Merge branch 'main' into agent

src/browser/Browser.zig

@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ pub fn deinit(self: *Browser) void {
 pub fn newSession(self: *Browser, notification: *Notification) !*Session {
     self.closeSession();
     self.session = @as(Session, undefined);
+    errdefer self.session = null;
     const session = &self.session.?;
     try Session.init(session, self, notification);
     return session;

src/browser/Frame.zig

@@ -4308,8 +4308,8 @@ pub fn submitForm(self: *Frame, submitter_: ?*Element, form_: ?*Element.Html.For
     // The submitter can be an input box (if enter was entered on the box)
     // I don't think this is technically correct, but FormData handles it ok
     const form_data = try FormData.init(form, submitter_, &self.js.execution);
-    // FormData.init acquires file's references. So we must release them once done.
-    defer form_data.deinit(self._page);
+    form_data.acquireRef();
+    defer form_data.releaseRef(self._page);
 
     const arena = try self._session.getArena(.medium, "submitForm");
     errdefer self._session.releaseArena(arena);

src/browser/js/Local.zig

@@ -1411,12 +1411,6 @@ pub fn rejectPromise(self: *const Local, err: js.PromiseResolver.RejectError) js
     return resolver.promise();
 }
 
-pub fn rejectErrorPromise(self: *const Local, value: js.PromiseResolver.RejectError) !js.Promise {
-    var resolver = js.PromiseResolver.init(self);
-    resolver.rejectError("Local.rejectPromise", value);
-    return resolver.promise();
-}
-
 pub fn resolvePromise(self: *const Local, value: anytype) !js.Promise {
     var resolver = js.PromiseResolver.init(self);
     resolver.resolve("Local.resolvePromise", value);

src/browser/js/bridge.zig

@@ -1022,6 +1022,7 @@ pub const WorkerJsApis = flattenTypes(&.{
     @import("../webapi/Console.zig"),
     @import("../webapi/Crypto.zig"),
     @import("../webapi/SubtleCrypto.zig"),
+    @import("../webapi/CryptoKey.zig"),
     @import("../webapi/net/FormData.zig"),
     @import("../webapi/net/Headers.zig"),
     @import("../webapi/net/Request.zig"),

src/browser/webapi/CryptoKey.zig

@@ -20,27 +20,44 @@ const crypto = @import("../../sys/libcrypto.zig");
 
 const js = @import("../js/js.zig");
 
+const Execution = js.Execution;
+
 /// Represents a cryptographic key obtained from one of the SubtleCrypto methods
 /// generateKey(), deriveKey(), importKey(), or unwrapKey().
 const CryptoKey = @This();
 
 /// Algorithm being used.
 _type: Type,
+/// Whether this is a secret (symmetric), public, or private key. Surfaced as
+/// the JS `.type` attribute.
+_kind: Kind = .secret,
 /// Whether the key is extractable.
 _extractable: bool,
 /// Bit flags of `usages`; see `Usages` type.
 _usages: u8,
 /// Raw bytes of key.
 _key: []const u8,
+/// Metadata needed to reconstruct the JS `.algorithm` dictionary. The strings
+/// are expected to outlive the key (arena-allocated alongside it).
+_algorithm: Algorithm,
 /// Different algorithms may use different data structures;
 /// this union can be used for such situations. Active field is understood
 /// from `_type`.
-_vary: extern union {
+_vary: union(enum) {
+    none,
     /// Used by HMAC.
     digest: *const crypto.EVP_MD,
     /// Used by asymmetric algorithms (X25519, Ed25519).
     pkey: *crypto.EVP_PKEY,
-},
+} = .none,
+
+/// Captures the algorithm parameters reported back via the `.algorithm`
+/// accessor. `hash` is only set for HMAC (and other hashed algorithms).
+pub const Algorithm = struct {
+    name: []const u8,
+    hash: ?[]const u8 = null,
+    named_curve: ?[]const u8 = null,
+};
 
 /// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/CryptoKeyPair
 pub const Pair = struct {
@@ -51,7 +68,17 @@ pub const Pair = struct {
 /// Key-creating functions expect this format.
 pub const KeyOrPair = union(enum) { key: *CryptoKey, pair: Pair };
 
-pub const Type = enum(u8) { hmac, rsa, x25519 };
+pub const Type = enum(u8) { hmac, rsa, x25519, aes, derive, ec };
+
+pub const Kind = enum {
+    secret,
+    public,
+    private,
+
+    pub fn toString(self: Kind) []const u8 {
+        return @tagName(self);
+    }
+};
 
 /// Changing the names of fields would affect bitmask creation.
 pub const Usages = struct {
@@ -67,32 +94,105 @@ pub const Usages = struct {
     // zig fmt: on
 };
 
-pub inline fn canSign(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
+pub fn canEncrypt(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
+    return self._usages & Usages.encrypt != 0;
+}
+
+pub fn canDecrypt(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
+    return self._usages & Usages.decrypt != 0;
+}
+
+pub fn canSign(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
     return self._usages & Usages.sign != 0;
 }
 
-pub inline fn canVerify(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
+pub fn canVerify(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
     return self._usages & Usages.verify != 0;
 }
 
-pub inline fn canDeriveBits(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
+pub fn canDeriveBits(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
     return self._usages & Usages.deriveBits != 0;
 }
 
-pub inline fn canExportKey(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
+pub fn canDeriveKey(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
+    return self._usages & Usages.deriveKey != 0;
+}
+
+pub fn canExportKey(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
     return self._extractable;
 }
 
 /// Only valid for HMAC.
-pub inline fn getDigest(self: *const CryptoKey) *const crypto.EVP_MD {
+pub fn getDigest(self: *const CryptoKey) *const crypto.EVP_MD {
     return self._vary.digest;
 }
 
 /// Only valid for asymmetric algorithms (X25519, Ed25519).
-pub inline fn getKeyObject(self: *const CryptoKey) *crypto.EVP_PKEY {
+pub fn getKeyObject(self: *const CryptoKey) *crypto.EVP_PKEY {
     return self._vary.pkey;
 }
 
+pub fn getType(self: *const CryptoKey) Kind {
+    return self._kind;
+}
+
+pub fn getExtractable(self: *const CryptoKey) bool {
+    return self._extractable;
+}
+
+/// The shape of the `.algorithm` dictionary depends on the algorithm. AES and
+/// HMAC expose a `length` (in bits, derived from the key material); HMAC also
+/// exposes a nested `hash`.
+const AlgorithmReport = union(enum) {
+    keyed: struct { name: []const u8, length: u32 },
+    hmac: struct { name: []const u8, length: u32, hash: struct { name: []const u8 } },
+    ec: struct { name: []const u8, namedCurve: []const u8 },
+    named: struct { name: []const u8 },
+};
+
+pub fn getAlgorithm(self: *const CryptoKey) AlgorithmReport {
+    const length: u32 = @intCast(self._key.len * 8);
+    return switch (self._type) {
+        .aes => .{ .keyed = .{ .name = self._algorithm.name, .length = length } },
+        .hmac => .{ .hmac = .{
+            .name = self._algorithm.name,
+            .length = length,
+            .hash = .{ .name = self._algorithm.hash orelse "" },
+        } },
+        .ec => .{ .ec = .{
+            .name = self._algorithm.name,
+            .namedCurve = self._algorithm.named_curve orelse "",
+        } },
+        else => .{ .named = .{ .name = self._algorithm.name } },
+    };
+}
+
+/// Returns the active usages, de-duplicated, in a stable order.
+pub fn getUsages(self: *const CryptoKey, exec: *const Execution) ![]const []const u8 {
+    // zig fmt: off
+    const all = [_]struct { mask: u8, name: []const u8 }{
+        .{ .mask = Usages.encrypt,    .name = "encrypt" },
+        .{ .mask = Usages.decrypt,    .name = "decrypt" },
+        .{ .mask = Usages.sign,       .name = "sign" },
+        .{ .mask = Usages.verify,     .name = "verify" },
+        .{ .mask = Usages.deriveKey,  .name = "deriveKey" },
+        .{ .mask = Usages.deriveBits, .name = "deriveBits" },
+        .{ .mask = Usages.wrapKey,    .name = "wrapKey" },
+        .{ .mask = Usages.unwrapKey,  .name = "unwrapKey" },
+    };
+    // zig fmt: on
+
+    var buf: [all.len][]const u8 = undefined;
+    var n: usize = 0;
+    for (all) |entry| {
+        if (self._usages & entry.mask != 0) {
+            buf[n] = entry.name;
+            n += 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return exec.call_arena.dupe([]const u8, buf[0..n]);
+}
+
 pub const JsApi = struct {
     pub const bridge = js.Bridge(CryptoKey);
 
@@ -102,4 +202,9 @@ pub const JsApi = struct {
         pub var class_id: bridge.ClassId = undefined;
         pub const prototype_chain = bridge.prototypeChain();
     };
+
+    pub const @"type" = bridge.accessor(CryptoKey.getType, null, .{});
+    pub const extractable = bridge.accessor(CryptoKey.getExtractable, null, .{});
+    pub const algorithm = bridge.accessor(CryptoKey.getAlgorithm, null, .{});
+    pub const usages = bridge.accessor(CryptoKey.getUsages, null, .{});
 };

src/browser/webapi/DOMException.zig

@@ -60,14 +60,15 @@ pub fn fromError(err: anyerror) ?DOMException {
         error.DataClone => .{ ._code = .data_clone_error },
         error.InvalidAccessError => .{ ._code = .invalid_access_error },
         error.OperationError => .{ ._code = .operation_error },
+        error.DataError => .{ ._code = .data_error },
         else => null,
     };
 }
 
 pub fn getCode(self: *const DOMException) u8 {
     return switch (self._code) {
-        // WebCrypto-only error: no legacy numeric code.
-        .operation_error => 0,
+        // WebCrypto-only errors: no legacy numeric code.
+        .operation_error, .data_error => 0,
         else => @intFromEnum(self._code),
     };
 }
@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ pub fn getName(self: *const DOMException) []const u8 {
         .invalid_node_type_error => "InvalidNodeTypeError",
         .data_clone_error => "DataCloneError",
         .operation_error => "OperationError",
+        .data_error => "DataError",
     };
 }
 
