Files
rsync/support/rrsync
T
Filipe Casal c3abc6c095 rrsync: protect no-overwrite auxiliary paths
--ignore-existing protects the live transfer destination, but three
peer-selectable options reach other existing objects inside the
restricted directory: --log-file appends to one, --partial-dir consumes
and then renames or unlinks one, and --delay-updates does the same
through its implicit .~tmp~ directory.  Refuse all three under
-no-overwrite.

Refusal rather than confinement, because confining these paths does not
help: keeping the --log-file append inside the tree still appends to an
existing file, and for the partial directories the peer controls both
the directory and the transferred basename, so a collision is always
reachable.  A pre-exec emptiness check would be raceable.  The cost is
that a push naming --partial-dir on the remote receiver, or using
--delay-updates, is now refused for a -no-overwrite account.

Each regression drives the option through a wrapper WITHOUT
-no-overwrite as well, and requires that to be accepted.  Without that
control the tests cannot tell "refused under -no-overwrite" from
"refused always", and would still pass if the options were disabled for
every rrsync deployment -- verified by making the refusal unconditional,
which the controls then catch.

The wrapper is handed a shim rather than RSYNC directly: RSYNC is a
multi-word command whenever the runner forces --protocol=N, and rrsync
execlp()s its RSYNC as a single executable name, so every one of these
tests died before reaching the policy under test.  A fleet run caught it
on the protocol columns of three targets.

Backup mode belongs in the same set.  Publishing a backup onto a name
that already exists deletes what is there (backup.c make_backup()), and
deleting a file backs it up first (delete.c), so a --delete of an
unrelated file can land on a protected name -- overwriting a file that
--ignore-existing was holding, with rc=0 and no diagnostic.  Disable -b
and --backup-dir.  --suffix is left enabled: with both of those refused
nothing can turn backups on, so it is inert.

The short option must be disabled before short_no_arg_re is built, since
a stock client sends b inside the remote short-option bundle and the
regex is snapshotted there; the whole -no-overwrite block therefore
moves up beside the other policy gates rather than sitting after the
chdir.  Its regression drives the collision through a wrapper without
-no-overwrite, passing --ignore-existing by hand, which both proves the
refusal is conditional and shows the primitive defeating the very
protection -no-overwrite forces.

rrsync.1.md now states what -no-overwrite costs: no explicit
--partial-dir, no --delay-updates, no server-side --log-file, no backups.
2026-07-31 13:18:39 +10:00

858 lines
36 KiB
Python
Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Restricts rsync to subdirectory declared in .ssh/authorized_keys. See
# the rrsync man page for details of how to make use of this script.
# NOTE: install python3 braceexpand to support brace expansion in the args!
# Originally a perl script by: Joe Smith <js-cgi@inwap.com> 30-Sep-2004
# Python version by: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
# You may configure these 2 values to your liking. See also the section of
# short & long options if you want to disable any options that rsync accepts.
RSYNC = '/usr/bin/rsync'
LOGFILE = 'rrsync.log' # NOTE: the file must exist for a line to be appended!
# The following options are mainly the options that a client rsync can send
# to the server, and usually just in the one option format that the stock
# rsync produces. However, there are some additional convenience options
# added as well, and thus a few options are present in both the short and
# long lists (such as --group, --owner, and --perms).
# NOTE when disabling: check for both a short & long version of the option!
### START of options data produced by the cull-options script. ###
# To disable a short-named option, add its letter to this string:
short_disabled = 's'
# These are also disabled when the restricted dir is not "/":
short_disabled_subdir = 'KLk'
