Merge pull request #4505 from smcv/seccomp-test-coverage

Add test coverage for our seccomp filter
This commit is contained in:
Phaedrus Leeds
2021-10-26 12:19:55 -07:00
committed by GitHub
5 changed files with 275 additions and 0 deletions

1
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ Flatpak-1.0.*
/tests/hold-lock
/tests/list-unused
/tests/mock-flatpak
/tests/try-syscall
*.test
/tests/*.sh.log
/tests/*.sh.test

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@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ TEST_MATRIX_DIST= \
tests/test-auth.sh \
tests/test-unused.sh \
tests/test-prune.sh \
tests/test-seccomp.sh \
$(NULL)
TEST_MATRIX_EXTRA_DIST= \
tests/test-run.sh \

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@@ -143,6 +143,10 @@ tests_test_authenticator_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(BASE_CFLAGS) \
tests_test_authenticator_LDADD = $(AM_LDADD) $(BASE_LIBS) libflatpak-common.la libflatpak-common-base.la libglnx.la
tests_test_authenticator_SOURCES = tests/test-authenticator.c
tests_try_syscall_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS)
tests_try_syscall_LDADD = $(AM_LDADD)
tests_try_syscall_SOURCES = tests/try-syscall.c
tests_list_unused_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(BASE_CFLAGS) $(OSTREE_CFLAGS) $(SOUP_CFLAGS) $(JSON_CFLAGS) $(APPSTREAM_GLIB_CFLAGS) \
-DFLATPAK_COMPILATION \
-DLOCALEDIR=\"$(localedir)\"
@@ -276,6 +280,7 @@ TEST_MATRIX_SOURCE = \
tests/test-summaries.sh{user+system} \
tests/test-subset.sh{user+system} \
tests/test-prune.sh \
tests/test-seccomp.sh \
$(NULL)
update-test-matrix:
@@ -317,6 +322,7 @@ test_extra_programs = \
tests/test-authenticator \
tests/test-portal-impl \
tests/test-update-portal \
tests/try-syscall \
$(NULL)
@VALGRIND_CHECK_RULES@

94
tests/test-seccomp.sh Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Copyright 2021 Collabora Ltd.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.0-or-later
set -euo pipefail
. $(dirname $0)/libtest.sh
skip_without_bwrap
echo "1..16"
setup_repo
install_repo
cp -a "$G_TEST_BUILDDIR/try-syscall" "$test_tmpdir/try-syscall"
# How this works:
# try-syscall tries to make various syscalls, some benign, some not.
#
# The parameters are chosen to make them fail with EBADF or EFAULT if
# not blocked. If they are blocked, we get ENOSYS or EPERM. If the syscall
# is impossible for a particular architecture, we get ENOENT.
#
# The exit status is an errno value, which we can compare with the expected
# errno value.
eval "$("$test_tmpdir/try-syscall" print-errno-values)"
try_syscall () {
${FLATPAK} run \
--filesystem="$test_tmpdir" \
--command="$test_tmpdir/try-syscall" \
$extra_argv \
org.test.Hello "$@"
}
for extra_argv in "" "--allow=multiarch"; do
echo "# testing with extra argv: '$extra_argv'"
echo "# chmod (benign)"
e=0
try_syscall chmod || e="$?"
assert_streq "$e" "$EFAULT"
ok "chmod not blocked"
echo "# chroot (harmful)"
e=0
try_syscall chroot || e="$?"
assert_streq "$e" "$EPERM"
ok "chroot blocked with EPERM"
echo "# clone3 (harmful)"
e=0
try_syscall clone3 || e="$?"
# This is either ENOSYS because the kernel genuinely doesn't implement it,
# or because we successfully blocked it. We can't tell which.
assert_streq "$e" "$ENOSYS"
ok "clone3 blocked with ENOSYS (CVE-2021-41133)"
echo "# ioctl TIOCNOTTY (benign)"
e=0
try_syscall "ioctl TIOCNOTTY" || e="$?"
assert_streq "$e" "$EBADF"
ok "ioctl TIOCNOTTY not blocked"
echo "# ioctl TIOCSTI (CVE-2017-5226)"
e=0
try_syscall "ioctl TIOCSTI" || e="$?"
assert_streq "$e" "$EPERM"
ok "ioctl TIOCSTI blocked (CVE-2017-5226)"
echo "# ioctl TIOCSTI (trying to repeat CVE-2019-10063)"
e=0
try_syscall "ioctl TIOCSTI CVE-2019-10063" || e="$?"
if test "$e" = "$ENOENT"; then
echo "ok # SKIP Cannot replicate CVE-2019-10063 on 32-bit architecture"
else
assert_streq "$e" "$EPERM"
ok "ioctl TIOCSTI with high bits blocked (CVE-2019-10063)"
fi
echo "# listen (benign)"
e=0
try_syscall "listen" || e="$?"
assert_streq "$e" "$EBADF"
ok "listen not blocked"
echo "# prctl (benign)"
e=0
try_syscall "prctl" || e="$?"
assert_streq "$e" "$EFAULT"
ok "prctl not blocked"
done