@@ -132,6 +134,7 @@ pub fn getMessage(self: *const DOMException) []const u8 {
         .invalid_node_type_error => "The supplied node is incorrect or has an incorrect ancestor for this operation",
         .data_clone_error => "The object can not be cloned",
         .operation_error => "The operation failed for an operation-specific reason",
+        .data_error => "Data provided to an operation does not meet requirements",
     };
 }
 
@@ -172,6 +175,8 @@ const Code = enum(u8) {
     invalid_node_type_error = 24,
     data_clone_error = 25,
     /// Defined by WebCrypto; no legacy code, exposed via name only.
+    data_error = 0xFE,
+    /// Defined by WebCrypto; no legacy code, exposed via name only.
     operation_error = 0xFF,
 
     /// Maps a standard error name to its legacy code
@@ -200,6 +205,7 @@ const Code = enum(u8) {
             .{ "InvalidNodeTypeError", .invalid_node_type_error },
             .{ "DataCloneError", .data_clone_error },
             .{ "OperationError", .operation_error },
+            .{ "DataError", .data_error },
         });
         return lookup.get(name) orelse .none;
     }

src/browser/webapi/SubtleCrypto.zig

@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ const EC = @import("crypto/EC.zig");
 const HMAC = @import("crypto/HMAC.zig");
 const RSA = @import("crypto/RSA.zig");
 const X25519 = @import("crypto/X25519.zig");
+const KDF = @import("crypto/KDF.zig");
+const common = @import("crypto/common.zig");
 
 const log = lp.log;
 const String = lp.String;
@@ -54,18 +56,8 @@ pub fn generateKey(
     const local = exec.js.local.?;
     switch (algo) {
         .hmac_key_gen => |params| return HMAC.init(params, extractable, key_usages, exec),
-        .aes_key_gen => |params| {
-            AES.validate(params, key_usages) catch |err| {
-                return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = err } });
-            };
-            log.warn(.not_implemented, "generateKey", .{ .name = params.name });
-        },
-        .ec_key_gen => |params| {
-            EC.validate(params, key_usages) catch |err| {
-                return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = err } });
-            };
-            log.warn(.not_implemented, "generateKey", .{ .name = params.name });
-        },
+        .aes_key_gen => |params| return AES.generate(params, extractable, key_usages, exec),
+        .ec_key_gen => |params| return EC.generate(params, extractable, key_usages, exec),
         .rsa_hashed_key_gen => |params| {
             RSA.validate(params, key_usages) catch |err| {
                 return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = err } });
@@ -108,10 +100,10 @@ fn _generateKeyFromName(
 
         const allowed: []const []const u8 = blk: {
             const str = name.str();
-            if (std.ascii.eqlIgnoreCase(str, "Ed25519") or std.ascii.eqlIgnoreCase(str, "Ed448")) {
+            if (eqlIgnoreCase(str, "Ed25519") or eqlIgnoreCase(str, "Ed448")) {
                 break :blk &.{ "sign", "verify" };
             }
-            if (std.ascii.eqlIgnoreCase(str, "X448")) {
+            if (eqlIgnoreCase(str, "X448")) {
                 break :blk &.{ "deriveKey", "deriveBits" };
             }
             return error.NotSupported;
@@ -139,6 +131,140 @@ fn _generateKeyFromName(
     return error.NotSupported;
 }
 
+/// Imports a key from an external, portable format and returns a `CryptoKey`.
+pub fn importKey(
+    _: *const SubtleCrypto,
+    format: []const u8,
+    key_data: algorithm.KeyData,
+    algo: algorithm.Import,
+    extractable: bool,
+    key_usages: []const []const u8,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) !js.Promise {
+    const local = exec.js.local.?;
+    const name = algo.algoName();
+
+    // Asymmetric algorithms (EC, OKP). Usage validation runs first (bad/empty
+    // usages → SyntaxError) so the failure-path tests pass regardless of whether
+    // the key material itself can be parsed yet.
+    const is_private = importKind(format, key_data);
+    if (asymmetricAllowedUsages(name, is_private)) |allowed| {
+        // Public keys may have empty usages; secret/private keys may not.
+        const mask = common.usageMaskInner(allowed, key_usages, is_private) catch |err| {
+            return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = err } });
+        };
+        if (EC.canonicalName(name) != null) {
+            const der = switch (key_data) {
+                .bytes => |b| b.values,
+                .jwk => return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } }),
+            };
+            return EC.import(name, algo.namedCurve(), format, der, is_private, extractable, mask, exec);
+        }
+        log.warn(.not_implemented, "SubtleCrypto.importKey", .{ .name = name });
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
+    }
+
+    // Resolve the raw key bytes from the requested format. Symmetric keys
+    // support "raw" (a BufferSource) and "jwk" (an "oct" JSON Web Key).
+    const raw: []const u8 = blk: {
+        if (std.mem.eql(u8, format, "raw")) {
+            break :blk switch (key_data) {
+                .bytes => |b| b.values,
+                // A JWK object passed where a BufferSource is expected.
+                .jwk => return local.rejectPromise(.{ .type_error = "raw format expects a BufferSource" }),
+            };
+        }
+        if (std.mem.eql(u8, format, "jwk")) {
+            const jwk = switch (key_data) {
+                .jwk => |j| j,
+                .bytes => return local.rejectPromise(.{ .type_error = "jwk format expects an object" }),
+            };
+            if (!std.mem.eql(u8, jwk.kty, "oct")) {
+                return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.DataError } });
+            }
+            const k = jwk.k orelse {
+                return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.DataError } });
+            };
+            break :blk common.base64Decode(exec.call_arena, k) catch |err| switch (err) {
+                error.DataError => return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.DataError } }),
+                else => |e| return e,
+            };
+        }
+        // spki / pkcs8 (asymmetric formats) are not supported for these algorithms.
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
+    };
+
+    if (AES.canonicalName(name) != null) {
+        return AES.import(name, raw, extractable, key_usages, exec);
+    }
+
+    // HKDF / PBKDF2: key-derivation inputs. The raw bytes are the key; there's
+    // no length constraint and these keys are non-extractable.
+    inline for ([_][]const u8{ "HKDF", "PBKDF2" }) |derive_name| {
+        if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, derive_name)) {
+            const mask = common.usageMask(&.{ "deriveKey", "deriveBits" }, key_usages) catch |err| {
+                return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = err } });
+            };
+            const key = try exec.arena.dupe(u8, raw);
+            const crypto_key = try exec._factory.create(CryptoKey{
+                ._type = .derive,
+                ._kind = .secret,
+                ._extractable = extractable,
+                ._usages = mask,
+                ._key = key,
+                ._algorithm = .{ .name = derive_name },
+            });
+            return local.resolvePromise(crypto_key);
+        }
+    }
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, "HMAC")) {
+        const hash_name = switch (algo) {
+            .hmac => |h| switch (h.hash) {
+                .string => |s| s,
+                .object => |o| o.name,
+            },
+            else => return local.rejectPromise(.{ .type_error = "HMAC import requires a hash" }),
+        };
+        return HMAC.import(hash_name, raw, extractable, key_usages, exec);
+    }
+
+    log.warn(.not_implemented, "SubtleCrypto.importKey", .{ .name = name });
+    return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
+}
+
+/// Whether the requested format/key-data describe a private key. The format
+/// alone decides for DER/raw variants; for JWK the presence of `d` marks it.
+fn importKind(format: []const u8, key_data: algorithm.KeyData) bool {
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(format, "pkcs8") or eqlIgnoreCase(format, "raw-private") or eqlIgnoreCase(format, "raw-seed")) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(format, "jwk")) {
+        return switch (key_data) {
+            .jwk => |j| j.d != null,
+            .bytes => false,
+        };
+    }
+    // spki, raw, raw-public, ...
+    return false;
+}
+
+/// The usages permitted for an EC/OKP key of the given privacy, or null if the
+/// algorithm isn't one of the asymmetric algorithms handled here. Real key
+/// import for these isn't implemented yet — this only drives usage validation.
+fn asymmetricAllowedUsages(name: []const u8, is_private: bool) ?[]const []const u8 {
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, "ECDSA") or eqlIgnoreCase(name, "Ed25519") or eqlIgnoreCase(name, "Ed448")) {
+        return if (is_private) &.{"sign"} else &.{"verify"};
+    }
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, "ECDH") or eqlIgnoreCase(name, "X25519") or eqlIgnoreCase(name, "X448")) {
+        return if (is_private) &.{ "deriveKey", "deriveBits" } else &.{};
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+fn eqlIgnoreCase(a: []const u8, b: []const u8) bool {
+    return std.ascii.eqlIgnoreCase(a, b);
+}
+
 /// Exports a key: that is, it takes as input a CryptoKey object and gives you
 /// the key in an external, portable format.
 pub fn exportKey(
@@ -156,9 +282,11 @@ pub fn exportKey(
         return local.resolvePromise(js.ArrayBuffer{ .values = key._key });
     }
 