# These are all possible short options that we will accept (when not disabled above):
short_no_arg = 'ACDEHIJKLNORSUWXbcdgklmnopqrstuvxyz' # DO NOT REMOVE ANY
short_with_num = '@B' # DO NOT REMOVE ANY
# To disable a long-named option, change its value to a -1. The values mean:
# 0 = the option has no arg; 1 = the arg doesn't need any checking; 2 = only
# check the arg when receiving; and 3 = always check the arg.
long_opts = {
'append': 0,
'backup-dir': 2,
'block-size': 1,
'bwlimit': 1,
'checksum-choice': 1,
'checksum-seed': 1,
'compare-dest': 2,
'compress-choice': 1,
'compress-level': 1,
'compress-threads': 1,
'copy-dest': 2,
'copy-devices': -1,
'copy-unsafe-links': 0,
'daemon': -1,
'debug': 1,
'delay-updates': 0,
'delete': 0,
'delete-after': 0,
'delete-before': 0,
'delete-delay': 0,
'delete-during': 0,
'delete-excluded': 0,
'delete-missing-args': 0,
'dirs': 0,
'existing': 0,
'fake-super': 0,
'files-from': 3,
'force': 0,
'from0': 0,
'fsync': 0,
'fuzzy': 0,
'group': 0,
'groupmap': 1,
'hard-links': 0,
'iconv': 1,
'ignore-errors': 0,
'ignore-existing': 0,
'ignore-missing-args': 0,
'ignore-times': 0,
'info': 1,
'inplace': 0,
'link-dest': 2,
'links': 0,
'list-only': 0,
'log-file': 3,
'log-format': 1,
'max-alloc': 1,
'max-delete': 1,
'max-size': 1,
'min-size': 1,
'mkpath': 0,
'modify-window': 1,
'msgs2stderr': 0,
'munge-links': 0,
'new-compress': 0,
'no-W': 0,
'no-implied-dirs': 0,
'no-msgs2stderr': 0,
'no-munge-links': -1,
'no-r': 0,
'no-relative': 0,
'no-specials': 0,
'numeric-ids': 0,
'old-compress': 0,
'one-file-system': 0,
'only-write-batch': 1,
'open-noatime': 0,
'owner': 0,
'partial': 0,
'partial-dir': 2,
'perms': 0,
'preallocate': 0,
'recursive': 0,
'remove-sent-files': 0,
'remove-source-files': 0,
'safe-links': 0,
'sender': 0,
'server': 0,
'size-only': 0,
'skip-compress': 1,
'specials': 0,
'stats': 0,
'stderr': 1,
'suffix': 1,
'super': 0,
'temp-dir': 2,
'timeout': 1,
'times': 0,
'use-qsort': 0,
'usermap': 1,
'write-devices': -1,
}
### END of options data produced by the cull-options script. ###
import os, sys, re, argparse, glob, socket, stat, time, subprocess
from argparse import RawTextHelpFormatter
# Held open across exec so rsync inherits them. Each entry pins a path
# validated_arg() approved; the corresponding arg passed to rsync is
# rewritten to /proc/self/fd/N so rsync's path resolution cannot be
# race-flipped after rrsync's realpath check, closing the realpath-vs-exec
# TOCTOU.
pinned_fds = []
# Directory pins, keyed by (st_dev, st_ino), so a glob or a multi-arg command
# whose args share a parent inherits one fd rather than one per arg.
pinned_dirs = {}
# Whether the client asked for --relative/-R, which decides how much of a
# sender arg rsync transmits as the file's name (see sender_pinned_arg).
client_relative = False
# The inode-pin trick needs /proc/self/fd/N to be a Linux-style magic symlink
# whose readlink yields the open file's real path. macOS/BSD lack the directory
# entirely; Solaris HAS /proc/self/fd but its entries are not such symlinks (its
# readlink does not return the path), so an isdir() check is not enough -- probe
# the actual behaviour once against a known fd. Where it works we pin (and a
# later readlink failure is an anomaly that fails closed); where it does not we
# fall through to the unhardened path.
#
# A correct readlink is NOT sufficient evidence that the fd pins anything, and
# the two platforms that get this wrong fail in opposite directions:
#
# * NetBSD makes the entry a symlink for DIRECTORIES only -- readlink of a
# regular file's entry fails with EINVAL, so a directory-only probe claims
# support that is not there and every pull of a file dies in the post-pin
# check.
# * Cygwin's readlink returns the right path, but opening the magic link
# RE-RESOLVES it: rename the directory out from under a held fd and the
# magic link reaches the replacement. The pin silently protects nothing.
#
# Only the Linux kernel gives the inode-bound magic link this relies on, so
# require that explicitly and keep the runtime probes as a guard for Linux-like
# environments where /proc is absent or restricted (containers, seccomp).
def _probe_proc_self_fd():
if not sys.platform.startswith(('linux', 'android')):
return False
def resolves(path):
try:
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY)
except OSError:
return False
try:
return os.readlink('/proc/self/fd/%d' % fd) == os.path.realpath(path)
except OSError:
return False
finally:
os.close(fd)
return resolves('/') and resolves(os.path.realpath(__file__))
HAVE_PROC_SELF_FD = _probe_proc_self_fd()
try:
from braceexpand import braceexpand
except:
braceexpand = lambda x: [ DE_BACKSLASH_RE.sub(r'\1', x) ]
HAS_DOT_DOT_RE = re.compile(r'(^|/)\.\.(/|$)')
LONG_OPT_RE = re.compile(r'^--([^=]+)(?:=(.*))?$')
DE_BACKSLASH_RE = re.compile(r'\\(.)')
def make_inheritable(fd):
"""Clear FD_CLOEXEC so the exec'd rsync inherits `fd`.
os.set_inheritable() prefers ioctl(FIONCLEX), which an O_PATH descriptor
rejects with EBADF on older kernels; F_SETFD is one of the few operations
O_PATH always allows.
