mirror of
https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale.git
synced 2026-01-19 05:08:26 -05:00
Send LOGIN audit messages to the kernel audit subsystem on Linux when users successfully authenticate to Tailscale SSH. This provides administrators with audit trail integration via auditd or journald, recording details about both the Tailscale user (whois) and the mapped local user account. The implementation uses raw netlink sockets to send AUDIT_USER_LOGIN messages to the kernel audit subsystem. It requires CAP_AUDIT_WRITE capability, which is checked at runtime. If the capability is not present, audit logging is silently skipped. Audit messages are sent to the kernel (pid 0) and consumed by either auditd (written to /var/log/audit/audit.log) or journald (available via journalctl _TRANSPORT=audit), depending on system configuration. Note: This may result in duplicate messages on a system where auditd/journald audit logs are enabled and the system has and supports `login -h`. Sadly Linux login code paths are still an inconsistent wild west so we accept the potential duplication rather than trying to avoid it. Fixes #18332 Signed-off-by: James Tucker <james@tailscale.com>
1579 lines
45 KiB
Go
1579 lines
45 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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//go:build (linux && !android) || (darwin && !ios) || freebsd || openbsd || plan9
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// Package tailssh is an SSH server integrated into Tailscale.
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package tailssh
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/netip"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"path/filepath"
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"runtime"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"syscall"
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"time"
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gossh "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
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"tailscale.com/envknob"
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"tailscale.com/feature"
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"tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal"
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"tailscale.com/net/tsaddr"
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"tailscale.com/net/tsdial"
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"tailscale.com/sessionrecording"
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"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
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"tailscale.com/tempfork/gliderlabs/ssh"
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"tailscale.com/types/key"
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"tailscale.com/types/logger"
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"tailscale.com/types/netmap"
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"tailscale.com/util/backoff"
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"tailscale.com/util/clientmetric"
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"tailscale.com/util/httpm"
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"tailscale.com/util/mak"
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)
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var (
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sshVerboseLogging = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_DEBUG_SSH_VLOG")
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sshDisableSFTP = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_SSH_DISABLE_SFTP")
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sshDisableForwarding = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_SSH_DISABLE_FORWARDING")
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sshDisablePTY = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_SSH_DISABLE_PTY")
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// errTerminal is an empty gossh.PartialSuccessError (with no 'Next'
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// authentication methods that may proceed), which results in the SSH
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// server immediately disconnecting the client.
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errTerminal = &gossh.PartialSuccessError{}
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// hookSSHLoginSuccess is called after successful SSH authentication.
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// It is set by platform-specific code (e.g., auditd_linux.go).
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hookSSHLoginSuccess feature.Hook[func(logf logger.Logf, c *conn)]
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)
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const (
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// forcePasswordSuffix is the suffix at the end of a username that forces
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// Tailscale SSH into password authentication mode to work around buggy SSH
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// clients that get confused by successful replies to auth type "none".
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forcePasswordSuffix = "+password"
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)
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// ipnLocalBackend is the subset of ipnlocal.LocalBackend that we use.
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// It is used for testing.
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type ipnLocalBackend interface {
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GetSSH_HostKeys() ([]gossh.Signer, error)
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ShouldRunSSH() bool
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NetMap() *netmap.NetworkMap
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WhoIs(proto string, ipp netip.AddrPort) (n tailcfg.NodeView, u tailcfg.UserProfile, ok bool)
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DoNoiseRequest(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
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Dialer() *tsdial.Dialer
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TailscaleVarRoot() string
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NodeKey() key.NodePublic
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}
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type server struct {
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lb ipnLocalBackend
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logf logger.Logf
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tailscaledPath string
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timeNow func() time.Time // or nil for time.Now
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sessionWaitGroup sync.WaitGroup
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// mu protects the following
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mu sync.Mutex
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activeConns map[*conn]bool // set; value is always true
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shutdownCalled bool
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}
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func (srv *server) now() time.Time {
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if srv != nil && srv.timeNow != nil {
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return srv.timeNow()
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}
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return time.Now()
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}
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func init() {
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ipnlocal.RegisterNewSSHServer(func(logf logger.Logf, lb *ipnlocal.LocalBackend) (ipnlocal.SSHServer, error) {
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tsd, err := os.Executable()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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srv := &server{
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lb: lb,
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logf: logf,
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tailscaledPath: tsd,
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timeNow: func() time.Time {
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return lb.ControlNow(time.Now())
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},
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}
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return srv, nil
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})
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}
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// attachSessionToConnIfNotShutdown ensures that srv is not shutdown before
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// attaching the session to the conn. This ensures that once Shutdown is called,
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// new sessions are not allowed and existing ones are cleaned up.
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// It reports whether ss was attached to the conn.
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func (srv *server) attachSessionToConnIfNotShutdown(ss *sshSession) bool {
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srv.mu.Lock()
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defer srv.mu.Unlock()
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if srv.shutdownCalled {
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// Do not start any new sessions.
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return false
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}
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ss.conn.attachSession(ss)
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return true
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}
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func (srv *server) trackActiveConn(c *conn, add bool) {
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srv.mu.Lock()
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defer srv.mu.Unlock()
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if add {
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mak.Set(&srv.activeConns, c, true)
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return
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}
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delete(srv.activeConns, c)
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}
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// NumActiveConns returns the number of active SSH connections.
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func (srv *server) NumActiveConns() int {
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srv.mu.Lock()
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defer srv.mu.Unlock()
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return len(srv.activeConns)
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}
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// HandleSSHConn handles a Tailscale SSH connection from c.
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// This is the entry point for all SSH connections.
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// When this returns, the connection is closed.
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func (srv *server) HandleSSHConn(nc net.Conn) error {
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metricIncomingConnections.Add(1)
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c, err := srv.newConn()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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srv.trackActiveConn(c, true) // add
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defer srv.trackActiveConn(c, false) // remove
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c.HandleConn(nc)
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// Return nil to signal to netstack's interception that it doesn't need to
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// log. If ss.HandleConn had problems, it can log itself (ideally on an
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// sshSession.logf).
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return nil
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}
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// Shutdown terminates all active sessions.
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func (srv *server) Shutdown() {
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srv.mu.Lock()
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srv.shutdownCalled = true
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for c := range srv.activeConns {
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c.Close()
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}
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srv.mu.Unlock()
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srv.sessionWaitGroup.Wait()
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}
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// OnPolicyChange terminates any active sessions that no longer match
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// the SSH access policy.
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func (srv *server) OnPolicyChange() {
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srv.mu.Lock()
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defer srv.mu.Unlock()
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for c := range srv.activeConns {
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if c.info == nil {
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// c.info is nil when the connection hasn't been authenticated yet.