173
tests/try-syscall.c Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
/*
* Copyright 2021 Simon McVittie
* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.0-or-later
*
* Try one or more system calls that might have been blocked by a
* seccomp filter. Return the last value of errno seen.
*
* In general, we pass a bad fd or pointer to each syscall that will
* accept one, so that it will fail with EBADF or EFAULT without side-effects.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#if defined(_MIPS_SIM)
# if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32
# define MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 4000
# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64
# define MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 5000
# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32
# define MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 6000
# else
# error "Unknown MIPS ABI"
# endif
#endif
#if defined(__ia64__)
# define MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 1024
#endif
#if defined(__alpha__)
# define MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 110
#endif
#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__)
# define MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 0x40000000
#endif
/*
* MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE:
*
* Number to add to the syscall numbers of recently-added syscalls
* to get the appropriate syscall for the current ABI.
*/
#ifndef MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE
# define MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 0
#endif
#ifndef __NR_clone3
# define __NR_clone3 (MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 435)
#endif
/*
* The size of clone3's parameter (as of 2021)
*/
#define SIZEOF_STRUCT_CLONE_ARGS ((size_t) 88)
/*
* An invalid pointer that will cause syscalls to fail with EFAULT
*/
#define WRONG_POINTER ((char *) 1)
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
int errsv = 0;
int i;
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
{
const char *arg = argv[i];
if (strcmp (arg, "print-errno-values") == 0)
{
printf ("EBADF=%d\n", EBADF);
printf ("EFAULT=%d\n", EFAULT);
printf ("ENOENT=%d\n", ENOENT);
printf ("ENOSYS=%d\n", ENOSYS);
printf ("EPERM=%d\n", EPERM);
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "chmod") == 0)
{
/* If not blocked by seccomp, this will fail with EFAULT */
if (chmod (WRONG_POINTER, 0700) != 0)
{
errsv = errno;
perror (arg);
}
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "chroot") == 0)
{
/* If not blocked by seccomp, this will fail with EFAULT */
if (chroot (WRONG_POINTER) != 0)
{
errsv = errno;
perror (arg);
}
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "clone3") == 0)
{
/* If not blocked by seccomp, this will fail with EFAULT */
if (syscall (__NR_clone3, WRONG_POINTER, SIZEOF_STRUCT_CLONE_ARGS) != 0)
{
errsv = errno;
perror (arg);
}
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "ioctl TIOCNOTTY") == 0)
{
/* If not blocked by seccomp, this will fail with EBADF */
if (ioctl (-1, TIOCNOTTY) != 0)
{
errsv = errno;
perror (arg);
}
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "ioctl TIOCSTI") == 0)
{
/* If not blocked by seccomp, this will fail with EBADF */
if (ioctl (-1, TIOCSTI, WRONG_POINTER) != 0)
{
errsv = errno;
perror (arg);
}
}
#ifdef __LP64__
else if (strcmp (arg, "ioctl TIOCSTI CVE-2019-10063") == 0)
{
unsigned long not_TIOCSTI = (0x123UL << 32) | (unsigned long) TIOCSTI;
/* If not blocked by seccomp, this will fail with EBADF */
if (syscall (__NR_ioctl, -1, not_TIOCSTI, WRONG_POINTER) != 0)
{
errsv = errno;
perror (arg);
}
}
#endif
else if (strcmp (arg, "listen") == 0)
{
/* If not blocked by seccomp, this will fail with EBADF */
if (listen (-1, 42) != 0)
{
errsv = errno;
perror (arg);
}
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "prctl") == 0)
{
/* If not blocked by seccomp, this will fail with EFAULT */
if (prctl (PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER, WRONG_POINTER, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
{
errsv = errno;
perror (arg);
}
}
else
{
fprintf (stderr, "Unsupported syscall \"%s\"\n", arg);
errsv = ENOENT;
}
}
return errsv;
}