"""
try:
os.set_inheritable(fd, True)
except OSError:
import fcntl
fcntl.fcntl(fd, fcntl.F_SETFD,
fcntl.fcntl(fd, fcntl.F_GETFD) & ~fcntl.FD_CLOEXEC)
def pin_dir(path, orig_arg):
"""Inode-pin a directory and return an fd rsync will inherit.
The open resolves `path` normally -- including a symlink at its last
component, which is legitimate and which 3.4.4 accepts -- so a component
could be flipped first. The readlink check afterwards is what makes that
safe: it proves the inode we ended up holding is inside the restricted
tree. From then on the fd names that inode, not the path, so nothing above
it can be flipped again.
O_PATH, not O_RDONLY: reaching a known name beneath a directory needs only
search permission, and a mode 0111 parent is a perfectly ordinary way to
publish a file without letting it be listed. An O_PATH directory fd is
just as firmly pinned when used as a /proc/self/fd/N/... prefix (the O_PATH
caveat in validated_arg() is about reopening the magic link as the file
itself, which is not what happens here).
"""
flags = os.O_DIRECTORY | getattr(os, 'O_PATH', 0)
if not flags & getattr(os, 'O_PATH', 0):
flags |= os.O_RDONLY
try:
fd = os.open(path or '.', flags)
except OSError as e:
die('unable to pin sender path:', orig_arg, e.strerror)
try:
st = os.fstat(fd)
pinned_path = os.readlink('/proc/self/fd/%d' % fd)
except OSError as e:
os.close(fd)
die('post-pin readlink failed (race?):', orig_arg, e.strerror)
if pinned_path != args.dir and not pinned_path.startswith(args.dir_slash):
os.close(fd)
die('post-pin path escaped tree (race?):', orig_arg, pinned_path)
key = (st.st_dev, st.st_ino)
if key in pinned_dirs:
os.close(fd)
return pinned_dirs[key]
make_inheritable(fd)
pinned_fds.append(fd)
pinned_dirs[key] = fd
return fd
# sender_pinned_arg() verdicts that are not a rewritten argument.
KEEP_LEAF_PIN = 'keep' # hand rsync the leaf's own /proc/self/fd/N
LEAF_PIN_UNUSABLE = 'unusable' # no pin for this shape; keep the plain name
def sender_pinned_arg(fd, arg, orig_arg, has_slash, has_slash_dot):
"""Return a source name rsync will both resolve safely and name correctly.
The obvious rewrite -- hand rsync /proc/self/fd/N for the leaf itself --
only works where rsync open()s the argument. A sender lstat()s it first,
and lstat of a procfs magic link is always S_IFLNK, so rsync describes the
argument as a symlink instead of sending the file. Which pin is usable
therefore depends on what rsync does with the argument:
* a trailing "/" or "/." directory is opened, not lstat()ed, and rsync
DOES follow a symlink there, so it keeps the leaf pin;
* anything else keeps the pin one level up and passes the leaf by name.
rsync will not follow a symlink at that position (it sends the symlink
itself), the follow options that would change that are already disabled
for a restricted dir, and its own leaf open is O_NOFOLLOW.
Under --relative the transmitted name is the whole argument rather than
its basename, so the pin has to move up to wherever that name starts and
the rest is spelled after a /./ marker, which is how rsync is told where
the transmitted portion begins.