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// In that case, the connection will be terminated when it is.
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continue
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}
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go c.checkStillValid()
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}
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}
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// conn represents a single SSH connection and its associated
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// ssh.Server.
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//
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// During the lifecycle of a connection, the following are called in order:
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// Setup and discover server info
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// - ServerConfigCallback
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//
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// Get access to a ServerPreAuthConn (useful for sending banners)
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//
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// Do the user auth with a NoClientAuthCallback. If user specified
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// a username ending in "+password", follow this with password auth
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// (to work around buggy SSH clients that don't work with noauth).
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//
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// Once auth is done, the conn can be multiplexed with multiple sessions and
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// channels concurrently. At which point any of the following can be called
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// in any order.
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// - c.handleSessionPostSSHAuth
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// - c.mayForwardLocalPortTo followed by ssh.DirectTCPIPHandler
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type conn struct {
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*ssh.Server
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srv *server
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insecureSkipTailscaleAuth bool // used by tests.
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// idH is the RFC4253 sec8 hash H. It is used to identify the connection,
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// and is shared among all sessions. It should not be shared outside
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// process. It is confusingly referred to as SessionID by the gliderlabs/ssh
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// library.
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idH string
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connID string // ID that's shared with control
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// spac is a [gossh.ServerPreAuthConn] used for sending auth banners.
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// Banners cannot be sent after auth completes.
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spac gossh.ServerPreAuthConn
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action0 *tailcfg.SSHAction // set by clientAuth
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finalAction *tailcfg.SSHAction // set by clientAuth
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info *sshConnInfo // set by setInfo
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localUser *userMeta // set by clientAuth
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userGroupIDs []string // set by clientAuth
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acceptEnv []string
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// mu protects the following fields.
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//
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// srv.mu should be acquired prior to mu.
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// It is safe to just acquire mu, but unsafe to
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// acquire mu and then srv.mu.
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mu sync.Mutex // protects the following
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sessions []*sshSession
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}
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func (c *conn) logf(format string, args ...any) {
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format = fmt.Sprintf("%v: %v", c.connID, format)
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c.srv.logf(format, args...)
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}
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func (c *conn) vlogf(format string, args ...any) {
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if sshVerboseLogging() {
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c.logf(format, args...)
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}
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}
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// errDenied is returned by auth callbacks when a connection is denied by the
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// policy. It writes the message to an auth banner and then returns an empty
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// gossh.PartialSuccessError in order to stop processing authentication
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// attempts and immediately disconnect the client.
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func (c *conn) errDenied(message string) error {
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if message == "" {
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message = "tailscale: access denied"
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}
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if err := c.spac.SendAuthBanner(message); err != nil {
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c.logf("failed to send auth banner: %s", err)
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}
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return errTerminal
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}
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// errBanner writes the given message to an auth banner and then returns an
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// empty gossh.PartialSuccessError in order to stop processing authentication
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// attempts and immediately disconnect the client. The contents of err is not
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// leaked in the auth banner, but it is logged to the server's log.
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func (c *conn) errBanner(message string, err error) error {
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if err != nil {
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c.logf("%s: %s", message, err)
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}
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if err := c.spac.SendAuthBanner("tailscale: " + message + "\n"); err != nil {
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c.logf("failed to send auth banner: %s", err)
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}
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return errTerminal
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}
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// errUnexpected is returned by auth callbacks that encounter an unexpected
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// error, such as being unable to send an auth banner. It sends an empty
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// gossh.PartialSuccessError to tell gossh.Server to stop processing
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// authentication attempts and instead disconnect immediately.
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func (c *conn) errUnexpected(err error) error {
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c.logf("terminal error: %s", err)
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return errTerminal
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}
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// clientAuth is responsible for performing client authentication.
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//
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// If policy evaluation fails, it returns an error.
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// If access is denied, it returns an error. This must always be an empty
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// gossh.PartialSuccessError to prevent further authentication methods from
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// being tried.
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func (c *conn) clientAuth(cm gossh.ConnMetadata) (perms *gossh.Permissions, retErr error) {
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defer func() {
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if pse, ok := retErr.(*gossh.PartialSuccessError); ok {
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if pse.Next.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil ||
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pse.Next.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil ||
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pse.Next.PasswordCallback != nil ||
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pse.Next.PublicKeyCallback != nil {
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panic("clientAuth attempted to return a non-empty PartialSuccessError")
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}
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} else if retErr != nil {
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("clientAuth attempted to return a non-PartialSuccessError error of type: %t", retErr))
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}
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}()
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if c.insecureSkipTailscaleAuth {
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return &gossh.Permissions{}, nil
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}
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if err := c.setInfo(cm); err != nil {
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return nil, c.errBanner("failed to get connection info", err)
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}
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action, localUser, acceptEnv, result := c.evaluatePolicy()
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switch result {
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case accepted:
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// do nothing
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case rejectedUser:
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return nil, c.errBanner(fmt.Sprintf("tailnet policy does not permit you to SSH as user %q", c.info.sshUser), nil)
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case rejected, noPolicy:
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return nil, c.errBanner("tailnet policy does not permit you to SSH to this node", fmt.Errorf("failed to evaluate policy, result: %s", result))
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default:
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return nil, c.errBanner("failed to evaluate tailnet policy", fmt.Errorf("failed to evaluate policy, result: %s", result))
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}
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c.action0 = action
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if action.Accept || action.HoldAndDelegate != "" {
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// Immediately look up user information for purposes of generating
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// hold and delegate URL (if necessary).
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lu, err := userLookup(localUser)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, c.errBanner(fmt.Sprintf("failed to look up local user %q ", localUser), err)
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}
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gids, err := lu.GroupIds()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, c.errBanner("failed to look up local user's group IDs", err)
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}
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c.userGroupIDs = gids
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c.localUser = lu
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c.acceptEnv = acceptEnv
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}
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for {
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switch {
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case action.Accept:
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metricTerminalAccept.Add(1)
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if action.Message != "" {
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if err := c.spac.SendAuthBanner(action.Message); err != nil {
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return nil, c.errUnexpected(fmt.Errorf("error sending auth welcome message: %w", err))
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}
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}
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c.finalAction = action
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return &gossh.Permissions{}, nil
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case action.Reject:
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metricTerminalReject.Add(1)
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c.finalAction = action
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return nil, c.errDenied(action.Message)
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case action.HoldAndDelegate != "":
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if action.Message != "" {
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if err := c.spac.SendAuthBanner(action.Message); err != nil {
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return nil, c.errUnexpected(fmt.Errorf("error sending hold and delegate message: %w", err))
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}
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}
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url := action.HoldAndDelegate
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Minute)
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defer cancel()
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metricHolds.Add(1)
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url = c.expandDelegateURLLocked(url)
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var err error
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action, err = c.fetchSSHAction(ctx, url)
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if err != nil {
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metricTerminalFetchError.Add(1)
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return nil, c.errBanner("failed to fetch next SSH action", fmt.Errorf("fetch failed from %s: %w", url, err))
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}
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default:
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metricTerminalMalformed.Add(1)
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return nil, c.errBanner("reached Action that had neither Accept, Reject, nor HoldAndDelegate", nil)
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}
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}
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}
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// ServerConfig implements ssh.ServerConfigCallback.
