Files
tailscale/cmd/derper/ipcert_test.go
Brad Fitzpatrick 5384d23690 cmd/derper: add opt-in support for LetsEncrypt IP address certificates
LetsEncrypt made certificates for bare IP addresses generally
available in January 2026. They require the short-lived ACME
certificate profile and are valid for about six days.

Add a new --acme-ip-certs flag. When set (with the default
--certmode=letsencrypt), connections that arrive by IP address (no
TLS SNI, or an IP address SNI matching the connection's destination
address) get a LetsEncrypt cert for that IP, obtained on demand using
the "shortlived" profile and the HTTP-01 challenge served on derper's
plaintext HTTP port. Because the certificate is requested for
whatever address the connection actually arrived on, it works for
both IPv4 and IPv6 with no per-address configuration, and a client
can never make us request a certificate for an address that isn't
ours. Connections with a DNS name in the SNI keep using the regular
autocert manager for --hostname.

autocert can't do any of this itself, as it neither orders IP address
identifiers nor serves connections without SNI, so this adds a small
dedicated cert manager using tailscale.com/tempfork/acme instead.

Clients can then connect to https://<IP> without the DERPMap CertName
pinning that self-signed certs from --certmode=manual require.

Updates tailscale/corp#45167
Updates #11776

Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
Change-Id: I8e2d5b0a7c4f9e1b3d6a8c2f5e0b9d4a7c1f3e6d
2026-07-22 12:33:42 -07:00