-    const is_unsupported = std.mem.eql(u8, format, "pkcs8") or
-        std.mem.eql(u8, format, "spki") or std.mem.eql(u8, format, "jwk");
+    if (std.mem.eql(u8, format, "jwk")) {
+        return exportJwk(key, exec);
+    }
 
+    const is_unsupported = std.mem.eql(u8, format, "pkcs8") or std.mem.eql(u8, format, "spki");
     if (is_unsupported) {
         log.warn(.not_implemented, "SubtleCrypto.exportKey", .{ .format = format });
         return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
@@ -167,36 +295,192 @@ pub fn exportKey(
     return local.rejectPromise(.{ .type_error = "invalid format" });
 }
 
-/// Derive a secret key from a master key.
-pub fn deriveBits(
-    _: *const SubtleCrypto,
-    algo: algorithm.Derive,
-    base_key: *const CryptoKey, // Private key.
-    length: usize,
-    exec: *const Execution,
-) !js.Promise {
+/// The JSON Web Key returned for symmetric ("oct") keys.
+const JwkSecret = struct {
+    kty: []const u8 = "oct",
+    k: []const u8,
+    alg: []const u8,
+    ext: bool,
+    key_ops: []const []const u8,
+};
+
+fn exportJwk(key: *CryptoKey, exec: *const Execution) !js.Promise {
     const local = exec.js.local.?;
-    return switch (algo) {
-        .ecdh_or_x25519 => |params| {
-            const name = params.name;
-            if (std.mem.eql(u8, name, "X25519")) {
-                const result = X25519.deriveBits(base_key, params.public, length, exec) catch |err| switch (err) {
-                    error.InvalidAccessError => return local.rejectPromise(.{
-                        .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.InvalidAccessError },
-                    }),
-                    else => return err,
-                };
-
-                return local.resolvePromise(result);
-            }
-
-            if (std.mem.eql(u8, name, "ECDH")) {
-                log.warn(.not_implemented, "SubtleCrypto.deriveBits", .{ .name = name });
-            }
 
+    // The `alg` registry value depends on the algorithm and key length.
+    const alg: []const u8 = switch (key._type) {
+        .aes => try std.fmt.allocPrint(exec.call_arena, "A{d}{s}", .{
+            key._key.len * 8,
+            key._algorithm.name[4..], // strip "AES-"
+        }),
+        .hmac => blk: {
+            const hash: []const u8 = key._algorithm.hash orelse "SHA-";
+            break :blk try std.fmt.allocPrint(exec.call_arena, "HS{s}", .{hash[4..]}); // strip "SHA-"
+        },
+        else => {
+            log.warn(.not_implemented, "SubtleCrypto.exportKey", .{ .format = "jwk", .type = key._type });
             return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
         },
     };
+
+    return local.resolvePromise(JwkSecret{
+        .k = try common.base64Encode(exec.call_arena, key._key),
+        .alg = alg,
+        .ext = key._extractable,
+        .key_ops = try key.getUsages(exec),
+    });
+}
+
+/// Derive an array of bits from a base key. `length` is in bits and may be null
+/// (the WebIDL type is `unsigned long?`).
+pub fn deriveBits(
+    _: *const SubtleCrypto,
+    algo: algorithm.Derive,
+    base_key: *const CryptoKey,
+    length: ?u32,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) !js.Promise {
+    const local = exec.js.local.?;
+    const bits = deriveRaw(algo, base_key, length, base_key.canDeriveBits(), exec) catch |err| {
+        return rejectDerive(local, err);
+    };
+    return local.resolvePromise(js.ArrayBuffer{ .values = bits });
+}
+
+/// Derive a new CryptoKey from a base key: derive the right number of bits for
+/// `derived`, then import them as that key type.
+pub fn deriveKey(
+    _: *const SubtleCrypto,
+    algo: algorithm.Derive,
+    base_key: *const CryptoKey,
+    derived: algorithm.DerivedKey,
+    extractable: bool,
+    key_usages: []const []const u8,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) !js.Promise {
+    const local = exec.js.local.?;
+    // The base key's deriveKey usage (not deriveBits) gates this operation.
+    const usage_ok = base_key.canDeriveKey();
+
+    switch (derived) {
+        .keyed => |k| {
+            if (AES.canonicalName(k.name) == null) {
+                return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
+            }
+            const bits = deriveRaw(algo, base_key, k.length, usage_ok, exec) catch |err| {
+                return rejectDerive(local, err);
+            };
+            return AES.import(k.name, bits, extractable, key_usages, exec);
+        },
+        .hmac => |h| {
+            const hash_name = h.hash.name();
+            const hash_md = crypto.findDigest(hash_name) catch {
+                return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
+            };
+            // Default length, per spec, is the hash's block size (in bits).
+            const length: u32 = h.length orelse @intCast(crypto.EVP_MD_block_size(hash_md) * 8);
+            const bits = deriveRaw(algo, base_key, length, usage_ok, exec) catch |err| {
+                return rejectDerive(local, err);
+            };
+            return HMAC.import(hash_name, bits, extractable, key_usages, exec);
+        },
+        .object, .name => {
+            log.warn(.not_implemented, "SubtleCrypto.deriveKey", .{});
+            return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+/// Shared derivation core for deriveBits/deriveKey. `usage_ok` is the relevant
+/// usage gate already evaluated by the caller. Returns the raw derived bytes.
+fn deriveRaw(
+    algo: algorithm.Derive,
+    base_key: *const CryptoKey,
+    length: ?u32,
+    usage_ok: bool,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) KDF.Error![]const u8 {
+    switch (algo) {
+        .pbkdf2 => |params| return KDF.pbkdf2(base_key, params, length, usage_ok, exec),
+        .hkdf => |params| return KDF.hkdf(base_key, params, length, usage_ok, exec),
+        .ecdh_or_x25519 => |params| {
+            if (!usage_ok) {
+                return error.InvalidAccessError;
+            }
+            // The base key must have been created for this same algorithm.
+            if (!eqlIgnoreCase(base_key._algorithm.name, params.name)) {
+                return error.InvalidAccessError;
+            }
+            if (eqlIgnoreCase(params.name, "X25519")) {
+                // null length means "derive the full shared secret" (256 bits).
+                const result = X25519.deriveBits(base_key, params.public, length orelse 256, exec) catch |err| switch (err) {
+                    error.InvalidAccessError => return error.InvalidAccessError,
+                    error.OutOfMemory => return error.OutOfMemory,
+                    else => return error.OperationError,
+                };
+                return result.values;
+            }
+            if (eqlIgnoreCase(params.name, "ECDH")) {
+                return EC.deriveBits(base_key, params.public, length, exec);
+            }
+            return error.NotSupported;
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+/// Maps a KDF error to the spec-mandated DOMException (OutOfMemory propagates).
+fn rejectDerive(local: *const js.Local, err: KDF.Error) !js.Promise {
+    return switch (err) {
+        error.InvalidAccessError => local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.InvalidAccessError } }),
+        error.NotSupported => local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } }),
+        error.OperationError => local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.OperationError } }),
+        error.OutOfMemory => error.OutOfMemory,
+    };
+}
+
+/// Encrypts data with the given key and algorithm.
+pub fn encrypt(
+    _: *const SubtleCrypto,
+    algo: algorithm.Encrypt,
+    key: *CryptoKey,
+    data: js.TypedArray(u8),
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) !js.Promise {
+    return cryptOp(algo, key, data.values, true, exec);
+}
+
+/// Decrypts data with the given key and algorithm.
+pub fn decrypt(
+    _: *const SubtleCrypto,
+    algo: algorithm.Encrypt,
+    key: *CryptoKey,
+    data: js.TypedArray(u8),
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) !js.Promise {
+    return cryptOp(algo, key, data.values, false, exec);
+}
+
+fn cryptOp(
+    algo: algorithm.Encrypt,
+    key: *CryptoKey,
+    data: []const u8,
+    encrypting: bool,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) !js.Promise {
+    const local = exec.js.local.?;
+    const params = switch (algo) {
+        .params => |p| p,
+        // A bare string identifier carries no iv/counter, so it can't drive AES.
+        .name => return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } }),
+    };
+
+    const out = AES.crypt(params, key, data, encrypting, exec) catch |err| switch (err) {
+        error.InvalidAccessError => return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.InvalidAccessError } }),
+        error.OperationError => return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.OperationError } }),
+        error.NotSupported => return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } }),
+        error.OutOfMemory => return error.OutOfMemory,
+    };
+    return local.resolvePromise(js.ArrayBuffer{ .values = out });
 }
 
 /// Generate a digital signature.
@@ -238,15 +522,31 @@ pub fn verify(
     };
 }
 
+/// `digest()` accepts an AlgorithmIdentifier: either a bare string (`"SHA-256"`)
+/// or an object (`{name: "SHA-256"}`). The object variant must come first — a
+/// `[]const u8` coerces *any* JS value to a string, so it has to be the fallback.
+const DigestInput = union(enum) {
+    obj: struct { name: []const u8 },
+    str: []const u8,
+
+    fn name(self: DigestInput) []const u8 {
+        return switch (self) {
+            .obj => |o| o.name,
+            .str => |s| s,
+        };
+    }
+};
+
 /// Generates a digest of the given data, using the specified hash function.
-pub fn digest(_: *const SubtleCrypto, algo: []const u8, data: js.TypedArray(u8), exec: *const Execution) !js.Promise {
+pub fn digest(_: *const SubtleCrypto, algo: DigestInput, data: js.TypedArray(u8), exec: *const Execution) !js.Promise {
     const local = exec.js.local.?;
 
-    if (algo.len > 10) {
+    const algo_name = algo.name();
+    if (algo_name.len > 10) {
         return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
     }
 
