mirror of
https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync.git
synced 2026-09-17 07:38:57 -04:00
Two shapes a pristine 3.4.4 rrsync transfers, and88cee089broke, both from one cause: the pin opens the argument's CONTENT, when for a sender rsync often only needs to name or describe it. * an in-tree FIFO wedged rrsync before exec. O_RDONLY on a FIFO blocks until a writer appears, so an authorised user naming one could accumulate stuck processes indefinitely. * an in-tree dangling symlink failed the transfer. realpath() resolved it to a missing target and the ENOENT was reported as a detected race, though a dangling link is an ordinary archive entry that rsync transmits by its target string without opening anything. So only a regular file or a directory gets its content opened; anything else keeps the realpath()-validated name. The sender never opens these, it only describes them. The leaf is still spelled beneath a pinned directory. An earlier form of this commit left the bare name for rsync to re-resolve, on the reasoning that 3.4.4 passes it that way -- but that puts every component back in play and reintroduces CVE-2026-53783 for the shape: with an in-tree "dir/target" that is a dangling symlink, flipping "dir" to a symlink pointing outside leaked the outside file's content in 3 of 83 raced pulls. With the parent pinned it is 0 in 104 -- but a race only samples the window, and zero in 104 still leaves a few per cent of per-attempt risk unmeasured, so rrsync-sender-parent-pin closes it deterministically instead: a stub standing in for rsync inherits the pinned descriptor and blocks, the parent is swapped for a symlink out of the tree while it is blocked, and only then does the stub resolve the argument. It reports the in-tree leaf with the pin and the attacker's file without it, so it fails outright if the pin is removed rather than depending on winning anything. A control first proves the swap really does redirect the bare name, or the assertions would prove nothing. Pinning the parent costs nothing here -- pin_dir() opens it O_PATH, so the special file itself is still never opened and a FIFO still cannot block, and whatever the leaf becomes afterwards is reached only from beneath the held one. Which directory that is, sender_pinned_arg() already decides, and for every shape except one it is the immediate parent. The exception is a --relative argument with no client "/./": there the whole argument is the transmitted name, so only the anchor it starts from can be pinned and the components below it stay raceable. That limit predates this commit and NEWS states it; "the parent is pinned" is not true of that one shape. Two boundaries this must NOT cross, each found the hard way: * a trailing "/" or "/." argument keeps its leaf pin: rsync opens that one and does follow a symlink there. Declining it made rrsync-sender-leaf-flip leak the outside directory's content. * the decision is not gated on HAVE_PROC_SELF_FD. It is about what rsync does with the argument, not about whether we can pin it, so gating it left the dangling-symlink failure in place on the BSDs, macOS, Solaris and Cygwin. The shape matrix grows fifo, dangling-symlink and symlink-to-file cases, and now asserts what each delivered entry IS -- kind, symlink target and content -- on every case rather than spot-checking a couple at the end. A name-only comparison is satisfied by an empty directory called "f1", or by the correctly-named but empty symlinks that handing the sender a magic link produced. It still passes against a pristine 3.4.4 rrsync. The FIFO case asserts only that the pull does not hang. What a special file does on the wire is decided by the --no-D that a restricted dir forces on the remote side alone: the sender then omits the old-protocol rdev fields that the client's own -D receiver still reads, so protocol 29 and 30 fail regardless of this change. Verified by running the FIFO case under fakeroot at protocol 29 with and without the parent pin -- it hangs identically either way, so the pinned name is not the cause. That asymmetry is a pre-existing rrsync bug and is tracked separately. (cherry picked from commit1c0bd88f0b)
834 lines
35 KiB
Python
Executable File
834 lines
35 KiB
Python
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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# Restricts rsync to subdirectory declared in .ssh/authorized_keys. See
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# the rrsync man page for details of how to make use of this script.
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# NOTE: install python3 braceexpand to support brace expansion in the args!
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# Originally a perl script by: Joe Smith <js-cgi@inwap.com> 30-Sep-2004
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# Python version by: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
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# You may configure these 2 values to your liking. See also the section of
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# short & long options if you want to disable any options that rsync accepts.
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RSYNC = '/usr/bin/rsync'
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LOGFILE = 'rrsync.log' # NOTE: the file must exist for a line to be appended!
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# The following options are mainly the options that a client rsync can send
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# to the server, and usually just in the one option format that the stock
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# rsync produces. However, there are some additional convenience options
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# added as well, and thus a few options are present in both the short and
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# long lists (such as --group, --owner, and --perms).
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# NOTE when disabling: check for both a short & long version of the option!
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### START of options data produced by the cull-options script. ###
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# To disable a short-named option, add its letter to this string:
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short_disabled = 's'
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# These are also disabled when the restricted dir is not "/":
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short_disabled_subdir = 'KLk'
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# These are all possible short options that we will accept (when not disabled above):
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short_no_arg = 'ACDEHIJKLNORSUWXbcdgklmnopqrstuvxyz' # DO NOT REMOVE ANY
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short_with_num = '@B' # DO NOT REMOVE ANY
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# To disable a long-named option, change its value to a -1. The values mean:
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# 0 = the option has no arg; 1 = the arg doesn't need any checking; 2 = only
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# check the arg when receiving; and 3 = always check the arg.
