FilterTerm.php:
- Use intval() on AlarmedZoneId value in SQL subquery to prevent
injection via crafted filter val
report_event_audit.php, montagereview.php:
- Cast $selected_monitor_ids through array_map('intval') before
interpolating into SQL IN clause (values come from $_REQUEST)
download_functions.php:
- Replace manual single-quoting with escapeshellarg() for merged
file name in ffmpeg, tar, and zip commands (monitor names can
contain shell metacharacters including single quotes)
- Same fix for export list file path
export_functions.php:
- Use escapeshellarg() on source and destination paths in cp -as
commands during event export
functions.php:
- Validate column keys in getFormChanges() against /^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/
to prevent SQL injection via crafted array keys from $_REQUEST
- Use dbEscape() and intval() for image/document MIME type and size
fields instead of raw string interpolation
- Replace escapeshellcmd() with escapeshellarg() in deletePath()
rm -rf command
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Device field from the Monitors table was interpolated directly into
shell commands (qx(), backticks, exec()) without sanitization, allowing
authenticated users with monitor-edit permissions to execute arbitrary
commands as www-data via the Device Path field.
Defense in depth:
- Input validation: reject Device values not matching /^\/dev\/[\w\/.\-]+$/
at save time in both web UI and REST API
- Output sanitization: use escapeshellarg() in PHP and quote validated
values in Perl at every shell execution point
Affected locations:
- scripts/ZoneMinder/lib/ZoneMinder/Monitor.pm (control, zmcControl)
- scripts/zmpkg.pl.in (system startup)
- web/includes/Monitor.php (zmcControl)
- web/includes/functions.php (zmcStatus, zmcCheck, validDevicePath)
- web/includes/actions/monitor.php (save action)
- web/api/app/Model/Monitor.php (daemonControl, validation rules)
- web/api/app/Controller/MonitorsController.php (daemonStatus)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When adding cameras via ONVIF probe, passwords containing special
characters (like parentheses, slashes, etc.) were being stored in the
database in URL-encoded form instead of plain text. This caused
authentication failures when the encoded password was used.
The issue was in extract_auth_values_from_url() which extracted
credentials from the stream URI but didn't decode them. Since the ONVIF
probe process double-encodes passwords (to survive POST encoding), and
monitor.php decodes once, the extracted password still remained
URL-encoded.
The fix adds urldecode() to both username and password after extraction,
ensuring they're stored in their original form in the database.
Example: Password "pass)word" was being stored as "pass%29word"