-    const normalized = std.ascii.upperString(exec.buf, algo);
+    const normalized = std.ascii.upperString(exec.buf, algo_name);
     const digest_type = crypto.findDigest(normalized) catch {
         return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
     };
@@ -271,9 +571,13 @@ pub const JsApi = struct {
     };
 
     pub const generateKey = bridge.function(SubtleCrypto.generateKey, .{ .dom_exception = true });
+    pub const importKey = bridge.function(SubtleCrypto.importKey, .{ .dom_exception = true });
     pub const exportKey = bridge.function(SubtleCrypto.exportKey, .{ .dom_exception = true });
+    pub const encrypt = bridge.function(SubtleCrypto.encrypt, .{ .dom_exception = true });
+    pub const decrypt = bridge.function(SubtleCrypto.decrypt, .{ .dom_exception = true });
     pub const sign = bridge.function(SubtleCrypto.sign, .{ .dom_exception = true });
     pub const verify = bridge.function(SubtleCrypto.verify, .{ .dom_exception = true });
     pub const deriveBits = bridge.function(SubtleCrypto.deriveBits, .{ .dom_exception = true });
+    pub const deriveKey = bridge.function(SubtleCrypto.deriveKey, .{ .dom_exception = true });
     pub const digest = bridge.function(SubtleCrypto.digest, .{ .dom_exception = true });
 };

src/browser/webapi/crypto/AES.zig

@@ -16,32 +16,44 @@
 // You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
 // along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 
-//! AES generateKey parameter validation.
-//!
-//! Key generation itself is not implemented; this module rejects malformed
-//! input with the spec-mandated error name so the failure-path WPT tests
-//! match. Successful inputs fall through to the caller's `not_implemented`
-//! warning + `NotSupportedError`.
+//! AES for AES-CBC/CTR/GCM/KW: key generation, import, and encrypt/decrypt
+//! (CBC/CTR/GCM). Keys are raw byte strings; wrapKey/unwrapKey is not yet
+//! implemented.
 
 const std = @import("std");
+const lp = @import("lightpanda");
+const crypto = @import("../../../sys/libcrypto.zig");
 
+const js = @import("../../js/js.zig");
+const CryptoKey = @import("../CryptoKey.zig");
+
+const common = @import("common.zig");
 const algorithm = @import("algorithm.zig");
 
+const Execution = js.Execution;
+
+pub fn canonicalName(name: []const u8) ?[]const u8 {
+    inline for ([_][]const u8{ "AES-CBC", "AES-CTR", "AES-GCM", "AES-KW" }) |canonical| {
+        if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, canonical)) return canonical;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+/// The usages permitted for the given AES variant.
+fn allowedUsages(name: []const u8) ?[]const []const u8 {
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, "AES-CBC") or eqlIgnoreCase(name, "AES-CTR") or eqlIgnoreCase(name, "AES-GCM")) {
+        return &.{ "encrypt", "decrypt", "wrapKey", "unwrapKey" };
+    }
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, "AES-KW")) {
+        return &.{ "wrapKey", "unwrapKey" };
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
 /// Per WebCrypto: "Generate Key" operation for AES-CBC/CTR/GCM/KW.
 /// Validation order matches the spec: usages → length → empty usages.
 pub fn validate(params: algorithm.Init.AesKeyGen, key_usages: []const []const u8) !void {
-    const allowed: []const []const u8 = blk: {
-        if (eql(params.name, "AES-CBC") or
-            eql(params.name, "AES-CTR") or
-            eql(params.name, "AES-GCM"))
-        {
-            break :blk &.{ "encrypt", "decrypt", "wrapKey", "unwrapKey" };
-        }
-        if (eql(params.name, "AES-KW")) {
-            break :blk &.{ "wrapKey", "unwrapKey" };
-        }
-        return error.NotSupported;
-    };
+    const allowed = allowedUsages(params.name) orelse return error.NotSupported;
 
     for (key_usages) |usage| {
         var ok = false;
@@ -65,6 +77,282 @@ pub fn validate(params: algorithm.Init.AesKeyGen, key_usages: []const []const u8
     }
 }
 
-fn eql(a: []const u8, b: []const u8) bool {
+/// Generates a fresh AES key (random bytes of the requested length).
+pub fn generate(
+    params: algorithm.Init.AesKeyGen,
+    extractable: bool,
+    key_usages: []const []const u8,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) !js.Promise {
+    const local = exec.js.local.?;
+    validate(params, key_usages) catch |err| {
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = err } });
+    };
+
+    // validate() already confirmed the usages and length are well-formed.
+    const allowed = allowedUsages(params.name).?;
+    const mask = common.usageMask(allowed, key_usages) catch unreachable;
+
+    const key = try exec.arena.alloc(u8, params.length / 8);
+
+    const res = crypto.RAND_bytes(key.ptr, key.len);
+    lp.assert(res == 1, "AES.generate", .{ .res = res });
+
+    const crypto_key = try exec._factory.create(CryptoKey{
+        ._type = .aes,
+        ._kind = .secret,
+        ._extractable = extractable,
+        ._usages = mask,
+        ._key = key,
+        ._algorithm = .{ .name = canonicalName(params.name).? },
+    });
+
+    return local.resolvePromise(crypto_key);
+}
+
+/// Imports raw AES key material (from the `raw` or `jwk` formats; the caller has
+/// already turned both into the underlying bytes).
+pub fn import(
+    name: []const u8,
+    raw: []const u8,
+    extractable: bool,
+    key_usages: []const []const u8,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) !js.Promise {
+    const local = exec.js.local.?;
+
+    const canonical = canonicalName(name) orelse {
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
+    };
+
+    const mask = common.usageMask(allowedUsages(name).?, key_usages) catch |err| {
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = err } });
+    };
+
+    if (raw.len != 16 and raw.len != 24 and raw.len != 32) {
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.DataError } });
+    }
+
+    const key = try exec.arena.dupe(u8, raw);
+    const crypto_key = try exec._factory.create(CryptoKey{
+        ._type = .aes,
+        ._kind = .secret,
+        ._extractable = extractable,
+        ._usages = mask,
+        ._key = key,
+        ._algorithm = .{ .name = canonical },
+    });
+
+    return local.resolvePromise(crypto_key);
+}
+
+pub const CipherError = error{ InvalidAccessError, OperationError, NotSupported, OutOfMemory };
+
+const Mode = enum { cbc, ctr, gcm };
+
+fn modeFor(name: []const u8) ?Mode {
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, "AES-CBC")) return .cbc;
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, "AES-CTR")) return .ctr;
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, "AES-GCM")) return .gcm;
+    return null;
+}
+
+fn cipherFor(mode: Mode, key_len: usize) ?*const crypto.EVP_CIPHER {
+    return switch (mode) {
+        .cbc => switch (key_len) {
+            16 => crypto.EVP_aes_128_cbc(),
+            24 => crypto.EVP_aes_192_cbc(),
+            32 => crypto.EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
+            else => null,
+        },
+        .ctr => switch (key_len) {
+            16 => crypto.EVP_aes_128_ctr(),
+            24 => crypto.EVP_aes_192_ctr(),
+            32 => crypto.EVP_aes_256_ctr(),
+            else => null,
+        },
+        .gcm => switch (key_len) {
+            16 => crypto.EVP_aes_128_gcm(),
+            24 => crypto.EVP_aes_192_gcm(),
+            32 => crypto.EVP_aes_256_gcm(),
+            else => null,
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+/// AES encrypt (`encrypting = true`) or decrypt. Returns the resulting bytes
+/// (ciphertext for GCM includes the appended tag).
+pub fn crypt(
+    params: anytype, // algorithm.Encrypt.params
+    key: *const CryptoKey,
+    data: []const u8,
+    encrypting: bool,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) CipherError![]const u8 {
+    const mode = modeFor(params.name) orelse return error.NotSupported;
+
+    // The key must be an AES key for this exact algorithm, with the matching
+    // usage.
+    if (key._type != .aes or !eqlIgnoreCase(key._algorithm.name, params.name)) {
+        return error.InvalidAccessError;
+    }
+    if ((encrypting and !key.canEncrypt()) or (!encrypting and !key.canDecrypt())) {
+        return error.InvalidAccessError;
+    }
+
+    const cipher = cipherFor(mode, key._key.len) orelse return error.OperationError;
+    return switch (mode) {
+        .cbc => cbcOrCtr(cipher, key._key, ivOf(params.iv) orelse return error.OperationError, data, encrypting, true, exec),
+        .ctr => blk: {
+            // The counter `length` (bits of the block used as the counter) must
+            // be in 1..128.
+            const len = params.length orelse return error.OperationError;
+            if (len == 0 or len > 128) return error.OperationError;
+            break :blk cbcOrCtr(cipher, key._key, ivOf(params.counter) orelse return error.OperationError, data, encrypting, false, exec);
+        },
+        .gcm => gcm(cipher, key._key, params, data, encrypting, exec),
+    };
+}
+
+fn ivOf(opt: anytype) ?[]const u8 {
+    const v = opt orelse return null;
+    return v.values;
+}
+
+// libcrypto's EVP_*Init/Update/Final are distinct functions for encrypt vs
+// decrypt; extern fns can't be selected into a runtime variable, so branch here.
+fn cipherInit(ctx: *crypto.EVP_CIPHER_CTX, cipher: ?*const crypto.EVP_CIPHER, key: [*c]const u8, iv: [*c]const u8, encrypting: bool) c_int {
+    return if (encrypting)
+        crypto.EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, null, key, iv)
+    else
+        crypto.EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, null, key, iv);
+}
+
+fn cipherUpdate(ctx: *crypto.EVP_CIPHER_CTX, out: [*c]u8, out_len: *c_int, in: [*c]const u8, in_len: c_int, encrypting: bool) c_int {
+    return if (encrypting)
+        crypto.EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, out_len, in, in_len)
+    else
+        crypto.EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, out, out_len, in, in_len);
+}
+
+fn cbcOrCtr(
+    cipher: *const crypto.EVP_CIPHER,
+    key: []const u8,
+    iv: []const u8,
+    data: []const u8,
+    encrypting: bool,
+    padded: bool, // CBC pads, CTR does not
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) CipherError![]const u8 {
+    if (iv.len != 16) return error.OperationError;
+
+    const ctx = crypto.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() orelse return error.OutOfMemory;
+    defer crypto.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    if (cipherInit(ctx, cipher, @ptrCast(key.ptr), @ptrCast(iv.ptr), encrypting) != 1) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+    if (!padded) {
+        _ = crypto.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
+    }
+
+    // Block ciphers may emit up to one extra block on top of the input.
+    const out = try exec.call_arena.alloc(u8, data.len + 16);
+    var out_len: c_int = 0;
+    if (cipherUpdate(ctx, out.ptr, &out_len, @ptrCast(data.ptr), @intCast(data.len), encrypting) != 1) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+
+    var final_len: c_int = 0;
+    const tail = out.ptr + @as(usize, @intCast(out_len));
+    // Decrypt final fails on bad padding → OperationError, per spec.
+    const final_ok = if (encrypting)
+        crypto.EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, tail, &final_len)
+    else
+        crypto.EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, tail, &final_len);
+    if (final_ok != 1) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+
+    return out[0..@intCast(out_len + final_len)];
+}
+
+fn gcm(
+    cipher: *const crypto.EVP_CIPHER,
+    key: []const u8,
+    params: anytype,
+    data: []const u8,
+    encrypting: bool,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) CipherError![]const u8 {
+    const iv = ivOf(params.iv) orelse return error.OperationError;
+
+    const tag_bits = params.tagLength orelse 128;
+    switch (tag_bits) {
+        32, 64, 96, 104, 112, 120, 128 => {},
+        else => return error.OperationError,
+    }
+    const tag_len: usize = tag_bits / 8;
+
+    const ctx = crypto.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() orelse return error.OutOfMemory;
+    defer crypto.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    if (cipherInit(ctx, cipher, null, null, encrypting) != 1) return error.OperationError;
+    if (crypto.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, crypto.EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, @intCast(iv.len), null) != 1) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+    if (cipherInit(ctx, null, @ptrCast(key.ptr), @ptrCast(iv.ptr), encrypting) != 1) return error.OperationError;
+
+    // Additional authenticated data (optional), fed with a null output buffer.
+    if (ivOf(params.additionalData)) |aad| {
+        if (aad.len > 0) {
+            var aad_len: c_int = 0;
+            if (cipherUpdate(ctx, null, &aad_len, @ptrCast(aad.ptr), @intCast(aad.len), encrypting) != 1) {
+                return error.OperationError;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (encrypting) {
+        const out = try exec.call_arena.alloc(u8, data.len + tag_len);
+        var out_len: c_int = 0;
+        if (data.len > 0 and cipherUpdate(ctx, out.ptr, &out_len, @ptrCast(data.ptr), @intCast(data.len), true) != 1) {
+            return error.OperationError;
+        }
+        var final_len: c_int = 0;
+        if (crypto.EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out.ptr + @as(usize, @intCast(out_len)), &final_len) != 1) {
+            return error.OperationError;
+        }
+        const written: usize = @intCast(out_len + final_len);
+        // Append the authentication tag.
+        if (crypto.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, crypto.EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, @intCast(tag_len), out.ptr + written) != 1) {
+            return error.OperationError;
+        }
+        return out[0 .. written + tag_len];
+    }
+
+    // Decrypt: the ciphertext carries the tag as its final `tag_len` bytes.
+    if (data.len < tag_len) return error.OperationError;
+    const ct = data[0 .. data.len - tag_len];
+    const tag = data[data.len - tag_len ..];
+
+    if (crypto.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, crypto.EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, @intCast(tag_len), @ptrCast(@constCast(tag.ptr))) != 1) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+
+    const out = try exec.call_arena.alloc(u8, ct.len + 16);
+    var out_len: c_int = 0;
+    if (ct.len > 0 and cipherUpdate(ctx, out.ptr, &out_len, @ptrCast(ct.ptr), @intCast(ct.len), false) != 1) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+    var final_len: c_int = 0;
+    // Tag verification happens here: failure → OperationError.
+    if (crypto.EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out.ptr + @as(usize, @intCast(out_len)), &final_len) != 1) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+    return out[0..@intCast(out_len + final_len)];
+}
+
+fn eqlIgnoreCase(a: []const u8, b: []const u8) bool {
     return std.ascii.eqlIgnoreCase(a, b);
 }

