web/views/image.php exposes an outbound fetch via ?view=image&proxy=.
It validated only the URL scheme, so any user with canView('Events')
could make the server issue HTTP requests to arbitrary hosts and, on a
401 Digest challenge, replay credentials taken from the URL's user-info.
view=image is also exempt from CSRF handling in index.php, so the fetch
could be triggered from an attacker page via a plain <img> tag.
Camera discovery legitimately proxies cameras on the local LAN, so
private ranges stay reachable. Reject only loopback, link-local and
other reserved addresses via FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE, which covers
127.0.0.0/8, ::1, fe80::/10 and 169.254.0.0/16 (cloud metadata) without
excluding 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16 or fc00::/7. Resolve the host
first so a hostname cannot point at those ranges.
Also require canEdit('Monitors') — the only consumer is the discovery
thumbnail in add_monitors, which already demands that right — and stop
reading $url_parts['user'] without an isset() guard.
Refs GHSA-g28p-q36w-h3c5, GHSA-rq9f-p634-rrpg.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
image.php, view_video.php and view_hls.php previously checked only the
coarse canView('Events') / canView('Snapshots') role before streaming
media for a user-supplied event id. An authenticated user denied access
to a monitor could still fetch event snapshots, captured frames,
recorded MP4s and HLS manifests for events belonging to that monitor by
calling the direct endpoints with the event id.
Call Event->canView() after loading the event and return 404 on denial
so the event id cannot be enumerated. view_video also validates
Event->Id() so unknown ids return 404 instead of an empty 200 body.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
FilterTerm.php:
- Replace eval() with safe compare() method for SystemLoad, DiskPercent,
and DiskBlocks filter conditions (RCE via crafted op/val)
- Validate operator against allowlist in constructor
- Sanitize collate field to alphanumeric/underscore only (SQLi)
onvifprobe.php:
- Use escapeshellarg() on interface, device_ep, soapversion, username,
and password arguments passed to execONVIF() (command injection)
Event.php:
- Use escapeshellarg() on all arguments to zmvideo.pl instead of
escapeshellcmd() on the whole command (command injection via format)
- Anchor scale regex with ^ and $ to prevent partial matches
image.php:
- Restrict proxy URL scheme to http/https only (SSRF via file:// etc)
filterdebug.php:
- Use already-sanitized $fid instead of raw $_REQUEST['fid'] (XSS)
MonitorsController.php:
- Use escapeshellarg() on token, username, password, and monitor id
in zmu shell command instead of escapeshellcmd() on whole command
HostController.php:
- Use escapeshellarg() on path in du command (command injection via mid)
- Remove space from daemon name allowlist (argument injection)
EventsController.php:
- Remove single quotes from interval expression regex (SQLi)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add RBAC checks to ConfigsController edit() and delete() requiring
System=Edit permission, matching the pattern used by other controllers.
Harden System/Readonly column checks with !empty() to handle missing
columns gracefully. Fix command injection in Event.php by using
ZM_PATH_FFMPEG constant with escapeshellarg() instead of hardcoded
unsanitized ffmpeg call. Add is_executable() validation at all exec()
sites using ZM_PATH_FFMPEG as defense-in-depth against poisoned config
values.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add input validation and shell argument escaping to prevent OS command
injection via the 'show' parameter in web/views/image.php. The parameter
is now validated against an allowlist and all values passed to exec()
are wrapped with escapeshellarg().
Also fix PHP operator precedence bug in shutdown.php where 'and' was
used instead of '&&', causing the 'when' parameter validation to not
work as intended.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
