Files
flatpak/common
Alexander Larsson 8a18137d7e Don't follow symlinks when mounting persisted directories
These directories are in a location under application control, so we
can't trust them to not be a symlink outside of the files accessibe to
the application.

Continue to treat --persist=/foo as --persist=foo for backwards compat,
since this is how it (accidentally) worked before, but print a warning.

Don't allow ".." elements in persist paths: these would not be useful
anyway, and are unlikely to be in use, however they could potentially
be used to confuse the persist path handling.

This partially addresses CVE-2024-42472. If only one instance of the
malicious or compromised app is run at a time, the vulnerability
is avoided. If two instances can run concurrently, there is a
time-of-check/time-of-use issue remaining, which can only be resolved
with changes to bubblewrap; this will be resolved in a separate commit,
because the bubblewrap dependency might be more difficult to provide in
LTS distributions.

Helps: CVE-2024-42472, GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87
[smcv: Make whitespace consistent]
[smcv: Use g_warning() if unable to create --persist paths]
[smcv: Use stat() to detect symlinks and warn about them]
[smcv: Use glnx_steal_fd() for portability to older GLib]
Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
2024-08-14 13:43:29 +01:00
..
2019-02-25 18:12:30 +00:00
2021-02-09 09:36:59 +01:00
2018-05-24 11:59:52 +00:00
2018-10-08 08:36:23 +00:00
2022-06-16 13:49:45 +02:00
2019-04-08 12:50:42 +00:00