"""
if client_relative:
# Look for the marker in the argument as the client spelled it: the
# caller has already split off a trailing "/" or "/.", which is exactly
# what turns "sub/./" into a terminal marker.
full = arg + ('/' if has_slash else '/.' if has_slash_dot else '')
# rsync honours the FIRST /./, so split there and keep the client's
# marker rather than inserting a second, earlier one.
head, marker, tail = full.partition('/./')
if marker:
anchor, suffix = head, tail.rstrip('/')
else:
anchor, suffix = '', arg
if suffix.startswith('/'):
return LEAF_PIN_UNUSABLE
if suffix in ('', '.'):
# A terminal marker: everything the client wants transmitted starts
# at the argument itself, which is the directory we already pinned.
# The caller re-appends the trailing "/" or "/.".
dfd = pin_dir(anchor, orig_arg)
check = '.'
pinned = '/proc/self/fd/%d/.' % dfd
else:
dfd = pin_dir(anchor, orig_arg)
pinned = '/proc/self/fd/%d/./%s' % (dfd, suffix)
check = suffix
else:
if has_slash or has_slash_dot:
return KEEP_LEAF_PIN
anchor, _, leaf = arg.rpartition('/')
if not leaf or leaf in ('.', '..'):
return LEAF_PIN_UNUSABLE
dfd = pin_dir(anchor, orig_arg)
pinned = '/proc/self/fd/%d/%s' % (dfd, leaf)
check = leaf
# Tie the pinned directory to the inode realpath() validated: resolving
# `check` beneath the held fd cannot be redirected above the leaf, so if it
# does not reach the same file, something was flipped -- fail closed.
# fd is None for a leaf we deliberately never opened (a symlink, or a
# device/FIFO/socket): there is no inode to compare against, and the leaf
# was never going to be content-opened by the sender either.
if fd is None:
return pinned
try:
st = os.stat(check, dir_fd=dfd)
except OSError as e:
die('post-pin stat failed (race?):', orig_arg, e.strerror)
leaf_st = os.fstat(fd)
if (st.st_dev, st.st_ino) != (leaf_st.st_dev, leaf_st.st_ino):
die('post-pin path changed (race?):', orig_arg, check)
return pinned
def safe_open_logfile():
nofollow = getattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW', 0)
try:
st = os.lstat(LOGFILE)
except OSError:
return None
if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
return None
try:
fd = os.open(LOGFILE, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_APPEND | nofollow)
except OSError:
return None
st2 = os.fstat(fd)
if not stat.S_ISREG(st2.st_mode) or st.st_dev != st2.st_dev or st.st_ino != st2.st_ino:
os.close(fd)
return None
return os.fdopen(fd, 'a')
def main():
if not os.path.isdir(args.dir):
die("Restricted directory does not exist!")
# The format of the environment variables set by sshd:
# SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND:
# rsync --server -vlogDtpre.iLsfxCIvu --etc . ARG # push
# rsync --server --sender -vlogDtpre.iLsfxCIvu --etc . ARGS # pull
# SSH_CONNECTION (client_ip client_port server_ip server_port):
# 192.168.1.100 64106 192.168.1.2 22
command = os.environ.get('SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND', None)
if not command:
die("Not invoked via sshd")
if command == 'true':
# Allow checking connectivity with "ssh <host> true". (For example,
# rsbackup uses this.)
sys.exit(0)
command = command.split(' ', 2)
if command[0:1] != ['rsync']:
die("SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND does not run rsync")
if command[1:2] != ['--server']:
die("--server option is not the first arg")
command = '' if len(command) < 3 else command[2]
global am_sender
am_sender = command.startswith("--sender ") # Restrictive on purpose!
if args.ro and not am_sender:
die("sending to read-only server is not allowed")
if args.wo and am_sender:
die("reading from write-only server is not allowed")
if args.wo or not am_sender:
long_opts['sender'] = -1
if args.no_del:
for opt in long_opts:
if opt.startswith(('remove', 'delete')):
long_opts[opt] = -1
if args.ro:
long_opts['log-file'] = -1
global short_disabled
if args.no_overwrite:
# --ignore-existing guards only the live transfer destination. These
# options append to, consume, move or remove other existing objects in
# the restricted dir. Backup mode belongs here too: publishing a
# backup onto a name that already exists deletes what is there
# (backup.c make_backup()), and deletion backs files up as well
# (delete.c), so an unrelated --delete can land on a protected name.
long_opts['log-file'] = long_opts['partial-dir'] = long_opts['delay-updates'] = -1
long_opts['backup-dir'] = -1
short_disabled += 'b' # must precede the short_no_arg_re build below
if args.dir != '/':
short_disabled += short_disabled_subdir
long_opts['copy-unsafe-links'] = -1
short_no_arg_re = short_no_arg
short_with_num_re = short_with_num
if short_disabled:
for ltr in short_disabled:
short_no_arg_re = short_no_arg_re.replace(ltr, '')
short_with_num_re = short_with_num_re.replace(ltr, '')
short_disabled_re = re.compile(r'^-[%s]*([%s])' % (short_no_arg_re, short_disabled))
short_no_arg_re = re.compile(r'^-(?=.)[%s]*(e\d*\.\w*)?$' % short_no_arg_re)
short_with_num_re = re.compile(r'^-[%s]\d+$' % short_with_num_re)
log_fh = safe_open_logfile()
try:
os.chdir(args.dir)
except OSError as e:
die('unable to chdir to restricted dir:', str(e))
global client_relative
rsync_opts = [ '--server' ]
rsync_args = [ ]
saw_the_dot_arg = False
last_opt = check_type = None
for arg in re.findall(r'(?:[^\s\\]+|\\.[^\s\\]*)+', command):
if check_type:
rsync_opts.append(validated_arg(last_opt, arg, check_type))
check_type = None
elif saw_the_dot_arg:
# NOTE: an arg that starts with a '-' is safe due to our use of "--" in the cmd tuple.
try:
b_e = braceexpand(arg) # Also removes backslashes
except: # Handle errors such as unbalanced braces by just de-backslashing the arg:
b_e = [ DE_BACKSLASH_RE.sub(r'\1', arg) ]
for xarg in b_e:
rsync_args += validated_arg('arg', xarg, wild=True)
else: # parsing the option args
if arg == '.':
saw_the_dot_arg = True
continue
rsync_opts.append(arg)
sm = short_no_arg_re.match(arg)
if sm or short_with_num_re.match(arg):
if sm:
# Scan the cluster's own letters only: the trailing
# capability blob (-e.iLsfxC) is not a set of options.
letters = arg[1:]
if sm.group(1):
letters = letters[:-len(sm.group(1))]
if 'R' in letters:
client_relative = True
continue
disabled = False
m = LONG_OPT_RE.match(arg)
if m:
opt = m.group(1)
opt_arg = m.group(2)
ct = long_opts.get(opt, None)
if ct is None:
break # Generate generic failure due to unfinished arg parsing
# Last one wins, matching rsync's own option handling.
if opt == 'relative':
client_relative = True
elif opt == 'no-relative':
client_relative = False
if ct == 0:
continue
opt = '--' + opt
if ct > 0:
if opt_arg is not None:
rsync_opts[-1] = opt + '=' + validated_arg(opt, opt_arg, ct)
else:
check_type = ct
last_opt = opt
continue
disabled = True
elif short_disabled:
m = short_disabled_re.match(arg)
if m:
disabled = True
opt = '-' + m.group(1)
if disabled:
die("option", opt, "has been disabled on this server.")
break # Generate a generic failure
if not saw_the_dot_arg:
die("invalid rsync-command syntax or options")
if args.dir != '/' and not am_sender:
# A restricted dir denies device/special CREATION, but `-a` (-rlptgoD)
# bundles -D into the client's short-option string, so rejecting -D
# outright would break every `rsync -a` to a restricted rrsync.
#
# --no-D cannot do this job: preserve_devices/preserve_specials also
# frame the file list's rdev fields, and only this end of the
# connection gets the option, so the client's -D sender writes rdev
# that a --no-D receiver never reads. That desynchronises the list --
# a FIFO hangs the transfer at protocol 29 and corrupts it at 30, a
# device node breaks EVERY protocol. --drop-D refuses the creation
# while leaving the wire format alone. (Needs rsync 3.5.0+, which is
# what rrsync is installed alongside.)
#
# Only on the receiving side: creation happens where files are
# written, so a sender has nothing to deny -- --drop-D would be a
# no-op there.
rsync_opts.append('--drop-D')
if args.munge:
rsync_opts.append('--munge-links')
if args.no_overwrite:
rsync_opts.append('--ignore-existing')
if not rsync_args:
rsync_args = [ '.' ]
cmd = (RSYNC, *rsync_opts, '--', '.', *rsync_args)
if log_fh:
now = time.localtime()
host = os.environ.get('SSH_CONNECTION', 'unknown').split()[0] # Drop everything after the IP addr
if host.startswith('::ffff:'):
host = host[7:]
try:
host = socket.gethostbyaddr(socket.inet_aton(host))
except:
pass
log_fh.write("%02d:%02d:%02d %-16s %s\n" % (now.tm_hour, now.tm_min, now.tm_sec, host, str(cmd)))
log_fh.close()
# NOTE: This assumes that the rsync protocol will not be maliciously hijacked.
if args.no_lock:
os.execlp(RSYNC, *cmd)
die("execlp(", RSYNC, *cmd, ') failed')
# pass_fds keeps the inode-pinning O_PATH fds open across the spawn so
# /proc/self/fd/N in the cmd resolves correctly in the child. See the
# pinned_fds comment near the top.
child = subprocess.run(cmd, pass_fds=tuple(pinned_fds))
if child.returncode != 0:
sys.exit(child.returncode)
def validated_arg(opt, arg, typ=3, wild=False):
if opt != 'arg': # arg values already have their backslashes removed.