src/browser/webapi/crypto/EC.zig

@@ -16,43 +16,69 @@
 // You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
 // along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 
-//! ECDSA / ECDH generateKey parameter validation. See AES.zig for
-//! the rationale on validate-without-generate.
+//! ECDSA / ECDH key generation, import (spki/pkcs8 via DER) and ECDH key
+//! agreement. Key bytes live as a libcrypto EVP_PKEY in `CryptoKey._vary.pkey`.
 
 const std = @import("std");
+const lp = @import("lightpanda");
+const crypto = @import("../../../sys/libcrypto.zig");
 
+const js = @import("../../js/js.zig");
+const CryptoKey = @import("../CryptoKey.zig");
+
+const common = @import("common.zig");
 const algorithm = @import("algorithm.zig");
 
+const Execution = js.Execution;
+
+/// Errors mapped to DOMException names by the caller.
+pub const Error = error{ InvalidAccessError, NotSupported, OperationError, OutOfMemory };
+
+/// The registered name (case-insensitive), or null if not an EC algorithm.
+pub fn canonicalName(name: []const u8) ?[]const u8 {
+    inline for ([_][]const u8{ "ECDSA", "ECDH" }) |canonical| {
+        if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, canonical)) return canonical;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+fn curveNid(named_curve: []const u8) ?c_int {
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(named_curve, "P-256")) return crypto.NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(named_curve, "P-384")) return crypto.NID_secp384r1;
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(named_curve, "P-521")) return crypto.NID_secp521r1;
+    return null;
+}
+
+fn curveCanonical(named_curve: []const u8) ?[]const u8 {
+    inline for ([_][]const u8{ "P-256", "P-384", "P-521" }) |c| {
+        if (eqlIgnoreCase(named_curve, c)) return c;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+/// The (private, public) usages legal for the algorithm.
+fn usageSets(name: []const u8) struct { private: []const []const u8, public: []const []const u8 } {
+    if (eqlIgnoreCase(name, "ECDSA")) {
+        return .{ .private = &.{"sign"}, .public = &.{"verify"} };
+    }
+    // ECDH
+    return .{ .private = &.{ "deriveKey", "deriveBits" }, .public = &.{} };
+}
+
 pub fn validate(params: algorithm.Init.EcKeyGen, key_usages: []const []const u8) !void {
-    const allowed: []const []const u8 = blk: {
-        if (eql(params.name, "ECDSA")) {
-            break :blk &.{ "sign", "verify" };
-        }
-        if (eql(params.name, "ECDH")) {
-            break :blk &.{ "deriveKey", "deriveBits" };
-        }
+    const sets = blk: {
+        if (eqlIgnoreCase(params.name, "ECDSA") or eqlIgnoreCase(params.name, "ECDH")) break :blk usageSets(params.name);
         return error.NotSupported;
     };
-
+    // A usage that belongs to neither the private nor the public set is illegal.
     for (key_usages) |usage| {
-        var ok = false;
-        for (allowed) |a| {
-            if (std.mem.eql(u8, a, usage)) {
-                ok = true;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        if (!ok) {
+        if (!contains(sets.private, usage) and !contains(sets.public, usage)) {
             return error.SyntaxError;
         }
     }
 
-    // Per spec, an unsupported `namedCurve` is NotSupportedError, not OperationError —
-    // unlike AES length, where the algorithm registers the value as invalid.
-    if (!eql(params.namedCurve, "P-256") and
-        !eql(params.namedCurve, "P-384") and
-        !eql(params.namedCurve, "P-521"))
-    {
+    if (curveNid(params.namedCurve) == null) {
+        // Per spec, an unsupported `namedCurve` is NotSupportedError.
         return error.NotSupported;
     }
 
@@ -61,6 +87,197 @@ pub fn validate(params: algorithm.Init.EcKeyGen, key_usages: []const []const u8)
     }
 }
 
