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Previously the acceptEnv variables forwarded to the incubator child were JSON-encoded onto its command line (--encoded-env), so their values were visible in /proc/<pid>/cmdline to any other local user and were logged in the session-start argv (locally and to log.tailscale.com except where --no-logs-no-support was specified). This change now carries those variables through an os.Pipe file descriptor as a json encoded payload. Added end-to-end testing helps validate secrets reach the session but are not in flags or logged. Fixes tailscale/corp#44903 Change-Id: I5b137b20e9c06feec6b70aaf4e6925e6db74017e Signed-off-by: Mike Jensen <mikej@tailscale.com> Co-authored-by: Mike Jensen <mikej@tailscale.com>
167 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
167 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & contributors
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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package tailssh
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import (
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"fmt"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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)
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// isDangerousEnvVar reports whether the given environment variable name
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// is unconditionally prohibited from being forwarded, regardless of
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// acceptEnv policy. This prevents privilege escalation via dynamic
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// linker environment variables (e.g. LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH,
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// DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES) or leaking of secrets (e.g. GOTRACEBACK)
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// even when a wildcard acceptEnv pattern like "*" is configured.
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func isDangerousEnvVar(name string) bool {
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upper := strings.ToUpper(name)
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return strings.HasPrefix(upper, "LD_") || strings.HasPrefix(upper, "DYLD_") ||
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upper == "GOTRACEBACK"
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}
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// forbiddenEnvKey reports whether name must never be accepted from the client as a
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// forwarded environment variable, independent of the acceptEnv policy. Names are
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// restricted to a known-safe charset so they cannot corrupt the "su -w" allowlist
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// built from them, truncate on exec, or confuse downstream consumers of the user's
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// environment.
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func forbiddenEnvKey(name string) bool {
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for _, r := range name {
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if r != '_' && r != '-' && (r < 'a' || r > 'z') && (r < 'A' || r > 'Z') && (r < '0' || r > '9') {
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return true
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}
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}
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return name == ""
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}
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// filterEnv filters a passed in environ string slice (a slice with strings
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// representing environment variables in the form "key=value") based on
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// the supplied slice of acceptEnv values.
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//
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// acceptEnv is a slice of environment variable names that are allowlisted
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// for the SSH rule in the policy file.
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//
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// acceptEnv values may contain * and ? wildcard characters which match against
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// zero or one or more characters and a single character respectively.
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//
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// Certain dangerous environment variables (such as those controlling the
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// dynamic linker) are always rejected regardless of the acceptEnv policy.
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// See isDangerousEnvVar.
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func filterEnv(acceptEnv []string, environ []string) ([]string, error) {
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var acceptedPairs []string
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// Quick return if we have an empty list.
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if acceptEnv == nil || len(acceptEnv) == 0 {
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return acceptedPairs, nil
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}
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for _, envPair := range environ {
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variableName, _, ok := strings.Cut(envPair, "=")
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if !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(`invalid environment variable: %q. Variables must be in "KEY=VALUE" format`, envPair)
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}
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// Reject NUL bytes: envp entries are NUL-terminated, so a NUL would silently truncate on exec
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if strings.Contains(envPair, "\x00") {
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continue
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}
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// Always reject dangerous environment variables that could
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// enable privilege escalation, regardless of acceptEnv policy.
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if isDangerousEnvVar(variableName) {
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continue
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}
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// Always reject names that would corrupt the incubator's "su -w"
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// allowlist (see reservedEnvKey), regardless of acceptEnv policy.
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if forbiddenEnvKey(variableName) {
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continue
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}
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// Short circuit if we have a direct match between the environment
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// variable and an AcceptEnv value.
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if slices.Contains(acceptEnv, variableName) {
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acceptedPairs = append(acceptedPairs, envPair)
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continue
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}
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// Otherwise check if we have a wildcard pattern that matches.
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if matchAcceptEnv(acceptEnv, variableName) {
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acceptedPairs = append(acceptedPairs, envPair)
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continue
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}
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}
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return acceptedPairs, nil
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}
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// matchAcceptEnv is a convenience function that wraps calling matchAcceptEnvPattern
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// with every value in acceptEnv for a given env that is being matched against.
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func matchAcceptEnv(acceptEnv []string, env string) bool {
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for _, pattern := range acceptEnv {
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if matchAcceptEnvPattern(pattern, env) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// matchAcceptEnvPattern returns true if the pattern matches against the target string.
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// Patterns may include * and ? wildcard characters which match against zero or one or
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// more characters and a single character respectively.
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func matchAcceptEnvPattern(pattern string, target string) bool {
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patternIdx := 0
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targetIdx := 0
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for {
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// If we are at the end of the pattern we can only have a match if we
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// are also at the end of the target.
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if patternIdx >= len(pattern) {
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return targetIdx >= len(target)
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}
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if pattern[patternIdx] == '*' {
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// Optimization to skip through any repeated asterisks as they
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// have the same net effect on our search.
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for patternIdx < len(pattern) {
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if pattern[patternIdx] != '*' {
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break
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}
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patternIdx++
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}
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// We are at the end of the pattern after matching the asterisk,
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// implying a match.
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if patternIdx >= len(pattern) {
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return true
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}
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// Search through the target sequentially for the next character
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// from the pattern string, recursing into matchAcceptEnvPattern
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// to try and find a match.
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for ; targetIdx < len(target); targetIdx++ {
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if matchAcceptEnvPattern(pattern[patternIdx:], target[targetIdx:]) {
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return true
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}
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}
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// No match after searching through the entire target.
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return false
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}
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if targetIdx >= len(target) {
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return false
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}
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if pattern[patternIdx] != '?' && pattern[patternIdx] != target[targetIdx] {
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return false
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}
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patternIdx++
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targetIdx++
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}
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}
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