Files
rsync/access.c
Holger Hoffstätte a5bbe859db Fix glibc-2.43 constness warnings
Glibc 2.43 added C23 const-preserving overloads to various string functions,
which change the return type depending on the constness of the argument(s).
Currently this leads to warnings from calls to strtok() or strchr().
Fix this by properly declaring the respective variable types.

Signed-off-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
2026-04-22 12:10:08 +10:00

293 lines
6.1 KiB
C

/*
* Routines to authenticate access to a daemon (hosts allow/deny).
*
* Copyright (C) 1998 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 2004-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
* with this program; if not, visit the http://fsf.org website.
*/
#include "rsync.h"
#include "ifuncs.h"
#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
#include <netgroup.h>
#endif
static int allow_forward_dns;
extern const char undetermined_hostname[];
static int match_hostname(const char **host_ptr, const char *addr, const char *tok)
{
struct hostent *hp;
unsigned int i;
const char *host = *host_ptr;
if (!host || !*host)
return 0;
#ifdef HAVE_INNETGR
if (*tok == '@' && tok[1])
return innetgr(tok + 1, host, NULL, NULL);
#endif
/* First check if the reverse-DNS-determined hostname matches. */
if (iwildmatch(tok, host))
return 1;
if (!allow_forward_dns)
return 0;
/* Fail quietly if tok is an address or wildcarded entry, not a simple hostname. */
if (!tok[strspn(tok, ".0123456789")] || tok[strcspn(tok, ":/*?[")])
return 0;
/* Now try forward-DNS on the token (config-specified hostname) and see if the IP matches. */
if (!(hp = gethostbyname(tok)))
return 0;
for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(addr, inet_ntoa(*(struct in_addr*)(hp->h_addr_list[i]))) == 0) {
/* If reverse lookups are off, we'll use the conf-specified
* hostname in preference to UNDETERMINED. */
if (host == undetermined_hostname)
*host_ptr = strdup(tok);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int match_binary(const char *b1, const char *b2, const char *mask, int addrlen)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < addrlen; i++) {
if ((b1[i] ^ b2[i]) & mask[i])
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void make_mask(char *mask, int plen, int addrlen)
{
int w, b;
w = plen >> 3;
b = plen & 0x7;
if (w)
memset(mask, 0xff, w);
if (w < addrlen)
mask[w] = 0xff & (0xff<<(8-b));
if (w+1 < addrlen)
memset(mask+w+1, 0, addrlen-w-1);
return;
}
static int match_address(const char *addr, char *tok)
{
char *p;
struct addrinfo hints, *resa, *rest;
int gai;
int ret = 0;
int addrlen = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_STRTOL
long int bits;
#else
int bits;
#endif
char mask[16];
char *a = NULL, *t = NULL;
if (!addr || !*addr)
return 0;
p = strchr(tok,'/');
if (p)
*p = '\0';
/* Fail quietly if tok is a hostname, not an address. */
if (tok[strspn(tok, ".0123456789")] && strchr(tok, ':') == NULL) {
if (p)
*p = '/';
return 0;
}
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
#ifdef AI_NUMERICHOST
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
#endif
if (getaddrinfo(addr, NULL, &hints, &resa) != 0) {
if (p)
*p = '/';
return 0;
}
gai = getaddrinfo(tok, NULL, &hints, &rest);
if (p)
*p++ = '/';
if (gai != 0) {
rprintf(FLOG, "error matching address %s: %s\n",
tok, gai_strerror(gai));
freeaddrinfo(resa);
return 0;
}
if (rest->ai_family != resa->ai_family) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
switch(resa->ai_family) {
case PF_INET:
a = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)resa->ai_addr)->sin_addr;
t = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)rest->ai_addr)->sin_addr;
addrlen = 4;
break;
#ifdef INET6
case PF_INET6: {
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6a, *sin6t;
sin6a = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)resa->ai_addr;
sin6t = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)rest->ai_addr;
a = (char *)&sin6a->sin6_addr;
t = (char *)&sin6t->sin6_addr;
addrlen = 16;
#ifdef HAVE_SOCKADDR_IN6_SCOPE_ID
if (sin6t->sin6_scope_id && sin6a->sin6_scope_id != sin6t->sin6_scope_id) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
#endif
break;
}
#endif
default:
rprintf(FLOG, "unknown family %u\n", rest->ai_family);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
bits = -1;
if (p) {
if (inet_pton(resa->ai_addr->sa_family, p, mask) <= 0) {
#ifdef HAVE_STRTOL
char *ep = NULL;
#else
unsigned char *pp;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRTOL
bits = strtol(p, &ep, 10);
if (!*p || *ep) {
rprintf(FLOG, "malformed mask in %s\n", tok);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
#else
for (pp = (unsigned char *)p; *pp; pp++) {
if (!isascii(*pp) || !isdigit(*pp)) {
rprintf(FLOG, "malformed mask in %s\n", tok);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
}
bits = atoi(p);
#endif
if (bits == 0) {
ret = 1;
goto out;
}
if (bits < 0 || bits > (addrlen << 3)) {
rprintf(FLOG, "malformed mask in %s\n", tok);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
}
} else {
bits = 128;
}
if (bits >= 0)
make_mask(mask, bits, addrlen);
ret = match_binary(a, t, mask, addrlen);
out:
freeaddrinfo(resa);
freeaddrinfo(rest);
return ret;
}
static int access_match(const char *list, const char *addr, const char **host_ptr)
{
char *tok;
char *list2 = strdup(list);
strlower(list2);
for (tok = strtok(list2, " ,\t"); tok; tok = strtok(NULL, " ,\t")) {
if (match_hostname(host_ptr, addr, tok) || match_address(addr, tok)) {
free(list2);
return 1;
}
}
free(list2);
return 0;
}
int allow_access(const char *addr, const char **host_ptr, int i)
{
const char *allow_list = lp_hosts_allow(i);
const char *deny_list = lp_hosts_deny(i);
if (allow_list && !*allow_list)
allow_list = NULL;
if (deny_list && !*deny_list)
deny_list = NULL;
allow_forward_dns = lp_forward_lookup(i);
/* If we match an allow-list item, we always allow access. */
if (allow_list) {
if (access_match(allow_list, addr, host_ptr))
return 1;
/* For an allow-list w/o a deny-list, disallow non-matches. */
if (!deny_list)
return 0;
}
/* If we match a deny-list item (and got past any allow-list
* items), we always disallow access. */
if (deny_list && access_match(deny_list, addr, host_ptr))
return 0;
/* Allow all other access. */
return 1;
}