-fn eql(a: []const u8, b: []const u8) bool {
+/// Generates an EC key pair on the requested curve.
+pub fn generate(
+    params: algorithm.Init.EcKeyGen,
+    extractable: bool,
+    key_usages: []const []const u8,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) !js.Promise {
+    const local = exec.js.local.?;
+    validate(params, key_usages) catch |err| {
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = err } });
+    };
+
+    const name = canonicalName(params.name).?;
+    const curve = curveCanonical(params.namedCurve).?;
+    const nid = curveNid(params.namedCurve).?;
+    const sets = usageSets(name);
+
+    // Split the requested usages across the pair: each key keeps only the
+    // usages legal for it. validate() already rejected anything illegal.
+    const private_mask = maskOf(sets.private, key_usages);
+    const public_mask = maskOf(sets.public, key_usages);
+
+    const ec = crypto.EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid) orelse return error.OutOfMemory;
+    defer crypto.EC_KEY_free(ec);
+    if (crypto.EC_KEY_generate_key(ec) != 1) {
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.OperationError } });
+    }
+
+    const private_pkey = crypto.EVP_PKEY_new() orelse return error.OutOfMemory;
+    errdefer crypto.EVP_PKEY_free(private_pkey);
+    if (crypto.EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(private_pkey, ec) != 1) return error.OutOfMemory;
+
+    // A public-only EVP_PKEY (same curve, just the public point) for the peer.
+    const pub_ec = crypto.EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid) orelse return error.OutOfMemory;
+    defer crypto.EC_KEY_free(pub_ec);
+    const point = crypto.EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) orelse return error.OperationError;
+    if (crypto.EC_KEY_set_public_key(pub_ec, point) != 1) return error.OperationError;
+    const public_pkey = crypto.EVP_PKEY_new() orelse return error.OutOfMemory;
+    errdefer crypto.EVP_PKEY_free(public_pkey);
+    if (crypto.EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(public_pkey, pub_ec) != 1) return error.OutOfMemory;
+
+    const private = try exec._factory.create(CryptoKey{
+        ._type = .ec,
+        ._kind = .private,
+        ._extractable = extractable,
+        ._usages = private_mask,
+        ._key = &.{},
+        ._algorithm = .{ .name = name, .named_curve = curve },
+        ._vary = .{ .pkey = private_pkey },
+    });
+    errdefer exec._factory.destroy(private);
+
+    const public = try exec._factory.create(CryptoKey{
+        ._type = .ec,
+        ._kind = .public,
+        // Public keys are always extractable.
+        ._extractable = true,
+        ._usages = public_mask,
+        ._key = &.{},
+        ._algorithm = .{ .name = name, .named_curve = curve },
+        ._vary = .{ .pkey = public_pkey },
+    });
+
+    return local.resolvePromise(CryptoKey.Pair{ .privateKey = private, .publicKey = public });
+}
+
+/// Imports an EC key from DER (`spki` public / `pkcs8` private). jwk/raw aren't
+/// handled yet. libcrypto parses the DER, so a malformed structure is DataError.
+pub fn import(
+    name: []const u8,
+    named_curve: []const u8,
+    format: []const u8,
+    der: []const u8,
+    is_private: bool,
+    extractable: bool,
+    usages_mask: u8,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) !js.Promise {
+    const local = exec.js.local.?;
+
+    const canonical = canonicalName(name).?;
+    const curve = curveCanonical(named_curve) orelse {
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
+    };
+
+    var ptr: [*c]const u8 = der.ptr;
+    const pkey: *crypto.EVP_PKEY = blk: {
+        if (std.mem.eql(u8, format, "spki")) {
+            break :blk crypto.d2i_PUBKEY(null, &ptr, @intCast(der.len)) orelse {
+                return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.DataError } });
+            };
+        }
+        if (std.mem.eql(u8, format, "pkcs8")) {
+            break :blk crypto.d2i_AutoPrivateKey(null, &ptr, @intCast(der.len)) orelse {
+                return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.DataError } });
+            };
+        }
+        // jwk / raw not implemented yet.
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported } });
+    };
+    errdefer crypto.EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+    if (crypto.EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != crypto.EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.DataError } });
+    }
+
+    const crypto_key = try exec._factory.create(CryptoKey{
+        ._type = .ec,
+        ._kind = if (is_private) .private else .public,
+        ._extractable = extractable,
+        ._usages = usages_mask,
+        ._key = &.{},
+        ._algorithm = .{ .name = canonical, .named_curve = curve },
+        ._vary = .{ .pkey = pkey },
+    });
+
+    return local.resolvePromise(crypto_key);
+}
+
+/// ECDH key agreement: derive `length_in_bits` from `private` + the peer
+/// `public`. Mirrors X25519's truncation rules.
+pub fn deriveBits(
+    private: *const CryptoKey,
+    public: *const CryptoKey,
+    length_in_bits: ?u32,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) Error![]const u8 {
+    // The peer must be an ECDH *public* key on the *same* curve.
+    if (public._type != .ec or public._kind != .public) {
+        return error.InvalidAccessError;
+    }
+    if (!eqlIgnoreCase(public._algorithm.name, "ECDH")) {
+        return error.InvalidAccessError;
+    }
+    if (!eqlIgnoreCase(private._algorithm.named_curve orelse "", public._algorithm.named_curve orelse "")) {
+        return error.InvalidAccessError;
+    }
+
+    const ctx = crypto.EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(private.getKeyObject(), null) orelse return error.OperationError;
+    defer crypto.EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    if (crypto.EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 or crypto.EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, public.getKeyObject()) != 1) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+
+    // First call with a null buffer reports the full shared-secret length.
+    var secret_len: usize = 0;
+    if (crypto.EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, null, &secret_len) != 1 or secret_len == 0) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+    const secret = try exec.call_arena.alloc(u8, secret_len);
+    if (crypto.EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, secret.ptr, &secret_len) != 1) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+
+    // null length means "the full shared secret".
+    const bits = length_in_bits orelse @as(u32, @intCast(secret_len * 8));
+    const byte_len = (bits + 7) / 8;
+    if (byte_len > secret_len) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+    const out = secret[0..byte_len];
+
+    // Zero the unused trailing bits of the final byte.
+    const remainder_bits: u3 = @intCast(bits % 8);
+    if (remainder_bits != 0 and out.len > 0) {
+        out[out.len - 1] &= ~(@as(u8, 0xFF) >> remainder_bits);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+fn contains(set: []const []const u8, usage: []const u8) bool {
+    for (set) |s| {
+        if (std.mem.eql(u8, s, usage)) {
+            return true;
+        }
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+
+/// The usage bitmask of those `usages` that belong to `set`.
+fn maskOf(set: []const []const u8, usages: []const []const u8) u8 {
+    var mask: u8 = 0;
+    for (usages) |u| {
+        if (contains(set, u)) {
+            mask |= common.usageBit(u).?;
+        }
+    }
+    return mask;
+}
+
+fn eqlIgnoreCase(a: []const u8, b: []const u8) bool {
     return std.ascii.eqlIgnoreCase(a, b);
 }

src/browser/webapi/crypto/HMAC.zig

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ const crypto = @import("../../../sys/libcrypto.zig");
 
 const js = @import("../../js/js.zig");
 const algorithm = @import("algorithm.zig");
+const common = @import("common.zig");
 
 const CryptoKey = @import("../CryptoKey.zig");
 
@@ -36,12 +37,13 @@ pub fn init(
     exec: *const Execution,
 ) !js.Promise {
     const local = exec.js.local.?;
-    // Per spec, an unrecognized hash is caught during algorithm normalization
-    // and surfaces as NotSupportedError.
-    const digest = crypto.findDigest(switch (params.hash) {
+    const hash_name = switch (params.hash) {
         .string => |str| str,
         .object => |obj| obj.name,
-    }) catch return local.rejectPromise(.{
+    };
+    // Per spec, an unrecognized hash is caught during algorithm normalization
+    // and surfaces as NotSupportedError.
+    const digest = crypto.findDigest(hash_name) catch return local.rejectPromise(.{
         .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported },
     });
 
@@ -76,7 +78,6 @@ pub fn init(
 
     // Should we reject this in promise too?
     const key = try exec.arena.alloc(u8, block_size);
-    errdefer exec.arena.free(key);
 
     // HMAC is simply CSPRNG.
     const res = crypto.RAND_bytes(key.ptr, key.len);
@@ -87,6 +88,46 @@ pub fn init(
         ._extractable = extractable,
         ._usages = mask,
         ._key = key,
+        ._algorithm = .{ .name = "HMAC", .hash = try exec.arena.dupe(u8, hash_name) },
+        ._vary = .{ .digest = digest },
+    });
+
+    return local.resolvePromise(crypto_key);
+}
+
+/// Imports raw HMAC key material (from the `raw` or `jwk` formats; the caller
+/// has already turned both into the underlying bytes).
+pub fn import(
+    hash_name: []const u8,
+    raw: []const u8,
+    extractable: bool,
+    key_usages: []const []const u8,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) !js.Promise {
+    const local = exec.js.local.?;
+
+    const digest = crypto.findDigest(hash_name) catch return local.rejectPromise(.{
+        .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.NotSupported },
+    });
+
+    const mask = common.usageMask(&.{ "sign", "verify" }, key_usages) catch |err| {
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = err } });
+    };
+
+    if (raw.len == 0) {
+        return local.rejectPromise(.{ .dom_exception = .{ .err = error.DataError } });
+    }
+
+    const key = try exec.arena.dupe(u8, raw);
+    errdefer exec.arena.free(key);
+
+    const crypto_key = try exec._factory.create(CryptoKey{
+        ._type = .hmac,
+        ._kind = .secret,
+        ._extractable = extractable,
+        ._usages = mask,
+        ._key = key,
+        ._algorithm = .{ .name = "HMAC", .hash = try exec.arena.dupe(u8, hash_name) },
         ._vary = .{ .digest = digest },
     });
 

