reduce symbol dependencies between files and therefore make it easier
to write unit tests. The diff is large, but the actual code changes
are pretty small.
* Fix situation where failure to fork (e.g. because out of process
slots) would cause rsync to kill all processes owned by the
current user. Yes, really! (Paul Haas, Martin Pool)
Also, add a little more documentation and paranoia to make sure we
never call kill(2) with a negative pid.
show expected time to complete. That's kind of inconsistent, but
people can probably cope. Hopefully we'll get more consistent and
complete progress reporting soon. (Cameron Simpson)
list ... done" to the way it was in 2.5.1 and before when not using -P.
Apply the file list progress messages when receiving files in addition to
sending files.
mode.
Also, drop -f and -F for batch mode: these should be reserved for
options that are more commonly used.
It also appends a newline to the argvs file and skips adding the
source directory to the command line.
Based on a patch from Rik Faith, but modified to make sure we do only
one rprintf call, and that we never end up with two copies of the line
printed out.
rsh relies on stdin being blocking
ssh relies on stdout being non-blocking
what we've done before is to set both stdin and stdout to either
blocking or non-blocking. Now I set stdin to blocking and stdout to
non-blocking. This seems to fix all cases I've tested.
ssh clag problems as long as you also fix the same problem in sshd
removed all the old read buffering code from io.c as this was only
there to try to reduce the chance of clagging up sshd.
One is a note that a leading "/" in a symlink target will not behave
exactly as if a chroot had occurred, but I decided it wasn't worth the
making it the same.
The other is note about an extra harmless trailing "." that is added under
some rare circumstances.
1. The file paths being sent and received were not "sanitized" to
ensure that there weren't any ".." components that would escape the
top level directory. This can't happen with the standard rsync
client, but it could be exploited on both read and write if someone
modified an rsync client. This fix sanitizes all incoming and
outgoing paths when "use chroot = no".
2. If a module is also "read only = no", clients could have created
symbolic links with ".." components that would allow writing
outside of the module. This could happen with the standard rsync
client. This fix sanitizes all incoming symbolic link targets
when "use chroot = no".
Previously, only top-level paths (anything passed in command line arguments)
were sanitized. Sorry, I didn't think about the individual file paths
before now.
The reason for that is that on SVR2-based UTS 2.1.2 (which along with many
other old systems implements getcwd by forking "pwd") getcwd hangs when
called when other child processes are running.
I also added a quick return from push_dir if name == NULL so it doesn't
actually have to chdir anywhere when just initializing.
An initializing call to push_dir("/",0) had previously been put in at the
beginning of daemon_main() to avoid calling getcwd after a chroot, but
since that is no longer I needed I removed it and changed the call to
chdir("/") after chroot into a push_dir("/",0) so it will remember the
correct current directory.