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func (c *conn) ServerConfig(ctx ssh.Context) *gossh.ServerConfig {
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return &gossh.ServerConfig{
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PreAuthConnCallback: func(spac gossh.ServerPreAuthConn) {
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c.spac = spac
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},
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NoClientAuth: true, // required for the NoClientAuthCallback to run
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NoClientAuthCallback: func(cm gossh.ConnMetadata) (*gossh.Permissions, error) {
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// First perform client authentication, which can potentially
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// involve multiple steps (for example prompting user to log in to
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// Tailscale admin panel to confirm identity).
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perms, err := c.clientAuth(cm)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// Authentication succeeded. Buggy SSH clients get confused by
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// success from the "none" auth method. As a workaround, let users
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// specify a username ending in "+password" to force password auth.
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// The actual value of the password doesn't matter.
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if strings.HasSuffix(cm.User(), forcePasswordSuffix) {
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return nil, &gossh.PartialSuccessError{
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Next: gossh.ServerAuthCallbacks{
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PasswordCallback: func(_ gossh.ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*gossh.Permissions, error) {
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return &gossh.Permissions{}, nil
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},
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},
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}
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}
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return perms, nil
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},
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PasswordCallback: func(cm gossh.ConnMetadata, pword []byte) (*gossh.Permissions, error) {
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// Some clients don't request 'none' authentication. Instead, they
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// immediately supply a password. We humor them by accepting the
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// password, but authenticate as usual, ignoring the actual value of
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// the password.
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return c.clientAuth(cm)
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},
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PublicKeyCallback: func(cm gossh.ConnMetadata, key gossh.PublicKey) (*gossh.Permissions, error) {
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// Some clients don't request 'none' authentication. Instead, they
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// immediately supply a public key. We humor them by accepting the
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// key, but authenticate as usual, ignoring the actual content of
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// the key.
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return c.clientAuth(cm)
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},
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}
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}
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|
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func (srv *server) newConn() (*conn, error) {
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srv.mu.Lock()
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if srv.shutdownCalled {
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srv.mu.Unlock()
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// Stop accepting new connections.
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// Connections in the auth phase are handled in handleConnPostSSHAuth.
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// Existing sessions are terminated by Shutdown.
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return nil, errors.New("server is shutting down")
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}
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srv.mu.Unlock()
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c := &conn{srv: srv}
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now := srv.now()
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c.connID = fmt.Sprintf("ssh-conn-%s-%02x", now.UTC().Format("20060102T150405"), randBytes(5))
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fwdHandler := &ssh.ForwardedTCPHandler{}
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c.Server = &ssh.Server{
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Version: "Tailscale",
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ServerConfigCallback: c.ServerConfig,
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|
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Handler: c.handleSessionPostSSHAuth,
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LocalPortForwardingCallback: c.mayForwardLocalPortTo,
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ReversePortForwardingCallback: c.mayReversePortForwardTo,
|
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SubsystemHandlers: map[string]ssh.SubsystemHandler{
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"sftp": c.handleSessionPostSSHAuth,
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},
|
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// Note: the direct-tcpip channel handler and LocalPortForwardingCallback
|
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// only adds support for forwarding ports from the local machine.
|
|
// TODO(maisem/bradfitz): add remote port forwarding support.
|
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ChannelHandlers: map[string]ssh.ChannelHandler{
|
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"direct-tcpip": ssh.DirectTCPIPHandler,
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},
|
|
RequestHandlers: map[string]ssh.RequestHandler{
|
|
"tcpip-forward": fwdHandler.HandleSSHRequest,
|
|
"cancel-tcpip-forward": fwdHandler.HandleSSHRequest,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
ss := c.Server
|
|
for k, v := range ssh.DefaultRequestHandlers {
|
|
ss.RequestHandlers[k] = v
|
|
}
|
|
for k, v := range ssh.DefaultChannelHandlers {
|
|
ss.ChannelHandlers[k] = v
|
|
}
|
|
for k, v := range ssh.DefaultSubsystemHandlers {
|
|
ss.SubsystemHandlers[k] = v
|
|
}
|
|
keys, err := srv.lb.GetSSH_HostKeys()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
for _, signer := range keys {
|
|
ss.AddHostKey(signer)
|
|
}
|
|
return c, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mayReversePortPortForwardTo reports whether the ctx should be allowed to port forward
|
|
// to the specified host and port.
|
|
// TODO(bradfitz/maisem): should we have more checks on host/port?
|
|
func (c *conn) mayReversePortForwardTo(ctx ssh.Context, destinationHost string, destinationPort uint32) bool {
|
|
if sshDisableForwarding() {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
if c.finalAction != nil && c.finalAction.AllowRemotePortForwarding {
|
|
metricRemotePortForward.Add(1)
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mayForwardLocalPortTo reports whether the ctx should be allowed to port forward
|
|
// to the specified host and port.
|
|
// TODO(bradfitz/maisem): should we have more checks on host/port?
|
|
func (c *conn) mayForwardLocalPortTo(ctx ssh.Context, destinationHost string, destinationPort uint32) bool {
|
|
if sshDisableForwarding() {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
if c.finalAction != nil && c.finalAction.AllowLocalPortForwarding {
|
|
metricLocalPortForward.Add(1)
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sshPolicy returns the SSHPolicy for current node.
|
|
// If there is no SSHPolicy in the netmap, it returns a debugPolicy
|
|
// if one is defined.
