fix(gallery): block SSRF in gallery config URL fetch (#10665) (#10673)

POST /models/apply with an empty "id" fetches the attacker-supplied
"url" gallery config directly via http.Client, with no check that the
URL resolves to a public IP. In the default Docker deployment no API key
is configured, so any network-reachable client can coerce LocalAI into
issuing requests to internal services or cloud-metadata endpoints (and
exfiltrate a small slice of the response through the job error message).

Guard the config fetch chokepoints (GetGalleryConfigFromURL and
GetGalleryConfigFromURLWithContext, which back both the /models/apply
worker and gallery installs) with utils.ValidateExternalURL, matching
the protection already applied to the CORS proxy and image/video/audio
download paths. Only plain http(s) URLs are validated; non-network
schemes (huggingface://, github:, oci://, ollama://, file://) resolve to
fixed public services or local files and are left untouched.


Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 [Claude Code]

Signed-off-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>
Co-authored-by: Ettore Di Giacinto <mudler@localai.io>

core/gallery/gallery.go

@@ -15,14 +15,35 @@ import (
 	"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/core/config"
 	"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/pkg/downloader"
 	"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/pkg/system"
+	"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/pkg/utils"
 	"github.com/mudler/LocalAI/pkg/xsync"
 	"github.com/mudler/xlog"
 
 	"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
 )
 
+// validateGalleryConfigURL guards the gallery config fetch against SSRF. A
+// gallery config URL can be attacker-controlled (e.g. POST /models/apply with
+// an empty id fetches it directly), so a plain http(s) URL must not be allowed
+// to reach private, loopback, link-local or cloud-metadata addresses. Other
+// schemes (huggingface://, github:, oci://, ollama://, file://) resolve to
+// fixed public services or local files and are not a network-SSRF vector, so
+// they are left untouched.
+// See https://github.com/mudler/LocalAI/issues/10665
+func validateGalleryConfigURL(rawURL string) error {
+	lower := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(rawURL))
+	if strings.HasPrefix(lower, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "https://") {
+		return utils.ValidateExternalURL(rawURL)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func GetGalleryConfigFromURL[T any](url string, basePath string) (T, error) {
 	var config T
+	if err := validateGalleryConfigURL(url); err != nil {
+		xlog.Error("refusing to fetch gallery config", "error", err, "url", url)
+		return config, err
+	}
 	uri := downloader.URI(url)
 	err := uri.ReadWithCallback(basePath, func(url string, d []byte) error {
 		return yaml.Unmarshal(d, &config)
@@ -36,6 +57,10 @@ func GetGalleryConfigFromURL[T any](url string, basePath string) (T, error) {
 
 func GetGalleryConfigFromURLWithContext[T any](ctx context.Context, url string, basePath string) (T, error) {
 	var config T
+	if err := validateGalleryConfigURL(url); err != nil {
+		xlog.Error("refusing to fetch gallery config", "error", err, "url", url)
+		return config, err
+	}
 	uri := downloader.URI(url)
 	err := uri.ReadWithAuthorizationAndCallback(ctx, basePath, "", func(url string, d []byte) error {
 		return yaml.Unmarshal(d, &config)

core/gallery/request_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 package gallery_test
 
 import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+
 	. "github.com/mudler/LocalAI/core/gallery"
 	. "github.com/onsi/ginkgo/v2"
 	. "github.com/onsi/gomega"
@@ -19,4 +23,49 @@ var _ = Describe("Gallery API tests", func() {
 			Expect(e.Name).To(Equal("gpt4all-j"))
 		})
 	})
+
+	// SSRF guard: a user-supplied gallery config URL (e.g. POST /models/apply
+	// with an empty id) must not be able to reach internal network addresses.
+	// See https://github.com/mudler/LocalAI/issues/10665
+	Context("SSRF protection on config URLs", func() {
+		var server *httptest.Server
+
+		BeforeEach(func() {
+			// A reachable internal server that would happily serve a valid
+			// gallery config. Without the SSRF guard the fetch succeeds; the
+			// guard must block it before the request ever leaves the process.
+			server = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+				_, _ = w.Write([]byte("name: internal-ssrf\nfiles: []\n"))
+			}))
+		})
+
+		AfterEach(func() {
+			server.Close()
+		})
+
+		It("blocks fetching a config from a loopback address", func() {
+			_, err := GetGalleryConfigFromURL[ModelConfig](server.URL, "")
+			Expect(err).To(HaveOccurred())
+			Expect(err.Error()).To(ContainSubstring("not allowed"))
+		})
+
+		It("blocks fetching a config from a loopback address (context variant)", func() {
+			_, err := GetGalleryConfigFromURLWithContext[ModelConfig](context.Background(), server.URL, "")
+			Expect(err).To(HaveOccurred())
+			Expect(err.Error()).To(ContainSubstring("not allowed"))
+		})
+
+		It("blocks well-known internal hostnames and metadata endpoints", func() {
+			for _, u := range []string{
+				"http://localhost/secret",
+				"http://10.0.0.1/config.yaml",
+				"http://192.168.1.1/config.yaml",
+				"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
+			} {
+				_, err := GetGalleryConfigFromURL[ModelConfig](u, "")
+				Expect(err).To(HaveOccurred(), "expected %s to be rejected", u)
+			}
+		})
+	})
 })