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long_opts = {
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'append': 0,
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'backup-dir': 2,
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'block-size': 1,
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'bwlimit': 1,
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'checksum-choice': 1,
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'checksum-seed': 1,
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'compare-dest': 2,
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'compress-choice': 1,
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'compress-level': 1,
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'compress-threads': 1,
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'copy-dest': 2,
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'copy-devices': -1,
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'copy-unsafe-links': 0,
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'daemon': -1,
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'debug': 1,
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'delay-updates': 0,
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'delete': 0,
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'delete-after': 0,
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'delete-before': 0,
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'delete-delay': 0,
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'delete-during': 0,
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'delete-excluded': 0,
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'delete-missing-args': 0,
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'dirs': 0,
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'existing': 0,
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'fake-super': 0,
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'files-from': 3,
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'force': 0,
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'from0': 0,
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'fsync': 0,
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'fuzzy': 0,
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'group': 0,
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'groupmap': 1,
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'hard-links': 0,
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'iconv': 1,
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'ignore-errors': 0,
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'ignore-existing': 0,
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'ignore-missing-args': 0,
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'ignore-times': 0,
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'info': 1,
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'inplace': 0,
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'link-dest': 2,
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'links': 0,
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'list-only': 0,
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'log-file': 3,
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'log-format': 1,
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'max-alloc': 1,
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'max-delete': 1,
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'max-size': 1,
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'min-size': 1,
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'mkpath': 0,
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'modify-window': 1,
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'msgs2stderr': 0,
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'munge-links': 0,
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'new-compress': 0,
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'no-W': 0,
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'no-implied-dirs': 0,
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'no-msgs2stderr': 0,
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'no-munge-links': -1,
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'no-r': 0,
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'no-relative': 0,
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'no-specials': 0,
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'numeric-ids': 0,
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'old-compress': 0,
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'one-file-system': 0,
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'only-write-batch': 1,
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'open-noatime': 0,
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'owner': 0,
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'partial': 0,
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'partial-dir': 2,
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'perms': 0,
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'preallocate': 0,
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'recursive': 0,
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'remove-sent-files': 0,
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'remove-source-files': 0,
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'safe-links': 0,
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'sender': 0,
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'server': 0,
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'size-only': 0,
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'skip-compress': 1,
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'specials': 0,
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'stats': 0,
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'stderr': 1,
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'suffix': 1,
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'super': 0,
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'temp-dir': 2,
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'timeout': 1,
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'times': 0,
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'use-qsort': 0,
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'usermap': 1,
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'write-devices': -1,
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}
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### END of options data produced by the cull-options script. ###
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import os, sys, re, argparse, glob, socket, stat, time, subprocess
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from argparse import RawTextHelpFormatter
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# Held open across exec so rsync inherits them. Each entry pins a path
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# validated_arg() approved; the corresponding arg passed to rsync is
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# rewritten to /proc/self/fd/N so rsync's path resolution cannot be
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# race-flipped after rrsync's realpath check, closing the realpath-vs-exec
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# TOCTOU.
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pinned_fds = []
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# Directory pins, keyed by (st_dev, st_ino), so a glob or a multi-arg command
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# whose args share a parent inherits one fd rather than one per arg.
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pinned_dirs = {}
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# Whether the client asked for --relative/-R, which decides how much of a
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# sender arg rsync transmits as the file's name (see sender_pinned_arg).
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client_relative = False
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# The inode-pin trick needs /proc/self/fd/N to be a Linux-style magic symlink
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# whose readlink yields the open file's real path. macOS/BSD lack the directory
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# entirely; Solaris HAS /proc/self/fd but its entries are not such symlinks (its
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# readlink does not return the path), so an isdir() check is not enough -- probe
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# the actual behaviour once against a known fd. Where it works we pin (and a
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# later readlink failure is an anomaly that fails closed); where it does not we
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# fall through to the unhardened path.
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#
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# A correct readlink is NOT sufficient evidence that the fd pins anything, and
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# the two platforms that get this wrong fail in opposite directions:
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#
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# * NetBSD makes the entry a symlink for DIRECTORIES only -- readlink of a
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# regular file's entry fails with EINVAL, so a directory-only probe claims
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# support that is not there and every pull of a file dies in the post-pin
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# check.
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# * Cygwin's readlink returns the right path, but opening the magic link
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# RE-RESOLVES it: rename the directory out from under a held fd and the
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# magic link reaches the replacement. The pin silently protects nothing.
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#
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# Only the Linux kernel gives the inode-bound magic link this relies on, so
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# require that explicitly and keep the runtime probes as a guard for Linux-like
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# environments where /proc is absent or restricted (containers, seccomp).
