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Fix the EXCLUDE_PKI test build, and format

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Two copies of test_proof_binds_error_reason and test_proof_binds_direction were
sitting in the #else branch of test_ack_proof, where Identity, makeIdentity,
makeAck, becomeNode, crypto and ACK_PROOF_SIZE do not exist. They were also
unregistered, so they were dead code that only served to break the build. The
native suite never compiles that branch, so a local run could not see it.

Also apply clang-format to a declaration that had been wrapped by hand.
This commit is contained in:
Claude committed 2026-09-17 20:15:21 +00:00
1 parent 5cad3fe724
commit 945522eb68
2 files changed
+2 -43
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src/mesh/CryptoEngine.h
+2 -2
View File
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ class CryptoEngine
* Clobbers shared_key, so the caller must hold cryptLock (which is NOT recursive - do not call
* this from a context that already holds it, such as perhapsEncode).
*/
bool ackProofCompute(const uint8_t *peerPubKey, uint32_t ackFrom, uint32_t ackTo, uint32_t requestId,
const uint8_t *routing, size_t routingLen, uint8_t *proofOut);
bool ackProofCompute(const uint8_t *peerPubKey, uint32_t ackFrom, uint32_t ackTo, uint32_t requestId, const uint8_t *routing,
size_t routingLen, uint8_t *proofOut);
void setDHPrivateKey(uint8_t *_private_key);
// The remotePublic key parameter takes the public_key bytes container from
test/test_ack_proof/test_main.cpp
-41
View File
@@ -422,47 +422,6 @@ void loop() {}
void setUp(void) {}
void tearDown(void) {}
// REGRESSION: an ack and a nak for the same packet share from/to/portnum/request_id and differ
// only in the Routing payload. Channel crypto is CTR with no MAC, so if the payload were not bound
// a PSK holder could bit-flip a proven "delivered" into a "failed" and the proof would still
// verify. The easy direction is success -> failure; manufacturing a fake success is much narrower,
// needing a captured proofed nak, and the naks that exist either never reach the air or come from
// a node that by definition holds no key.
void test_proof_binds_error_reason(void)
{
const Identity alice = makeIdentity();
const Identity bob = makeIdentity();
becomeNode(bob);
meshtastic_MeshPacket ack = makeAck(BOB, ALICE, REQUEST_ID);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(0x18, ack.decoded.payload.bytes[0], "expected error_reason to be field 3, varint");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE, ack.decoded.payload.bytes[1], "expected a success ack");
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(ackProofAttachWithKey(&ack, alice.pub));
becomeNode(alice);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(AckProofResult::VALID, ackProofVerifyWithKey(&ack, REQUEST_ID, bob.pub));
// Exactly what a CTR bit-flip buys the attacker: same proof bytes, different verdict.
ack.decoded.payload.bytes[1] = meshtastic_Routing_Error_MAX_RETRANSMIT;
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_MESSAGE(AckProofResult::INVALID, ackProofVerifyWithKey(&ack, REQUEST_ID, bob.pub),
"flipping a proven ack into a nak must invalidate the proof");
}
// X25519 is symmetric - DH(a_priv, B_pub) == DH(b_priv, A_pub) - so without the direction bound an
// A->B proof for a request_id would equal the B->A proof for it. Cheap insurance; this pins it.
void test_proof_binds_direction(void)
{
const Identity alice = makeIdentity();
const Identity bob = makeIdentity();
becomeNode(bob);
uint8_t forward[ACK_PROOF_SIZE], reverse[ACK_PROOF_SIZE];
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(crypto->ackProofCompute(alice.pub, BOB, ALICE, REQUEST_ID, ROUTING, ROUTING_LEN, forward));
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(crypto->ackProofCompute(alice.pub, ALICE, BOB, REQUEST_ID, ROUTING, ROUTING_LEN, reverse));
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(memcmp(forward, reverse, ACK_PROOF_SIZE) != 0,
"A->B and B->A proofs must differ despite the symmetric shared secret");
}
void setup()
{
initializeTestEnvironment();