|
|
func (c *conn) sshPolicy() (_ *tailcfg.SSHPolicy, ok bool) {
|
|
lb := c.srv.lb
|
|
if !lb.ShouldRunSSH() {
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
nm := lb.NetMap()
|
|
if nm == nil {
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
if pol := nm.SSHPolicy; pol != nil && !envknob.SSHIgnoreTailnetPolicy() {
|
|
return pol, true
|
|
}
|
|
debugPolicyFile := envknob.SSHPolicyFile()
|
|
if debugPolicyFile != "" {
|
|
c.logf("reading debug SSH policy file: %v", debugPolicyFile)
|
|
f, err := os.ReadFile(debugPolicyFile)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logf("error reading debug SSH policy file: %v", err)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
p := new(tailcfg.SSHPolicy)
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(f, p); err != nil {
|
|
c.logf("invalid JSON in %v: %v", debugPolicyFile, err)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
return p, true
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func toIPPort(a net.Addr) (ipp netip.AddrPort) {
|
|
ta, ok := a.(*net.TCPAddr)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
tanetaddr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ta.IP)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
return netip.AddrPortFrom(tanetaddr.Unmap(), uint16(ta.Port))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// connInfo populates the sshConnInfo from the provided arguments,
|
|
// validating only that they represent a known Tailscale identity.
|
|
func (c *conn) setInfo(cm gossh.ConnMetadata) error {
|
|
if c.info != nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
ci := &sshConnInfo{
|
|
sshUser: strings.TrimSuffix(cm.User(), forcePasswordSuffix),
|
|
src: toIPPort(cm.RemoteAddr()),
|
|
dst: toIPPort(cm.LocalAddr()),
|
|
}
|
|
if !tsaddr.IsTailscaleIP(ci.dst.Addr()) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("tailssh: rejecting non-Tailscale local address %v", ci.dst)
|
|
}
|
|
if !tsaddr.IsTailscaleIP(ci.src.Addr()) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("tailssh: rejecting non-Tailscale remote address %v", ci.src)
|
|
}
|
|
node, uprof, ok := c.srv.lb.WhoIs("tcp", ci.src)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("unknown Tailscale identity from src %v", ci.src)
|
|
}
|
|
ci.node = node
|
|
ci.uprof = uprof
|
|
|
|
c.idH = string(cm.SessionID())
|
|
c.info = ci
|
|
c.logf("handling conn: %v", ci.String())
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type evalResult string
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
noPolicy evalResult = "no policy"
|
|
rejected evalResult = "rejected"
|
|
rejectedUser evalResult = "rejected user"
|
|
accepted evalResult = "accept"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// evaluatePolicy returns the SSHAction and localUser after evaluating
|
|
// the SSHPolicy for this conn.
|
|
func (c *conn) evaluatePolicy() (_ *tailcfg.SSHAction, localUser string, acceptEnv []string, result evalResult) {
|
|
pol, ok := c.sshPolicy()
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, "", nil, noPolicy
|
|
}
|
|
return c.evalSSHPolicy(pol)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleSessionPostSSHAuth runs an SSH session after the SSH-level authentication,
|
|
// but not necessarily before all the Tailscale-level extra verification has
|
|
// completed. It also handles SFTP requests.
|
|
func (c *conn) handleSessionPostSSHAuth(s ssh.Session) {
|
|
// Do this check after auth, but before starting the session.
|
|
switch s.Subsystem() {
|
|
case "sftp":
|
|
if sshDisableSFTP() {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(s.Stderr(), "sftp disabled\r\n")
|
|
s.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
metricSFTP.Add(1)
|
|
case "":
|
|
// Regular SSH session.
|
|
default:
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(s.Stderr(), "Unsupported subsystem %q\r\n", s.Subsystem())
|
|
s.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ss := c.newSSHSession(s)
|
|
ss.logf("handling new SSH connection from %v (%v) to ssh-user %q", c.info.uprof.LoginName, c.info.src.Addr(), c.localUser.Username)
|
|
ss.logf("access granted to %v as ssh-user %q", c.info.uprof.LoginName, c.localUser.Username)
|
|
|
|
if f, ok := hookSSHLoginSuccess.GetOk(); ok {
|
|
f(c.srv.logf, c)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ss.run()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) expandDelegateURLLocked(actionURL string) string {
|
|
nm := c.srv.lb.NetMap()
|
|
ci := c.info
|
|
lu := c.localUser
|
|
var dstNodeID string
|
|
if nm != nil {
|
|
dstNodeID = fmt.Sprint(int64(nm.SelfNode.ID()))
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.NewReplacer(
|
|
"$SRC_NODE_IP", url.QueryEscape(ci.src.Addr().String()),
|
|
"$SRC_NODE_ID", fmt.Sprint(int64(ci.node.ID())),
|
|
"$DST_NODE_IP", url.QueryEscape(ci.dst.Addr().String()),
|
|
"$DST_NODE_ID", dstNodeID,
|
|
"$SSH_USER", url.QueryEscape(ci.sshUser),
|
|
"$LOCAL_USER", url.QueryEscape(lu.Username),
|
|
).Replace(actionURL)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sshSession is an accepted Tailscale SSH session.
|
|
type sshSession struct {
|
|
ssh.Session
|
|
sharedID string // ID that's shared with control
|
|
logf logger.Logf
|
|
|
|
ctx context.Context
|
|
cancelCtx context.CancelCauseFunc
|
|
conn *conn
|
|
agentListener net.Listener // non-nil if agent-forwarding requested+allowed
|
|
|
|
// initialized by launchProcess:
|
|
cmd *exec.Cmd
|
|
wrStdin io.WriteCloser
|
|
rdStdout io.ReadCloser
|
|
rdStderr io.ReadCloser // rdStderr is nil for pty sessions
|
|
ptyReq *ssh.Pty // non-nil for pty sessions
|
|
|
|
// childPipes is a list of pipes that need to be closed when the process exits.
|
|
// For pty sessions, this is the tty fd.
|
|
// For non-pty sessions, this is the stdin, stdout, stderr fds.
|
|
childPipes []io.Closer
|
|
|
|
// We use this sync.Once to ensure that we only terminate the process once,
|
|
// either it exits itself or is terminated
|
|
exitOnce sync.Once
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) vlogf(format string, args ...any) {
|
|
if sshVerboseLogging() {
|
|
ss.logf(format, args...)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) newSSHSession(s ssh.Session) *sshSession {
|
|
sharedID := fmt.Sprintf("sess-%s-%02x", c.srv.now().UTC().Format("20060102T150405"), randBytes(5))
|
|
c.logf("starting session: %v", sharedID)
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancelCause(s.Context())
|
|
return &sshSession{
|
|
Session: s,
|
|
sharedID: sharedID,
|
|
ctx: ctx,
|
|
cancelCtx: cancel,
|
|
conn: c,
|
|
logf: logger.WithPrefix(c.srv.logf, "ssh-session("+sharedID+"): "),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isStillValid reports whether the conn is still valid.
|
|
func (c *conn) isStillValid() bool {
|
|
a, localUser, _, result := c.evaluatePolicy()
|
|
c.vlogf("stillValid: %+v %v %v", a, localUser, result)
|
|
if result != accepted {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
if !a.Accept && a.HoldAndDelegate == "" {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return c.localUser.Username == localUser
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkStillValid checks that the conn is still valid per the latest SSHPolicy.