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def _probe_proc_self_fd():
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if not sys.platform.startswith(('linux', 'android')):
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return False
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def resolves(path):
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try:
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fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY)
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except OSError:
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return False
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try:
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return os.readlink('/proc/self/fd/%d' % fd) == os.path.realpath(path)
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except OSError:
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return False
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finally:
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os.close(fd)
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return resolves('/') and resolves(os.path.realpath(__file__))
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HAVE_PROC_SELF_FD = _probe_proc_self_fd()
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try:
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from braceexpand import braceexpand
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except:
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braceexpand = lambda x: [ DE_BACKSLASH_RE.sub(r'\1', x) ]
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HAS_DOT_DOT_RE = re.compile(r'(^|/)\.\.(/|$)')
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LONG_OPT_RE = re.compile(r'^--([^=]+)(?:=(.*))?$')
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DE_BACKSLASH_RE = re.compile(r'\\(.)')
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def make_inheritable(fd):
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"""Clear FD_CLOEXEC so the exec'd rsync inherits `fd`.
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os.set_inheritable() prefers ioctl(FIONCLEX), which an O_PATH descriptor
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rejects with EBADF on older kernels; F_SETFD is one of the few operations
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O_PATH always allows.
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"""
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try:
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os.set_inheritable(fd, True)
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except OSError:
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import fcntl
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fcntl.fcntl(fd, fcntl.F_SETFD,
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fcntl.fcntl(fd, fcntl.F_GETFD) & ~fcntl.FD_CLOEXEC)
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def pin_dir(path, orig_arg):
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"""Inode-pin a directory and return an fd rsync will inherit.
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The open resolves `path` normally -- including a symlink at its last
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component, which is legitimate and which 3.4.4 accepts -- so a component
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could be flipped first. The readlink check afterwards is what makes that
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safe: it proves the inode we ended up holding is inside the restricted
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tree. From then on the fd names that inode, not the path, so nothing above
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it can be flipped again.
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O_PATH, not O_RDONLY: reaching a known name beneath a directory needs only
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search permission, and a mode 0111 parent is a perfectly ordinary way to
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publish a file without letting it be listed. An O_PATH directory fd is
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just as firmly pinned when used as a /proc/self/fd/N/... prefix (the O_PATH
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caveat in validated_arg() is about reopening the magic link as the file
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itself, which is not what happens here).
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"""
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flags = os.O_DIRECTORY | getattr(os, 'O_PATH', 0)
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if not flags & getattr(os, 'O_PATH', 0):
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flags |= os.O_RDONLY
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try:
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fd = os.open(path or '.', flags)
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except OSError as e:
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die('unable to pin sender path:', orig_arg, e.strerror)
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try:
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st = os.fstat(fd)
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pinned_path = os.readlink('/proc/self/fd/%d' % fd)
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except OSError as e:
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os.close(fd)
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die('post-pin readlink failed (race?):', orig_arg, e.strerror)
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if pinned_path != args.dir and not pinned_path.startswith(args.dir_slash):
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os.close(fd)
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die('post-pin path escaped tree (race?):', orig_arg, pinned_path)
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key = (st.st_dev, st.st_ino)
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if key in pinned_dirs:
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os.close(fd)
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return pinned_dirs[key]
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make_inheritable(fd)
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pinned_fds.append(fd)
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pinned_dirs[key] = fd
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return fd
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# sender_pinned_arg() verdicts that are not a rewritten argument.
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KEEP_LEAF_PIN = 'keep' # hand rsync the leaf's own /proc/self/fd/N
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LEAF_PIN_UNUSABLE = 'unusable' # no pin for this shape; keep the plain name
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def sender_pinned_arg(fd, arg, orig_arg, has_slash, has_slash_dot):
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"""Return a source name rsync will both resolve safely and name correctly.
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The obvious rewrite -- hand rsync /proc/self/fd/N for the leaf itself --
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only works where rsync open()s the argument. A sender lstat()s it first,
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and lstat of a procfs magic link is always S_IFLNK, so rsync describes the
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argument as a symlink instead of sending the file. Which pin is usable
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therefore depends on what rsync does with the argument:
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* a trailing "/" or "/." directory is opened, not lstat()ed, and rsync
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DOES follow a symlink there, so it keeps the leaf pin;
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* anything else keeps the pin one level up and passes the leaf by name.
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rsync will not follow a symlink at that position (it sends the symlink
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itself), the follow options that would change that are already disabled
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for a restricted dir, and its own leaf open is O_NOFOLLOW.
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Under --relative the transmitted name is the whole argument rather than
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its basename, so the pin has to move up to wherever that name starts and
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the rest is spelled after a /./ marker, which is how rsync is told where
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the transmitted portion begins.
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"""
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if client_relative:
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# Look for the marker in the argument as the client spelled it: the
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# caller has already split off a trailing "/" or "/.", which is exactly
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# what turns "sub/./" into a terminal marker.
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full = arg + ('/' if has_slash else '/.' if has_slash_dot else '')
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# rsync honours the FIRST /./, so split there and keep the client's
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# marker rather than inserting a second, earlier one.