487 lines
15 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
package main
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
// fakeIPACME is a minimal fake ACME (RFC 8555) certificate authority
// for testing ipCertManager. It implements just enough of the protocol
// for http-01 order flows with IP address identifiers and the
// "shortlived" profile: one order at a time, no JWS signature
// verification, no nonce tracking.
type fakeIPACME struct {
t *testing.T
srv *httptest.Server
challengeBase string // base URL at which http-01 challenges are fetched
caKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey
caCert *x509.Certificate
mu sync.Mutex
orders int // number of orders created
gotProfile string // profile of the last order
gotIDType string // identifier type of the last order
gotIDValue string // identifier value of the last order
authzStatus string // "pending" or "valid"
orderStatus string // "pending", "ready", or "valid"
token string
certPEM []byte
}
func newFakeIPACME(t *testing.T) *fakeIPACME {
caKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
caTmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "fake IP ACME root"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour),
IsCA: true,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
}
caDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTmpl, caTmpl, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
caCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(caDER)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f := &fakeIPACME{
t: t,
caKey: caKey,
caCert: caCert,
}
f.srv = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(f.serveHTTP))
t.Cleanup(f.srv.Close)
return f
}
func (f *fakeIPACME) directoryURL() string { return f.srv.URL + "/directory" }
func (f *fakeIPACME) numOrders() int {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return f.orders
}
func (f *fakeIPACME) serveHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "test-nonce")
writeJSON := func(v any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}
orderJSON := func() any {
return map[string]any{
"status": f.orderStatus,
"identifiers": []map[string]string{{"type": f.gotIDType, "value": f.gotIDValue}},
"authorizations": []string{f.srv.URL + "/authz/1"},
"finalize": f.srv.URL + "/finalize/1",
"certificate": f.srv.URL + "/cert/1",
}
}
switch {
case r.URL.Path == "/directory":
writeJSON(map[string]any{
"newNonce": f.srv.URL + "/new-nonce",
"newAccount": f.srv.URL + "/new-account",
"newOrder": f.srv.URL + "/new-order",
"revokeCert": f.srv.URL + "/revoke-cert",
"keyChange": f.srv.URL + "/key-change",
"meta": map[string]any{
"profiles": map[string]string{
"classic": "the default profile",
shortlivedProfile: "six day certificates",
},
},
})
case r.URL.Path == "/new-nonce":
// The Replay-Nonce header was already set above.
case r.URL.Path == "/new-account":
w.Header().Set("Location", f.srv.URL+"/account/1")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
writeJSON(map[string]any{"status": "valid"})
case r.URL.Path == "/new-order":
var req struct {
Identifiers []struct{ Type, Value string } `json:"identifiers"`
Profile string `json:"profile"`
}
if err := decodeJWSPayload(r, &req); err != nil {
f.t.Errorf("new-order payload: %v", err)
}
f.mu.Lock()
f.orders++
f.gotProfile = req.Profile
if len(req.Identifiers) == 1 {
f.gotIDType = req.Identifiers[0].Type
f.gotIDValue = req.Identifiers[0].Value
}
f.authzStatus = "pending"
f.orderStatus = "pending"
f.token = fmt.Sprintf("tok-%d", f.orders)
f.mu.Unlock()
w.Header().Set("Location", f.srv.URL+"/order/1")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
writeJSON(orderJSON())
case r.URL.Path == "/authz/1":
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
writeJSON(map[string]any{
"status": f.authzStatus,
"identifier": map[string]string{"type": f.gotIDType, "value": f.gotIDValue},
"challenges": []map[string]string{{
"type": "http-01",
"url": f.srv.URL + "/chal/1",
"token": f.token,
"status": f.authzStatus,
}},
})
case r.URL.Path == "/chal/1":
if err := f.validateChallenge(); err != nil {
f.t.Errorf("challenge validation: %v", err)
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
f.mu.Lock()
f.authzStatus = "valid"
f.orderStatus = "ready"
f.mu.Unlock()
writeJSON(map[string]any{"type": "http-01", "status": "valid", "token": f.token})
case r.URL.Path == "/order/1":
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
w.Header().Set("Location", f.srv.URL+"/order/1")
writeJSON(orderJSON())
case r.URL.Path == "/finalize/1":
var req struct {
CSR string `json:"csr"`
}
if err := decodeJWSPayload(r, &req); err != nil {
f.t.Errorf("finalize payload: %v", err)
}
if err := f.issueCert(req.CSR); err != nil {
f.t.Errorf("issuing cert: %v", err)
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
f.mu.Lock()
f.orderStatus = "valid"
f.mu.Unlock()
w.Header().Set("Location", f.srv.URL+"/order/1")
writeJSON(orderJSON())
case r.URL.Path == "/cert/1":
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pem-certificate-chain")
w.Write(f.certPEM)
default:
f.t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}
// validateChallenge fetches the http-01 challenge response from the
// server under test, standing in for the CA dialing port 80 at the IP
// address being validated.
func (f *fakeIPACME) validateChallenge() error {
f.mu.Lock()
token := f.token
base := f.challengeBase
f.mu.Unlock()
res, err := http.Get(base + "/.well-known/acme-challenge/" + token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return fmt.Errorf("status %d", res.StatusCode)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(string(body), token+".") {
return fmt.Errorf("challenge response %q does not start with %q", body, token+".")
}
return nil
}
// issueCert signs a certificate for the CSR (base64url DER), valid for
// six days like a LetsEncrypt shortlived profile certificate.
func (f *fakeIPACME) issueCert(csrB64 string) error {
csrDER, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(csrB64)
if err != nil {
return err
}
csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(csrDER)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if len(csr.IPAddresses) != 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("CSR has %d IP addresses; want 1", len(csr.IPAddresses))
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(2),
IPAddresses: csr.IPAddresses,
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(6 * 24 * time.Hour),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, f.caCert, csr.PublicKey, f.caKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var buf []byte
buf = append(buf, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der})...)
buf = append(buf, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: f.caCert.Raw})...)
f.mu.Lock()
f.certPEM = buf
f.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
// decodeJWSPayload decodes the payload of a JWS-encoded ACME request
// without verifying its signature.
func decodeJWSPayload(r *http.Request, v any) error {
var req struct{ Payload string }
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
return err
}
b, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(req.Payload)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return json.Unmarshal(b, v)