arg = DE_BACKSLASH_RE.sub(r'\1', arg)
# "-" is rsync's read-the-list-from-stdin sentinel, not a pathname: a pull
# with a local --files-from sends exactly "--files-from=-" to the server.
if opt == '--files-from':
if arg == '-':
return arg
if args.wo:
die('a write-only server cannot read a remote --files-from path')
orig_arg = arg
if arg.startswith('./'):
arg = arg[1:]
arg = arg.replace('//', '/')
is_absolute_arg = args.absolute and opt == 'arg' and args.dir != '/' and (arg == args.dir or arg.startswith(args.dir_slash))
if not is_absolute_arg:
arg = arg.lstrip('/')
if args.dir != '/':
if HAS_DOT_DOT_RE.search(arg):
die("do not use .. in", opt, "(anchor the path at the root of your restricted dir)")
if wild:
got = glob.glob(arg)
if not got:
got = [ arg ]
else:
got = [ arg ]
ret = [ ]
for arg in got:
if args.dir != '/' and arg != '.' and (typ == 3 or (typ == 2 and not am_sender)):
arg_has_trailing_slash = arg.endswith('/')
arg_has_trailing_slash_dot = False
if arg_has_trailing_slash:
arg = arg[:-1]
else:
arg_has_trailing_slash_dot = arg.endswith('/.')
if arg_has_trailing_slash_dot:
arg = arg[:-2]
real_arg = os.path.realpath(arg)
if arg != real_arg and not real_arg.startswith(args.dir_slash):
if not (is_absolute_arg and real_arg == args.dir):
die('unsafe arg:', orig_arg, [arg, real_arg])