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head, marker, tail = full.partition('/./')
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if marker:
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anchor, suffix = head, tail.rstrip('/')
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else:
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anchor, suffix = '', arg
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if suffix.startswith('/'):
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return LEAF_PIN_UNUSABLE
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if suffix in ('', '.'):
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# A terminal marker: everything the client wants transmitted starts
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# at the argument itself, which is the directory we already pinned.
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# The caller re-appends the trailing "/" or "/.".
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dfd = pin_dir(anchor, orig_arg)
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check = '.'
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pinned = '/proc/self/fd/%d/.' % dfd
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else:
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dfd = pin_dir(anchor, orig_arg)
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pinned = '/proc/self/fd/%d/./%s' % (dfd, suffix)
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check = suffix
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else:
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if has_slash or has_slash_dot:
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return KEEP_LEAF_PIN
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anchor, _, leaf = arg.rpartition('/')
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if not leaf or leaf in ('.', '..'):
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return LEAF_PIN_UNUSABLE
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dfd = pin_dir(anchor, orig_arg)
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pinned = '/proc/self/fd/%d/%s' % (dfd, leaf)
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check = leaf
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# Tie the pinned directory to the inode realpath() validated: resolving
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# `check` beneath the held fd cannot be redirected above the leaf, so if it
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# does not reach the same file, something was flipped -- fail closed.
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# fd is None for a leaf we deliberately never opened (a symlink, or a
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# device/FIFO/socket): there is no inode to compare against, and the leaf
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# was never going to be content-opened by the sender either.
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if fd is None:
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return pinned
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try:
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st = os.stat(check, dir_fd=dfd)
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except OSError as e:
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die('post-pin stat failed (race?):', orig_arg, e.strerror)
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leaf_st = os.fstat(fd)
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if (st.st_dev, st.st_ino) != (leaf_st.st_dev, leaf_st.st_ino):
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die('post-pin path changed (race?):', orig_arg, check)
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return pinned
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def safe_open_logfile():
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nofollow = getattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW', 0)
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try:
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st = os.lstat(LOGFILE)
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except OSError:
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return None
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if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
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return None
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try:
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fd = os.open(LOGFILE, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_APPEND | nofollow)
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except OSError:
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return None
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st2 = os.fstat(fd)
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if not stat.S_ISREG(st2.st_mode) or st.st_dev != st2.st_dev or st.st_ino != st2.st_ino:
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os.close(fd)
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return None
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return os.fdopen(fd, 'a')
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def main():
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if not os.path.isdir(args.dir):
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die("Restricted directory does not exist!")
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# The format of the environment variables set by sshd:
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# SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND:
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# rsync --server -vlogDtpre.iLsfxCIvu --etc . ARG # push
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# rsync --server --sender -vlogDtpre.iLsfxCIvu --etc . ARGS # pull
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# SSH_CONNECTION (client_ip client_port server_ip server_port):
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# 192.168.1.100 64106 192.168.1.2 22
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command = os.environ.get('SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND', None)
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if not command:
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die("Not invoked via sshd")
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if command == 'true':
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# Allow checking connectivity with "ssh <host> true". (For example,
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# rsbackup uses this.)
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sys.exit(0)
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command = command.split(' ', 2)
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if command[0:1] != ['rsync']:
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die("SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND does not run rsync")
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if command[1:2] != ['--server']:
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die("--server option is not the first arg")
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command = '' if len(command) < 3 else command[2]
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global am_sender
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am_sender = command.startswith("--sender ") # Restrictive on purpose!
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if args.ro and not am_sender:
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die("sending to read-only server is not allowed")
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if args.wo and am_sender:
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die("reading from write-only server is not allowed")
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|
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if args.wo or not am_sender:
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long_opts['sender'] = -1
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if args.no_del:
|
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for opt in long_opts:
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if opt.startswith(('remove', 'delete')):
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long_opts[opt] = -1
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if args.ro:
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long_opts['log-file'] = -1
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|
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if args.dir != '/':
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global short_disabled
|
|
short_disabled += short_disabled_subdir
|
|
long_opts['copy-unsafe-links'] = -1
|
|
|
|
short_no_arg_re = short_no_arg
|
|
short_with_num_re = short_with_num
|
|
if short_disabled:
|
|
for ltr in short_disabled:
|
|
short_no_arg_re = short_no_arg_re.replace(ltr, '')
|
|
short_with_num_re = short_with_num_re.replace(ltr, '')
|
|
short_disabled_re = re.compile(r'^-[%s]*([%s])' % (short_no_arg_re, short_disabled))
|
|
short_no_arg_re = re.compile(r'^-(?=.)[%s]*(e\d*\.\w*)?$' % short_no_arg_re)
|
|
short_with_num_re = re.compile(r'^-[%s]\d+$' % short_with_num_re)
|
|
|
|
log_fh = safe_open_logfile()
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
os.chdir(args.dir)
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
die('unable to chdir to restricted dir:', str(e))
|
|
|
|
global client_relative
|
|
rsync_opts = [ '--server' ]
|
|
rsync_args = [ ]
|
|
saw_the_dot_arg = False
|
|
last_opt = check_type = None
|
|
|
|
for arg in re.findall(r'(?:[^\s\\]+|\\.[^\s\\]*)+', command):
|
|
if check_type:
|
|
rsync_opts.append(validated_arg(last_opt, arg, check_type))
|
|
check_type = None
|
|
elif saw_the_dot_arg:
|
|
# NOTE: an arg that starts with a '-' is safe due to our use of "--" in the cmd tuple.
|
|
try:
|
|
b_e = braceexpand(arg) # Also removes backslashes
|
|
except: # Handle errors such as unbalanced braces by just de-backslashing the arg:
|
|
b_e = [ DE_BACKSLASH_RE.sub(r'\1', arg) ]
|
|
for xarg in b_e:
|
|
rsync_args += validated_arg('arg', xarg, wild=True)
|
|
else: # parsing the option args
|
|
if arg == '.':
|
|
saw_the_dot_arg = True
|
|
continue
|
|
rsync_opts.append(arg)
|
|
sm = short_no_arg_re.match(arg)
|
|
if sm or short_with_num_re.match(arg):
|
|
if sm:
|
|
# Scan the cluster's own letters only: the trailing
|
|
# capability blob (-e.iLsfxC) is not a set of options.
|
|
letters = arg[1:]
|
|
if sm.group(1):
|
|
letters = letters[:-len(sm.group(1))]
|
|
if 'R' in letters:
|
|
client_relative = True
|
|
continue
|
|
disabled = False
|
|
m = LONG_OPT_RE.match(arg)
|
|
if m:
|
|
opt = m.group(1)
|
|
opt_arg = m.group(2)
|
|
ct = long_opts.get(opt, None)
|
|
if ct is None:
|
|
break # Generate generic failure due to unfinished arg parsing
|
|
# Last one wins, matching rsync's own option handling.
|
|
if opt == 'relative':
|
|
client_relative = True
|
|
elif opt == 'no-relative':
|
|
client_relative = False
|
|
if ct == 0:
|
|
continue
|
|
opt = '--' + opt
|
|
if ct > 0:
|
|
if opt_arg is not None:
|
|
rsync_opts[-1] = opt + '=' + validated_arg(opt, opt_arg, ct)
|
|
else:
|
|
check_type = ct
|
|
last_opt = opt
|
|
continue
|
|
disabled = True
|
|
elif short_disabled:
|
|
m = short_disabled_re.match(arg)
|
|
if m:
|
|
disabled = True
|
|
opt = '-' + m.group(1)
|
|
|
|
if disabled:
|
|
die("option", opt, "has been disabled on this server.")
|
|
break # Generate a generic failure
|
|
|
|
if not saw_the_dot_arg:
|
|
die("invalid rsync-command syntax or options")
|
|
|
|
if args.dir != '/':
|
|
# A restricted dir denies device/special creation, but `-a` (-rlptgoD)
|
|
# bundles -D into the client's short-option string, so rejecting -D
|
|
# outright would break every `rsync -a` to/from a restricted rrsync.
|
|
# Force --no-D instead: it follows the client's options, so it strips
|
|
# the device/special semantics (devices/specials are skipped, not
|
|
# created) while the rest of the transfer proceeds normally.
|
|
rsync_opts.append('--no-D')
|
|
|
|
if args.munge:
|
|
rsync_opts.append('--munge-links')
|
|
|
|
if args.no_overwrite:
|
|
rsync_opts.append('--ignore-existing')
|
|
|
|
if not rsync_args:
|
|
rsync_args = [ '.' ]
|
|
|
|
cmd = (RSYNC, *rsync_opts, '--', '.', *rsync_args)
|
|
|
|
if log_fh:
|
|
now = time.localtime()
|
|
host = os.environ.get('SSH_CONNECTION', 'unknown').split()[0] # Drop everything after the IP addr
|
|
if host.startswith('::ffff:'):
|
|
host = host[7:]
|
|
try:
|
|
host = socket.gethostbyaddr(socket.inet_aton(host))
|
|
except:
|
|
pass
|
|
log_fh.write("%02d:%02d:%02d %-16s %s\n" % (now.tm_hour, now.tm_min, now.tm_sec, host, str(cmd)))
|
|
log_fh.close()
|
|
|
|
# NOTE: This assumes that the rsync protocol will not be maliciously hijacked.
|
|
if args.no_lock:
|
|
os.execlp(RSYNC, *cmd)
|
|
die("execlp(", RSYNC, *cmd, ') failed')
|
|
# pass_fds keeps the inode-pinning O_PATH fds open across the spawn so
|
|
# /proc/self/fd/N in the cmd resolves correctly in the child. See the
|
|
# pinned_fds comment near the top.
|
|
child = subprocess.run(cmd, pass_fds=tuple(pinned_fds))
|
|
if child.returncode != 0:
|
|
sys.exit(child.returncode)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def validated_arg(opt, arg, typ=3, wild=False):
|
|
if opt != 'arg': # arg values already have their backslashes removed.
