Files
tailscale/drive/driveimpl/fileserver.go
Brad Fitzpatrick 420a8e5a1a drive/driveimpl: handle Unicode normalization mismatches in filenames
Files whose names contain characters with Unicode decompositions (such
as umlauts or voiced kana) could not be opened or written over
Taildrive.

Background: keyboards and IMEs emit NFC (precomposed) characters on
every platform, so filenames on Linux (ext4 etc) and Windows (NTFS)
disks are usually NFC bytes. NFD (decomposed) names mostly come from
Apple software: HFS+ forced a variant of NFD on write, and Apple's
frameworks still decompose paths via fileSystemRepresentation. APFS
preserves whatever bytes it is given but does normalization-insensitive
lookups (it stores a hash of the normalized name), so canonically
equivalent names find the same file. ext4 and NTFS lookups, by
contrast, are byte-exact.

On the wire, the macOS WebDAV client sends paths in NFD form (they
pass through the decomposing file system representation, and unlike
Apple's NFS client there is no "nfc" mount option). Windows and Linux
WebDAV clients pass names through as the application provided them,
typically NFC. WebDAV itself mandates no normalization, and PROPFIND
hrefs reflect the server's on-disk bytes.

The two forms are canonically equivalent but byte-wise different, so a
macOS client requesting the NFD form of an NFC-named file on a Linux
or Windows host got a 404 from the exact-byte lookup. Even against an
APFS host, where the filesystem absorbs the mismatch, the client-side
StatCache could still infer a 404: a cached directory listing in one
form caused depth 0 PROPFINDs in the other form to be treated as not
found without ever reaching the server. The inverse direction (NFD
bytes on a Linux disk, copied there from a Mac, requested in NFC form
by a Windows or Linux client) was broken too.

Alternative regimes considered: normalizing names at storage time (as
Nextcloud and Syncthing's autoNormalize do) would rename user files in
shared directories as a side effect of serving them; normalizing
request paths to a fixed form on the wire is unsound because the
on-disk form is unknowable a priori (ext4 can hold either form, or
both). Instead, adopt the APFS model: preserve bytes, but make lookups
normalization-insensitive.

Concretely, wrap the remote file server's webdav.Dir in a
normalizingFS that, when an exact path lookup fails, rescans the
parent directory for an entry whose name is canonically equivalent,
comparing the NFC form of both sides (which also sidesteps Apple's
nonstandard decomposition tables). Exact matches always win, and newly
created files keep the exact bytes the client sent. Also NFC-normalize
StatCache keys so canonically equivalent names share a cache entry.

The change is covered at three levels: unit tests for the StatCache,
an in-process two-node test in drive/driveimpl, and a new TestTaildrive
VM integration test in tstest/natlab/vmtest that shares a directory
between two Ubuntu VMs and exercises the NFC/NFD cases over the real
stack with curl playing the part of a macOS WebDAV client.

Fixes #15020

Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
Change-Id: I9c2f157e604efc629828581e08d5b3191dbb7d4e
2026-07-27 06:35:54 -07:00

167 lines
5.0 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
package driveimpl
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"sync"
"github.com/tailscale/xnet/webdav"
"tailscale.com/drive/driveimpl/shared"
)
// FileServer is a standalone WebDAV server that dynamically serves up shares.
// It's typically used in a separate process from the actual Taildrive server to
// serve up files as an unprivileged user.
type FileServer struct {
ln net.Listener
secretToken string
shareHandlers map[string]http.Handler
sharesMu sync.RWMutex
}
// NewFileServer constructs a FileServer.
//
// The server attempts to listen at a random address on 127.0.0.1.
// The listen address is available via the Addr() method.
//
// The server has to be told about shares before it can serve them. This is
// accomplished either by calling SetShares(), or locking the shares with
// LockShares(), clearing them with ClearSharesLocked(), adding them
// individually with AddShareLocked(), and finally unlocking them with
// UnlockShares().
//
// The server doesn't actually process requests until the Serve() method is
// called.
func NewFileServer() (*FileServer, error) {
// path := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), fmt.Sprintf("%v.socket", uuid.New().String()))
// ln, err := safesocket.Listen(path)
// if err != nil {
// TODO(oxtoacart): actually get safesocket working in more environments (MacOS Sandboxed, Windows, ???)
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("listen: %w", err)
}
secretToken, err := generateSecretToken()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &FileServer{
ln: ln,
secretToken: secretToken,
shareHandlers: make(map[string]http.Handler),
}, nil
}
// generateSecretToken generates a hex-encoded 256 bit secret.
func generateSecretToken() (string, error) {
tokenBytes := make([]byte, 32)
_, err := rand.Read(tokenBytes)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("generateSecretToken: %w", err)
}
return hex.EncodeToString(tokenBytes), nil
}
// Addr returns the address at which this FileServer is listening. This
// includes the secret token in front of the address, delimited by a pipe |.
func (s *FileServer) Addr() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s", s.secretToken, s.ln.Addr().String())
}
// Serve() starts serving files and blocks until it encounters a fatal error.
func (s *FileServer) Serve() error {
return http.Serve(s.ln, s)
}
// LockShares locks the map of shares in preparation for manipulating it.
func (s *FileServer) LockShares() {
s.sharesMu.Lock()
}
// UnlockShares unlocks the map of shares.
func (s *FileServer) UnlockShares() {
s.sharesMu.Unlock()
}
// ClearSharesLocked clears the map of shares, assuming that LockShares() has
// been called first.
func (s *FileServer) ClearSharesLocked() {
s.shareHandlers = make(map[string]http.Handler)
}
// AddShareLocked adds a share to the map of shares, assuming that LockShares()
// has been called first.
func (s *FileServer) AddShareLocked(share, path string) {
s.shareHandlers[share] = &webdav.Handler{
FileSystem: &birthTimingFS{&normalizingFS{webdav.Dir(path)}},
LockSystem: webdav.NewMemLS(),
}
}
// SetShares sets the full map of shares to the new value, mapping name->path.
func (s *FileServer) SetShares(shares map[string]string) {
s.LockShares()
defer s.UnlockShares()
s.ClearSharesLocked()
for name, path := range shares {
s.AddShareLocked(name, path)
}
}
// ServeHTTP implements the http.Handler interface. This requires a secret
// token in the path in order to prevent Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) bypass attacks
// of the below sort:
//
// 1. Attacker with write access to the share puts a malicious file via
// http://100.100.100.100:8080/<tailnet>/<machine>/</share>/bad.exe
// 2. Attacker then induces victim to visit
// http://localhost:[PORT]/<share>/bad.exe
// 3. Because that is loaded from localhost, it does not get the MOTW
// thereby bypasses some OS-level security.
//
// The path on this file server is actually not as above, but rather
// http://localhost:[PORT]/<secretToken>/<share>/bad.exe. Unless the attacker
// can discover the secretToken, the attacker cannot craft a localhost URL that
// will work.
func (s *FileServer) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
parts := shared.CleanAndSplit(r.URL.Path)
token := parts[0]
a, b := []byte(token), []byte(s.secretToken)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(a, b) != 1 {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
if len(parts) < 2 {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
r.URL.Path = shared.Join(parts[2:]...)
share := parts[1]
s.sharesMu.RLock()
h, found := s.shareHandlers[share]
s.sharesMu.RUnlock()
if !found {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
// WebDAV's locking code compares the lock resources with the request's
// host header, set this to empty to avoid mismatches.
r.Host = ""
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
func (s *FileServer) Close() error {
return s.ln.Close()
}