pipe transport exercises this code path on
every daemon test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
fixes a one byte stack overflow when using RSYNC_PROXY with a
malicious proxy.
Reach: only when RSYNC_PROXY is set and a malicious or MITM'd
proxy returns the pathological response. The byte written is
always '\0' and the attacker doesn't choose the offset, so impact
is corruption of one adjacent stack byte and possible later
misbehaviour or crash -- no information disclosure beyond the
existing rprintf of buffer contents.
Reported by Aisle Research via Michal Ruprich
- All the memory-allocation macros now auto-check for failure and exit
with a failure message that incudes the caller's file and lineno
info. This includes strdup().
- Added the `--max-alloc=SIZE` option to be able to override the memory
allocator's sanity-check limit. It defaults to 1G (as before).
Fixes bugzilla bug 12769.
- Standardized the format of the opening comment, including adding a
brief description of what's in the file for those that lacked it.
- Added some missing copyright lines.
- Some minor whitespace tweaks (in a few of the files).
Stuart Inglis