|
|
arg = DE_BACKSLASH_RE.sub(r'\1', arg)
|
|
|
|
# "-" is rsync's read-the-list-from-stdin sentinel, not a pathname: a pull
|
|
# with a local --files-from sends exactly "--files-from=-" to the server.
|
|
if opt == '--files-from' and arg == '-':
|
|
return arg
|
|
|
|
orig_arg = arg
|
|
if arg.startswith('./'):
|
|
arg = arg[1:]
|
|
arg = arg.replace('//', '/')
|
|
is_absolute_arg = args.absolute and opt == 'arg' and args.dir != '/' and (arg == args.dir or arg.startswith(args.dir_slash))
|
|
if not is_absolute_arg:
|
|
arg = arg.lstrip('/')
|
|
if args.dir != '/':
|
|
if HAS_DOT_DOT_RE.search(arg):
|
|
die("do not use .. in", opt, "(anchor the path at the root of your restricted dir)")
|
|
|
|
if wild:
|
|
got = glob.glob(arg)
|
|
if not got:
|
|
got = [ arg ]
|
|
else:
|
|
got = [ arg ]
|
|
|
|
ret = [ ]
|
|
for arg in got:
|
|
if args.dir != '/' and arg != '.' and (typ == 3 or (typ == 2 and not am_sender)):
|
|
arg_has_trailing_slash = arg.endswith('/')
|
|
arg_has_trailing_slash_dot = False
|
|
if arg_has_trailing_slash:
|
|
arg = arg[:-1]
|
|
else:
|
|
arg_has_trailing_slash_dot = arg.endswith('/.')
|
|
if arg_has_trailing_slash_dot:
|
|
arg = arg[:-2]
|
|
real_arg = os.path.realpath(arg)
|
|
if arg != real_arg and not real_arg.startswith(args.dir_slash):
|
|
if not (is_absolute_arg and real_arg == args.dir):
|
|
die('unsafe arg:', orig_arg, [arg, real_arg])
|
|
# Inode-pin the validated path so an attacker cannot flip a
|
|
# path component AFTER realpath validates it but BEFORE the
|
|
# exec'd rsync resolves it.
|
|
#
|
|
# CRITICAL: open with O_RDONLY (not O_PATH). An O_PATH fd
|
|
# holds a path/dentry reference and /proc/self/fd/N for an
|
|
# O_PATH fd re-resolves the path on open -- which means the
|
|
# race window stays open across the exec. A regular
|
|
# O_RDONLY fd holds an open file (inode-bound), and
|
|
# /proc/self/fd/N for a regular fd references the inode
|
|
# directly -- exactly the race-closing primitive we need.
|
|
#
|
|
# O_NOFOLLOW on this open means a symlink that raced into
|
|
# place between realpath and this open is refused at the
|
|
# leaf. A subsequent fstat() + readlink-of-fd verifies the
|
|
# pinned inode is still within the restricted tree (a
|
|
# parent-component race that landed on an in-tree symlink
|
|
# but outside-tree target would surface here).
|
|
#
|
|
# /proc/self/fd/N then routes the exec'd rsync's open
|
|
# through the kernel's magic link to the SAME pinned inode
|
|
# regardless of any subsequent flip; the race is closed.
|
|
#
|
|
# Linux-only (O_PATH/proc trick is Linux specific); on
|
|
# non-Linux fall through to the unhardened path. For paths
|
|
# that don't exist yet (receiver-side new dest) os.open
|
|
# fails -- we skip pinning there; the new-dest race is a
|
|
# separate concern.
|
|
# Only a regular file or directory gets its CONTENT opened. A
|
|
# sender needs neither for anything else: rsync transmits a symlink
|
|
# by its target string and skips a device/FIFO/socket under the
|
|
# forced --no-D. Opening them here is also actively wrong --
|
|
# O_RDONLY on a FIFO blocks until a writer appears, so naming an
|
|
# in-tree FIFO wedged rrsync before exec, and a dangling symlink
|
|
# resolved to a missing target and was reported as a race. 3.4.4
|
|
# transfers both. These shapes take the parent pin, which is what
|
|
# confines them anyway.
|
|
# NOT for a trailing "/" or "/." argument: rsync opens that one and
|
|
# DOES follow a symlink there, so its leaf pin is load-bearing --
|
|
# rrsync-sender-leaf-flip proves a raced flip leaks the outside
|
|
# directory's content without it.
|
|
sender_leaf_unopened = False
|
|
# Not gated on HAVE_PROC_SELF_FD: this is a decision about what
|
|
# rsync does with the argument, not about whether we can pin it, so
|
|
# it has to hold on the BSDs, macOS, Solaris and Cygwin too -- where
|
|
# otherwise a dangling symlink still resolved to nothing and died.
|
|
if (am_sender and opt == 'arg'
|
|
and not arg_has_trailing_slash
|
|
and not arg_has_trailing_slash_dot):
|
|
try:
|
|
lst = os.lstat(arg)
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
lst = None
|
|
if lst is not None and not (stat.S_ISREG(lst.st_mode)
|
|
or stat.S_ISDIR(lst.st_mode)):
|
|
sender_leaf_unopened = True
|
|
try:
|
|
if sender_leaf_unopened:
|
|
raise InterruptedError() # jump to the sender-pin branch
|
|
try:
|
|
# O_NONBLOCK so a special file that raced in after the
|
|
# lstat above still cannot block this open.
|
|
fd = os.open(real_arg,
|
|
os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK)
|
|
except IsADirectoryError:
|
|
fd = os.open(real_arg,
|
|
os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_DIRECTORY)
|
|
except InterruptedError:
|
|
# No CONTENT fd for this leaf -- but it is still named
|
|
# beneath a pinned directory below, not re-resolved from
|
|
# the tree root.
|
|
fd = None
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
# In --sender mode the path MUST exist (we're reading
|
|
# from it) -- ENOENT here means the rename-based race
|
|
# caught a transient gap in the flipper's swap. Die.
|
|
if am_sender:
|
|
die('post-realpath open failed (race detected):',
|
|
orig_arg, 'No such file or directory')
|
|
# Receiver-side new destination: the leaf has no inode to pin
|
|
# yet, but pin its existing PARENT directory and route the
|
|
# exec'd rsync's creation through /proc/self/fd/<parent>/<leaf>,
|
|
# so a parent-component flip after realpath can't redirect the
|
|
# new file/dir out of the tree. Linux-only (the /proc magic
|
|
# link); elsewhere, or if the parent itself doesn't exist yet
|
|
# (a deeper -R new path), fall through unpinned as before.
|
|
fd = None
|
|
leaf = os.path.basename(real_arg)
|
|
if HAVE_PROC_SELF_FD and leaf and leaf not in ('.', '..'):
|
|
try:
|
|
pfd = os.open(os.path.dirname(real_arg) or '/',
|
|
os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_DIRECTORY)
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
pfd = -1
|
|
if pfd >= 0:
|
|
try:
|
|
ppath = os.readlink('/proc/self/fd/%d' % pfd)
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
os.close(pfd)
|
|
die('post-pin readlink failed (race?):',
|
|
orig_arg, e.strerror)
|
|
# The pinned parent must be the tree root or under it.
|
|
if ppath != args.dir and not ppath.startswith(args.dir_slash):
|
|
os.close(pfd)
|
|
die('post-pin path escaped tree (race?):',
|
|
orig_arg, ppath)
|
|
os.set_inheritable(pfd, True)
|
|
pinned_fds.append(pfd)
|
|
arg = '/proc/self/fd/%d/%s' % (pfd, leaf)
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
# ELOOP or anything else is a race signal: realpath
|
|
# validated the path moments ago, but the open just
|
|
# failed -- something flipped between the check and
|
|
# the pin (typically a symlink-flip on the leaf).
|
|
die('post-realpath open failed (race detected):',
|
|
orig_arg, e.strerror)
|
|
if am_sender and opt == 'arg':
|
|
logical = arg
|
|
if is_absolute_arg:
|
|
if logical == args.dir:
|
|
logical = ''
|
|
elif logical.startswith(args.dir_slash):
|
|
logical = logical[args.dir_slash_len:]
|
|
if fd is None and sender_leaf_unopened:
|
|
# A leaf we deliberately never opened is still spelled beneath
|
|
# a pinned directory: leaving the bare name for rsync to
|
|
# re-resolve puts every component back in play, which is
|
|
# CVE-2026-53783 -- measured at 3 leaks in 83 raced pulls with
|
|
# a dangling-symlink leaf whose parent was flipped to point
|
|
# outside the tree. It costs nothing here: the directory is
|
|
# opened O_PATH, so the special file itself is never opened
|
|
# and a FIFO cannot block, and whatever the leaf turns into
|
|
# afterwards is reached only from beneath the held one.
|
|
#
|
|
# WHICH directory is sender_pinned_arg()'s decision, and it is
|
|
# the immediate parent for every shape EXCEPT a --relative
|
|
# argument with no client "/./": there the whole argument is
|
|
# the transmitted name, so only the anchor it starts from can
|
|
# be pinned and the components below it stay raceable. That
|
|
# --relative limit predates this and is stated in NEWS.
|
|
if HAVE_PROC_SELF_FD:
|
|
pinned = sender_pinned_arg(None, logical, orig_arg,
|
|
arg_has_trailing_slash,
|
|
arg_has_trailing_slash_dot)
|
|
if pinned != LEAF_PIN_UNUSABLE:
|
|
arg = pinned
|
|
elif fd is not None:
|
|
# The inode-pin trick (verify + route the exec'd rsync's open via
|
|
# the /proc/self/fd magic link) is Linux-only. Where /proc/self/fd
|
|
# does not exist at all (the BSDs, Solaris, macOS, Cygwin, or a
|
|
# /proc-less namespace) we cannot pin -- fall through to the
|
|
# unhardened path (close the fd, keep the realpath-validated arg)
|
|
# per the design note above. But where /proc/self/fd DOES exist
|
|
# (Linux), a readlink failure is an anomaly (sandbox/seccomp), not
|
|
# a no-proc platform: fail CLOSED rather than silently unharden.
|
|
if not HAVE_PROC_SELF_FD:
|
|
os.close(fd) # no /proc/self/fd: run unpinned
|
|
else:
|
|
try:
|
|
pinned_path = os.readlink('/proc/self/fd/%d' % fd)
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
os.close(fd)
|
|
die('post-pin readlink failed (race?):',
|
|
orig_arg, e.strerror)
|
|
# The pinned inode must live under args.dir_slash (or BE
|
|
# args.dir). Catches a parent-component flip that landed
|
|
# inside an in-tree path but pointed outside.
|
|
if (not pinned_path.startswith(args.dir_slash)
|
|
and pinned_path != args.dir):
|
|
os.close(fd)
|
|
die('post-pin path escaped tree (race?):',
|
|
orig_arg, pinned_path)
|
|
if am_sender and opt == 'arg':
|
|
pinned = sender_pinned_arg(fd, logical, orig_arg,
|
|
arg_has_trailing_slash,
|
|
arg_has_trailing_slash_dot)
|
|
else:
|
|
pinned = KEEP_LEAF_PIN
|
|
if pinned == KEEP_LEAF_PIN:
|
|
os.set_inheritable(fd, True)
|
|
pinned_fds.append(fd)
|
|
arg = '/proc/self/fd/%d' % fd
|
|
elif pinned == LEAF_PIN_UNUSABLE:
|
|
# Nothing to spell beneath a held directory (a bare "."
|
|
# or the tree root): keep the realpath-validated name,
|
|
# which is what 3.4.4 passes.
|
|
os.close(fd)
|
|
else:
|
|
os.close(fd) # only needed to validate the pin
|
|
arg = pinned
|
|
if arg_has_trailing_slash:
|
|
arg += '/'
|
|
elif arg_has_trailing_slash_dot:
|
|
arg += '/.'
|
|
if is_absolute_arg and arg == args.dir:
|
|
arg = '.'
|
|
elif opt == 'arg' and arg.startswith(args.dir_slash):
|
|
arg = arg[args.dir_slash_len:]
|
|
if arg == '':
|
|
arg = '.'
|
|
ret.append(arg)
|
|
|
|
return ret if wild else ret[0]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def lock_or_die(dirname):
|
|
import fcntl, errno
|
|
global lock_handle
|
|
lock_handle = os.open(dirname, os.O_RDONLY)
|
|
try:
|
|
fcntl.flock(lock_handle, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
if e.errno in (errno.EWOULDBLOCK, errno.EAGAIN, errno.EACCES):
|
|
die('Another instance of rrsync is already accessing this directory.')
|
|
# flock() is unavailable on this fd/platform -- e.g. Solaris returns
|
|
# EBADF for flock() on a directory fd. The single-run lock is a
|
|
# best-effort convenience (cf. -no-lock), not a security control, so
|
|
# proceed without it rather than abort every transfer.
|
|
os.close(lock_handle)
|
|
lock_handle = None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def die(*msg):
|
|
print(sys.argv[0], 'error:', *msg, file=sys.stderr)
|
|
if sys.stdin.isatty():
|
|
arg_parser.print_help(sys.stderr)
|
|
sys.exit(1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This class displays the --help to the user on argparse error IFF they're running it interactively.
|
|
class OurArgParser(argparse.ArgumentParser):
|
|
def error(self, msg):
|
|
die(msg)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
|
our_desc = """Use "man rrsync" to learn how to restrict ssh users to using a restricted rsync command."""
|
|
arg_parser = OurArgParser(description=our_desc, add_help=False)
|
|
only_group = arg_parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
|
|
only_group.add_argument('-ro', action='store_true', help="Allow only reading from the DIR. Implies -no-del and -no-lock.")
|
|
only_group.add_argument('-wo', action='store_true', help="Allow only writing to the DIR.")
|
|
arg_parser.add_argument('-munge', action='store_true', help="Enable rsync's --munge-links on the server side.")
|
|
arg_parser.add_argument('-absolute', action='store_true', help="Allow transfer args to use absolute server paths under DIR.")
|
|
arg_parser.add_argument('-no-del', action='store_true', help="Disable rsync's --delete* and --remove* options.")
|
|
arg_parser.add_argument('-no-lock', action='store_true', help="Avoid the single-run (per-user) lock check.")
|
|
arg_parser.add_argument('-no-overwrite', action='store_true', help="Prevent overwriting existing files by enforcing --ignore-existing")
|
|
arg_parser.add_argument('-help', '-h', action='help', help="Output this help message and exit.")
|
|
arg_parser.add_argument('dir', metavar='DIR', help="The restricted directory to use.")
|
|
args = arg_parser.parse_args()
|
|
args.dir = os.path.realpath(args.dir)
|
|
args.dir_slash = args.dir + '/'
|
|
args.dir_slash_len = len(args.dir_slash)
|
|
if args.ro:
|
|
args.no_del = True
|
|
elif not args.no_lock:
|
|
lock_or_die(args.dir)
|
|
main()
|
|
|
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# vim: sw=4 et
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