|
|
// If not, it terminates all sessions associated with the conn.
|
|
func (c *conn) checkStillValid() {
|
|
if c.isStillValid() {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
metricPolicyChangeKick.Add(1)
|
|
c.logf("session no longer valid per new SSH policy; closing")
|
|
c.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer c.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for _, s := range c.sessions {
|
|
s.cancelCtx(userVisibleError{
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("Access revoked.\r\n"),
|
|
context.Canceled,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) fetchSSHAction(ctx context.Context, url string) (*tailcfg.SSHAction, error) {
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Minute)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
bo := backoff.NewBackoff("fetch-ssh-action", c.logf, 10*time.Second)
|
|
for {
|
|
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
res, err := c.srv.lb.DoNoiseRequest(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
bo.BackOff(ctx, err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if res.StatusCode != 200 {
|
|
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
|
|
res.Body.Close()
|
|
if len(body) > 1<<10 {
|
|
body = body[:1<<10]
|
|
}
|
|
c.logf("fetch of %v: %s, %s", url, res.Status, body)
|
|
bo.BackOff(ctx, fmt.Errorf("unexpected status: %v", res.Status))
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
a := new(tailcfg.SSHAction)
|
|
err = json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(a)
|
|
res.Body.Close()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logf("invalid next SSHAction JSON from %v: %v", url, err)
|
|
bo.BackOff(ctx, err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
return a, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// killProcessOnContextDone waits for ss.ctx to be done and kills the process,
|
|
// unless the process has already exited.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) killProcessOnContextDone() {
|
|
<-ss.ctx.Done()
|
|
// Either the process has already exited, in which case this does nothing.
|
|
// Or, the process is still running in which case this will kill it.
|
|
ss.exitOnce.Do(func() {
|
|
err := context.Cause(ss.ctx)
|
|
if serr, ok := err.(SSHTerminationError); ok {
|
|
msg := serr.SSHTerminationMessage()
|
|
if msg != "" {
|
|
io.WriteString(ss.Stderr(), "\r\n\r\n"+msg+"\r\n\r\n")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("terminating SSH session from %v: %v", ss.conn.info.src.Addr(), err)
|
|
// We don't need to Process.Wait here, sshSession.run() does
|
|
// the waiting regardless of termination reason.
|
|
|
|
// TODO(maisem): should this be a SIGTERM followed by a SIGKILL?
|
|
ss.cmd.Process.Kill()
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// attachSession registers ss as an active session.
|
|
func (c *conn) attachSession(ss *sshSession) {
|
|
c.srv.sessionWaitGroup.Add(1)
|
|
if ss.sharedID == "" {
|
|
panic("empty sharedID")
|
|
}
|
|
c.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer c.mu.Unlock()
|
|
c.sessions = append(c.sessions, ss)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// detachSession unregisters s from the list of active sessions.
|
|
func (c *conn) detachSession(ss *sshSession) {
|
|
defer c.srv.sessionWaitGroup.Done()
|
|
c.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer c.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for i, s := range c.sessions {
|
|
if s == ss {
|
|
c.sessions = append(c.sessions[:i], c.sessions[i+1:]...)
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var errSessionDone = errors.New("session is done")
|
|
|
|
// handleSSHAgentForwarding starts a Unix socket listener and in the background
|
|
// forwards agent connections between the listener and the ssh.Session.
|
|
// On success, it assigns ss.agentListener.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) handleSSHAgentForwarding(s ssh.Session, lu *userMeta) error {
|
|
if !ssh.AgentRequested(ss) || !ss.conn.finalAction.AllowAgentForwarding {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
if sshDisableForwarding() {
|
|
// TODO(bradfitz): or do we want to return an error here instead so the user
|
|
// gets an error if they ran with ssh -A? But for now we just silently
|
|
// don't work, like the condition above.
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("ssh: agent forwarding requested")
|
|
ln, err := ssh.NewAgentListener()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if err != nil && ln != nil {
|
|
ln.Close()
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
uid, err := strconv.ParseUint(lu.Uid, 10, 32)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
gid, err := strconv.ParseUint(lu.Gid, 10, 32)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
socket := ln.Addr().String()
|
|
dir := filepath.Dir(socket)
|
|
// Make sure the socket is accessible only by the user.
|
|
if err := os.Chmod(socket, 0600); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := os.Chown(socket, int(uid), int(gid)); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
// Make sure the dir is also accessible.
|
|
if err := os.Chmod(dir, 0755); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
go ssh.ForwardAgentConnections(ln, s)
|
|
ss.agentListener = ln
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// run is the entrypoint for a newly accepted SSH session.
|
|
//
|
|
// It handles ss once it's been accepted and determined
|
|
// that it should run.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) run() {
|
|
metricActiveSessions.Add(1)
|
|
defer metricActiveSessions.Add(-1)
|
|
defer ss.cancelCtx(errSessionDone)
|
|
|
|
if attached := ss.conn.srv.attachSessionToConnIfNotShutdown(ss); !attached {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(ss, "Tailscale SSH is shutting down\r\n")
|
|
ss.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer ss.conn.detachSession(ss)
|
|
|
|
lu := ss.conn.localUser
|
|
logf := ss.logf
|
|
|
|
if ss.conn.finalAction.SessionDuration != 0 {
|
|
t := time.AfterFunc(ss.conn.finalAction.SessionDuration, func() {
|
|
ss.cancelCtx(userVisibleError{
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("Session timeout of %v elapsed.", ss.conn.finalAction.SessionDuration),
|
|
context.DeadlineExceeded,
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
defer t.Stop()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if euid := os.Geteuid(); euid != 0 && runtime.GOOS != "plan9" {
|
|
if lu.Uid != fmt.Sprint(euid) {
|
|
ss.logf("can't switch to user %q from process euid %v", lu.Username, euid)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(ss, "can't switch user\r\n")
|
|
ss.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Take control of the PTY so that we can configure it below.