}
// ipConn is a stub net.Conn whose LocalAddr is the given IP, standing
// in for the accepted TLS connection whose destination address decides
// which certificate to serve.
type ipConn struct {
net.Conn
local net.Addr
}
func (c ipConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { return c.local }
// helloFor returns a ClientHelloInfo as ipCertManager.getCertificate
// would see it for a connection to localIP with the given SNI value.
func helloFor(t *testing.T, localIP, sni string) *tls.ClientHelloInfo {
t.Helper()
ip := net.ParseIP(localIP)
if ip == nil {
t.Fatalf("bad IP %q", localIP)
}
return &tls.ClientHelloInfo{
ServerName: sni,
Conn: ipConn{local: &net.TCPAddr{IP: ip, Port: 443}},
}
}
// stubCertProvider is a certProvider returning a fixed certificate,
// standing in for the autocert manager handling DNS hostname
// connections.
type stubCertProvider struct {
cert *tls.Certificate
}
func (p *stubCertProvider) TLSConfig() *tls.Config {
return &tls.Config{
GetCertificate: func(hi *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
return p.cert, nil
},
}
}
func (p *stubCertProvider) HTTPHandler(fallback http.Handler) http.Handler { return fallback }
// TestIPCertManager exercises the on-demand issuance flow of
// ipCertManager against a fake ACME CA: certs are ordered for whatever
// IP address a connection arrives on (IPv4 and IPv6), with the
// shortlived profile, answering the http-01 challenge, and reusing the
// on-disk cache.
func TestIPCertManager(t *testing.T) {
const ip4 = "203.0.113.7"
const ip6 = "2001:db8::7"
dir := t.TempDir()
ca := newFakeIPACME(t)
m, err := newIPCertManager(dir, "test@example.com", ca.directoryURL(), nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Serve the manager's HTTP-01 challenge handler like derper's port
// 80 listener does.
challengeSrv := httptest.NewServer(m.HTTPHandler(http.NotFoundHandler()))
defer challengeSrv.Close()
ca.challengeBase = challengeSrv.URL
// A connection to the IPv4 address with no SNI mints a cert for it.
cert, err := m.getCertificate(helloFor(t, ip4, ""))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := cert.Leaf.VerifyHostname(ip4); err != nil {
t.Errorf("issued cert not valid for %v: %v", ip4, err)
}
if got, want := ca.gotProfile, shortlivedProfile; got != want {
t.Errorf("order profile = %q; want %q", got, want)
}
if ca.gotIDType != "ip" || ca.gotIDValue != ip4 {
t.Errorf("order identifier = %q %q; want %q %q", ca.gotIDType, ca.gotIDValue, "ip", ip4)
}
if n := ca.numOrders(); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("orders created = %d; want 1", n)
}
// A connection to the IPv6 address mints a second, separate cert.
cert6, err := m.getCertificate(helloFor(t, ip6, ""))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := cert6.Leaf.VerifyHostname(ip6); err != nil {
t.Errorf("issued cert not valid for %v: %v", ip6, err)
}
if ca.gotIDType != "ip" || ca.gotIDValue != ip6 {
t.Errorf("order identifier = %q %q; want %q %q", ca.gotIDType, ca.gotIDValue, "ip", ip6)
}
if n := ca.numOrders(); n != 2 {
t.Errorf("orders created = %d; want 2", n)
}
// An SNI containing the connection's own IP address is served from
// the cache.
if _, err := m.getCertificate(helloFor(t, ip4, ip4)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("getCertificate with matching IP SNI: %v", err)
}
if n := ca.numOrders(); n != 2 {
t.Errorf("orders created after cached hit = %d; want 2", n)
}
// An SNI naming some other IP address is rejected.
if _, err := m.getCertificate(helloFor(t, ip4, "203.0.113.8")); err == nil {
t.Error("getCertificate with mismatched IP SNI succeeded; want error")
}
// A DNS name SNI has no provider to go to here.
if _, err := m.getCertificate(helloFor(t, ip4, "derp.example.com")); err == nil {
t.Error("getCertificate with DNS SNI and no next provider succeeded; want error")
}
// A second manager over the same cert directory must use the
// on-disk cache rather than creating more orders.
m2, err := newIPCertManager(dir, "test@example.com", ca.directoryURL(), nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cachedCert, err := m2.getCertificate(helloFor(t, ip4, ""))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := cachedCert.Leaf.VerifyHostname(ip4); err != nil {
t.Errorf("cached cert not valid for %v: %v", ip4, err)
}
if n := ca.numOrders(); n != 2 {
t.Errorf("orders created after cache reuse = %d; want 2", n)
}
// Non-challenge requests go to the fallback handler.
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.HTTPHandler(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
io.WriteString(w, "fallback")
})).ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/other", nil))
if got := rec.Body.String(); got != "fallback" {
t.Errorf("fallback body = %q; want %q", got, "fallback")
}
}
// TestIPCertManagerNextProvider verifies that connections with a DNS
// name in the SNI are passed through to the next provider.
func TestIPCertManagerNextProvider(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
ca := newFakeIPACME(t)
stubCert := &tls.Certificate{}
m, err := newIPCertManager(dir, "", ca.directoryURL(), &stubCertProvider{cert: stubCert})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got, err := m.getCertificate(helloFor(t, "203.0.113.7", "derp.example.com"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got != stubCert {
t.Errorf("DNS SNI returned %p; want the next provider's cert %p", got, stubCert)
}
if n := ca.numOrders(); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("orders created = %d; want 0", n)
}
}
// TestCertModeIPCertsGating verifies the flag validation around
// --acme-ip-certs and IP address hostnames.
func TestCertModeIPCertsGating(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
mode string
host string
ipCerts bool
wantErr string // or empty to expect success
}{
{"letsencrypt_ip_no_flag", "letsencrypt", "1.2.3.4", false, "--acme-ip-certs"},
{"gcp_ip", "gcp", "1.2.3.4", false, "--certmode=gcp requires --hostname to be a DNS name"},
{"gcp_flag", "gcp", "1.2.3.4", true, "--acme-ip-certs requires --certmode=letsencrypt"},
{"manual_flag", "manual", "1.2.3.4", true, "--acme-ip-certs requires --certmode=letsencrypt"},
{"letsencrypt_ip_flag", "letsencrypt", "1.2.3.4", true, ""},
{"letsencrypt_hostname_flag", "letsencrypt", "derp.example.com", true, ""},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cp, err := certProviderByCertMode(tt.mode, t.TempDir(), tt.host, tt.ipCerts, "", "", "")
if tt.wantErr == "" {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("certProviderByCertMode(%q, %q, ipCerts=%v) = %v; want success", tt.mode, tt.host, tt.ipCerts, err)
}
m, ok := cp.(*ipCertManager)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("provider type = %T; want *ipCertManager", cp)
}
wantNext := net.ParseIP(tt.host) == nil
if gotNext := m.next != nil; gotNext != wantNext {
t.Errorf("has next provider = %v; want %v", gotNext, wantNext)
}
return
}
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("certProviderByCertMode(%q, %q, ipCerts=%v) error = %v; want contains %q",
tt.mode, tt.host, tt.ipCerts, err, tt.wantErr)
}
})
}
}