# Inode-pin the validated path so an attacker cannot flip a
# path component AFTER realpath validates it but BEFORE the
# exec'd rsync resolves it.
#
# CRITICAL: open with O_RDONLY (not O_PATH). An O_PATH fd
# holds a path/dentry reference and /proc/self/fd/N for an
# O_PATH fd re-resolves the path on open -- which means the
# race window stays open across the exec. A regular
# O_RDONLY fd holds an open file (inode-bound), and
# /proc/self/fd/N for a regular fd references the inode
# directly -- exactly the race-closing primitive we need.
#
# O_NOFOLLOW on this open means a symlink that raced into
# place between realpath and this open is refused at the
# leaf. A subsequent fstat() + readlink-of-fd verifies the
# pinned inode is still within the restricted tree (a
# parent-component race that landed on an in-tree symlink
# but outside-tree target would surface here).
#
# /proc/self/fd/N then routes the exec'd rsync's open
# through the kernel's magic link to the SAME pinned inode
# regardless of any subsequent flip; the race is closed.
#
# Linux-only (O_PATH/proc trick is Linux specific); on
# non-Linux fall through to the unhardened path. For paths
# that don't exist yet (receiver-side new dest) os.open
# fails -- we skip pinning there; the new-dest race is a
# separate concern.
# Only a regular file or directory gets its CONTENT opened. A
# sender needs neither for anything else: rsync transmits a symlink
# by its target string and skips a device/FIFO/socket under the
# forced --no-D. Opening them here is also actively wrong --
# O_RDONLY on a FIFO blocks until a writer appears, so naming an
# in-tree FIFO wedged rrsync before exec, and a dangling symlink
# resolved to a missing target and was reported as a race. 3.4.4
# transfers both. These shapes take the parent pin, which is what
# confines them anyway.
# NOT for a trailing "/" or "/." argument: rsync opens that one and
# DOES follow a symlink there, so its leaf pin is load-bearing --
# rrsync-sender-leaf-flip proves a raced flip leaks the outside
# directory's content without it.
sender_leaf_unopened = False
# Not gated on HAVE_PROC_SELF_FD: this is a decision about what
# rsync does with the argument, not about whether we can pin it, so
# it has to hold on the BSDs, macOS, Solaris and Cygwin too -- where
# otherwise a dangling symlink still resolved to nothing and died.
if (am_sender and opt == 'arg'
and not arg_has_trailing_slash
and not arg_has_trailing_slash_dot):
try:
lst = os.lstat(arg)
except OSError:
lst = None
if lst is not None and not (stat.S_ISREG(lst.st_mode)
or stat.S_ISDIR(lst.st_mode)):
sender_leaf_unopened = True
try:
if sender_leaf_unopened:
raise InterruptedError() # jump to the sender-pin branch
try:
# O_NONBLOCK so a special file that raced in after the
# lstat above still cannot block this open.
fd = os.open(real_arg,
os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK)
except IsADirectoryError:
fd = os.open(real_arg,
os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_DIRECTORY)
except InterruptedError:
# No CONTENT fd for this leaf -- but it is still named
# beneath a pinned directory below, not re-resolved from
# the tree root.
fd = None
except FileNotFoundError:
# In --sender mode the path MUST exist (we're reading
# from it) -- ENOENT here means the rename-based race
# caught a transient gap in the flipper's swap. Die.
if am_sender:
die('post-realpath open failed (race detected):',
orig_arg, 'No such file or directory')
# Receiver-side new destination: the leaf has no inode to pin
# yet, but pin its existing PARENT directory and route the
# exec'd rsync's creation through /proc/self/fd/<parent>/<leaf>,
# so a parent-component flip after realpath can't redirect the
# new file/dir out of the tree. Linux-only (the /proc magic
# link); elsewhere, or if the parent itself doesn't exist yet
# (a deeper -R new path), fall through unpinned as before.
fd = None
leaf = os.path.basename(real_arg)
if HAVE_PROC_SELF_FD and leaf and leaf not in ('.', '..'):
try:
pfd = os.open(os.path.dirname(real_arg) or '/',
os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_DIRECTORY)
except OSError:
pfd = -1
if pfd >= 0:
try:
ppath = os.readlink('/proc/self/fd/%d' % pfd)
except OSError as e:
os.close(pfd)
die('post-pin readlink failed (race?):',
orig_arg, e.strerror)
# The pinned parent must be the tree root or under it.
if ppath != args.dir and not ppath.startswith(args.dir_slash):
os.close(pfd)
die('post-pin path escaped tree (race?):',
orig_arg, ppath)
os.set_inheritable(pfd, True)
pinned_fds.append(pfd)
arg = '/proc/self/fd/%d/%s' % (pfd, leaf)
except OSError as e:
# ELOOP or anything else is a race signal: realpath
# validated the path moments ago, but the open just
# failed -- something flipped between the check and
# the pin (typically a symlink-flip on the leaf).
die('post-realpath open failed (race detected):',
orig_arg, e.strerror)
if am_sender and opt == 'arg':
logical = arg
if is_absolute_arg:
if logical == args.dir:
logical = ''
elif logical.startswith(args.dir_slash):
logical = logical[args.dir_slash_len:]
if fd is None and sender_leaf_unopened:
# A leaf we deliberately never opened is still spelled beneath
# a pinned directory: leaving the bare name for rsync to
# re-resolve puts every component back in play, which is
# CVE-2026-53783 -- measured at 3 leaks in 83 raced pulls with
# a dangling-symlink leaf whose parent was flipped to point
# outside the tree. It costs nothing here: the directory is
# opened O_PATH, so the special file itself is never opened
# and a FIFO cannot block, and whatever the leaf turns into
# afterwards is reached only from beneath the held one.
#
# WHICH directory is sender_pinned_arg()'s decision, and it is
# the immediate parent for every shape EXCEPT a --relative
# argument with no client "/./": there the whole argument is
# the transmitted name, so only the anchor it starts from can
# be pinned and the components below it stay raceable. That
# --relative limit predates this and is stated in NEWS.
if HAVE_PROC_SELF_FD:
pinned = sender_pinned_arg(None, logical, orig_arg,
arg_has_trailing_slash,
arg_has_trailing_slash_dot)
if pinned != LEAF_PIN_UNUSABLE:
arg = pinned
elif fd is not None:
# The inode-pin trick (verify + route the exec'd rsync's open via
# the /proc/self/fd magic link) is Linux-only. Where /proc/self/fd
# does not exist at all (the BSDs, Solaris, macOS, Cygwin, or a
# /proc-less namespace) we cannot pin -- fall through to the
# unhardened path (close the fd, keep the realpath-validated arg)
# per the design note above. But where /proc/self/fd DOES exist
# (Linux), a readlink failure is an anomaly (sandbox/seccomp), not
# a no-proc platform: fail CLOSED rather than silently unharden.
if not HAVE_PROC_SELF_FD:
os.close(fd) # no /proc/self/fd: run unpinned
else:
try:
pinned_path = os.readlink('/proc/self/fd/%d' % fd)
except OSError as e:
os.close(fd)
die('post-pin readlink failed (race?):',
orig_arg, e.strerror)
# The pinned inode must live under args.dir_slash (or BE
# args.dir). Catches a parent-component flip that landed
# inside an in-tree path but pointed outside.
if (not pinned_path.startswith(args.dir_slash)
and pinned_path != args.dir):
os.close(fd)
die('post-pin path escaped tree (race?):',
orig_arg, pinned_path)
if am_sender and opt == 'arg':
pinned = sender_pinned_arg(fd, logical, orig_arg,
arg_has_trailing_slash,
arg_has_trailing_slash_dot)
else:
pinned = KEEP_LEAF_PIN
if pinned == KEEP_LEAF_PIN:
os.set_inheritable(fd, True)
pinned_fds.append(fd)
arg = '/proc/self/fd/%d' % fd
elif pinned == LEAF_PIN_UNUSABLE:
# Nothing to spell beneath a held directory (a bare "."
# or the tree root): keep the realpath-validated name,
# which is what 3.4.4 passes.
os.close(fd)
else:
os.close(fd) # only needed to validate the pin
arg = pinned
if arg_has_trailing_slash:
arg += '/'
elif arg_has_trailing_slash_dot:
arg += '/.'
if is_absolute_arg and arg == args.dir:
arg = '.'
elif opt == 'arg' and arg.startswith(args.dir_slash):
arg = arg[args.dir_slash_len:]
if arg == '':
arg = '.'
ret.append(arg)
return ret if wild else ret[0]
def lock_or_die(dirname):
import fcntl, errno
global lock_handle
lock_handle = os.open(dirname, os.O_RDONLY)
try:
fcntl.flock(lock_handle, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
except OSError as e:
if e.errno in (errno.EWOULDBLOCK, errno.EAGAIN, errno.EACCES):
die('Another instance of rrsync is already accessing this directory.')
# flock() is unavailable on this fd/platform -- e.g. Solaris returns
# EBADF for flock() on a directory fd. The single-run lock is a
# best-effort convenience (cf. -no-lock), not a security control, so
# proceed without it rather than abort every transfer.
os.close(lock_handle)
lock_handle = None
def die(*msg):
print(sys.argv[0], 'error:', *msg, file=sys.stderr)
if sys.stdin.isatty():
arg_parser.print_help(sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
# This class displays the --help to the user on argparse error IFF they're running it interactively.
class OurArgParser(argparse.ArgumentParser):
def error(self, msg):
die(msg)
if __name__ == '__main__':
our_desc = """Use "man rrsync" to learn how to restrict ssh users to using a restricted rsync command."""
arg_parser = OurArgParser(description=our_desc, add_help=False)
only_group = arg_parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
only_group.add_argument('-ro', action='store_true', help="Allow only reading from the DIR. Implies -no-del and -no-lock.")
only_group.add_argument('-wo', action='store_true', help="Allow only writing to the DIR.")
arg_parser.add_argument('-munge', action='store_true', help="Enable rsync's --munge-links on the server side.")
arg_parser.add_argument('-absolute', action='store_true', help="Allow transfer args to use absolute server paths under DIR.")
arg_parser.add_argument('-no-del', action='store_true', help="Disable rsync's --delete* and --remove* options.")
arg_parser.add_argument('-no-lock', action='store_true', help="Avoid the single-run (per-user) lock check.")
arg_parser.add_argument('-no-overwrite', action='store_true', help="Prevent overwriting existing files by enforcing --ignore-existing")
arg_parser.add_argument('-help', '-h', action='help', help="Output this help message and exit.")
arg_parser.add_argument('dir', metavar='DIR', help="The restricted directory to use.")
args = arg_parser.parse_args()
args.dir = os.path.realpath(args.dir)
args.dir_slash = args.dir + '/'
args.dir_slash_len = len(args.dir_slash)
if args.ro:
args.no_del = True
elif not args.no_lock:
lock_or_die(args.dir)
main()
# vim: sw=4 et