|
|
// See https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/4146
|
|
ss.DisablePTYEmulation()
|
|
|
|
var rec *recording // or nil if disabled
|
|
if ss.Subsystem() != "sftp" {
|
|
if err := ss.handleSSHAgentForwarding(ss, lu); err != nil {
|
|
ss.logf("agent forwarding failed: %v", err)
|
|
} else if ss.agentListener != nil {
|
|
// TODO(maisem/bradfitz): add a way to close all session resources
|
|
defer ss.agentListener.Close()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ss.shouldRecord() {
|
|
var err error
|
|
rec, err = ss.startNewRecording()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
var uve userVisibleError
|
|
if errors.As(err, &uve) {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(ss, "%s\r\n", uve.SSHTerminationMessage())
|
|
} else {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(ss, "can't start new recording\r\n")
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("startNewRecording: %v", err)
|
|
ss.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("startNewRecording: <nil>")
|
|
if rec != nil {
|
|
defer rec.Close()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err := ss.launchProcess()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
logf("start failed: %v", err.Error())
|
|
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
|
|
err := context.Cause(ss.ctx)
|
|
var uve userVisibleError
|
|
if errors.As(err, &uve) {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(ss, "%s\r\n", uve)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ss.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
go ss.killProcessOnContextDone()
|
|
|
|
var processDone atomic.Bool
|
|
go func() {
|
|
defer ss.wrStdin.Close()
|
|
if _, err := io.Copy(rec.writer("i", ss.wrStdin), ss); err != nil {
|
|
logf("stdin copy: %v", err)
|
|
ss.cancelCtx(err)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
outputDone := make(chan struct{})
|
|
var openOutputStreams atomic.Int32
|
|
if ss.rdStderr != nil {
|
|
openOutputStreams.Store(2)
|
|
} else {
|
|
openOutputStreams.Store(1)
|
|
}
|
|
go func() {
|
|
defer ss.rdStdout.Close()
|
|
_, err := io.Copy(rec.writer("o", ss), ss.rdStdout)
|
|
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
|
|
isErrBecauseProcessExited := processDone.Load() && errors.Is(err, syscall.EIO)
|
|
if !isErrBecauseProcessExited {
|
|
logf("stdout copy: %v", err)
|
|
ss.cancelCtx(err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if openOutputStreams.Add(-1) == 0 {
|
|
ss.CloseWrite()
|
|
close(outputDone)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
// rdStderr is nil for ptys.
|
|
if ss.rdStderr != nil {
|
|
go func() {
|
|
defer ss.rdStderr.Close()
|
|
_, err := io.Copy(ss.Stderr(), ss.rdStderr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
logf("stderr copy: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if openOutputStreams.Add(-1) == 0 {
|
|
ss.CloseWrite()
|
|
close(outputDone)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = ss.cmd.Wait()
|
|
processDone.Store(true)
|
|
|
|
// This will either make the SSH Termination goroutine be a no-op,
|
|
// or itself will be a no-op because the process was killed by the
|
|
// aforementioned goroutine.
|
|
ss.exitOnce.Do(func() {})
|
|
|
|
// Close the process-side of all pipes to signal the asynchronous
|
|
// io.Copy routines reading/writing from the pipes to terminate.
|
|
// Block for the io.Copy to finish before calling ss.Exit below.
|
|
closeAll(ss.childPipes...)
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-outputDone:
|
|
case <-ss.ctx.Done():
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
ss.logf("Session complete")
|
|
ss.Exit(0)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if ee, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok {
|
|
code := ee.ProcessState.ExitCode()
|
|
ss.logf("Wait: code=%v", code)
|
|
ss.Exit(code)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ss.logf("Wait: %v", err)
|
|
ss.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// recordSSHToLocalDisk is a deprecated dev knob to allow recording SSH sessions
|
|
// to local storage. It is only used if there is no recording configured by the
|
|
// coordination server. This will be removed in the future.
|
|
var recordSSHToLocalDisk = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_DEBUG_LOG_SSH")
|
|
|
|
// recorders returns the list of recorders to use for this session.
|
|
// If the final action has a non-empty list of recorders, that list is
|
|
// returned. Otherwise, the list of recorders from the initial action
|
|
// is returned.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) recorders() ([]netip.AddrPort, *tailcfg.SSHRecorderFailureAction) {
|
|
if len(ss.conn.finalAction.Recorders) > 0 {
|
|
return ss.conn.finalAction.Recorders, ss.conn.finalAction.OnRecordingFailure
|
|
}
|
|
return ss.conn.action0.Recorders, ss.conn.action0.OnRecordingFailure
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) shouldRecord() bool {
|
|
recs, _ := ss.recorders()
|
|
return len(recs) > 0 || recordSSHToLocalDisk()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type sshConnInfo struct {
|
|
// sshUser is the requested local SSH username ("root", "alice", etc).
|
|
sshUser string
|
|
|
|
// src is the Tailscale IP and port that the connection came from.
|
|
src netip.AddrPort
|
|
|
|
// dst is the Tailscale IP and port that the connection came for.
|
|
dst netip.AddrPort
|
|
|
|
// node is srcIP's node.
|
|
node tailcfg.NodeView
|
|
|
|
// uprof is node's UserProfile.
|
|
uprof tailcfg.UserProfile
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ci *sshConnInfo) String() string {
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("%v->%v@%v", ci.src, ci.sshUser, ci.dst)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) ruleExpired(r *tailcfg.SSHRule) bool {
|
|
if r.RuleExpires == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return r.RuleExpires.Before(c.srv.now())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) evalSSHPolicy(pol *tailcfg.SSHPolicy) (a *tailcfg.SSHAction, localUser string, acceptEnv []string, result evalResult) {
|
|
failedOnUser := false
|
|
for _, r := range pol.Rules {
|
|
if a, localUser, acceptEnv, err := c.matchRule(r); err == nil {
|
|
return a, localUser, acceptEnv, accepted
|
|
} else if errors.Is(err, errUserMatch) {
|
|
failedOnUser = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
result = rejected
|
|
if failedOnUser {
|
|
result = rejectedUser
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, "", nil, result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// internal errors for testing; they don't escape to callers or logs.
|
|
var (
|
|
errNilRule = errors.New("nil rule")
|
|
errNilAction = errors.New("nil action")
|
|
errRuleExpired = errors.New("rule expired")
|
|
errPrincipalMatch = errors.New("principal didn't match")
|
|
errUserMatch = errors.New("user didn't match")
|
|
errInvalidConn = errors.New("invalid connection state")
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) matchRule(r *tailcfg.SSHRule) (a *tailcfg.SSHAction, localUser string, acceptEnv []string, err error) {
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
c.vlogf("matchRule(%+v): %v", r, err)
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
if c == nil {
|
|
return nil, "", nil, errInvalidConn
|
|
}
|
|
if c.info == nil {
|
|
c.logf("invalid connection state")
|
|
return nil, "", nil, errInvalidConn
|
|
}
|
|
if r == nil {
|
|
return nil, "", nil, errNilRule
|
|
}
|
|
if r.Action == nil {
|
|
return nil, "", nil, errNilAction
|
|
}
|
|
if c.ruleExpired(r) {
|
|
return nil, "", nil, errRuleExpired
|
|
}
|
|
if !c.anyPrincipalMatches(r.Principals) {
|
|
return nil, "", nil, errPrincipalMatch
|
|
}
|
|
if !r.Action.Reject {
|
|
// For all but Reject rules, SSHUsers is required.