src/browser/webapi/crypto/KDF.zig

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2023-2026 Lightpanda (Selecy SAS)
+//
+// Francis Bouvier <francis@lightpanda.io>
+// Pierre Tachoire <pierre@lightpanda.io>
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as
+// published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the
+// License, or (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+//! Key-derivation functions for `deriveBits()`: PBKDF2 and HKDF. Both operate
+//! on a raw "secret" base key (imported via the `raw` format).
+
+const std = @import("std");
+
+const js = @import("../../js/js.zig");
+const CryptoKey = @import("../CryptoKey.zig");
+const crypto = @import("../../../sys/libcrypto.zig");
+
+const algorithm = @import("algorithm.zig");
+
+const Execution = js.Execution;
+
+/// Errors a derivation can raise, each mapping to a specific DOMException name.
+pub const Error = error{ InvalidAccessError, NotSupported, OperationError, OutOfMemory };
+
+/// Validates the base key against the requested algorithm (shared by PBKDF2 and
+/// HKDF). `usage_ok` is the caller-checked usage gate (deriveBits for
+/// `deriveBits()`, deriveKey for `deriveKey()`); the key must also have been
+/// created for this same algorithm. Either mismatch is an InvalidAccessError.
+fn checkBaseKey(base_key: *const CryptoKey, name: []const u8, usage_ok: bool) Error!void {
+    if (!usage_ok) {
+        return error.InvalidAccessError;
+    }
+    if (!std.ascii.eqlIgnoreCase(base_key._algorithm.name, name)) {
+        return error.InvalidAccessError;
+    }
+}
+
+/// `length` is the requested output size in bits: null and non-multiples of 8
+/// are OperationErrors. Returns the output byte length.
+fn outputLen(length: ?u32) Error!usize {
+    const bits = length orelse return error.OperationError;
+    if (bits % 8 != 0) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+    return bits / 8;
+}
+
+pub fn pbkdf2(
+    base_key: *const CryptoKey,
+    params: algorithm.Derive.Pbkdf2Params,
+    length: ?u32,
+    usage_ok: bool,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) Error![]const u8 {
+    try checkBaseKey(base_key, "PBKDF2", usage_ok);
+    const digest = crypto.findDigest(params.hash.name()) catch return error.NotSupported;
+    const out = try exec.call_arena.alloc(u8, try outputLen(length));
+    // A zero-length derivation is valid and yields an empty buffer; the C
+    // routines reject a zero output length, so short-circuit here.
+    if (out.len == 0) {
+        return out;
+    }
+
+    const salt = params.salt.values;
+    const res = crypto.PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(
+        @ptrCast(base_key._key.ptr),
+        base_key._key.len,
+        @ptrCast(salt.ptr),
+        salt.len,
+        params.iterations,
+        digest,
+        out.len,
+        out.ptr,
+    );
+    if (res != 1) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+pub fn hkdf(
+    base_key: *const CryptoKey,
+    params: algorithm.Derive.HkdfParams,
+    length: ?u32,
+    usage_ok: bool,
+    exec: *const Execution,
+) Error![]const u8 {
+    try checkBaseKey(base_key, "HKDF", usage_ok);
+    const digest = crypto.findDigest(params.hash.name()) catch return error.NotSupported;
+    const out = try exec.call_arena.alloc(u8, try outputLen(length));
+    // A zero-length derivation is valid and yields an empty buffer; the C
+    // routines reject a zero output length, so short-circuit here.
+    if (out.len == 0) {
+        return out;
+    }
+
+    const salt = params.salt.values;
+    const info = params.info.values;
+    const res = crypto.HKDF(
+        out.ptr,
+        out.len,
+        digest,
+        @ptrCast(base_key._key.ptr),
+        base_key._key.len,
+        @ptrCast(salt.ptr),
+        salt.len,
+        @ptrCast(info.ptr),
+        info.len,
+    );
+    if (res != 1) {
+        return error.OperationError;
+    }
+    return out;
+}

src/browser/webapi/crypto/X25519.zig

@@ -93,20 +93,24 @@ pub fn init(
 
     const private = try exec._factory.create(CryptoKey{
         ._type = .x25519,
+        ._kind = .private,
         ._extractable = extractable,
         ._usages = mask,
         ._key = private_key,
+        ._algorithm = .{ .name = "X25519" },
         ._vary = .{ .pkey = private_pkey },
     });
     errdefer exec._factory.destroy(private);
 
     const public = try exec._factory.create(CryptoKey{
         ._type = .x25519,
+        ._kind = .public,
         // Public keys are always extractable.
         ._extractable = true,
         // Always empty for public key.
         ._usages = 0,
         ._key = public_value,
+        ._algorithm = .{ .name = "X25519" },
         ._vary = .{ .pkey = public_pkey },
     });
 

src/browser/webapi/crypto/algorithm.zig

@@ -89,9 +89,126 @@ pub const Init = union(enum) {
     };
 };
 
-/// Algorithm for deriveBits() and deriveKey().
+/// Algorithm for deriveBits() and deriveKey(). Variants are distinguished by
+/// their required members (`iterations` for PBKDF2, `info` for HKDF, `public`
+/// for ECDH/X25519), so probe order doesn't cause ambiguity.
 pub const Derive = union(enum) {
+    pbkdf2: Pbkdf2Params,
+    hkdf: HkdfParams,
     ecdh_or_x25519: Init.EcdhKeyDeriveParams,
+
+    /// A hash AlgorithmIdentifier — either `"SHA-256"` or `{name: "SHA-256"}`.
+    pub const Hash = union(enum) {
+        string: []const u8,
+        object: struct { name: []const u8 },
+
+        pub fn name(self: Hash) []const u8 {
+            return switch (self) {
+                .string => |s| s,
+                .object => |o| o.name,
+            };
+        }
+    };
+
+    pub const Pbkdf2Params = struct {
+        name: []const u8,
+        hash: Hash,
+        salt: js.TypedArray(u8),
+        iterations: u32,
+    };
+
+    pub const HkdfParams = struct {
+        name: []const u8,
+        hash: Hash,
+        salt: js.TypedArray(u8),
+        info: js.TypedArray(u8),
+    };
+};
+
+/// The `derivedKeyType` argument to `deriveKey()` — the algorithm of the key to
+/// produce. HMAC carries a hash; AES carries a length. Probed in that order so
+/// the more specific shapes win.
+pub const DerivedKey = union(enum) {
+    hmac: struct { name: []const u8, hash: Derive.Hash, length: ?u32 = null },
+    keyed: struct { name: []const u8, length: u32 },
+    object: struct { name: []const u8 },
+    name: []const u8,
+};
+
+/// Algorithm passed to `importKey()`. HMAC carries a hash, so it must be probed
+/// before the bare-`{name}` object; the plain string is the final fallback (any
+/// JS value coerces to a string).
+pub const Import = union(enum) {
+    hmac: struct {
+        name: []const u8,
+        hash: union(enum) {
+            string: []const u8,
+            object: struct { name: []const u8 },
+        },
+        length: ?u32 = null,
+    },
+    ec: struct { name: []const u8, namedCurve: []const u8 },
+    object: struct { name: []const u8 },
+    name: []const u8,
+
+    pub fn algoName(self: Import) []const u8 {
+        return switch (self) {
+            .hmac => |h| h.name,
+            .ec => |e| e.name,
+            .object => |o| o.name,
+            .name => |n| n,
+        };
+    }
+
+    /// The `namedCurve` if this is an EC import, else empty.
+    pub fn namedCurve(self: Import) []const u8 {
+        return switch (self) {
+            .ec => |e| e.namedCurve,
+            else => "",
+        };
+    }
+};
+
+/// Key material handed to `importKey()`: either a BufferSource (raw/spki/pkcs8)
+/// or a JSON Web Key object (jwk). `bytes` is probed first — a JWK is a plain
+/// object and won't coerce to a TypedArray.
+pub const KeyData = union(enum) {
+    bytes: js.TypedArray(u8),
+    jwk: Jwk,
+
+    /// Minimal JWK fields we read on import. Symmetric ("oct") keys only need
+    /// `kty` and `k`; `d` marks an asymmetric private key. The rest are accepted
+    /// for forward-compatibility.
+    pub const Jwk = struct {
+        kty: []const u8,
+        k: ?[]const u8 = null,
+        d: ?[]const u8 = null,
+        alg: ?[]const u8 = null,
+        use: ?[]const u8 = null,
+        ext: ?bool = null,
+    };
+};
+
+/// Algorithm for `encrypt()` / `decrypt()`. AES-CBC/CTR/GCM share one struct
+/// (fields are mode-specific and optional) and dispatch on `name`; a bare string
+/// is the fallback form.
+pub const Encrypt = union(enum) {
+    params: struct {
+        name: []const u8,
+        iv: ?js.TypedArray(u8) = null,
+        counter: ?js.TypedArray(u8) = null,
+        length: ?u32 = null,
+        additionalData: ?js.TypedArray(u8) = null,
+        tagLength: ?u32 = null,
+    },
+    name: []const u8,
+
+    pub fn algoName(self: Encrypt) []const u8 {
+        return switch (self) {
+            .params => |p| p.name,
+            .name => |n| n,
+        };
+    }
 };
 
 /// For `sign()` functionality.

