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ad3bfab05d
Adds .github/workflows/ubuntu-version-mix.yml (ubuntu-latest) and a per-release manifest testsuite/expect/rsync_<ver>.expect for each of the nine peers. The workflow builds the current rsync, then runs the two- sided suite against every old binary over both the pipe and --use-tcp daemon transports. All peers run in a SINGLE looped job (not a matrix) so the PR shows one check line; each peer/transport is a foldable log group and a failure annotates which one broke. A new phony `check-progs` target builds rsync plus the test helper programs and check symlinks without running the suite -- the build half of `make check` -- so the workflow's direct runtests.py invocation has the helpers it needs. Notable expected results encoded in the manifests: - The four May-2026 security tests xfail against every released peer: the suite demonstrates each release is vulnerable to those findings while current master is fixed. - symlink-dirlink-basis xfails on 3.4.0/3.4.1 (issue #715: their secure_relative_open O_NOFOLLOW-confines the basedir, breaking a -K dir-symlink update; current master fixes it with secure_basis_open). - Older peers carry more xfails for options/negotiation they lack; 2.6.0 (protocol 27) fails most daemon tests. reverse-daemon-delta passes against all peers, confirming backward compat down to 2004. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
41 lines
2.0 KiB
Plaintext
41 lines
2.0 KiB
Plaintext
# Expected outcomes for current rsync <-> rsync 3.4.0 peer (see
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# rsync_3.1.3.expect for the format/semantics; listed tests are the run set).
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00-hello pass
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reverse-daemon-delta pass # old client -> current daemon (backward-compat: delta+compress, both directions)
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alt-dest pass
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bare-do-open-symlink-race pass
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batch-mode pass
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chmod-option pass
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daemon pass
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daemon-access pass
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daemon-auth pass
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daemon-config pass
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daemon-exec pass
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daemon-filter pass
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daemon-gzip-download pass
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daemon-gzip-upload pass
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daemon-munge pass
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daemon-refuse pass
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daemon-refuse-compress pass
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exclude pass
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files-from pass
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hardlinks pass
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ssh-basic pass
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# issue #715, present in 3.4.0: updating a file through a -K (--copy-dirlinks)
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# directory symlink fails on the receiver because its secure_relative_open()
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# O_NOFOLLOW-confines every path component, including the basedir reached via
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# the symlink, so the basis open is rejected and the update is discarded
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# ("failed verification"). Current master fixes this with secure_basis_open()
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# (receiver.c), which splits the path so the basedir may follow symlinks while
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# only the leaf is O_NOFOLLOW'd. Verified peer-version-, not protocol-, driven
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# (forcing this peer to --protocol=31 still fails; 3.3.0 at proto 31 passes).
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symlink-dirlink-basis xfail
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# --- May-2026 security fixes absent in 3.4.0 (peer is vulnerable) ---
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alt-dest-symlink-race xfail # --link-dest basis lookup follows basedir symlink (escape)
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chdir-symlink-race xfail # chmod escape via cd symlink during chdir
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copy-dest-source-symlink xfail # copy_file source reads /outside via cd symlink (poison)
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sender-flist-symlink-leak xfail # sender flist follows cd symlink, leaks outside paths
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