|
|
// If SSHUsers is nil or empty, mapLocalUser will return an
|
|
// empty string anyway.
|
|
localUser = mapLocalUser(r.SSHUsers, c.info.sshUser)
|
|
if localUser == "" {
|
|
return nil, "", nil, errUserMatch
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return r.Action, localUser, r.AcceptEnv, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func mapLocalUser(ruleSSHUsers map[string]string, reqSSHUser string) (localUser string) {
|
|
v, ok := ruleSSHUsers[reqSSHUser]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
v = ruleSSHUsers["*"]
|
|
}
|
|
if v == "=" {
|
|
return reqSSHUser
|
|
}
|
|
return v
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) anyPrincipalMatches(ps []*tailcfg.SSHPrincipal) bool {
|
|
for _, p := range ps {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if c.principalMatchesTailscaleIdentity(p) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// principalMatchesTailscaleIdentity reports whether one of p's four fields
|
|
// that match the Tailscale identity match (Node, NodeIP, UserLogin, Any).
|
|
func (c *conn) principalMatchesTailscaleIdentity(p *tailcfg.SSHPrincipal) bool {
|
|
ci := c.info
|
|
if p.Any {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if !p.Node.IsZero() && ci.node.Valid() && p.Node == ci.node.StableID() {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if p.NodeIP != "" {
|
|
if ip, _ := netip.ParseAddr(p.NodeIP); ip == ci.src.Addr() {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if p.UserLogin != "" && ci.uprof.LoginName == p.UserLogin {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func randBytes(n int) []byte {
|
|
b := make([]byte, n)
|
|
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
|
|
panic(err)
|
|
}
|
|
return b
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) openFileForRecording(now time.Time) (_ io.WriteCloser, err error) {
|
|
varRoot := ss.conn.srv.lb.TailscaleVarRoot()
|
|
if varRoot == "" {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("no var root for recording storage")
|
|
}
|
|
dir := filepath.Join(varRoot, "ssh-sessions")
|
|
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
f, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, fmt.Sprintf("ssh-session-%v-*.cast", now.UnixNano()))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return f, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// startNewRecording starts a new SSH session recording.
|
|
// It may return a nil recording if recording is not available.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) startNewRecording() (_ *recording, err error) {
|
|
// We store the node key as soon as possible when creating
|
|
// a new recording incase of FUS.
|
|
nodeKey := ss.conn.srv.lb.NodeKey()
|
|
if nodeKey.IsZero() {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("ssh server is unavailable: no node key")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
recorders, onFailure := ss.recorders()
|
|
var localRecording bool
|
|
if len(recorders) == 0 {
|
|
if recordSSHToLocalDisk() {
|
|
localRecording = true
|
|
} else {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("no recorders configured")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var w ssh.Window
|
|
if ptyReq, _, isPtyReq := ss.Pty(); isPtyReq {
|
|
w = ptyReq.Window
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
term := envValFromList(ss.Environ(), "TERM")
|
|
if term == "" {
|
|
term = "xterm-256color" // something non-empty
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
rec := &recording{
|
|
ss: ss,
|
|
start: now,
|
|
failOpen: onFailure == nil || onFailure.TerminateSessionWithMessage == "",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We want to use a background context for uploading and not ss.ctx.
|
|
// ss.ctx is closed when the session closes, but we don't want to break the upload at that time.
|
|
// Instead we want to wait for the session to close the writer when it finishes.
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
if localRecording {
|
|
rec.out, err = ss.openFileForRecording(now)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
var errChan <-chan error
|
|
var attempts []*tailcfg.SSHRecordingAttempt
|
|
rec.out, attempts, errChan, err = sessionrecording.ConnectToRecorder(ctx, recorders, ss.conn.srv.lb.Dialer().UserDial)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if onFailure != nil && onFailure.NotifyURL != "" && len(attempts) > 0 {
|
|
eventType := tailcfg.SSHSessionRecordingFailed
|
|
if onFailure.RejectSessionWithMessage != "" {
|
|
eventType = tailcfg.SSHSessionRecordingRejected
|
|
}
|
|
ss.notifyControl(ctx, nodeKey, eventType, attempts, onFailure.NotifyURL)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if onFailure != nil && onFailure.RejectSessionWithMessage != "" {
|
|
ss.logf("recording: error starting recording (rejecting session): %v", err)
|
|
return nil, userVisibleError{
|
|
error: err,
|
|
msg: onFailure.RejectSessionWithMessage,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("recording: error starting recording (failing open): %v", err)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
go func() {
|
|
err := <-errChan
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-ss.ctx.Done():
|
|
// Success.
|
|
ss.logf("recording: finished uploading recording")
|
|
return
|
|
default:
|
|
err = errors.New("recording upload ended before the SSH session")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if onFailure != nil && onFailure.NotifyURL != "" && len(attempts) > 0 {
|
|
lastAttempt := attempts[len(attempts)-1]
|
|
lastAttempt.FailureMessage = err.Error()
|
|
|
|
eventType := tailcfg.SSHSessionRecordingFailed
|
|
if onFailure.TerminateSessionWithMessage != "" {
|
|
eventType = tailcfg.SSHSessionRecordingTerminated
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ss.notifyControl(ctx, nodeKey, eventType, attempts, onFailure.NotifyURL)
|
|
}
|
|
if onFailure != nil && onFailure.TerminateSessionWithMessage != "" {
|
|
ss.logf("recording: error uploading recording (closing session): %v", err)
|
|
ss.cancelCtx(userVisibleError{
|
|
error: err,
|
|
msg: onFailure.TerminateSessionWithMessage,
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("recording: error uploading recording (failing open): %v", err)
|
|
}()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch := sessionrecording.CastHeader{
|
|
Version: 2,
|
|
Width: w.Width,
|
|
Height: w.Height,
|
|
Timestamp: now.Unix(),
|
|
Command: strings.Join(ss.Command(), " "),
|
|
Env: map[string]string{
|
|
"TERM": term,
|
|
// TODO(bradfitz): anything else important?
|
|
// including all seems noisey, but maybe we should
|
|
// for auditing. But first need to break
|
|
// launchProcess's startWithStdPipes and
|
|
// startWithPTY up so that they first return the cmd
|
|
// without starting it, and then a step that starts
|
|
// it. Then we can (1) make the cmd, (2) start the
|
|
// recording, (3) start the process.
