🪛 complete Noë, fix Transparency thesis

public/data/First-Order.json

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
         "relationship": "Compatible/Overlap"
       },
       {
-        "name": "Transparency Theory",
+        "name": "Transparency Thesis",
         "relationship": "Influence"
       }
     ],

public/data/Jackson.json

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
         "relationship": "Critique/Origin"
       },
       {
-        "name": "Transparency Theory",
+        "name": "Transparency Thesis",
         "relationship": "Foundation"
       },
       {

public/data/Noe.json

@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
 {
   "id_and_class": {
-    "theory_title": "Noë’s “Out of Our Heads” Theory",
+    "theory_title": "Sensorimotor (Enactive) Theory of Consciousness (Noë’s “Out of Our Heads” View)",
     "summary": "This theory rejects the assumption that consciousness occurs exclusively inside the brain, arguing that internal brain processes alone are insufficient to generate experience. Consciousness is fundamentally an activity or a process enacted through the dynamic, continuous, and skilled interaction between the brain, the body, and the environment.",
-    "associated_thinkers": ["Alva Noë"],
+    "associated_thinkers": [
+      "Alva Noë",
+      "Kevin O’Regan"
+    ],
     "category": "Materialism",
     "subcategory": "Relational",
     "core_identity_tagline": "Consciousness as Active World-Interaction",
@@ -69,10 +72,13 @@
   },
   "relations_and_sources": {
     "related_theories": [
-      { "name": "Enactivism", "relationship": "Influence" },
-      { "name": "A. Clark’s Extended Mind", "relationship": "Compatible" },
-      { "name": "Dualisms", "relationship": "Critique" },
-      { "name": "Materialism Theories", "relationship": "Critique" }
+      { "name": "Enactivism (Varela & Thompson)", "relationship": "Constituent Framework" },
+      { "name": "Ecological Psychology (James J. Gibson)", "relationship": "Foundational Influence" },
+      { "name": "Embodied Phenomenology (Maurice Merleau-Ponty)", "relationship": "Philosophical Influence" },
+      { "name": "Extended Mind Hypothesis (Andy Clark & David Chalmers)", "relationship": "Partially Compatible / Overlapping" },
+      { "name": "Susan Hurley — Action/Perception & Shared Circuits", "relationship": "Related / Complementary (active perception, shared circuits model)" },
+      { "name": "Internalist Materialism", "relationship": "Critique" },
+      { "name": "Dualism", "relationship": "Critique" }
     ],
     "sources_and_references": [
       {
@@ -83,6 +89,28 @@
       {
         "title_with_names": "Is consciousness an illusion, Alva Noë",
         "year": 2007
+      },
+      {
+        "title_with_names": "O’Regan, K., & Noë, A. A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5), 939–1031.",
+        "year": 2001
+      },
+      {
+        "title_with_names": "Noë, A. Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness.",
+        "year": 2009
+      },
+      {
+        "title_with_names": "Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience.",
+        "year": 1991
+      },
+      {
+        "title_with_names": "Gibson, J.J. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.",
+        "year": 1979
+      },
+      {
+        "title_with_names": "Hurley, S. L. (1998). Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press."
+      },
+      {
+        "title_with_names": "Hurley, S. (2008). The Shared Circuits Model (SCM): How control, mirroring, and simulation can enable imitation, deliberation, and mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31(1)."
       }
     ]
   }

public/data/Transparency.json

@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
 {
   "id_and_class": {
-    "theory_title": "Transparency Theory",
-    "summary": "Transparency theory argues that sensory experience is purely representational, focusing attention solely on external objects and their properties, rather than on the intrinsic features of the perceptual state itself. The core thesis holds that because introspection fails to reveal any mental properties beyond these representations, phenomenal consciousness poses no special problem for materialism.",
+    "theory_title": "Transparency Thesis (Transparency Theory)",
+    "summary": "Transparency thesis argues that sensory experience is purely representational, focusing attention solely on external objects and their properties, rather than on the intrinsic features of the perceptual state itself. The core thesis holds that because introspection fails to reveal any mental properties beyond these representations, phenomenal consciousness poses no special problem for materialism.",
     "associated_thinkers": [
       "William G. Lycan",
       "Gilbert Harman",
-      "Amy Kind",
       "Michael Tye",
       "Dirk Franken"
     ],
@@ -23,7 +22,7 @@
     "explanatory_identity_claim": "Phenomenal consciousness (phenomenal character) is identified as, or reduced to, the representational content (intentional content) of experience.",
     "ontological_status": "Reductive Physicalism/Materialism (The theory is used to undermine arguments against physicalism).",
     "mind_body_relationship": "Identity theory/Reductionism (The phenomenal character is reduced to intentional content, which is presumed to be physically realized, fitting the materialist camp).",
-    "primitive_or_emergent_status": "Emergent (Implicitly emergent, as it is categorized under Materialism Theories, which posit consciousness as a product of biological brains).",
+    "primitive_or_emergent_status": "Not primitive; reductively emergent (supervenient on neural representational content)",
     "emergence_type": "Weak Emergence (The theory aims to show that phenomenal properties are entirely exhausted or reducible to representational content, which aligns with the principles of weak emergence/reductionism).",
     "subjectivity_and_intentionality": "Subjective phenomenal quality is entirely defined and exhausted by the sensible properties presented to the subject. Intentionality (the quality of representing external objects) is fundamental to the conscious state.",
     "qualia_account": "Qualia, or the qualitative features of phenomenal consciousness, are illusory or incoherent if they are taken to be properties of the perceptual state over and above its representational properties. Phenomonal character is reduced to intentional content.",
@@ -89,6 +88,10 @@
       {
         "name": "Jackson’s Representationalism",
         "relationship": "Extension/Support"
+      },
+      {
+        "name": "Amy Kind",
+        "relationship": "Critique/Refinement"
       }
     ],
     "sources_and_references": [

src/data/theoryNames.ts

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ const staticTheoryNames: Record<string, string> = {
   'Metzinger': 'Metzinger\'s No-Self Representational Theory of Subjectivity',
   'Jackson': 'Jackson\'s Representationalism and the Knowledge Argument',
   'Lycan': 'Lycan\'s Homuncular Functionalism',
-  'Transparency': 'Transparency Theory',
+  'Transparency': 'Transparency Thesis',
   'Tye': 'Tye\'s Contingentism',
   'Thagard': 'Thagard\'s Neural Representation, Binding, Coherence, Competition',
   'T. Clark': 'T. Clark\'s Content Hypothesis',