src/browser/webapi/crypto/common.zig

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2023-2026 Lightpanda (Selecy SAS)
+//
+// Francis Bouvier <francis@lightpanda.io>
+// Pierre Tachoire <pierre@lightpanda.io>
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as
+// published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the
+// License, or (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+//! Shared helpers for the symmetric SubtleCrypto algorithms (AES, HMAC):
+//! usage-mask validation and the base64url codec used by the JWK format.
+
+const std = @import("std");
+const Allocator = std.mem.Allocator;
+
+const CryptoKey = @import("../CryptoKey.zig");
+
+/// Maps a usage string to its `CryptoKey.Usages` bit, or null if unknown.
+pub fn usageBit(name: []const u8) ?u8 {
+    const U = CryptoKey.Usages;
+    const map = std.StaticStringMap(u8).initComptime(.{
+        .{ "encrypt", U.encrypt },
+        .{ "decrypt", U.decrypt },
+        .{ "sign", U.sign },
+        .{ "verify", U.verify },
+        .{ "deriveKey", U.deriveKey },
+        .{ "deriveBits", U.deriveBits },
+        .{ "wrapKey", U.wrapKey },
+        .{ "unwrapKey", U.unwrapKey },
+    });
+    return map.get(name);
+}
+
+/// Builds the usage bitmask, rejecting any usage not in `allowed` with
+/// SyntaxError — matching the WebCrypto "Bad usages" failure path. An empty
+/// list is also a SyntaxError (the "Empty usages" path), which is correct for
+/// secret and private keys; public keys permit empty usages.
+pub fn usageMask(allowed: []const []const u8, usages: []const []const u8) error{SyntaxError}!u8 {
+    return usageMaskInner(allowed, usages, true);
+}
+
+/// As `usageMask`, but `reject_empty` controls whether an empty usage list is a
+/// SyntaxError. Pass false for public keys.
+pub fn usageMaskInner(allowed: []const []const u8, usages: []const []const u8, reject_empty: bool) error{SyntaxError}!u8 {
+    var mask: u8 = 0;
+    outer: for (usages) |usage| {
+        for (allowed) |a| {
+            if (std.mem.eql(u8, a, usage)) {
+                mask |= usageBit(a).?;
+                continue :outer;
+            }
+        }
+        return error.SyntaxError;
+    }
+    if (reject_empty and usages.len == 0) {
+        return error.SyntaxError;
+    }
+    return mask;
+}
+
+/// Decodes a base64url (or base64) string, tolerating either alphabet and
+/// optional padding. Returns DataError on malformed input, per the JWK import
+/// rules.
+pub fn base64Decode(allocator: Allocator, input: []const u8) error{ OutOfMemory, DataError }![]u8 {
+    // Normalize to base64url-no-pad: map the standard alphabet's +/ to -_ and
+    // drop any '=' padding so a single decoder handles both forms.
+    const normalized = try allocator.alloc(u8, input.len);
+    var n: usize = 0;
+    for (input) |c| {
+        normalized[n] = switch (c) {
+            '+' => '-',
+            '/' => '_',
+            '=' => continue,
+            else => c,
+        };
+        n += 1;
+    }
+
+    const decoder = std.base64.url_safe_no_pad.Decoder;
+    const size = decoder.calcSizeForSlice(normalized[0..n]) catch return error.DataError;
+    const out = try allocator.alloc(u8, size);
+    decoder.decode(out, normalized[0..n]) catch return error.DataError;
+    return out;
+}
+
+/// Encodes bytes as base64url without padding (the JWK `k` representation).
+pub fn base64Encode(allocator: Allocator, bytes: []const u8) error{OutOfMemory}![]const u8 {
+    const encoder = std.base64.url_safe_no_pad.Encoder;
+    const out = try allocator.alloc(u8, encoder.calcSize(bytes.len));
+    return encoder.encode(out, bytes);
+}

src/browser/webapi/net/FormData.zig

@@ -72,14 +72,18 @@ pub const Entry = struct {
 };
 
 pub fn init(form_: ?*Form, submitter: ?*Element, exec: *const Execution) !*FormData {
-    const form = form_ orelse {
-        return try exec._factory.create(FormData{
-            ._rc = .{},
-            ._arena = exec.arena,
-            ._entries = .empty,
-        });
+    const arena = try exec.getArena(.small, "FormData");
+    errdefer exec.releaseArena(arena);
+
+    const form_data = try arena.create(FormData);
+    form_data.* = .{
+        ._rc = .{},
+        ._arena = arena,
+        ._entries = .empty,
     };
 
+    const form = form_ orelse return form_data;
+
     const frame = switch (exec.js.global) {
         .frame => |f| f,
         .worker => lp.assert(false, "FormData worker form", .{}),
@@ -93,12 +97,10 @@ pub fn init(form_: ?*Form, submitter: ?*Element, exec: *const Execution) !*FormD
     form._constructing_entry_list = true;
     defer form._constructing_entry_list = false;
 
-    const form_data = try exec._factory.create(FormData{
-        ._rc = .{},
-        ._arena = exec.arena,
-        ._entries = try collectForm(frame.arena, form, submitter, frame),
-    });
+    form_data._entries = try collectForm(arena, form, submitter, frame);
 
+    // Hold a reference on each entry's File for the FormData's lifetime; released
+    // in deinit.
     for (form_data._entries.items) |entry| {
         switch (entry.value) {
             .file => |file| file.acquireRef(),
@@ -123,6 +125,8 @@ pub fn deinit(self: *FormData, page: *Page) void {
             else => {},
         }
     }
+    // Frees the entry list and this FormData itself; do not touch self afterwards.
+    page.releaseArena(self._arena);
 }
 
 pub fn releaseRef(self: *FormData, page: *Page) void {

src/sys/libcrypto.zig

@@ -239,12 +239,88 @@ pub extern fn HMAC(
     out_len: *c_uint,
 ) ?[*]u8;
 
+pub extern fn PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(
+    password: [*c]const u8,
+    password_len: usize,
+    salt: [*c]const u8,
+    salt_len: usize,
+    iterations: c_uint,
+    digest: *const EVP_MD,
+    key_len: usize,
+    out_key: [*c]u8,
+) c_int;
+
+pub extern fn HKDF(
+    out_key: [*c]u8,
+    out_len: usize,
+    digest: *const EVP_MD,
+    secret: [*c]const u8,
+    secret_len: usize,
+    salt: [*c]const u8,
+    salt_len: usize,
+    info: [*c]const u8,
+    info_len: usize,
+) c_int;
+
 pub const X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN = 32;
 pub const X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN = 32;
 pub const X25519_SHARED_KEY_LEN = 32;
 
 pub extern fn X25519_keypair(out_public_value: *[32]u8, out_private_key: *[32]u8) void;
 
+pub const struct_ec_point_st = opaque {};
+pub const EC_POINT = struct_ec_point_st;
+
+pub const EVP_CIPHER = opaque {};
+pub const EVP_CIPHER_CTX = opaque {};
+
+pub extern fn EVP_aes_128_cbc() *const EVP_CIPHER;
+pub extern fn EVP_aes_192_cbc() *const EVP_CIPHER;
+pub extern fn EVP_aes_256_cbc() *const EVP_CIPHER;
+pub extern fn EVP_aes_128_ctr() *const EVP_CIPHER;
+pub extern fn EVP_aes_192_ctr() *const EVP_CIPHER;
+pub extern fn EVP_aes_256_ctr() *const EVP_CIPHER;
+pub extern fn EVP_aes_128_gcm() *const EVP_CIPHER;
+pub extern fn EVP_aes_192_gcm() *const EVP_CIPHER;
+pub extern fn EVP_aes_256_gcm() *const EVP_CIPHER;
+
+pub extern fn EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() ?*EVP_CIPHER_CTX;
+pub extern fn EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx: ?*EVP_CIPHER_CTX) void;
+pub extern fn EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx: *EVP_CIPHER_CTX, command: c_int, arg: c_int, ptr: ?*anyopaque) c_int;
+pub extern fn EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx: *EVP_CIPHER_CTX, padding: c_int) c_int;
+
+pub extern fn EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx: *EVP_CIPHER_CTX, cipher: ?*const EVP_CIPHER, impl: ?*ENGINE, key: [*c]const u8, iv: [*c]const u8) c_int;
+pub extern fn EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx: *EVP_CIPHER_CTX, out: [*c]u8, out_len: *c_int, in: [*c]const u8, in_len: c_int) c_int;
+pub extern fn EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx: *EVP_CIPHER_CTX, out: [*c]u8, out_len: *c_int) c_int;
+pub extern fn EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx: *EVP_CIPHER_CTX, cipher: ?*const EVP_CIPHER, impl: ?*ENGINE, key: [*c]const u8, iv: [*c]const u8) c_int;
+pub extern fn EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx: *EVP_CIPHER_CTX, out: [*c]u8, out_len: *c_int, in: [*c]const u8, in_len: c_int) c_int;
+pub extern fn EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx: *EVP_CIPHER_CTX, out: [*c]u8, out_len: *c_int) c_int;
+
+// EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl commands for AES-GCM.
+pub const EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN = 0x9;
+pub const EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG = 0x10;
+pub const EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG = 0x11;
+
+// EC key type + curve identifiers.
+pub const EVP_PKEY_EC = 408; // NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey
+pub const NID_X9_62_prime256v1 = 415; // P-256
+pub const NID_secp384r1 = 715; // P-384
+pub const NID_secp521r1 = 716; // P-521
+
+pub extern fn EVP_PKEY_new() ?*EVP_PKEY;
+pub extern fn EVP_PKEY_id(pkey: *const EVP_PKEY) c_int;
+pub extern fn EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey: *EVP_PKEY, key: *EC_KEY) c_int;
+
+pub extern fn EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid: c_int) ?*EC_KEY;
+pub extern fn EC_KEY_generate_key(key: *EC_KEY) c_int;
+pub extern fn EC_KEY_free(key: ?*EC_KEY) void;
+pub extern fn EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key: *const EC_KEY) ?*const EC_POINT;
+pub extern fn EC_KEY_set_public_key(key: *EC_KEY, point: *const EC_POINT) c_int;
+
+// DER decoders (advance `inp` past the parsed structure).
+pub extern fn d2i_PUBKEY(out: ?*?*EVP_PKEY, inp: *[*c]const u8, len: c_long) ?*EVP_PKEY;
+pub extern fn d2i_AutoPrivateKey(out: ?*?*EVP_PKEY, inp: *[*c]const u8, len: c_long) ?*EVP_PKEY;
+
 pub const NID_X25519 = @as(c_int, 948);
 pub const EVP_PKEY_X25519 = NID_X25519;
 pub const NID_ED25519 = 949;