|
|
},
|
|
SSHUser: ss.conn.info.sshUser,
|
|
LocalUser: ss.conn.localUser.Username,
|
|
SrcNode: strings.TrimSuffix(ss.conn.info.node.Name(), "."),
|
|
SrcNodeID: ss.conn.info.node.StableID(),
|
|
ConnectionID: ss.conn.connID,
|
|
}
|
|
if !ss.conn.info.node.IsTagged() {
|
|
ch.SrcNodeUser = ss.conn.info.uprof.LoginName
|
|
ch.SrcNodeUserID = ss.conn.info.node.User()
|
|
} else {
|
|
ch.SrcNodeTags = ss.conn.info.node.Tags().AsSlice()
|
|
}
|
|
j, err := json.Marshal(ch)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
j = append(j, '\n')
|
|
if _, err := rec.out.Write(j); err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, io.ErrClosedPipe) && ss.ctx.Err() != nil {
|
|
// If we got an io.ErrClosedPipe, it's likely because
|
|
// the recording server closed the connection on us. Return
|
|
// the original context error instead.
|
|
return nil, context.Cause(ss.ctx)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return rec, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// notifyControl sends a SSHEventNotifyRequest to control over noise.
|
|
// A SSHEventNotifyRequest is sent when an action or state reached during
|
|
// an SSH session is a defined EventType.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) notifyControl(ctx context.Context, nodeKey key.NodePublic, notifyType tailcfg.SSHEventType, attempts []*tailcfg.SSHRecordingAttempt, url string) {
|
|
re := tailcfg.SSHEventNotifyRequest{
|
|
EventType: notifyType,
|
|
ConnectionID: ss.conn.connID,
|
|
CapVersion: tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion,
|
|
NodeKey: nodeKey,
|
|
SrcNode: ss.conn.info.node.ID(),
|
|
SSHUser: ss.conn.info.sshUser,
|
|
LocalUser: ss.conn.localUser.Username,
|
|
RecordingAttempts: attempts,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
body, err := json.Marshal(re)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ss.logf("notifyControl: unable to marshal SSHNotifyRequest:", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, httpm.POST, url, bytes.NewReader(body))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ss.logf("notifyControl: unable to create request:", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resp, err := ss.conn.srv.lb.DoNoiseRequest(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ss.logf("notifyControl: unable to send noise request:", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
ss.logf("notifyControl: noise request returned status code %v", resp.StatusCode)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// recording is the state for an SSH session recording.
|
|
type recording struct {
|
|
ss *sshSession
|
|
start time.Time
|
|
|
|
// failOpen specifies whether the session should be allowed to
|
|
// continue if writing to the recording fails.
|
|
failOpen bool
|
|
|
|
mu sync.Mutex // guards writes to, close of out
|
|
out io.WriteCloser
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (r *recording) Close() error {
|
|
r.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if r.out == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
err := r.out.Close()
|
|
r.out = nil
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// writer returns an io.Writer around w that first records the write.
|
|
//
|
|
// The dir should be "i" for input or "o" for output.
|
|
//
|
|
// If r is nil, it returns w unchanged.
|
|
//
|
|
// Currently (2023-03-21) we only record output, not input.
|
|
func (r *recording) writer(dir string, w io.Writer) io.Writer {
|
|
if r == nil {
|
|
return w
|
|
}
|
|
if dir == "i" {
|
|
// TODO: record input? Maybe not, since it might contain
|
|
// passwords.
|
|
return w
|
|
}
|
|
return &loggingWriter{r: r, dir: dir, w: w}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// loggingWriter is an io.Writer wrapper that writes first an
|
|
// asciinema JSON cast format recording line, and then writes to w.
|
|
type loggingWriter struct {
|
|
r *recording
|
|
dir string // "i" or "o" (input or output)
|
|
w io.Writer // underlying Writer, after writing to r.out
|
|
|
|
// recordingFailedOpen specifies whether we've failed to write to
|
|
// r.out and should stop trying. It is set to true if we fail to write
|
|
// to r.out and r.failOpen is set.
|
|
recordingFailedOpen bool
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (w *loggingWriter) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
|
|
if !w.recordingFailedOpen {
|
|
j, err := json.Marshal([]any{
|
|
time.Since(w.r.start).Seconds(),
|
|
w.dir,
|
|
string(p),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return 0, err
|
|
}
|
|
j = append(j, '\n')
|
|
if err := w.writeCastLine(j); err != nil {
|
|
if !w.r.failOpen {
|
|
return 0, err
|
|
}
|
|
w.recordingFailedOpen = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return w.w.Write(p)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (w loggingWriter) writeCastLine(j []byte) error {
|
|
w.r.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer w.r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if w.r.out == nil {
|
|
return errors.New("logger closed")
|
|
}
|
|
_, err := w.r.out.Write(j)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("logger Write: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func envValFromList(env []string, wantKey string) (v string) {
|
|
for _, kv := range env {
|
|
if thisKey, v, ok := strings.Cut(kv, "="); ok && envEq(thisKey, wantKey) {
|
|
return v
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// envEq reports whether environment variable a == b for the current
|
|
// operating system.
|
|
func envEq(a, b string) bool {
|
|
//lint:ignore SA4032 in case this func moves elsewhere, permit the GOOS check
|
|
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
|
|
return strings.EqualFold(a, b)
|
|
}
|
|
return a == b
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
metricActiveSessions = clientmetric.NewGauge("ssh_active_sessions")
|
|
metricIncomingConnections = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_incoming_connections")
|
|
metricTerminalAccept = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_accept")
|
|
metricTerminalReject = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_reject")
|
|
metricTerminalMalformed = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_malformed")
|
|
metricTerminalFetchError = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_fetch_error")
|
|
metricHolds = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_holds")
|
|
metricPolicyChangeKick = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_policy_change_kick")
|
|
metricSFTP = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_sftp_sessions")
|
|
metricLocalPortForward = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_local_port_forward_requests")
|
|
metricRemotePortForward = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_remote_port_forward_requests")
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// userVisibleError is a wrapper around an error that implements
|
|
// SSHTerminationError, so msg is written to their session.
|
|
type userVisibleError struct {
|
|
msg string
|
|
error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ue userVisibleError) SSHTerminationMessage() string { return ue.msg }
|
|
|
|
// SSHTerminationError is implemented by errors that terminate an SSH
|
|
// session and should be written to user's sessions.
|
|
type SSHTerminationError interface {
|
|
error
|
|
SSHTerminationMessage() string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func closeAll(cs ...io.Closer) {
|
|
for _, c := range cs {
|
|
if c != nil {
|
|
c.Close()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|